In this paper we argue that object perception may be affected by what we call “perceptual frames.” Perceptual frames are adaptations of the perceptual system that guide how perceptual objects are singled out from a sensory environment. These adaptations are caused by perceptual learning and realized through bottom-up functional processes such that sensory information is organized in a subject-dependent way leading to idiosyncratic perceptual object representations. Through domain-specific training, perceptual learning, and the acquisition of object-knowledge, it is possible to modulate (...) the adaptive perceptual system such that its ability to represent becomes bespoke. Different perceivers with different perceptual frames may, therefore, receive the same sensory information and perceive different perceptual objects due to the effects of framing. Consequently, we demonstrate the plausibility of this account by surveying empirical data concerning the functions of (1) multisensory integration, (2) amodal completion, and (3) predictive anticipation. Regarding (1), we argue that the perceptual system’s optimization processes employ perceptual frames to facilitate multisensory feature binding. Regarding (2), we argue that amodal completion can occur with or without the help of mental imagery, yet either instance of amodal completion requires perceptual frames. Regarding (3), we demonstrate that perceptually anticipating an object’s motion involves the implementation of perceptual frames. We conclude that framing effects are a matter of perceptual diversity and highlight the need to accommodate unique perspectives in the philosophy and science of perception. (shrink)

Synesthesia is a phenomenon in which an additional nonstandard perceptual experience occurs consistently in response to ordinary stimulation applied to the same or another modality. Recent studies suggest an important role of semantic representations in the induction of synesthesia. In the present proposal we try to link the empirically grounded theory of sensory-motor contingency and mirror system based embodied simulation to newly discovered cases of swimming-style color synesthesia. In the latter color experiences are evoked only by showing the synesthetes a (...) picture of a swimming person or asking them to think about a given swimming style. Neural mechanisms of mirror systems seem to be involved here. It has been shown that for mirror-sensory synesthesia, such as mirror-touch or mirror-pain synesthesia, concurrent experiences are caused by the overactivity in the mirror neuron system responding to the specific observation. The comparison of different forms of synesthesia has the potential of challenging conventional thinking on this phenomenon and providing a more general, sensory-motor account of synesthesia encompassing cases driven by semantic or emulational rather than pure sensory or motor representations. (shrink)

Recently, swimming-style colour synaesthesia was introduced as a new form of synaesthesia. A synaesthetic Stroop test was used to establish its genuineness. Since Stroop interference can occur for any type of overlearned association, in the present study we used a modified Stroop test and psychophysiological synaesthetic conditioning to further establish the genuineness of this form of synaesthesia. We compared the performance of a swimming-style colour synaesthete and a control who was trained on swimming-style colour associations. Our results showed that behavioural (...) aspects of swimming-style colour synaesthesia can be mimicked in a trained control. Importantly, however, our results showed a psychophysiological conditioning effect for the synaesthete only. We discuss the theoretical relevance of swimming-style colour synaesthesia according to different models of synaesthesia. We conclude that swimming-style colour synaesthesia is a genuine form of synaesthesia, can be mimicked behaviourally in non-synaesthetes, and is best explained by a re-entrant feedback model. (shrink)

Dustin Stokes’s book contributes to one of the continuing debates in empirically informed philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences which concerns the relation between thought and perception. The book sheds new light on such questions as: whether vision is modular, informationally encapsulated, and thus cognitively impenetrable or rather the opposite – whether it is malleable and sensitive to further improvements by cognitive states. Stokes supports the latter by referring to empirical evidence on perceptual expertise. Proponents of the modular and malleable (...) architectures of the mind offer different explanations of the phenomena involved in perceptual expertise, viz. object identification and categorization. Interestingly, both views assume some kind of automaticity of the recognitional capacities for identifying and categorizing objects. In this article, I examine the influence of perceptual expertise on object recognition and how the seeming automaticity of object recognition may be approached from the modularist and antimodularist (malleabilist) perspectives. (shrink)

This collection of new essays on sensory individuals in unimodal and multimodal perception features contributions by outstanding researchers in the fields of philosophy of perception, experimental psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. The topics investigated include conceptual, developmental, and methodological aspects of object perception, and especially how various sense modalities construct their objects from sensory features and feature bearers. The interdisciplinary approach offered has enabled new directions in research on this subject. As ordered in this volume, the topics of the contributions progress (...) from treating neural sensory processes as primarily unisensory towards approaches that take perceptual processing to be modality-independent, meta-modal, and multimodal. Even within these latter approaches, sensory stimuli, sensory properties, brain activations, and corresponding perceptual phenomenology have often been characterized in a modality-specific way. Thus, it is timely to explore the relation between those processes that are unisensory and those that are multisensory. One of the primary themes of this collection is examining whether the basic building blocks of human perception are best understood as modality-dependent units of different forms or in terms of multimodal perceptual objects. Another theme is the relation between low-level object processing (segmentation and perceptual grouping processes) and high-level object knowledge embracing object concept and object-related expectations. A final theme is the role that perceptual objects play as loci of unification in unimodal and multimodal perception, namely that they enable binding and integration of sensory properties to individual entities or events. (shrink)

Current research suggests that conceptual in?uences are primarily responsible for inducing synaesthesia, since numerous synaesthetic variants are triggered by linguistic symbols. These linguistic synaesthesias are the focus of the present review article. This article examines the literature on the transfer of synaesthetic colour-associations across languages and shows the scope of the linguistic mechanisms that are implicated. We review known evidence about the interaction between grapheme-colour synaesthesia and the acquisition of a second language, and specifically, we discuss cases of cross-linguistic transfer (...) in which a second language is learned later in life. Research on bilingual subjects has uncovered distinct representations in the brain for a mother tongue and for a later-acquired foreign language. Consequently, these differences have implications for synaesthesia associated with the writing systems of these different languages. By reviewing several individual cases of bilingual synaesthetes, we conclude that synaesthesia might have different types of influences on the acquisition of a second language, ranging from effects that support this learning to those that disturb it. (shrink)