In arithmetic, if only because many of its methods and concepts originated in India, it has been the tradition to reason less strictly than in geometry, ...

_The Foundations of Arithmetic_ is undoubtedly the best introduction to Frege's thought; it is here that Frege expounds the central notions of his philosophy, subjecting the views of his predecessors and contemporaries to devastating analysis. The book represents the first philosophically sound discussion of the concept of number in Western civilization. It profoundly influenced developments in the philosophy of mathematics and in general ontology.

§ i. After deserting for a time the old Euclidean standards of rigour, mathematics is now returning to them, and even making efforts to go beyond them. ...

The chapters in this section of the volume reveal the striking variety of human numerical cognition. The section comprises four chapters that focus on different aspects of the representation of numerical knowledge, as well as three chapters that examine the several cognitive processes involved in the manipulation of numbers during simple mental arithmetic. They show how chronometric analyses, in combination with clever experimental designs, can reveal the cognitive processes and representations underlying this impressive collection of cognitive skills. Our goal (...) in this overview chapter is to highlight common themes that connect these contributions. In particular, we suggest links between the present contributions, all of which are firmly grounded in the traditional information-processing approach to the human mind, and the more recently emerged embodied cognition perspective, according to which all knowledge representations remain associated with those sensory and motor features that were activated during acquisition of that knowledge. (shrink)

Dehaene (this volume) articulates a naturalistic approach to the cognitive foundations of mathematics. Further, he argues that the ‘number line’ (analog magnitude) system of representation is the evolutionary and ontogenetic foundation of numerical concepts. Here I endorse Dehaene’s naturalistic stance and also his characterization of analog magnitude number representations. Although analog magnitude representations are part of the evolutionary foundations of numerical concepts, I argue that they are unlikely to be part of the ontogenetic foundations of the capacity (...) to represent natural number. Rather, the developmental source of explicit integer list representations of number are more likely to be systems such as the object–file representations that articulate mid–level object based attention, systems that build parallel representations of small sets of individuals. (shrink)

In this paper, I pursue such a logical foundation for arithmetic in a variant of Zermelo set theory that has axioms of subset separation only for quantifier-free formulae, and according to which all sets are Dedekind finite. In section 2, I describe this variant theory, which I call ZFin0. And in section 3, I sketch foundations for arithmetic in ZFin0 and prove that certain foundational propositions that are theorems of the standard Zermelian foundation for arithmetic are (...) independent of ZFin0.<br><br>An equivalent theory of sets and an equivalent foundation for arithmetic was introduced by John Mayberry and developed by the current author in his doctoral thesis. In that thesis, the independence results mentioned above are proved using proof-theoretic methods. In this paper, I offer model-theoretic proofs of the central independence results using the technique of cumulation models, which was introduced by Steve Popham, a doctoral student of Mayberry<br>from the early 1980s. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to shed new light on the logical roots of arithmetic by presenting a logical framework that takes seriously ordinary locutions like ‘at least n Fs’, ‘n more Fs than Gs’ and ‘n times as many Fs as Gs’, instead of paraphrasing them away in terms of expressions of the form ‘the number of Fs’. It will be shown that the basic concepts of arithmetic can be intuitively defined in the language of ALA, (...) and the Dedekind–Peano axioms can be derived from those definitions by logical means alone. It will also be shown that some fundamental facts about cardinal numbers expressed using singular terms of the form ‘the number of Fs’, including Hume’s Principle, can be derived solely from definitions. (shrink)

This is a sequel to our article “Predicative foundations of arithmetic” (1995), referred to in the following as [PFA]; here we review and clarify what was accomplished in [PFA], present some improvements and extensions, and respond to several challenges. The classic challenge to a program of the sort exemplified by [PFA] was issued by Charles Parsons in a 1983 paper, subsequently revised and expanded as Parsons (1992). Another critique is due to Daniel Isaacson (1987). Most recently, Alexander George (...) and Daniel Velleman (1996) have examined [PFA] closely in the context of a general discussion of different philosophical approaches to the foundations of arithmetic. (shrink)

The main goal of part 1 is to challenge the widely held view that Poincaré orders the sciences in a hierarchy of dependence, such that all others presuppose arithmetic. Commentators have suggested that the intuition that grounds the use of induction in arithmetic also underlies the conception of a continuum, that the consistency of geometrical axioms must be proved through arithmetical induction, and that arithmetical induction licenses the supposition that certain operations form a group. I criticize each of (...) these readings. More fully, I argue that the justification Poincaré offers for the use of the group notion in geometry appears to extend to set-theoretic notions that would suffice to put arithmetic on a logical foundation, thus undermining his own case for the necessity of intuition in arithmetic. In part 2, I offer an interpretation of intuition’s role on which it justifies the use of group-theoretic, but not set-theoretic, notions. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to develop a formal reconstruction of Greek arithmetic. The reconstruction is based on textual evidence which comes mainly from Euclid, but also from passages in the texts of Plato and Aristotle. Following Paul Pritchard’s investigation into the meaning of the Greek term arithmos, the reconstruction will be mereological rather than set-theoretical. It is shown that the reconstructed system gives rise to an arithmetic comparable in logical strength to Robinson arithmetic. Our reconstructed (...) Greek arithmetic is then compared to modern developments in the foundations of arithmetic. Finally, it is shown that our reconstruction can help to clarify some issues in Plato’s philosophy of arithmetic, especially the question if Plato’s views can be compared to 19th – 20th century developments in the logical construction of arithmetic. (shrink)

Gideon Rosen and Robert Schwartzkopff have independently suggested (variants of) the following claim, which is a varian of Hume's Principle: -/- When the number of Fs is identical to the number of Gs, this fact is grounded by the fact that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the Fs and Gs. -/- My paper is a detailed critique of the proposal. I don't find any decisive refutation of the proposal. At the same time, it has some consequences which many will (...) find objectionable. (shrink)

Part 1 of this article exposed a tension between Poincaré’s views of arithmetic and geometry and argued that it could not be resolved by taking geometry to depend on arithmetic. Part 2 aims to resolve the tension by supposing not merely that intuition’s role is to justify induction on the natural numbers but rather that it also functions to acquaint us with the unity of orders and structures and show practices to fit or harmonize with experience. I argue (...) that in this manner, intuition serves the epistemological function of warranting generalizations and justifying practices. In particular, it justifies the application of group-theoretic notions in geometry but not the use of set-theoretic notions in arithmetic. (shrink)

First published in 1982, this reissue contains a critical exposition of the views of Frege, Dedekind and Peano on the foundations of arithmetic. The last quarter of the 19th century witnessed a remarkable growth of interest in the foundations of arithmetic. This work analyses both the reasons for this growth of interest within both mathematics and philosophy and the ways in which this study of the foundations of arithmetic led to new insights in philosophy (...) and striking advances in logic. This historical-critical study provides an excellent introduction to the problems of the philosophy of mathematics - problems which have wide implications for philosophy as a whole. This reissue will appeal to students of both mathematics and philosophy who wish to improve their knowledge of logic. (shrink)

In 1885, Georg Cantor published his review of Gottlob Frege's Grundlagen der Arithmetik . In this essay, we provide its first English translation together with an introductory note. We also provide a translation of a note by Ernst Zermelo on Cantor's review, and a new translation of Frege's brief response to Cantor. In recent years, it has become philosophical folklore that Cantor's 1885 review of Frege's Grundlagen already contained a warning to Frege. This warning is said to concern the defectiveness (...) of Frege's notion of extension. The exact scope of such speculations varies and sometimes extends as far as crediting Cantor with an early hunch of the paradoxical nature of Frege's notion of extension. William Tait goes even further and deems Frege 'reckless' for having missed Cantor's explicit warning regarding the notion of extension. As such, Cantor's purported inkling would have predated the discovery of the Russell-Zermelo paradox by almost two decades. In our introductory essay, we discuss this alleged implicit (or even explicit) warning, separating two issues: first, whether the most natural reading of Cantor's criticism provides an indication that the notion of extension is defective; second, whether there are other ways of understanding Cantor that support such an interpretation and can serve as a precisification of Cantor's presumed warning. (shrink)

As it is currently used, "foundations of arithmetic" can be a misleading expression. It is not always, as the name might indicate, being used as a plural term meaning X = {x : x is a foundation of arithmetic}. Instead it has come to stand for a philosophico-logical domain of knowledge, concerned with axiom systems, structures, and analyses of arithmetic concepts. It is a bit as if "rock" had come to mean "geology." The conflation of subject (...) matter and its study is a serious one, because in the end, one can lose sight of what one should be doing in the first place. Perhaps it is taking matters too literally, but it seems that there is something to be said for taking the term to represent X. Doing so and accepting the term to have some kind of significance, it is then natural to focus on the question of what a foundation of arithmetic should be; and, if one exists, what one is. Whatever the case, that is what shall be done in this paper. (shrink)

“ ‘Tell me, Protagoras,’ he said, ‘does a single grain of millet or the ten-thousandth part of a grain make any sound when it falls?’ And when Protagoras said it did not, ‘Then,’ asked Zeno, ‘does a bushel of millet make any sound when it falls or not?’ Protagoras answered that it did, whereupon Zeno replied, ‘But surely there is some ratio between a bushel of millet and a single grain or even the ten-thousandth part of a grain'; and when (...) this was admitted, ‘But then surely,’ Zeno said, ‘the ratios of the corresponding sounds to each other will be the same: for as the bodies which make the sounds are to one another, so will the sounds be to one another. And if this is so, and if the bushel of millet makes a sound, then the single grain of millet and the ten-thousandth part of a grain will make a sound.’ This was the way Zeno used to put his questions”. (shrink)

Recently, Feferman and Hellman (and Aczel) showed how to establish the existence and categoricity of a natural number system by predicative means given the primitive notion of a finite set of individuals and given also a suitable pairing function operating on individuals. This short paper shows that this existence and categoricity result does not rely (even indirectly) on finite-set induction, thereby sustaining Feferman and Hellman's point in favor of the view that natural number induction can be derived from a very (...) weak fragment of finite-set theory, so weak that finite-set induction is not assumed. Many basic features of finiteness fail to hold in these weak fragments, conspicuously the principle that finite sets are in one-one correspondence with a proper initial segments of a (any) natural number structure. In the last part of the paper, we propose two prima facie evident principles for finite sets that, when added to these fragments, entail this principle. (shrink)

IN Hilbert's theory of the foundations of any given branch of mathematics the main problem is to establish the consistency (of a suitable formalisation) of this branch. Since the (intuitionist) criticisms of classical logic, which Hilbert's theory was intended to meet, never even alluded to inconsistencies (in classical arithmetic), and since the investigations of Hilbert's school have always established much more than mere consistency, it is natural to formulate another general problem in the foundations of mathematics: to (...) translate statements of theorems and proofs in the branch considered into those of some preferred system, where the translation must satisfy certain appropriate conditions (interpretation). The problem is relative to the choice of preferred system, as is Hilbert's consistency problem since he required the consistency to be established by particular methods (finitist ones). A finitist interpretation of classical number theory, which has been published in full detail elsewhere, is here described by means of typical examples. Partial results on analysis (theory of arbitrary functions whose arguments and values are the non-negative integers) are here presented for the first time. One of these results is restricted to functions whose values are bounded; its interest derives from the fact that real numbers may be represented by such functions. It is hoped that diverse general observations and comments, which would bore the specialist, may be of help to the general reader. The specialist may find some points of interest in the last two sections of the main text and in the notes following it. (shrink)

It can be argued that only the equational theories of some sub-elementary function algebras are finitistic or intuitive according to a certain interpretation of Hilbert's conception of intuition. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation of those restricted forms of equational reasoning to classical quantifier logic in arithmetic. The conclusion reached is that Edward Nelson's ‘predicative arithmetic’ program, which makes essential use of classical quantifier logic, cannot be justified finitistically and thus requires a different philosophical (...) foundation, possibly as a restricted form of logicism. (shrink)

Philosophers of science since Nagel have been interested in the links between intertheoretic reduction and explanation, understanding and other forms of epistemic progress. Although intertheoretic reduction is widely agreed to occur in pure mathematics as well as empirical science, the relationship between reduction and explanation in the mathematical setting has rarely been investigated in a similarly serious way. This paper examines an important particular case: the reduction of arithmetic to set theory. I claim that the reduction is unexplanatory. In (...) defense of this claim, I offer evidence from mathematical practice, and I respond to contrary suggestions due to Steinhart, Maddy, Kitcher and Quine. I then show how, even if set-theoretic reductions are generally not explanatory, set theory can nevertheless serve as a legitimate foundation for mathematics. Finally, some implications of my thesis for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science are discussed. In particular, I suggest that some reductions in mathematics are probably explanatory, and I propose that differing standards of theory acceptance might account for the apparent lack of unexplanatory reductions in the empirical sciences. (shrink)

With the arrival of the nineteenth century, a process of change guided the treatment of three basic elements in the development of mathematics: rigour, the arithmetization and the clarification of the concept of function, categorised as the most important tool in the development of the mathematical analysis. In this paper we will show how several prominent mathematicians contributed greatly to the development of these basic elements that allowed the solid underpinning of mathematics and the consideration of mathematics as an axiomatic (...) way of thinking in which anyone can deduce valid conclusions from certain types of premises. This nineteenth century stage shares, possibly with the Heroic Age of Ancient Greece, the most revolutionary period in all history of mathematics. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: 1. Introduction Juliette Kennedy and Roman Kossak; 2. Historical remarks on Suslin's problem Akihiro Kanamori; 3. The continuum hypothesis, the generic-multiverse of sets, and the [OMEGA] conjecture W. Hugh Woodin; 4. [omega]-Models of finite set theory Ali Enayat, James H. Schmerl and Albert Visser; 5. Tennenbaum's theorem for models of arithmetic Richard Kaye; 6. Hierarchies of subsystems of weak arithmetic Shahram Mohsenipour; 7. Diophantine correct open induction Sidney Raffer; 8. Tennenbaum's theorem and recursive reducts (...) James H. Schmerl; 9. History of constructivism in the 20th century A. S. Troelstra; 10. A very short history of ultrafinitism Rose M. Cherubin and Mirco A. Mannucci; 11. Sue Toledo's notes of her conversations with Gödel in 1972-1975 Sue Toledo; 12. Stanley Tennenbaum's Socrates Curtis Franks; 13. Tennenbaum's proof of the irrationality of [the square root of] 2́. (shrink)

Last spring, as I was beginning a graduate seminar on Frege, I received a complimentary copy of this new translation of his masterwork, The Foundations of Arithmetic . I had ordered Austin's famous translation, well-loved for the beauty of its English and the clarity with which it presents Frege's overall argument, but known to be less than literal, and to sometimes supplement translation with interpretation. I was intrigued by Dale Jacquette's promise "to combine literal accuracy and readability for (...) beginning students and professional scholars alike," and to improve on Austin where the latter "does not always faithfully represent or seem to perfectly understand certain of Frege's German idioms." (v) Such a translation, complete with index, critical introduction, and commentary, and at a bargain price, seemed worthy of my students' attention. So, I mentioned to the class that this book might be worth looking into. (shrink)

Proof-theoretic reflection principles are schemas which attempt to express the soundness of arithmetical theories within their own language, e.g., ${\mathtt{{Prov}_{\mathsf {PA}} \rightarrow \varphi }}$ can be understood to assert that any statement provable in Peano arithmetic is true. It has been repeatedly suggested that justification for such principles follows directly from acceptance of an arithmetical theory $\mathsf {T}$ or indirectly in virtue of their derivability in certain truth-theoretic extensions thereof. This paper challenges this consensus by exploring relationships between reflection (...) principles and principles of mathematical and transfinite induction as well as the status of the latter with respect to various foundational characterizations of number theory. (shrink)

We prove that for each recursively axiomatized consistent extension T of Peano Arithmetic and \, there exists a \ numeration \\) of T such that the provability logic of the provability predicate \\) naturally constructed from \\) is exactly \ \rightarrow \Box p\). This settles Sacchetti’s problem affirmatively.