Much has been written about the linear model of innovation. While it may have been the dominant model used to explain technological innovation for decades, alternatives did exist. One such alternative—generally discussed as being the exact opposite of the linear model—is the demand-pull model. Beginning in the 1960s, people from different disciplines started looking at technological innovation from a demand rather than a supply perspective. The theory was that technological innovation is stimulated by market demand rather than by scientific discoveries. (...) However, few traces of the demand-pull model remain in the literature today. This article looks at what happened to the demand-pull model from a historical perspective, at three points in time: birth, crystallization, and death. It suggests that the idea of demand as a factor explaining technological innovation emerged in the 1960s, was formalized into models in the 1970-1980s, then got integrated into “multidimensional” models. From then on, the demand-pull model disappeared from the literature, existing only as an object of the past, like the linear model of innovation. (shrink)

For F. P. Ramsey, “there is no separate problem of truth,” but, rather, substantive problems about the nature of belief and judgment and the place and function of truth in these propositional attitudes. In this paper, I expound and defend an important but largely overlooked aspect of Ramsey’s view of belief and inquiry: his thesis that truth does not intervene at all in one’s ordinary beliefs, nor in one’s ordinarily inquiring into—in the sense of wondering, or reflecting on—whether or not (...) something obtains. More specifically, I show that this thesis can solve a particularly perplexing problem that Davidson helped to bring into focus: that of explaining how it is possible for one to inquire into any empirical issue, and to form any empirical beliefs, if one takes truth to be objective. (shrink)

Jean-Claude SCHMITT, Les rythmes au Moyen Âge, Paris, Gallimard, 2016, 718 p. Le livre de Jean-Claude Schmitt sur les rythmes au Moyen Âge est une somme, qu'il importe de lire et de discuter. Fruit d'un travail de longue haleine, il résume à certains égards une vie entière de recherche, placée sous le signe d'une lecture anthropologique du monde médiéval, à la croisée de la réflexion sur le texte et sur l'image, laquelle abonde ici, faisant de ce volume un manuel d'interprétation (...) de l'iconographie - Recensions. (shrink)

We are naturally inclined to judge that it is better to know that p than to merely truly believe that p. How to account for this intuition? In this paper, I examine Williamson, Goldman and Olsson, and Pritchard's answers, and agree with Pritchard that it cannot be consistently claimed that knowledge is epistemically superior to mere true belief, and that truth is the only finally valuable epistemic good. Contrary to Pritchard, I argue that the latter claim is deeply mistaken. I (...) do so by showing that mere true beliefs have no epistemic value at all. I sketch the consequences of this point concerning the epistemic value of knowledge, and answer some objections to the thesis that mere true beliefs do not possess epistemic value. (shrink)

My main aim in this paper is to contribute to the elucidation of the nature of non-religious faith. I start by summarising several well-known arguments that belief is neither necessary nor sufficient for faith. I then try to identify the nature of the positive cognitive attitude towards p that is involved in having faith that p. After dismissing some candidates for the role, I explore the idea that faith and hope are similar attitudes. On this basis, I then advance a (...) new characterisation of faith. Finally, I turn to the question of the rationality of faith. I argue that faith is intrinsically irrational because it is an intrinsically incoherent propositional attitude, but that there is nonetheless a sense in which faith is neither intrinsically epistemically irrational nor intrinsically practically irrational. (shrink)

In this paper, I propose a new argument against Gettier’s counterexamples to the thesis that knowledge is justified true belief. I claim that if there is no doxastic voluntarism, and if it is admitted that one has formed the belief that p at t1 if, at t0, one would be surprised to learn or discover that not–p, it can be plausibly argued that Gettiered beliefs simply cannot be formed.

A mass problem is a set of functions$\omega \to \omega $. For mass problems${\mathcal {C}}, {\mathcal {D}}$, one says that${\mathcal {C}}$is Muchnik reducible to${\mathcal {D}}$if each function in${\mathcal {C}}$is computed by a function in${\mathcal {D}}$. In this paper we study some highness properties of Turing oracles, which we view as mass problems. We compare them with respect to Muchnik reducibility and its uniform strengthening, Medvedev reducibility.For$p \in [0,1]$let${\mathcal {D}}(p)$be the mass problem of infinite bit sequencesy(i.e.,$\{0,1\}$-valued functions) such that for each (...) computable bit sequencex, the bit sequence$ x {\,\leftrightarrow\,} y$has asymptotic lower density at mostp(where$x {\,\leftrightarrow\,} y$has a$1$in positionniff$x(n) = y(n)$). We show that all members of this family of mass problems parameterized by a realpwith$0 p$for each computable setx. We prove that the Medvedev (and hence Muchnik) complexity of the mass problems${\mathcal {B}}(p)$is the same for all$p \in (0, 1/2)$, by showing that they are Medvedev equivalent to the mass problem of functions bounded by${2^{2}}^{n}$that are almost everywhere different from each computable function.Next, together with Joseph Miller, we obtain a proper hierarchy of the mass problems of type$\text {IOE}$: we show that for any order functiongthere exists a faster growing order function$h $such that$\text {IOE}(h)$is strictly above$\text {IOE}(g)$in the sense of Muchnik reducibility.We study cardinal characteristics in the sense of set theory that are analogous to the highness properties above. For instance,${\mathfrak {d}} (p)$is the least size of a setGof bit sequences such that for each bit sequencexthere is a bit sequenceyinGso that$\underline \rho (x {\,\leftrightarrow\,} y)>p$. We prove within ZFC all the coincidences of cardinal characteristics that are the analogs of the results above. (shrink)

It seems to be a platitude that the belief that p is correct iff it is true that p. And the claim that truth is the correct‐making feature of belief seems to be just another way of expressing this platitude. It is often thought that this indicates that truth constitutes a normative standard or criterion of correctness for belief because it seems to follow from this platitude that having a false belief is believing wrongly, and having a true belief is (...) believing rightly or correctly. In this paper, I aim to show that when we judge the platitude in question to be indisputably true, we do not endorse that truth is normative for belief but merely the triviality that the belief that p is true iff it is true that p. (shrink)

Dans une note de son ouvrage consacré à Henry, P. Audi affirme qu’« il n’y a pas de philosophie de l’histoire à proprement parler chez Henry ». Nous ambitionnons de rappeler ici que Henry a néanmoins donné un contenu au concept d’histoire et posé les conditions épistémologiques pour construire une phénoménologie radicale de l’histoire. Cette thématique, il est vrai, est généralement ignorée de la littérature secondaire. À son corps défendant, on est obligé de reconnaître que la question de l’...

The pragmatist epistemologist is supposed to defend the idea that there is no pure epistemic activity and, thereby, that the way we form our beliefs does not have to be assessed according to aims, or norms that rest on the illusory denial of the pragmatic encroachment of any inquiry. According to the pragmatist, the kind of epistemic purism that is widely endorsed in contemporary epistemology has in fact no other raison d’être than the doxastic puritanism that appears in W. K. (...) Clifford’s ethical principle. But a belief being defective has in fact nothing to do neither with the kind of practical factors that pragmatism so conceived, considers as relevant nor with the rules or values that epistemic puritanism reveres. Between believing that P and believing that E establishes that P, there is no such thing as the distance there is between practical reasons to φ and φ-ing. The position I defend is closer to Peirce’s pragmatism than to any other pragmatist approach. Among other things, it explains why C. S. Peirce’s thesis that: 1) The “real man of science” does not give any weight to practical stakes in his inquiries not only goes hand in hand with the thesis that 2) He never believes of any hypothesis that it is true, but also with the thesis that 3) The inquiry to which such a man devotes is infinite. Peirce is right from an epistemic point of view to praise men, whose life is devoted to the disinterested search for truth. (shrink)

H. Baayen (désormais HB) a publié récemment, généralement en partenariat, de nombreux articles importants en statistique linguistique, sur la notion de productivité morphologique tout particulièrement [Baayen et al., 2000 ; Baayen & Schreuder, 2000] L'ouvrage de synthèse qu'il présente est une étude statistique approfondie des distributions des fréquences des mots. A travers ce sujet clairement affiché dans le titre mais à première vue rebattu, HB semble, au moins pour les distributions des m...

Background Making appropriate end-of-life decisions in the intensive care unit (ICU) requires shared interprofessional decision-making. Thus, a decision-making climate that values the contributions of all team members, addresses diverse opinions and seeks consensus among team members is necessary. Little is known about religion’s influence on ethical decision-making climates. Therefore, this study aimed to examine the association between religious belief and ethical decision-making climates. Methods The study was a cross-sectional analytical observation study as a part of the prospective observational DISPROPRICUS study. (...) A total of 2,275 nurses and 717 physicians from 68 ICUs representing 12 countries in Europe and the US participated. All participants were asked which religion (if any) they belonged to and how important their religion (if any) was for their professional attitude towards end-of-life care. Perceptions of ethical decision-making climates were evaluated using a validated, 35-item self-assessment questionnaire that evaluates seven factors. Using cluster analysis, ICUs were categorised into four ethical decision-making climates: good, average (with nurses’ involvement at the end of life), average (without nurses’ involvement at the end of life) and poor. Results Of the 2,992 participants, 453 (15%) were religious (had religious convictions and found them important or very important for their attitude towards end-of-life care). The remaining 2,539 were non-religious (i.e. had religious convictions but assessed that they were not important for their attitude towards end-of-life care). When adjusting for country and ICU, the overall perception of the four ethical climates was associated with religious beliefs, with non-religious healthcare providers having more positive perceptions of the ethical climates compared to religious healthcare providers (p < 0.01). Within good climates, non-religious healthcare providers rated leadership by physicians (p < 0.01), interdisciplinary reflection (p = 0.049) and active decision-making by physicians (p = 0.02) as more positive compared to religious participants. In poor climates, religious healthcare providers had a more positive perception of the active involvement of nurses (p = 0.01). Within the other climates, no differences were found. Conclusions Overall perceptions of ethical decision-making climates were associated with religious beliefs, with non-religious healthcare providers generally having a more positive perception of the ethical climates than religious healthcare providers. (shrink)

The Initiation Biblique of Robert-Tricot was first published in 1939, with an enlarged edition in 1948, and was made available to a wider public in 1951 when it appeared in English translation as Guide to the Bible. The third French edition was a thorough-going revision—some chapters were entirely re-written. The most important change was, beyond all question, the chapter on Inspiration by Father P. Benoit. As an exegete and a theologian, keenly aware both of the doctrinal principles involved and of (...) the real difficulties in the Bible, his approach to the question of inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture is truly illuminating; it disposes beforehand of a host of false problems which inevitably bedevil a notion of inspiration that is too rigid and, in fact, ‘unscriptural’. A thorough understanding of Benoit’s theory of Inspiration will rid one of a certain vague uneasiness and will leave one free to savour to the full the beauty and the riches, human as well as divine, of the Bible. The second edition of Guide to the Bible, Vol. I gives us the first nine chapters of the new Initiation Biblique. True to the spirit of the original it is not a mere translation. The bibliography has been consistently brought up to date and the translators have added very many footnotes. Besides, there are appendices which cover the idea of inspiration in Protestantism and Islam, and which give a detailed analysis of the books of the Pentateuch and an extended treatment of the Dead Sea Scrolls. It would be superfluous to emphasise the excellent qualities of the work. The appearance of this new edition should be a reminder to Catholics of our incalculable debt to French biblical scholarship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Introduction to the Mystery of the Church by Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, O.P.David OlsonIntroduction to the Mystery of the Church. By Benoît-Dominique de La Soujeole, O.P. Trans. by Michael J. Miller. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2014. Pp. xxviii + 640. $75.00 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8132-2607-1.La Soujeole intends his work to be a textbook in an introductory course in ecclesiology. While this is a (...) review of the English translation, the book was first published in French in 2007, and the preface to the original edition stated, “The present volume is a course in ecclesiology that has been taught regularly at the Dominican House of Studies in Toulouse” (xxv). As a textbook, it is well structured and should be accessible to a wide variety of students. The writing style in translation is clear and straightforward, with explanations given for any terms of art which are used, making it accessible to an audience with some theological training.The tone of the book is theological, that is to say, it is focused on an ordered view of the Catholic faith. It is not apologetic or polemical as is sometimes the case with books on ecclesiology, particularly those preceding the Second Vatican Council. On the other hand, it is certainly not a relativistic, blandly Christian study of various notions of church. Each of the topics within the book is situated within Scripture, and the author provides ample bibliography, though—not surprisingly, considering his religious order and background—the work leans heavily upon St. Thomas Aquinas. The book gives a very balanced view of the teachings of Vatican II.The author begins his work with a general introduction that provides a brief historical overview of important moments and trends in the theology of the Church, as well as a review of ecclesiology as a separate theological subject. One point is that the study of ecclesiology per se is relatively new, beginning only in the fourteenth century, but that questions concerning the ecclesia are found within all major areas of theological study. Ecclesiology cannot neatly be divorced from the study of the doctrine of God, Christology, or the sacraments. Issues regarding sacramental theology and Christology are prominent in the second portion of the book.Explanations are full and show a certain rigor. Some might consider them at times pedantic. For example, the distinction of belief in God from belief in the Church in the Nicene Creed is more than four pages in length, rehearsing difficulties of translation (296-301). More substantially on this point, over these four plus pages the author does not manage to make what would be to many theologians the obvious distinction between the absolute God and the created reality referred to as the Church. In fact, it is not clear that this is a distinction the author would want to make, as the second part of the book, containing his speculative theology, eschews a distinction between a visible and invisible church, the body of the Church and the grace of Jesus Christ. A [End Page 324] too-cursory reading of the second part could tend toward conflating the Church and the inner life of God.The book is divided into three parts. The first part is subdivided into thematic descriptions of the Church. The several themes explored are “Images of the Church and the Kingdom of God,” “the Church [as] the Body of Christ,” “the Church [as] the Temple of the Spirit,” and “the Church [as] the People of God.” The discussion on the Kingdom of God is the most limited. The first part of the book concludes with a section entitled “Recapitulation: The Church Is a Mystery.”The presentations on the Body of Christ, the Temple of the Spirit, and the People of God are done thoroughly. They follow a standard pattern of reviewing Scripture, patristic developments, the medieval period (mostly St. Thomas), and developments from Vatican II, which the author characterizes as the council on the Church. Following a thematic approach, particularly in teaching ecclesiology, seems most appropriate since the typical student may lack the needed... (shrink)

Chronique/critique de Françoise Favretto parue dans la revue L'intranquille. Revue de littérature, n° 20, St-Quentin-de-Caplong, L'Atelier de l'Agneau, 2021, p. 83. - Recensions.