Basic tenets of Advaita school in Hindu philosophy.

Study of the Advaita system of Indian philosophy.

Comprehensive commentary on Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, work on Jaina doctriners and philosophy by Umāsvāti ; includes complete text.

Articles on aesthetics with special reference to India.

On the fundamentals of Hindu philosophy and doctrines.

Study of Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, aphoristic work on Jaina doctrines and philosophy by Umāsvāti, ca. 135-ca. 219.

Interpretation of Tattvārthasūtra, work on Jaina doctrines and philosophy by Umāsvāti, 2nd century author.

Sanskrit text, with Advaitacintākaustubha autocommentary, on Advaita philosophy.

On Advaita Vedanta philosophy; critically edited text, based on rare manuscripts.

On Advaita philosophy; Sanskrit text with commentary and translation.

Critical study of Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, work on Jaina philosophy, ethics and doctrines by Umāsvāti.

Contributed articles on the philosophical concept of "other" as reflected in the culture of West Bengal, India.

Study on metaphysics and ethics in Indic and western philosophy.

Classical aphoristic work with commentary on Jaina philosophy.

Treatise on the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy and ethics by Umāsvāti ; Sanskrit text with English translation.

Commentary on Tattvārthādhigamasūtra of Umāsvāti, ca. 135-ca. 219, on Jaina philosophy.

Study of Umāsvātī's Tattvārthādhigamasūtra, 2nd century aphoristic work, with autocommentary, on the basic tenets of Jaina philosophy.

Study on the contribution of Citsukha, 13th century Indian philosopher, to the non-dualistic (advaita) school of Hindu philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reply to Vaidya, Guhe, and Williams on the Bloomsbury Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇi of GaṅgeśaStephen Phillips (bio)More or less happy with the reviews, I would like mainly, in response, to identify advances made in the study of Gaṅgeśa. Anand Vaidya articulates a clearer overview of Gaṅgeśa's theory of knowledge; Eberhard Guhe shows a better way to render the notion of vyāpti, "pervasion," which is central in the theory (...) of inference as a knowledge source; and Michael Williams, too, shows need for improvement on that score as well as for elaboration of matters taken up by classical commentators that are given short shrift in my running comments. For example, whereas long discussions are provoked by Gaṅgeśa's definition of "knowledge," pramā, major points in the purvapakṣa in the section on proving the existence of an īśvara, a "Lord," seem, as Williams says, "threadbare."Vaidya, following Burge (2003), introduces a distinction between entitlement and justification: entitlement is the kind of unreflective epistemic warrant delivered by Gaṅgeśa's pramāṇa, "knowledge sources," working automatically in our everyday lives, whereas justification requires self-conscious certification, prāmāṇya-jñapti. Thereby splitting the horns of a dilemma posed by internalist accounts of knowledge in opposition to externalist ones, Burge and Vaidya are able to incorporate the most [End Page 519] attractive features of each approach. The entitlement/justification distinction cashes out, I may add, to Vaidya's elucidation, Nyāya's deeply held doctrine of parataḥ-prāmāṇya, "certification by another," against the view of "intrinsic certification," svataḥ-prāmāṇya, of Prabhākara and others. As Williams notes, Prābhākara positions, for which Gaṅgeśa sometimes shows sympathy, may have led him to presume that an anubhava—"awareness" or "presentational experience" in my translation, "fresh news" in Matilal's snappy rendering—is an episode of knowledge, pramā, "unless one knows otherwise," bādhakam vinā.On reflection, one sees that such a presentation (it could be perceptual, inferential, analogical, or testimonial) has been produced by a pramāṇa, or, in abnormal cases, not, and so by a "pramāṇa-pretender," a pramāṇaābhāsa, as in seeing a mirage. Again, an anubhava is not just any old cognition or "thought" (pace Das 2021, p. 162); it is defined as nonrecollective. Unlike a deliverance of a genuine pramāṇa, some instances may, on examination, prove to be a-pramā, "non-knowledge," but are, nevertheless, at the animal level, sufficient to provoke and guide action that would not be unhesitating were there doubt in any way. A thirsty Maya, in Vaidya's example, would naturally move in the direction of the water she "sees." But she would hesitate were she to learn from her friend about the unreliability of water-perception in the current circumstances. At the reflective level, where she is unsure whether the anubhava she apperceives is pramā or apramā, her action, including speech (implying assertability), is altered.So far so good in Vaidya's reconstruction. But Gaṅgeśa does not himself pronounce on the question of whether, after learning about the defeater, Maya would still be entitled to her perceptual belief that there is water in the distance. In the volumes under review, I assumed that she would not be "justified" and indeed that she would no longer have the belief (if we may speak about "beliefs"). The defeater grasped at the reflective level would mean not only that she could not certify the perceptual deliverance but also that there would be no knowledge. Clearly, she can't certify it, and thus, as Vaidya reasons, loses the right to assert. But maybe he's correct that, according to Gaṅgeśa's sensibilities, she does not lose the perceptual knowledge. She would remain entitled to her belief.Personally, I think this is wrong, but Vaidya's understanding does have the merit of explaining why some later Naiyāyikas apparently took absurd positions on epistemic luck (Bhattacharya 1996, p. ix). I think that Maya would lose her entitlement, too, but what if, after being informed of the unreliability of water-perception... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some Ideas Concerning Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology:A Complete and Annotated Translation of the Tattva-cintā-maṇiEberhard Guhe (bio)Stephen Phillips' Jewel of Reflection on the Truth about Epistemology (see Phillips 2020) is surely a landmark achievement in the realm of research on Navya-Nyāya. It is a work of reference not only for specialists but also for a broader audience of philosophically interested readers. Phillips has (...) demonstrated his expertise on Nyāya in general in many previous publications. At present, there is probably hardly anybody else who would have been better qualified to accomplish the mammoth task of translating and elucidating such a complex and voluminous Sanskrit work as the Tattvacintāmaṇi. It should however be noted that there is another edition and annotated translation of the Tattvacintāmaṇi (excluding the Upamānakhaṇḍa) by V.P. Bhatta (see Bhatta 2005, 2012, 2021), which is rather addressed to specialists, who are proficient in Sanskrit. The two volumes on the Anumānakhaṇḍa were published in 2021 (one year after the publication of Phillips' three volumes). Considering the enormous size of such a book project, the result cannot be expected to be completely flawless. The present review focuses on the introduction in volume 1 and on volume 2. I will address some minor issues, primarily methodological ones, but I will also address a few more serious (albeit surely accidental) translation errors (especially in the Siddhāntalakṣaṇa-section of the Vyāptivāda), which can lead to a misunderstanding of Gaṅgeśa's stance on a pivotal topic of the Navya-Naiyāyikas, namely the correct definition of the concept of pervasion (vyāpti).IThe introduction is very insightful. However, logicians will probably stumble over Phillips' methods of formalization. Some examples are given below. [End Page 498](1) The language of Phillips' formalizations looks a bit like a first-order language. Thus, for example, he uses "Ha" as a formal equivalent of the sentence "The mountain is smoky" (see vol. 1, p. 18). An obvious deviation from first-order conventions consists in the fact that Phillips uses at least two types of negation. Propositional negation is expressed by means of the symbol "~" (see vol. 2, p. 668; unfortunately, this symbol is not mentioned in vol. 1, pp. 18–19, where Phillips introduces his formalization techniques). Moreover, Phillips uses the negation symbol "¬," which he applies to capital Roman letters, in order to express a kind of term negation. Thus, for example, "¬H" may serve as a term referring to "the absence of the probans" (vol. 2, p. 623). To be precise, the type of absence which "¬H" refers to is a so-called "relational absence" (saṃsargâbhāva). Phillips formalizes the so-called "mutual absences" (anyonyâbhāva) differently (see below).Although "¬Hc" (see vol. 1, p. 18) looks like an ordinary first-order wff, it should more accurately be read as "The absence of H is located at c." Properly speaking, we should then also read atomic wffs like "Hc" as "H is located at c," where "H" should not be regarded as an expression of a predicate like "… is smoky," but rather as a general term, that is, as a formal counterpart of expressions like, for example, "smoke."Unfortunately, Phillips renders the meaning of wffs of the form "¬ϕx" not as "the absence of H is located at x," but in a somewhat simplified manner, which obscures the fact that he treats the negation symbol "¬" as a means to express a term negation: "And negation is term negation, not propositional negation [author's note: as we have just seen, this is not true of all kinds of negation which Phillips refers to in his formalizations, since he uses the "~" in a different sense]; thus, the negative sign '¬' in '¬ϕx' is defined as 'ϕ is absent at x'" (vol. 1, p. 19).Moreover, the use of different kinds of letters for the variables in "¬ϕx" (Greek and Roman) seems to suggest that the absentee should always be the referent of a general term. However, expressions of the form "the absence of a is... (shrink)

This book is an analysis of the philosophical chapters of the Tattvārthādhigama (TA), a foundational text for the Jaina tradition and the first text that presented the Jaina worldview in a clear and systematic way. The book also includes the first English translation of its oldest commentary, the Tattvārthādhigamabhāṣya (TABh). Focusing on the philosophical sections of the TA and TABh, which deviate from the traditional views and introduce several new concepts for the Jaina tradition, the analysis suggests that the TA (...) and the TABh were written by different authors, and that both texts contain several historical layers. The texts reflect aspects of the concurrent intellectual movements, and the textual analysis includes comparisons with the views of other schools, such as the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika traditions, and offers an in-depth analysis of the philosophical content of these works. The appendix contains an English translation from the original Sanskrit text of the TA and provides the first English translation of the commentary on these passages from the TABh. Situating the text in the wider history of Indian philosophy, the book offers a better understanding of the role of the Jainas in the history of Indian thought. It will be of interest to those studying Indian philosophy, Indian thought and Asian Religions. (shrink)

Study of the seven classical commentaries dealing with definition of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) according to the Navya-Nyāya philosophy.

Comprehensive study of Advaita philosophy of self-realization in Svānubhavadarśa of Mādhavāśrama, fl. 1740.

Text, with extensive interpretive notes, of Maṅgala prabhāta, a treatise on ethics by Mahatma Gandhi, 1869-1948, Indian statesman.

Hindu cosmology according to ancient Vedic literature; includes Sanskrit text.

Research papers on knowledge and theory in Jaina philosophy.

Scientific study of the cult of Krishna with reference to philosophy of Bhagavadgītā.

On fundamentals of Yoga in Vedic literature and Indic philosophy.

Study of Yatīndramatadīpikā, treatise on Viśiṣṭādvaita metaphysics and epistemology by Śrīnivāsācārya, Son of Govindācārya, active 17th century.

Comprehensive work on the fundamentals of Jaina philosophy.

Articles on fundamentals of Hinduism, philosophy, and culture.

Articles on fundamentals of Hinduism, philosophy, and culture.