The Sense of I: Conceptualizing Subjectivity: In Indian Philosophy (Sāṃkhya-Yoga) This book discusses the sense of I as it is captured in the Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition – one of the oldest currents of Indian philosophy, dating back to as early as the 7th c. BCE. The author offers her reinterpretation of the Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā complemented with several commentaries, including the writings of Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya – a charismatic scholar-monk believed to have re-established the Sāṃkhya-Yoga lineage in the early 20th century. The (...) textual analysis of the classical Sanskrit sources and their constructive interpretation is enhanced by some crucial questions and points of dispute commonly picked up in the contemporary philosophy of mind, such as the challenge of ontological and categorical reductionism, the criteria of personal identity, the limits of agency and free will, the ineluctability of self-deception, etc. However, defining the sense of ego (ahaṃkāra) and ‘I-am-ness’ (asmitā) is the main focus of this research. Four chapters composing the study are subsequently devoted to: (1) the methodological assumptions of the present author and the basic historical distinctions relevant to the subject matter, (2) linguistic preconditioning of I-consciousness as well as metaphysical coherency and ambiguity of the concept of subjectivity presented by Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers, (3) cognitive and ontological issues concerning the embodied ego being opposed to inactive and contentless consciousness, or the pure self (puruṣa), (4) axiological evaluation of self-discipline and significance of liberation from ego. 1. The method, scope, and problem. In the first chapter, the method of comparative philosophy adopted in this book is introduced by a phenomenological analysis of ‘otherness’ and ‘alienness’ inspired by the considerations of Bernhard Waldenfels and his understanding of xenology. This section is followed by a critical reflection on the incommensurability of the alternative conceptual frameworks, supported by some arguments provided by Ludwik Fleck and Richard E. Nisbett. When explaining the term ‘comparative philosophy’, the author pays special attention to those proponents of the aforementioned current who contributed to the rapprochement of Western and Indian philosophical traditions by tracing both their similarities and divergences. The author makes references to numerous prominent researchers, such as Paul Masson-Oursel, Paul Deussen, Stanisław Schayer, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Bimal K. Matilal, Raimundo Panikkar, Daya Krishna, Wilhelm Halbfass, and many others representing a younger generation. The historical introduction presents a concise survey of the evolution of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga textual tradition, and distinguishes five phases of its development: proto-Sāṃkhya (7th c. BCA – 1st c. CE), pre-classical phase (1st – 5th c. CE), classical Sāṃkhya (3rd – 9th c. CE), post-classical phase (till 14th c.), and neo-classical phase (since 1927). Here, the author also evaluates the primary sources, including Sanskrit commentaries, and the secondary sources in the light of their relevance and usefulness to the constructive interpretation of Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā. Then, she makes some methodological remarks concerning the specificity of their reading. This section is concluded with highlighting three main strategies usually applied when interpreting Patañjali’s sūtras: (1) anti-philosophical approach – treating the text as a merely mystical report or the yogic vademecum, (2) anti-mystical perspective – which reads the text as a highly speculative divagation of no much use to a practitioner, (3) mystic-and- philosophical approach – emphasizing the fact that the theory of consciousness presented in Yogasūtra is both philosophically coherent and empirically (or mystically) verified. The author argues for the third, heuristic, perspective mentioned above. The last section of the first chapter aims to problematize the I-concept (aham) and the paradoxical situation of the ego searching for self-knowledge. This part starts with the acknowledgement of the deliberation on non-self (anātman) by Śāntideva, a Buddhist philosopher claiming that one’s own ego ought to be identified with the ego of any other. Then, the author unfolds the fundamental assumptions and scope of the constructive interpretation she wants to develop following K.C. Bhattacharyya’s clues. When explaining her reasons, she stresses both the need to reveal the philosophical meaning of the source materials and, at the same time, the need to make them meaningful on the ground of our contemporary philosophical enquiry. Thus, among the main purposes there is a reliable, scrupulous and careful reconstruction of the historical conception of the self as elaborated on in the classical period of Sāṃkhya-Yoga tradition, as well as reinterpretation of the sense of I as it was grasped by the Sāṃkhya-Yoga thinkers in terms of modern comparative and ‘polylogical’ discourse. 2. Naming I. In the second chapter, a variety of linguistic categories capturing different aspects of subjectivity is discussed in detail. A textual examination is preceded by clarification of the semantic distinctions made by Patañjali, such as a verbal convention (saṃketa) which stands for uniting or overlapping a word (śabda), its meaning (artha) and a mental state of comprehension (pratyaya) that ascribes the word to a particular object. Among the key concepts there is also explained a spontaneous mental activity referring to pseudo-objects posited only by words (vikalpa), which is unwittingly involved in every process of conceptualizing, designating, and naming objects. Such mental states can neither be ‘valid’ nor ‘invalid’, and are believed to unavoidably accompany one’s use of language. These presuppositions testify to Patañjali’s severe criticism towards all verbal conventions that not only affect the way we formulate and construct our views, but also determine the very process of perception. A major section of the chapter contains the analysis of the ambiguous sense of subjectivity and its basic aspects distinguished by the author in the result of a contextual and comparative study of the Sanskrit terms used in Yogasūtra and Sāṃkhyakārikā for naming I-consciousness. The six basic aspects of the self comprise: essentializing oneself, perceiving (something), getting conscious (of something), mastering or owning (something), and being capable of self-identifying as well as disidentifying oneself. A majority of the enumerated predicates ascribed to the self refer to different functions and activities of the empirical ego and the embodied mind. Yet, apart from this intentional, active, reactive, sensing, and objectifiable self Sāṃkhya-Yoga philosophers distinguish a sense of subjectivity going beyond all these psycho-physical characteristics: the self that remains unmanifest, non-active, free from experiencing any joy or pain, said to be the principle of consciousness. The plausibility of its existence as the final cause of the world is to be determined by the embodied ego by virtue of abductive reasoning based on the analysis of all material and psycho-physical phenomena preconditioned by three guṇas that compose the domain of nature (prakṛti). In the subsequent section, three Sanskrit notions – ahaṃkāra, asmitā, and puruṣa, most significant for the Sāṃkhya and Yoga understanding of subjectivity, are discussed closely one after another to expose their semantic, epistemic and metaphysical connotations. The chapter is completed by some pivotal remarks bringing out the problem of discrepancy between the metaphysical position implied by Patañjali and Īśvarakṛṣṇa, and the grammatical instruments applied by them to express it. 3. Cognizing I. The third chapter addresses two important issues in the phenomenology of self-perception, namely the question of psycho-physical dualism explained on the grounds of the considered darśanas, and the spiritual quest for the ideal embodiment of consciousness. While emphasizing the unity of human psycho-physical nature the author refers to several contemporary Western thinkers, such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Thomas Nagel, John R. Searle, David Chalmers and others, by making some comparative remarks on the idea of the embodied mind. Furthermore, three arguments for the plurality of selves (puruṣa-bahutva) are reconstructed and critically considered. The arguments given by Īśvarakṛṣṇa (SK 18) include the diversity of ways in which one experiences one’s life and death, the spatio-temporal distinctness of particular embodied egos, and the variations of features manifested by individual selves. The second section of this chapter presents a thorough inquiry into a non-theistic devotion and spiritual pragmatism defended by the adherents of Sāṃkhya- Yoga. God (īśvara) is defined here primarily as an object of meditative practice and a special tool convenient for yogic pedagogy. In the concluding part of this section four functions of devotional practice (īśvara-pranidhāna) are recognized and explained; they embrace: (1) prevention from mental scattering and dispersion, (2) therapy allowing to form some positive perceptual habits and the right cognitive approach, (3) enhancement of morally and spiritually required qualities, and (4) reinforcement of the sense of subjective identity being a complementary method of self-development. 4. Liberating oneself from I. The final chapter consists of three sections. The first one introduces the concept of liberation through action (pravṛtti-dharma), commonly opposed in Indian tradition to the path of renunciation (nivṛtti- dharma). According to Hariharānanda Ᾱraṇya’s interpretation, both Sāṃkhya- Yoga and Buddhism follow the latter one, which in terms of spiritual practice dynamics makes them much closer to each other than it is usually believed. In the subsequent section the idea of liberating oneself from one’s attachment to ego is explained in detail, along with the significance of gradual self-negation. Then the author raises the interpretation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga perspective on liberation as self-distinction-through-renunciation. The main focus in this section is placed on the sense of agency (kartṛ), the problem of free will, and the criteria of moral and soteriological evaluation of one’s deeds. Some crucial questions on karmic conditioning of self-knowledge in the form of kleśas are also the subject of careful analysis. The next section undertakes the issue of ownership (mamakāra) of one’s activity and self-esteem (abhimāna) involved in spiritual growth. Again, some comparative remarks are made by referring to the Buddhist philosophers’ positions, such as Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti. Among others, the Buddhist refutation of the Sāṃkhya-Yoga concept of eternal, inactive, indifferent, irresponsible, and exclusively conscious self (puruṣa) is quoted and partly rejected in favour of the classical Hindu darśanas. In summary, the author emphasized the significance-generating or sense-creating function of I, its engagement in the search for its own raison d’être, its role in self-identification as well as subverting it, and the expediency of liberation from ego. The philosophers of classical Sāṃkhya and Yoga indicate a twofold sense of the self; on the one hand, the only appropriate designation: ‘I’ is true self (puruṣa), a passive and unknowable principle of consciousness whose existence makes the empirical phenomena meaningful. On the other hand, the ‘I’ clearly designates the current sense of the self, expressed as “I think”, “I doubt”, “I suffer”, etc. This second meaning of ‘I’, the specific sense of ‘mineness’, is recognized as a secondary and relative one – thus illusive and troublesome. However, its delusiveness does not mean that the empirical ego is an unreal or non-existent entity. What it implies is that the empirical self-identity is fundamentally inadequate and – according to the Indian thinkers – ought to be unveiled and, ultimately, given up. (shrink)

On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of C. S. Lewis’s death, a special annotated edition of his Christian classic, The Screwtape Letters, with notes and excerpts from his other works that help illuminate this diabolical masterpiece. Since its publication in 1942, The Screwtape Letters has sold millions of copies worldwide and is recognized as a milestone in the history of popular theology. A masterpiece of satire, it offers a sly and ironic portrayal of human life and foibles from the (...) vantage point of Screwtape, a highly placed assistant to “Our Father Below.” At once wildly comic, deadly serious, and strikingly original, The Screwtape Letters comprises the correspondence of the worldly-wise devil Screwtape and his nephew Wormwood, a novice demon in charge of securing the damnation of an ordinary young man. For the first time, The Screwtape Letters will be presented in full-text accompanied by helpful annotations in a striking two-color format. These annotations will give fans a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the popular book, providing background information, explanations of terms, historical significance, and excerpts from Lewis’s other works that more fully explain the ideas in this volume. For both expert Lewis fans and casual readers, The Screwtape Letters: Annotated Edition will be a beautiful and insightful guide to a beloved classic. (shrink)

The elegiac poem of eight lines discovered in the Ceramicus and published by by W. Peek is of considerable interest for the historian. Peek is surely right in maintaining that it was composed for the Athenians who fell under Tolmides at Coronea in 447 B.C., and his general exposition of the poem's meaning is convincing. The aim of this paper is to make some comments and supplements to his interpretation and then to consider some peculiarities in the thought and technique (...) of the poem. We may first set out a text and a translation:λμονες ℎοῖον γṑνα μχες ελσανες λπ[ο]φσχς δαιμονṐς ṑλσα' μ πολμοισὐν κακι χσετλελεσσε βροοῖσι δ πσι λοιπνφρζεσθαι λογṐν πιοσν ἔθκε λος. (shrink)

In this talk presented at the 2022 conference of the Catholic Bar Association, C’Zar Bernstein unpacks the meaning of the word person in the Fourteenth Amendment and, through his exegesis, identifies philosophical arguments that may be instrumental in affording legal protection to the most vulnerable members of society.

Open peer commentary on the article “Developing a Dialogical Platform for Disseminating Research through Design” by Abigail C. Durrant, John Vines, Jayne Wallace & Joyce Yee. Upshot: The target article provides a thorough and insightful review of the Research Through Design conferences and discusses the successes and limitations of the events in the dissemination of design knowledge.

Designed as a companion to the study of apologetics and philosophy of religion, this pocket dictionary by C. Stephen Evans offers 300 entries covering terms, apologists, philosophers, movements, apologetic arguments and theologies.

Immanuel Kant, Soren Kierkegaard, and William James- three diverse philosophers from three different eras- have followed a similar route of non-theoretical justification of belief. This position states that there is no theoretical knowledge, positive or negative, of divine existence. The defense of religious belief, therefore, must be related to pervasive features of practical human existence; in other words, it must be subjective. While giving amble attention to the differences among these three philosophers, C. Stephen Evans finds and examines a common (...) structure to all their arguments. This structure includes a theoretical skepticism about the existence of God, a repudiation of a neutral attitude on this question, and a deliberate shift of this question from theoretical reason to practical reason. (shrink)

In this comprehensive history of evolutionism, C. Leon Harris has combined primary source readings with clear, pertinent background information, to provide a solid basic understanding of the ways scientists have arrived at today's views of evolution. Harris describes the major contributors to the theory of evolutionism, placing each in the context of the general cultural influences to which he was exposed. Each chapter also contains an explanation of the philosophical basis of the scientific approach of the period in question. A (...) lengthy bibliography provides direction for further reading on this important and timely subject. (shrink)

In order to characterize actions, It is not necessary to describe the characteristic way in which they are caused by an agent's wants and beliefs, As a I goldman and d davidson have supposed. It is enough to note the absence of alternative causes. Nor are all our actions intentional, As both davidson and, In a more limiting way, A c danto, Have suggested. These are the theses argued in this paper.

This paper starts with an overview of C.G. Jung’s notion of archetypes. His ideas imply that Jungian archetypes can be viewed as the most general examples of the shared awarenesses that occur in groups of people of all sizes, ranging from families to humanity as a whole. The term ‘archetype’ is used in connection with such shared awarenesses in the subsequent discussion. The distinction that Jung made between archetypal representations and archetypes themselves is retained and emphasized. It is then pointed (...) out that archetypal representations are sets of Dawkins’ memes appearing in awareness. Pursuing the line of thought suggested by this, it is further proposed that the meme set can be regarded as analogous to the genotype in biology, while the representation itself resembles the phenotype in heuristically useful respects. Archetypes, as opposed to their representations, are the factors which predispose particular sets of memes to spread within a group of people and enter their awarenesses. It follows from the biological analogy that archetypes can be thought of as regularities that occur in an ‘ecology’ of representations. Because memes are subject to pseudo-Darwinian influences, parallels between the behaviour of representations and the phenomena of parasitology and epidemiology will sometimes be observed. The view of archetypes arrived at opens up a possibility that they might be responsible for some mass behaviours; e.g. those involved in the production of social movements such as Nazism or certain medical conditions of obscure aetiology. Archetypal representations possess in some circumstances the power to fill the consciousnesses of individuals ‘infected’ by them for long periods of time. These points are illustrated in a brief account of fatigue syndromes. Finally, should consciousness have a quantum theoretical basis, details of the epidemiology of archetypal representations will differ from those to be expected if it has no such basis. The phenomenon of alien abduction, presumed to be of archetypal origin, is discussed as an example. (shrink)

This book explores 'nothingness', the negative way found in Buddhist and Christian traditions, with a focused and comparative approach. It examines the works of Nagarjuna (c. 150 CE), a Buddhist monk, philosopher and one of the greatest thinkers of classical India, and those of John of the Cross (1542-1591), a Carmelite monk, outstanding Spanish poet, and one of the greatest mystical theologians. The conception of nothingness in both the thinkers points to a paradox of linguistic transcendence and provides a novel (...) insight into via negativa. This is the first full-length work comparing nothingness (emptiness) in Nagarjuna (Mahayana Buddhism) and John of the Cross (Christianity) in any language. It augments the comparative approach found in Buddhist-Christian comparative philosophy and theology. This book is of especial interest to academics of Buddhist and Christian studies searching for avenues for intellectual dialogue. (shrink)

These two books are among the most recently published tomes of a projected twenty comprising the first French edition of the Complete Works of Kierkegaard. Such a work represents the life-long dedication of Paul Tisseau, Kierkegaard's principal French translator. Many of Tisseau's translations have already been published in various other places, and it is generally known that he undertook to publish on his own several of the less commercially appealing religious works. After his death in 1964, his daughter completed his (...) work by correcting published and unpublished manuscripts and by translating the few works her father had not been able to do. The present edition was indeed worth waiting for; it is at once an artful translation and an excellent scholarly tool, complete with marginal pagination of the definitive Danish edition, the Drachmann, Heiberg, Lange of 1920-1926, plus location of each separate work in the first and third Danish editions. Jean Brun provides to-the-point introductions containing a wealth of historical material and ample footnotes referring to significant textual variations, subtleties of translation, and related passages in other works. Volume thirteen contains the Edifying Discourses in Various Spirits, Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing, The Lilies and the Birds, and The Gospel of Sufferings; volume eighteen, Two Discourses at the Communion on Fridays, The Woman that Was a Sinner, The Unchangeableness of God, For Self-Examination, and Judge for Yourselves.--C. M. R. (shrink)

Reprints a useful, non-technical statement of Reichenbach's mature thought, combining an unconvincing survey of speculative philosophy and its "failure," with a concise account of the results of a philosophy carried out "scientifically." The original appeared in 1951.--V. C. C.

A careful and competent introduction to the Russell-Broad type of analytic philosophy.--A. C. P.

An attractive paperback reprint of Cohen's illuminating studies in the philosophy of logic.--A. C. P.

A rather popular mixture of biography, philosophy, and theology, for the Catholic layman. Scotus' role in the defense of the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception receives special emphasis. --A. C. P.

A nicely done paperback reprint of Lewis' classic in epistemology.--A. C. P.

A collection of previously published essays and addresses on New Testament topics. Though these pieces are distinctly theological rather than philosophical, the studies of Bultmann and Dibelius should be of interest to some philosophers.--A. C. P.

The esoteric teachings of Jesus of Nazareth, revealed by an author who claims to have been, in a previous incarnation, an early Christian mystic.--A. C. P.

A photographic reprint of the 1920 edition of Fry's graceful essays on painting, sculpture, and the principles of aesthetics criticism. --A. C. P.

This edition, providing the only available English language access to Collin de Plancy's long-forgotten Dictionnaire infernal, is directed to the reader who likes the reinforcement of being able to get through a whole book in an hour or so, whizzing through clean pages at incredible speeds. Perhaps the most misleading aspect of this flashy volume is the fact that the publishers never mention that it is abbreviated at all; it contains 177 truncated versions of Collin de Plancy's 2,400 plus entries, (...) which filled in the 1825-1826 edition of four volumes of text and one of plates. Wade Baskin, a master of condensation, does cover a lot of ground in his two and one-half page introduction. This, unfortunately, serves as little but a teaser to the reader interested in more than a mere mention of Collin de Plancy's colorful, success-oriented career, his filiations with spiritual brothers like Nodier, and his influence on other writers of the Romantic period. One can begrudge this sort of holding back with good reason, for Collin de Plancy is a name unfamiliar today even to French scholars. Baskin's translation is, as usual, excellent.—C. M. R. (shrink)

In this revised and expanded edition of his well-known study of Denis Diderot's life and works, Crocker combines solid scholarship with a vivid portrayal of his subjects. Leaving firm ground only occasionally, Crocker masterfully reconstructs Diderot's life by weaving into his narrative the testimony of Diderot's contemporaries and the philosopher's own anecdotes of the more picturesque episodes of his life. The author never departs from firm ground, however, in his presentation of Diderot's works. With a rare blend of erudition and (...) a lively critical sense, he sets them forth in the light of eighteenth-century currents of thought, highlighting Diderot's most significant contributions to materialism, sensualism, and experimentalism, while at the same time preserving, in quite readable summaries, the integrity of individual writings. His extensive consideration of the twenty years Diderot devoted to the Encyclopedia is particularly stimulating. By contrast, his summary presentation of Diderot's novels is somewhat disappointing, especially since he gives all too brief mention to Diderot's innovations in that genre. A needed index is lacking, but in spite of this and other minor shortcomings, Crocker's efforts have resulted in what is clearly the best complete English biography of one of the eighteenth century's most colorful geniuses.—C. M. M. (shrink)

A collection of previously published articles by one of the leading translators and interpreters of Hegel's philosophy. Most of the studies about Hegel concern the Phenomenology, although one goes back to his early writings to find the roots of some later doctrines. The other studies are about the philosophical presuppositions of Marxism and their relation to their idealistic sources.--C. L.

A second, corrected edition of the 1948 original, plus preface and a third appendix on the import of Pascal for the present day. The work consists of a number of brief considerations centered around the theme of "common sense," essential to a study of history as sacred. Castelli writes in a climate interpreted as threatening to lead us to a state of "second innocence". Against this threat, Castelli lays the groundwork for a theological existentialism, based on a "sense of revelation," (...) a personal "common sense" commitment arising from the realization of one's own insufficiency. In an age where Catholic theologians are developing a political basis for their thought, Castelli's book appears perhaps even more apropos than in the late 1940's. It opposes modern solipsism resulting from subjectivist tendencies in philosophy since Descartes, as well as analogues in the political sphere--monologue and violence--and proposes as an alternative a theologically based human solidarity.--C. M. R. (shrink)

Students of Marcel will find this volume a helpful guide to the genesis of his mature thought; by themselves the "fragments" are of scant value, as the author himself states in a postscript written in 1961. During this five-year period, Marcel struggled mostly with Hegel and the post-Kantians, and though in complete ignorance of Kierkegaard, he paralleled the Dane's thought strikingly.--C. D.

In this exposition of Boehme's key conceptions, the author tries to show that the seventeenth-century Silesian mystic's work can and should be viewed as an original, coherent philosophic system. Includes detailed biographical sketch, bibliography, indexes, illustrations and diagrams.--C. M.

In this book we are offered a collection of ten papers illustrating Malcolm's conception of ordinary language philosophy, ranging in content over a wide variety of topics in epistemology. The influence of his former teachers, Moore and Wittgenstein, is evident throughout. Three lectures on the often neglected concept of memory, two of which are new, are included in the book, together with the widely regarded article entitled "Anselm's Ontological Arguments."--C. V.

Constantly aware of the mutual limits of philosophy and religion, Montagnes examines the development of St. Thomas' thought concerning the analogy of being and the conformity of his thought to that doctrine of Cajetan largely accepted by Thomists. He argues convincingly that Cajetan's thought differs importantly from that of Aquinas with regard to the source of the analogy.--C. E. B.

Twelve essays--two about and one by Bentley--on such varied topics as economics, politics, physics, law, and metaphysics. A bibliography of Bentley's writings is appended.--C. L.

A collection of eight essays, including five that have previously been published. The subjects discussed are logical truth, modal logic, conditionals and entailment.--C. L.

Seventy brief essays, all but one of them on some aspect of the subject of truth. Though the journey from cover to cover is dull, there are a few excellent papers. The variety of philosophical schools and styles shows clearly that it is a mistake to identify contemporary French-language philosophy with any one trend or school.—C. D.

This study of "problems of the soul in the neoaristotelian and neoplatonic tradition" is exceedingly well documented and for the most part minutely argued. An historical examination of doctrines leading to, derived from, and similar to Plotinus' theory of nous eventuates in a "typology of solutions" or ideal types to which the various doctrines approximate. The final chapter traces nous to "collective consciousness, double consciousness, and metaconsciousness in Kant and some post-kantians," who are represented by Windelband, Husserl and Simmel. The (...) footnotes and critical bibliography are extremely valuable.--C. D. (shrink)

Can Nietzsche be this great? Yes, in a special sense; and whatever the faults and difficulties of this book, it must be said that someone had to do it. It stands as a classic: as a thorough reading of Nietzsche, to be sure, and possibly also as an introduction to Jaspers' own thought. The translators have performed commendably.—C. D.

A collection of passages from Plato's dialogues which bear on Christian theology and morals, arranged and translated by the Archdeacon of Westminster. --C. L.

A large collection of materials, subtitled "An Introduction to Philosophy," and divided into the three parts suggested by the title. "Philosophy," "Religion," and "Science" are treated by the editor as attitudes or ways of thinking. There are biographical sketches before each selection, and questions for discussion and bibliographies after. The editor also includes an introduction, a glossary, an index, and a concluding chapter entitled "Towards a Philosophy of Life."--N. S. C.

Renou's Louis H. Jordan Lectures for 1951 give a concise, erudite, yet readable survey of Hinduism and Jainism. Their title is misleading since they mention modern as well as ancient developments and dwell not so much on religious as on theologico-philosophical and literary-historical issues. The work provides a good sense of European scholarship on its subject and includes more information on the various Hindu sects than do some of its counterparts. Except for the occasional, brilliant aside, it does not help (...) one to understand what it might have been like to have ever been a Hindu or a Jain.--C. P. S. (shrink)

An elaborate epitomization of the thought of all the main philosophers, grouped according to the conventional "schools of thought." The scope of the undertaking in this introductory text is ambitious, though some may feel that its manner of categorizing philosophers tends to blur the line between epitome and caricature.—C. T. W.

A collection of texts, otherwise not easily accessible, indispensable to students of comparative religion and comparative literature, reprinted from the Princeton Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament. Includes hymns, prayers, myths, epics, etc. Each text is provided with a brief introduction; a short bibliography and index to Biblical references is also included.--C. M.

The new epilogue entitled "Original Sin, Natural Law and Politics," in which the philosophic contributions of Niebuhr and Lippman are discussed and disposed of is somewhat disappointing.--C. M.

Although extremely comprehensive in its subject-matter, catholic in its treatment of diverse points of view, and lucid, this book is not simply a survey. Rather, it is, in its own way, original—not because any information or thesis it contains is new, but because it offers a clear, synoptic, and sophisticated look at what has been a relatively ill-defined and fragmented sector of philosophy, that of determining the nature of the "behavioral sciences." Kaplan's way of accomplishing this is to consider the (...) concepts and activities of science "functionally"; and he generally finds that "no one function can suffice" to show us what, e.g., a law of nature is, or what an experiment is, or what a model is, etc. Thus he typically finds other, mutually competing theories both partially true and too narrow. He also has much that is illuminating to say about the Deweyan ideas that the logic of science is fundamentally a "logic-in-use" ; and that scientific concepts are "open" and properly depend on the context of inquiry, rather than on the logician, for their "closure." Consonant with these themes is his stress on the openness of the concept of methodology itself: behavioral scientists, he contends, will gain no salvation merely by finding better procedures. Of greater importance are the values, choices, and invention of the inquirer himself; and Kaplan, accordingly, treats these matters in detail.—C. T. W. (shrink)

Though the philosopher will undoubtedly find this study too elementary for many of his purposes, the student of literature and the generally interested reader will be delighted by this rich source of reference material. Published under the general editorship of Mortimer J. Adler by the Institute for Philosophical Research, The Idea of Love has one of the most accessible formats of the Concepts in Western Thought Series. Preliminary chapters explain critical notions used in later schematizations of various figures, and relate (...) in neat topical divisions controversies about natural and supernatural human love. Next, illustrative chapters present different authors according to whether they hold that love can be either acquisitive or benevolent desire, is only acquisitive desire, must include benevolence, is wholly or primarily judgment. Two final divisions which overlap these give judgmental aspects of wholly and primarily tendential conceptions of love. Expositions within each of these divisions both justify the classification and adequately develop particular sub-themes. In toto, more than forty philosophers, writers, theologians, and psychologists receive a fairly extensive treatment, including generous citations, while brief references are also made to minor figures. Among those given major consideration are Plato, Augustine, Aristotle, Cicero, Aquinas, Dante, Kierkegaard, Kant, Freud, Jung, and William James ; Plotinus, Andreas Capellanus, Stendhal, Schopenhauer, Santayana, Darwin, Rousseau, Spinoza, Leibniz ; Adam Smith, Hegel, C. S. Lewis, Ortega Y Gasset, Erich Fromm ; Descartes, Hume, Locke, and Pascal. The work is indexed and supplemented by a seven-page bibliography.--C. M. R. (shrink)

This is an attempt to show, with a Roycean form of dialectic, the inadequacies of common sense, realism, and pragmatism for explaining the possibility of epistemic error, and the way their respective deficiencies require Royce's own solution. The argument is marred by repeated imprecisions of statement, and obscurities of presentation and criticism.—C. T. W.

A welcome re-issue of a pioneer study first published in 1894. The author explains the recurrence of certain basic Eurasian decorative motifs--e.g., the triskelion, the swastika, and the caduceus --by tracing their migration from one culture to another. The range of the author's archaeological samples is very wide, and a wealth of illustrations allows the reader to check on his inductive claims; the archaeological and historical evidence is well integrated.--C. M.

A collection of nine essays delivered at a Brock University symposium, including papers by J. Owens, C. Kahn, and H. G. Gadamer. As the title indicates, this volume is an example of "comparative philosophy": four of the papers deal with the Western tradition of thinking about being, and four with the Eastern tradition. Only one paper actually compares the two traditions at any length.

Purports to be a "critical survey of the fundamental problems of logic and epistemology and their metaphysical implications," but is mainly an exposition. It is difficult to discover a unifying thesis explaining why the author chose to compare precisely these two philosophers.--C. M.

Helm criticizes contemporary—largely analytic—work in philosophy of religion which closes off dispute or objection by a simple appeal to "the grammar of religious language" or to "what the believer would say." "The argument of this book is that such approaches involve an important error in philosophical method, for they rest on the mistaken assumption that the ‘religious believer’ has an unmistakable identity, and that ‘religious language’ is a distinct, homogeneous form of language". The issue is methodological because it focuses on (...) "the conceptual imperialism that has plagued accounts of religious belief". Helm believes that philosophical models will more adequately and less dogmatically reflect the pluralism and complexity of religion if we separate religion or theology from metareligion or metatheology. Thus, Part I of the book argues for this distinction and for the interpenetration of meta- and object-languages, in order to reject what are presented as straightforward appeals to an uncontroversial univocity in the logic or language of religious belief. Part II illustrates the inadequacy of such appeals by describing four prominent models of religious belief: 1) the probability model, based on empirical data or natural analogies ; 2) the self-authentication model, based on the intuitively grasped character of a document ; 3) the regulative model, based on morality ; and 4) the acquaintance model, based on immediate awareness and a free or unconstrained interpretation. Part III suggests how each of these four paradigm theories might respond to the two basic questions in Flew’s "falsificationist challenge": What would falsify p? and What reasons would induce A to change his mind as to the truth of p? The variety of the responses is intended to reinforce Helm’s contention that philosophers must give over question-begging methodologies which surreptitiously impose favored models on religious belief.—C.A.C. (shrink)

A fine new translation, in which clarity and ease of reading have been the principal aims. Mr. Warrington has re-arranged the traditional text in an effort to make of its often disparate parts a unified and well-ordered whole. Book Δ is printed first, for example, and Ι and Λ last, with α and parts of Κ and Μ as Appendices. Long sentences have been broken up, subtitles inserted, points and paragraphs numbered for ready reference, and parenthetical phrases printed as footnotes. (...) Further footnotes explain difficult passages and provide cross-references. The result is perhaps the easiest Metaphysics possible, though even it, of course, is far from easy going.--V. C. C. (shrink)

An effort to account for the discrepancy between modern man's technological skill and his understanding of moral and social values, which has made human self-destruction a very real threat. The author's conclusions are familiar and not too illuminating.--V. C. C.

This is a very readable theological attack on current religious journalism about "the death of God" and its moral consequences. Rightly chiding the "radical" theologians for their tendentious use of words like "new," Hamilton wrongly equates their talk of "the secular" with support of the profane and so sometimes misses the import of their groping for new ways of thinking and acting as Christians. Seen through his eyes, much of their thought is really nineteenth century liberal humanism repackaged for the (...) suburban market. Recognizing the incoherence of the Barth-Bonhoeffer concept of religion, he nevertheless uses it when accusing Bishop Robinson, van Buren, and the rest of replacing Christianity with religion, rather than inaugurating a "religionless Christianity," as they intend. The best part of the book is an analysis of what Bonhoeffer really meant by "religionless Christianity" and other such provocative phrases. Like those he criticizes, Hamilton is quite sure that the Bible supports only his version of Christianity. His unabashed neo-orthodoxy commits him to conceiving of God as an arbitrary dictator, but it also provides him with a keen critical vantage-point, by reference to which all philosophical theologies are damned as modernizing, hypothetical, Hegelian, and un-Christian at heart. His own preference for talk of "natural piety" instead of "secular Christianity" is too sketchily presented to be assessed.--C. P. S. (shrink)

With respect to "beginnings," Marxism-Leninism shares with Hegel the opinion that 1) man is a product of an historical process and hence has no fixed nature; 2) knowledge and its object are changeable, but there is an "absolute standpoint" created by change itself from which a view of the whole is obtainable. There is disagreement about the nature of the object known and hence also about the nature of the absolute standpoint. This study repeats the customary objection that Hegel begins (...) with thinking, whereas he ought to have begun with primitive human activity. Accordingly, Hegel ends with speculation whereas Marxism-Leninism issues in praxis. The best part of the study appears to be the discussion of the relation in Hegel between sensibility and thought, and therewith the relation between the beginning of the Logik and of the Phänomenologie.—H. C. (shrink)