COnstantien Sandis speaks to Nassim Taleb about inductive knowledge,black swans, Hume, Popper, and Wittgenstein.

Bowers et al. focus their criticisms on research that compares behavioral and brain data from the ventral stream with a class of deep neural networks for object recognition. While they are right to identify issues with current benchmarking research programs, they overlook a much more fundamental limitation of this literature: Disregarding the importance of action and interaction for perception.

History casts a spell on our minds more powerful than science or religion. It does not root us in the past at all. It rather flatters us with the belief in our ability to recreate the world in our image. It is a form of self-assertion that brooks no opposition or dissent and shelters us from the experience of time. So argues Constantin Fasolt in _The Limits of History_, an ambitious and pathbreaking study that conquers history's power by carrying (...) the fight into the center of its domain. Fasolt considers the work of Hermann Conring and Bartolus of Sassoferrato, two antipodes in early modern battles over the principles of European thought and action that ended with the triumph of historical consciousness. Proceeding according to the rules of normal historical analysis—gathering evidence, putting it in context, and analyzing its meaning—Fasolt uncovers limits that no kind of history can cross. He concludes that history is a ritual designed to maintain the modern faith in the autonomy of states and individuals. God wants it, the old crusaders would have said. The truth, Fasolt insists, only begins where that illusion ends. With its probing look at the ideological underpinnings of historical practice, _The Limits of History_ demonstrates that history presupposes highly political assumptions about free will, responsibility, and the relationship between the past and the present. A work of both intellectual history and historiography, it will prove invaluable to students of historical method, philosophy, political theory, and early modern European culture. (shrink)

Interview with Constantine Sigov, dedicated to the history of the "European Dictionary of Philosophies": from the emergence of an idea in the early 90's in France until the accomplishment of the Ukrainian edition in 2019.

The two Heisenberg Uncertainties (UR) entail an incompatibility between the two pairs of conjugated variables E, t and p, q. But incompatibility comes in two kinds, exclusive of one another. There is incompatibility defineable as: (p → − q) & (q→ − p) or defineable as [(p →− q) & (q →− p)] ↔ r. The former kind is unconditional, the latter conditional. The former, in accordance, is fact independent, and thus a matter of logic, the latter fact dependent, and (...) thus a matter of fact. The two types are therefore diametrically opposed. In spite of this, however, the existing derivations of the Uncertainties are shown here to entail both types of incompatibility simultaneously. Δ E Δ t ≥ h is known to derive from the quantum relation E = hν plus the Fourier relation Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1. And the Fourier relation assigns a logical incompatibility between Δ ν = 0, Δ t = 0. (Defining a repetitive phenomenon at an instant t → 0 is a self contradictory notion.) An incompatibility, therefore, which is fact independent and unconditional. How can one reconcile this with the fact that Δ EΔ t exists if and only if h > 0, which latter supposition is a factual truth, entailing that a Δ E = 0, Δ t = 0 incompatibility should itself be fact dependent? Are we to say that E and t are unconditionally incompatible (via Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1) on condition that E = hν is at all true? Hence, as presently standing, the UR express a self-contradicting type of incompatibility. To circumvent this undesirable result, I reinterpret E = hν as relating the energy with a period. Though only one such period. And not with frequency literally. (It is false that E = ν. It is true that E = ν times the quantum.) In this way, the literal concept of frequency does not enter as before, rendering Δ ν Δ t ≥ 1 inapplicable. So the above noted contradiction disappears. Nevertheless, the Uncertainties are derived. If energy is only to be defined over a period, momentum only over a distance (formerly a wavelength) resulting during such period, thus yielding quantized action of dimensions Et = pq, then energies will become indefinite at instants, momenta indefinite at points, leading, as demanded, to (symmetric!) Δ E Δ t = Δ p Δ q ≥ h’s. (shrink)

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Review the Istvan Kiraly V.'s book: Death and History.

Modern societies are characterized by a division of epistemic labor between laypeople and epistemic authorities. Authorities are often far more competent than laypeople and can thus, ideally, inform their beliefs. But how should laypeople rationally respond to an authority’s beliefs if they already have beliefs and reasons of their own concerning some subject matter? According to the standard view, the beliefs of epistemic authorities are just further, albeit weighty, pieces of evidence. In contrast, the Preemption View claims that, when one (...) discovers what an authority believes, it is not permissible to rely on any of one’s own reasons concerning the subject matter. The original version of this view, as proposed by Linda Zagzebski, has recently been severely criticized for recommending blind trust and for abandoning even minimal standards for critical thinking. In our paper, we defend a new version of the Preemption View—Defeatist Preemptionism—in a way that differs radically from Zagzebski’s. We argue that our view can be derived from certain widely accepted general epistemic principles. In particular, we claim that preemption can be identified as a special case of source sensitive defeat. Moreover, we argue that Defeatist Preemptionism does not lead to the undesirable consequences that critics ascribe to the Preemption View. The paper thus articulates the foundations and refinements of the Preemption View, such that it adequately captures the phenomenon of epistemic authority and the rational requirements related to it. (shrink)

This paper documents a conversation between a philosopher and a human computer interaction researcher whose research has been enormously influenced by Wittgenstein. In particular, the in vivo use of categories in the design of communications and AI technologies are discussed, and how this meaning needs to evolve to allow creative design to flourish. The paper will be of interest to anyone concerned with philosophical tools in everyday action.

This paper attempts to motivate the view that instead of rejecting modus ponens as invalid in certain situations, one could preserve its validity by associating such situations with non-normal interpretations of logical connectives.

The anthology contains twenty-two essays and is divided into two parts. The essays are, in the main, critical responses to aspects of what has come to be known in action theory as the ‘Standard View’ – the view that traces back to Donald Davidson's contribution to twentieth-century philosophy of action. The view under criticism treats actions as bodily movements caused in a non-deviant way by belief–desire pairs, construes these belief–desire pairs as the primary reasons for the actions that they cause, (...) and embraces event-causality.The issue of how we should conceive of action is taken up in several essays. For example: in Essay 1, Fred Dretske challenges the view that actions are external events that are the effect of the reasons for which the action is done. In Essay 16, Helen Steward, proposes that, instead of treating the availability of a reason-giving explanation as essential to action, we should construe action as ‘an exercise of the power of bodily control by an animal’. In Essay 21, Jonathan Dancy argues for a deflationary approach to actions, which forgoes treating actions ‘as individuals, with identity conditions’.Other authors – for example, Stephen Everson, Rowland Stout and Maria Alvarez – focus on the issue of what reasons for action are. Are they psychological states, or propositions, or states of affairs? Also under review is how to distinguish different kinds of reason: normative and explanatory reasons, and even explanatory and motivating reasons. (shrink)

Die Untersuchung stellt die Psychologie und Psychiatrie des jungen Kant vor, die im Rahmen seiner Auseinandersetzung mit dem schwedischen Gelehrten, Mystiker und Geisterseher Emanuel von Swedenborg entstanden ist. Hieraus ging Kants Wahnkritik hervor, in der er die drei Aspekte der Schizophrenie die Projektion, die Ich-Spaltung sowie die Paranoia analysiert. Constantin Rauer zeigt, dass und wie Kant seine fruhe Wahnkritik in die spatere Vernunftkritik ubertragen hat, und wie sich durch diese Anwendung der Psychologie auf die Logik das vollzog, was spater (...) Kants kritische Wende genannt wurde. Damit vollzieht der Autor erstmals Kants Revolution der Denkungsart und mit dieser die Genese seiner Kritik der reinen Vernunft systematisch nach. So fuhrt seine Untersuchung zu einem neuen Kant-Verstandnis, indem sie zeigt, dass Kants Vernunftkritik auch als eine Anti-Wahnkritik zu verstehen ist. Mit seiner Kritik des Wahns aber zielt Kant auf die verborgene Irrationalitat der Moderne: auf den erkenntnistheoretischen Wahn des Empirismus, den ethischen Wahn des Sozialdarwinismus sowie den religiosen Wahn im Kulturrelativismus. "Die Arbeit ist klar und uberzeugend aufgebaut. Uberdies ist sie sehr gut lesbar geschrieben: klar, zupackend, argumentativ, immer wieder von erhellenden Bildern durchsetzt; und die Verbindung einer wohldurchdachten Interpretation und Argumentation mit einer neuartigen These fuhrt zu einem philosophisch geradezu spannenden Text.... Hier findet eine hochentwickelte internationale Kantforschung einen grundlegend neuen Blick." ". (shrink)

Is knowledge-how, or “practical” knowledge, a species of knowledge-that, or “theoretical” knowledge? There is no comfortable position to take in the debate around this question. On the one hand, there are counterexamples against the anti-intellectualist thesis that practical knowledge is best analysed as an ability. They show that having an ability to ϕ is not necessary for knowing how to ϕ. On the other hand, the intellectualist analysis of practical knowledge as a subspecies of theoretical knowledge is threatened by its (...) own set of counterexamples, which convincingly establish that practical knowledge lacks many of the typical characteristics of theoretical knowledge. Most strikingly it does not even appear to require a belief. In this paper, I develop an account of practical knowledge that avoids these counterexamples. It also manages to preserve both the status of such knowledge as a cognitive achievement and its apparently close conceptual relation to abilities. I start with the counterexamples against the necessity of abilities for practical knowledge and show that they fail because they underestimate the cognitive demands of attempts. I then make use of the logic of dispositions to bridge the gap that counterexamples against the necessity of abilities for practical knowledge open. It is argued that, instead of the ability to ϕ, it is a specific disposition to have the ability to ϕ that constitutes practical knowledge about ϕ. The resulting theory is an anti-intellectualist position that preserves essential intellectualist motivations and thus should be satisfactory for proponents of both views. (shrink)

The Things We Do and Why We Do Them argues against the common assumption that there is a kind of thing called "action" which all reason-giving explanation of action are geared towards. Sandis explains why all theories concerned with the form which any such explanation must take fail from the outset, and shows how various debates on the nature of so-called motivating reasons only arise because the participants all share a number of mistaken views which follow from the basic assumption (...) under attack. In so doing, he urges philosophers and psychologists alike to stop asking whether the explanation of action is causal, and to focus instead on its multifarious objects. This book will appeal to anyone interested in motivational psychology, the reasons for which we act, and the philosophy of explanation in general. (shrink)

Constantine Sandis argues for a holistic approach to museums.

Due to Gӧdel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments –Warren (2020), Murzi and Topey (2021)– for the idea that the natural deduction rules for (...) the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s (2013) local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e. non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the ω-rule and I show that the addition of the ω-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement. (shrink)

Over the course of the last 15 years, Constantine Sandis has advanced our understanding of the role that action plays in shaping our moral thought. In this collection of his best essays in the philosophy of action, Sandis brings together updated versions of his writings, accompanied by a new introduction. Read collectively they demonstrate the breadth of his interests and ability to relate to broader issues within the culture, connecting debates in philosophical psychology about motivation, negligence, and moral responsibility with (...) Greek tragedy, social psychology and literature. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The article attempts to present the monograph Enlightenment and Revolution: The Making of Modern Greece by Paschalis M. Kitromilides, through its main protagonist, Adamantios Korais. Special emphasis is given to the main feature of the book, which is linking the history of ideas with the history of material life, ie theory and practice. In this way, the historiographical method of Kitromilides and its originality are examined at the same time.

The limits of ignorance Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-2 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9571-z Authors Constantine Sandis, Westminster Institute of Education, Oxford Brookes University, Harcourt Hill Campus, Oxford, OX2 9AT UK Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Back cover: Jedes konkrete Selbst- und Weltverhältnis baut sich im Zuge eines deutenden Verstehens auf. Das gilt auch für die Religion, die am Leben eine Tiefendimension unbedingten Sinns eröffnet. Constantin Plaul rekonstruiert das Werk Wilhelm Diltheys als Reflexion dieser Einsicht.

The generalization of Complementarity has been an ambition and a challenge to many a Bohrian scholar or quantum philosopher, and to Bohr himself above all others besides. A very recent attempt by Professor Gonzalo Munevar, proposing an extension of CTY to alternative conceptual schemes, re-opens this issue and seeks to place it within the context of modern day Relativism on the grounds that conceptual schemes belonging to different cultural groups or even different biological species are neither reducible to one another, (...) nor equivalent, nor however contradictory and therefore simply "complementary." Such being the case, neither conceptual scheme can overrule its rival scheme, nor however include or assimilate it, being to all intents and purposes as valid as its rival, albeit fundamentally divergent from it. This conclusion inevitably guides the steps of knowledge along the path of Relativism and Subjectivism, a route which Prof. Munevar makes it perfectly clear that he would eagerly follow. (shrink)

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