Avtor v prispevku predstavi okoliščine korespondence med teologom in klasicistom Richardom Bentleyem in filozofom Isaacom Newtonom. Bentley je v svojih osmih Boylovih predavanjih, naslovljenih Ovržba ateizma, uporabil številne misli in ugotovitve, ali pa njihove izpeljave, iz Newtonovih Matematičnih principov filozofije narave, ker pa ni pa bil povsem prepričan, ali jih dovolj dobro razume, se je obrnil na Newtona s prošnjo za dodatna pojasnila. Newton v svojih odgovorih pojasnjuje nekatere temeljne elemente svoje filozofske teologije ali metafizike in filozofije narave, predvsem o (...) vlogi in delovanju Boga pri stvarjenju in ureditvi sveta. Tako Bentley kot Newton sta prepričana, je svet ustvaril »umni dejavnik«. Drugi pomemben vidik korespondence predstavljajo Newtonova razmišljanja o gravitaciji ali, povedano drugače, vprašanje, ali je gravitacija materiji vrojena ali ne, in o možnosti delovanja teles na daljavo. (shrink)

Isaac Newton affirms on several occasions that human understanding cannot reach the essence of bodies. The article seeks to answer the question of why we cannot reach their essence either through our reflection or our senses, which confines our cognition to their appearances. I argue that the answer to this problem lies in Newton’s theological voluntarism, which he fully developed for the first time and explicitly in relation to the problem of the nature of bodies in his manuscript De gravitatione. (...) Newton’s God could create beings similar to bodies, which display all their actions and exhibit all their phenomena, and yet they would not be bodies in their essential and metaphysical constitution. Newton’s theological voluntarism has other important epistemological consequences, such as God’s ability to freely change the laws of nature according to his will. (shrink)

Aspiracija za jedinstvenim upravljanjem svetom je stara koliko i sam svet. Ona u suštini proizlazi iz naše percepcije sveta kao jednog, bez obzira na sve razlike koje se u njemu takođe vide. U naše vreme ova percepcija je pojačana utiskom o sve većoj međuzavisnosti delova sveta, kao i osećajem da su razlike, ma koliko bile velike, sve manje važne u odnosu na ono što je isto ili bar slično u različitim delovima sveta. Ovaj osećaj jedinstva je još više pojačan percepcijom (...) potrebe, ili nužde, da se o važnim stvarima u svetu odlučuje i upravlja na jedinstven način, bez kolizija koje bi proces odlučivanja učinile neefikasnim ili nemogućim. Ali jedinstvo sveta bi trebalo da u sebi sadrži ideju ravnopravnosti, i neke načelne jednakosti. Međutim, uvidom u način na koji se ovaj proces unifikacije sveta stvarno odvija vidimo mnoge probleme. Neki od njih su za očekivati – problemi reprezentacije i pristanka na svetsku vlast koja bi bila odraz jedinstvene zakonodavne volje čovečanstva. Takva volja možda uopšte ne može da se konstituiše. Umesto nje imamo volju za hegemonijom koju prati ideja nejednakosti i manihejske podele sveta na naš i tuđi deo, kao i razne vrste pokušaja ukidanja onog uslova koji svakom zakonodavstvu daje njegov legitimet – a to je sloboda. Suočavamo se sa idejom da je, kao uslov mira i demokratije (šta god da to znači, ili što će značiti u bližoj i daljoj budućnosti) potrebno uspostaviti krutu nejednakost i rigidnu kontrolu svih različitosti u jednom zamrznutom stanju podele na povlašćene i obezvlašćene, na „dobre“ i „loše“ momke, kao da se svet sastoji od „momaka“. Ključni deo ove sheme je pretpostavka o univerzalnoj samerljivosti svega što život čini vrednim. Ta pretpostavka uniformiše i simplifikuje, smanjuje, svet, negirajući relevanciju i stvarnost razlikama koji sada predstavljaju stvarnost sveta. Zakoni više ne pretpostavljaju postojanje zakonodavne volje. U toj situaciji proizvodnja ogromne količine iluzorne sreće više liči na podmićivanje svetskog lumpenproletarijata, sa rizikom da celokupno čovečanstvo postane totalno ravnodušno prema svakoj posebnosti i svakoj vrlini, sasvim primereno svojoj novoj lumpenproleterskoj prirodi. (shrink)

Izhajajoč iz Montaignovega eseja Apologie de Raimond Sebond skuSa avtor osvetliti razliko med povezovanjem tako imenovanih razlogov za dvom, se pravi čutnih zmot, norosti in sanj pri Montaignu in v Descartesovi Prvi meditaciji. V zvezi z demonom kot razlogom oziroma sredstvom za dvom pa skuša - ob navezavi na Popkinovo tezo, da bi bilo zgodovinski vir Descarte-sovega demona mogoče iskati v znamenitem sodnem procesu zoper Urbaina Grandierja, do katerega je v začetku tridesetih let 17. stoletja prišlo v Loudunu v Franciji (...) - opozoriti na določeno ujemanje med Descartesovo lastno držo do demona v Prvi meditaciji, da bo namreč trdno odločen pazil, da mu ta varljivec ne bo mogel vsiliti kaj lažnega, in odklonilnim stališčem teologov s pariške Sorbone do pričevanja demonov na tedanjih sodnih procesih. (shrink)

Besedilo je prevedel in z opombami opremil Kajetan Škraban. Strokovno redakcijo prevoda je opravil Matjaž Vesel.

Descartes uses the term experience (experientia; expérience) many time not only in the subject of physics but also in the one of metaphysics, especially in the arguments about the cogito and the free will: “he learns [‘I am thinking, therefore I am’] from experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing” (2ae Resp., AT-VII, 140; CSM-II, 100); “I cannot complain that the will or freedom of choice which I received from God is not (...) sufficiently extensive or perfect, since I know by experience that it is not restricted in any way” (Med., AT-VII, 56; CSM-II, 39), and so on. However, it is not clear what Descartes means by the term experientia; he never defines it. Then what is experience in Descartes’ metaphysics? In this paper, I intend to explore what Descartes meant by the term “experience” in the context of metaphysics. To be concrete, I first compare Descartes with earlier philosophers and clarify that Descartes’ use of the term “experience” has characteristics that were not recognized earlier (Section 1). I then clarify what the role of experience in Descartes is, while examining the validity of previous studies that equate Descartes’ experience with intuition and understanding (sections 2 and 3). (shrink)

Avtor v prispevku predstavi okoliščine, ki so spodbudile korespondenco med cambriškim platonistom Henryjem Morom in korposkularnim filozofom Renéjem Descartesom. Morova vprašanja zadevajo številna ključna vprašanja Descartesove filozofije in jih lahko razumemo kot zadnji niz ugovorov, ki jih je glede svoje filozofije prejel Descartes. More naslovi celotno področje filozofije, se pravi metafiziko, fiziko in logiko, odpre pa tudi številne probleme s področja optike in meteorologije. Avtor povzame ta vprašanja, prispevek pa zaključi z opozorilom na vpliv, ki ga je korespondenca imela na (...) mladega Isaaca Newtona in njegov rokopis De gravitatione. (shrink)

Med hjemmel i de lovfestede spesielle god skikk-reglene har flere yrker utformet yrkesetiske regler med en lovmessig forankring. Denne artikkelen tar utgangspunkt i fem yrker og gir en juridisk analyse av god revisorskikk, god advokatskikk, god regnskapsføringsskikk, god meglerskikk og god landmålerskikk. Formålet er å sammenligne den rettslige betydningen av disse SGS-reglene. De sammenlignes ut fra hjemmelsgrunnlaget og hvilken bransjeorganisasjon som har utformet de yrkesetiske reglene, autorisasjonsordning og en hypotese om at de yrkesetiske reglene inneholder følgende elementer: profesjonsansvar, integritet, objektivitet, (...) taushetsplikt og kompetansekrav.Sammenligningen viser at lovfestede SGS-regler har ført til at de aktuelle bransjeorganisasjonene har tatt ansvar for å utforme de yrkesetiske reglene. Når det gjelder autorisasjonsordningen, har Finanstilsynet ansvaret for autorisasjonene til revisorer, regnskapsførere og eiendomsmeglere. For advokater har Tilsynsrådet for advokatvirksomhet ansvaret for å føre tilsyn med advokatbevillingene, mens landmålerne ikke er underlagt en autorisasjonsordning.Analysen viser at en finner de fem elementene både i god revisorskikk, god advokatskikk, god regnskapsføringsskikk og god landmålerskikk. God meglerskikk er derimot svært forskjellig fra de andre yrkesetiske reglene. Samlet viser analysene at de yrkesetiske reglene har en viss rettslig betydning, selv om den varierer.Nøkkelord: lovfestede god skikk-regler, yrkesetiske reglerEnglish summary: The significance of ethical rules based on legislated rules for Code of ConductIn accordance with statutory authority rules for Code of conduct, several professions have designed ethical rules with a legal foundation. This article is based on a legal analysis of CoC for auditors, lawyers, accountants, real estate agents and for land surveyors. The purpose of the article is to compare the legal significance of these rules for the CoC. The various rules for CoC are compared in terms of their legal basis, the professional organisation which has designed the professional ethical rules and the system of authorisation. The rules for CoC are also compared in a hypothesis about five elements. The hypothesis is that the ethical rules contain the following elements: professionalism, integrity, objectivity, confidentiality and competency.The comparison shows that legislated rules for CoC have enabled the relevant professional organisations to take responsibility for designing professional ethical rules. In the case of system of authorisation, the «Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway» is responsible for authorising auditors, accountants and real estate agents. For lawyers the «Supervisory Council For Legal Practice» is responsible for supervising their authorisation, whereas land surveyors are not subject to an authorisation system – either public or professional.The analysis shows that one can find all five elements in the CoC for auditors, lawyers, accountants, and land surveyors. The CoC for real estate agents, however, is different from the other ethical rules. Overall, the analysis shows that the ethical rules have a certain legal significance, although it varies. (shrink)

Offers comprehensive treatment of Thomas Hobbes’s thought, providing readers with different ways of understanding Hobbes as a systematic philosopher As one of the founders of modern political philosophy, Thomas Hobbes is best known for his ideas regarding the nature of legitimate government and the necessity of society submitting to the absolute authority of sovereign power. Yet Hobbes produced a wide range of writings, from translations of texts by Homer and Thucydides, to interpretations of Biblical books, to works devoted to geometry, (...) optics, morality, and religion. Hobbes viewed himself as presenting a unified method for theoretical and practical science—an interconnected system of philosophy that provides many entry points into his thought. A Companion to Hobbes is an expertly curated collection of essays offering close textual engagement with the thought of Thomas Hobbes in his major works while probing his ideas regarding natural philosophy, mathematics, human nature, civil philosophy, religion, and more. The Companion discusses the ways in which scholars have tried to understand the unity and diversity of Hobbes’s philosophical system and examines the reception of the different parts of Hobbes’s philosophy by thinkers such as René Descartes, Margaret Cavendish, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant. Presenting a diversity of fresh perspectives by both emerging and established scholars, this volume: Provides a comprehensive treatment of Hobbes’s thought in his works, including Elements of Law, Elements of Philosophy, and Leviathan Explores the connecting points between Hobbes’ metaphysics, epistemology, mathematics, natural philosophy, morality, and civil philosophy Offers readers strategies for understanding how the parts of Hobbes’s philosophical system fit together Examines Hobbes’s philosophy of mathematics and his attempts to understand geometrical objects and definitions Considers Hobbes’s philosophy in contexts such as the natural state of humans, gender relations, and materialist worldviews Challenges conceptions of Hobbes’s moral theory and his views about the rights of sovereigns Part of the acclaimed Blackwell Companions to Philosophy series, A Companion to Hobbes is an invaluable resource for scholars and advanced students of Early modern thought, particularly those from disciplines such as History of Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Intellectual History, History of Politics, Political Theory, and English. (shrink)

This book brings together contributions by historians of philosophy and medicine to trace the concept of health from ancient Greece and China, through the Islamic world, down to modern thinkers like Descartes and Freud. Major themes include the parallel between mental and physical health and the difficulty of defining health.

In this paper, I address the controversy between Henry More and René Descartes on the indefinite extension of the world. I provide a new reading of Descartes’ famous final answer of 15 April 1649. I read the entire debate in the terms of a disagreement concerning the epistemological status of the necessity of our judgement about the extension of the universe. Accordingly, the disagreement on the infinity of the world constitutes a case of a more general disagreement on the nature (...) of the necessity of the theorems of Cartesian Physics. In particular, as concerns Descartes’ last reply, I argue that his assertion that a finite world is contradictory should be interpreted as a reply to More’s claim that the thesis of the infinity of the world, in so far as it cannot be grounded on the identity between matter and extension, does not express a logical necessity. Descartes’ assertion of the logical impossibility of a finite world, far from being, as it has always been read, a concession he made under the pressure of More’s objections, expresses the more radical element of the entire debate about the extension of the universe. (shrink)

This chapter presents some important facets of the scholastic background to Descartes’s conception of infinity. In particular, this chapter considers Francisco Suárez’s role in the late medieval debate over the concept of the relationship between God’s status as a perfect being and God’s status as an infinite being. Although I do not argue that Descartes knew Suárez’s position when he originally wrote the Meditations, I show that Suárez’s position lies behind Caterus’s criticisms of Descartes in the Objections and Replies that (...) Descartes published with the Meditations. Thus, knowledge of Suárez’s position is important for assessing both the reception and success of Descartes’s proofs of God’s existence in the Meditations. (shrink)

Descartes maintains that we can love God and that it is pleasant and morally beneficial to do so. In this essay, I examine the necessary conditions for such an intellectual love of God. I argue that the intellectual love of God is incited by a judgment that we are joined to God in reality, which is constitutive of an intellectual joy. I go on to show that the intellectual love of God is, itself, constituted by a stripping of our private (...) interests in favor of God’s divine will. (shrink)

This volume contains essays that examine infinity in early modern philosophy. The essays not only consider the ways that key figures viewed the concept. They also detail how these different beliefs about infinity influenced major philosophical systems throughout the era. These domains include mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, science, and theology. Coverage begins with an introduction that outlines the overall importance of infinity to early modern philosophy. It then moves from a general background of infinity up through Kant. Readers will learn (...) about the place of infinity in the writings of key early modern thinkers. The contributors profile the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Debates over infinity significantly influenced philosophical discussion regarding the human condition and the extent and limits of human knowledge. Questions about the infinity of space, for instance, helped lead to the introduction of a heliocentric solar system as well as the discovery of calculus. This volume offers readers an insightful look into all this and more. It provides a broad perspective that will help advance the present state of knowledge on this important but often overlooked topic. (shrink)

A questão sobre o homem e a II Meditação Resumo: Neste artigo, analiso a noção pré-filosófica de “homem” discutida por Descartes na Segunda Meditação. Apesar da atenção dirigida a esse tópico pelos contemporâneos de Descartes, em particular Bourdin, os pesquisadores não se demoram sobre tal questão. Argumentarei nas páginas seguintes que a análise da noção pré-filosófica de homem, por parte de Descartes, constitui um caso paradigmático do procedimento seguido na Segunda Meditação para encontrar a distinção. Esse procedimento consiste, de fato, (...) em um movimento que, retomando uma noção pré-filosófica, encontra, através da atenção e, por conseguinte, da clareza, a distinção: concentrando a atenção na noção pré-filosófica de homem em que “descobre” a cogitatio, o meditador torna tal noção clara; depois, a separa das determinações às quais está unida, tornando-a distinta. Palavras-chave: Descartes; Meditações; Homem; Clareza e distinção. La domanda sul l’uomo e la II Meditazione Riassunto: In questo articolo analizzo la nozione pre-filosofica di ‘uomo discussa da Descartes nella Seconda Meditazione. A dispetto dell’attenzione rivolta su questo punto dai contemporanei di Descartes, in particolare Bourdin, gli studiosi non si sono particolarmente soffermati su tale questione. Argomenterò nelle pagine seguenti che l’analisi, da parte di Descartes, della nozione pre-filosofica di uomo costituisce un caso paradigmaico della procedura seguita nella seconda Meditazione per giungere alla distinzione. Questa procedura consiste, infatti, in un movimento che, regredendo da una nozione pre-filosofica, giunge, attraverso l’attenzione e, quindi, la chiarezza, alla distinzione: dentro la nozione pre-filosofica di uomo in cui il meditante ‘scopre’ la cogitatio, egli sofferma l’attenzione rendendo tale nozione chiara, poi la separa dalle determinazioni cui è unita nella medesima nozione rendendola distinta. Parole-chiave: Descartes; Meditações; Homem; Clareza e distinção. The question about man and II Meditation Abstract: In this paper I will focus on the pre-philosophical notion of ‘man’ discussed by Descartes in the Second Meditation. In spite of the attention addressed on this very point by Descartes’s contemporaries, especially by Bourdin, scholars have not much dealt with this topic. In what follows, I will argue that Descartes’s analysis of the pre-philosophical notion of ‘man’ constitutes a paradigmatic case of the procedure followed in the Second Meditation in order to attain distinction. This procedure consists in a movement by which the meditator, by regressing from a pre-philosophical notion, obtains clearness through attention, and therefore distinctness through clearness: by focusing his attention on the pre-philosophical notion of ‘man’, in which he discovers the ‘cogitatio’, the meditator makes such a notion clear; then, by internal means of separation, he makes this notion distinct as well. Keywords: Descartes; Meditações; Homem; Clareza e distinção. (shrink)

Cet article propose de lire la séquence de AT VII 27, l. 18 à AT VII 29, l. 18 (B Op I 716-718) de la Méditation II de Descartes comme une description de nature « phénoménologique » que le méditant fait de ses actes mentaux, afin de redéfinir la sensibilité et l’imagination. Ceci ne conduit pas simplement à leur inclusion dans la res cogitans (à titre de cogitationes), mais à une resignification qui permet leur unification et, en même temps, leur (...) distinction sous la cogitatio ; ou autrement dit, ce qui permet de les distinguer l’une de l’autre et toutes les deux de l’intellection. (shrink)

Descartes claims that we can love God sensuously. However, it is prima facie unclear how this is possible, given that he is also committed to the impossibility of sensing or imagining God. In this essay, I show that Descartes has the metaphysical and psychophysical resources necessary to alleviate this tension. First, I discuss Descartes’s account of the intellectual love of God, demonstrating that the intellectual love of God constitutively involves the love of God’s creation. Second, I argue that an image (...) of God’s creation is sufficient for communicating the intellectual love of God to the body, so as to produce a sensuous love of God. And third, I discuss Descartes’s reasons for developing an account of the sensuous love of God. (shrink)

A comienzos de los años 60 el marxismo althusseriano y el psicoanálisis lacaniano coincidían en un punto: su voluntad de intervenir críticamente en una coyuntura teórica caracterizada por el avance de las ciencias humanas. Ambas corrientes señalaban, con grandes convergencias, que las “ciencias humanas” (de manera evidente en sus versiones “tecnocráticas”: ego psychology, pisicología social, sociología en sus distintos avatares, etc.) cumplían funciones de adaptación de los individuos al sistema social, considerado como un invariante. Dichas ciencias humanas se presentaban como (...) obstáculos epistemológicos para lo que entonces se pensaba como el re-comienzo del materialismo histórico y del psicoanálisis. El hallazgo de obstáculos semejantes no es una mera coincidencia. Ambas líneas de pensamiento convergen en puntos importantes, afirmando, en lo que podría pensarse como una común tendencia materialista, la subordinación de la esfera biológica a la de lo simbólico o a la práctica social, la primacía del significante sobre el sentido, la necesidad de conceptualizar formas originales de la causalidad, cuyo leit-motiv es la sobredeterminación. El presente trabajo busca explorar algunas de las tensiones contenidas en esta coincidencia. El punto de mayor tensión lo suscitan los desarrollos de Althusser y algunos de sus seguidores (en particular Pêcheux y Lecourt) acerca de la relación entre la categoría de sujeto, la de ideología y el conocimiento científico en tanto que “proceso sin sujeto”, al sostener la imposibilidad de un “sujeto de la ciencia”, tesis que sin embargo juega un rol importante en el pensamiento de Lacan. Esta tensión remite a diferentes factores: la diferente herencia epistemológica (Bachelard en un caso, Koyré en el otro), la diferente recepción de la historia de la filosofía (el caso de Descartes), como así también diferencias de registro de los conceptos clave: inconsciente por un lado, ideología y lucha de clases, por el otro. En este trabajo haremos algunas observaciones sobre los efectos que acarrea la diferente recepción de la filosofía de Descartes. (shrink)

Descartes’ epistemologies of meditation and sense imply that we cannot know anything about the mind-body union, either in the Cartesian sense of having scientia or, more interestingly, in terms of any other concept of knowledge available to Descartes. After considering the implications of this conclusion for what we may know about mind-body interaction, it becomes clear that, on Descartes’ view, we at best can be said to know that mind-body interaction, if it does in fact take place, does not violate (...) a set of causal principles, without knowing how mind and body interact, or even if they interact at all. (This article is the winner of the 2010 Rockefeller Prize awarded by the American Philosophical Association.). (shrink)

Dans les débats classiques des xvie et xviie siècles, la représentation est considérée avant tout comme une question rhétorique et psychologique, mais à la fin du xviie siècle, elle devient une question épistémologique. Cet ouvrage explore le contexte de cette transformation et ses sources.

This volume brings together a collection of new essays by leading scholars on the subject of causation in the early modern period, from Descartes to Lady Mary Shepherd. Aimed at researchers, graduate students and advanced undergraduates, the volume advances the understanding of early modern discussions of causation, and situates these discussions in the wider context of early modern philosophy and science. Specifically, the volume contains essays on key early modern thinkers, such as Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Hume, Kant. It also (...) contains essays that examine the important contributions to the causation debate of less widely discussed figures, including Louis la Forge, Thomas Brown and Lady Mary Shepherd. (shrink)

In this paper, I assess Husserl's reading of Descartes. I argue that Husserl's relationship with Descartes was a crucial element in the development of his own idea of transcendental phenomenology. I try to show that Husserl was not sensitive to the Cartesian questioning about the being of the ego sum and, from there, I argue that the ontological drift contained in Descartes does not give in to the Husserlian criticisms of “transcendental realism” and of being the precursor of “psychologism.” I (...) characterize this limitation of the Husserlian reading as the blind spot of his appraisal of Descartes. Next, I try to show how there is an ontological horizon that Descartes only foresees and that Husserl does not see at all, locking himself into his doctrines of the temporal self-constitution of transcendental subjectivity and the ego as “absolute fact.” Finally, I argue that the horizon of being and its expression as a “there is” and not an “I am” remains irreducible to both Cartesian doubt and Husserlian epoche. I draw from this situation some theses about the space of a fundamental ontology above the regional ontic spheres of Husserl's system of a priori, eidetic knowledge. (shrink)

This article presents an alternative vision of the debate on the Cartesian dualism of mind and body. It is argued that the Cartesian dualism of substances does not serve to explain the human condition, which is notably marked by the compound mind and body. In this way I will try to show that the passions or emotions responsible for our mental states are derived from the interaction between the mind and the body, and can in no way be reduced to (...) the mind or body taken separately. They are properties that emerge, in the heterodox sense of the term emergence, from the relation of the mind to the body. (shrink)

This chapter examines how the borderline cases pointed out by English naturalists and philosophers in the second half of the seventeenth-century call into doubt the common notion of life as a vegetative power. In the first part of this chapter, I focus on Nehemiah Grew’s notions of life and living beings by comparing his plant anatomy, in which he examines the cases of sponges and corals, with his physico-theology. In the second part, I confront Grew’s views on life to those (...) of John Ray and Ralph Cudworth. My aim is threefold. First, I want to show that there was then no agreement on what a “vital phenomenon” is. Second, I want to emphasize the fact that what we would classify today as physical phenomena, such as gravitation, were then regarded as living phenomena. Third, and accordingly, I would like to challenge the view that the English naturalists and philosophers who then developed a physico-theology simply used empirical vital phenomena in order to refute Descartes’ metaphysics. In my view, there were no such things as “empirical vital phenomena.” Indeed, the very identification and description of the phenomena considered as “vital” was a matter of interpretation, and those different authors did not share the same set of assumptions regarding what kinds of beings are alive. At the very least, they do not share the set of assumptions that define what we regard as “vital.”. (shrink)

Tous les individus sont animés, quoiqu'à des degrés divers. Cette proposition de Spinoza approuvée par Leibniz n'a cessé d'alimenter une lecture vitaliste de la nature. Comprise à partir du développement des savoirs médicaux après Descartes, elle révèle pourtant de tout autres enjeux. Elle suppose une interprétation nouvelle du pouvoir de la raison et du statut de l'observable, liée à l'essor du mécanisme. La vie selon la raison suit une méthode comparatiste qui éclaire ces décisions philosophiques. Par l'analyse contextuelle des concepts (...) d'organisme, de vie et de siège de l'âme, « écueil de la philosophie et de l'anatomie moderne », l'ouvrage reconstruit l'ensemble d'une culture scientifique et soulève un point essentiel : le geste par lequel Spinoza et Leibniz reconfigurent les rapports traditionnels entre deux types de discours sur les facultés de l'âme – la métaphysique et la physiologie. Au-delà de la confrontation doctrinale, c'est donc tout un pan de la philosophie et de l'histoire des sciences de la vie qui se trouve ici mis en lumière. (shrink)

This volume explores the themes of vanishing matter, matter and the laws of nature, the qualities of matter, and the diversity of the debates about matter in the early modern period. Chapters are unified by a number of interlocking themes which together enable some of the broader contours of the philosophy of matter to be charted in new ways. Part I concerns Cartesian Matter; Part II covers Matter, Mechanism and Medicine; Part III covers Matter and the Laws of Motion; and (...) Part IV covers Leibniz and Hume. Bringing together some of the world’s leading scholars of early modern philosophy, as well as some exciting new researchers, _Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion _stakes out new territory that all serious scholars of early modern philosophy and science will want to traverse. (shrink)

The Malebranchian Reception of Pascal’s Anthropology. The Question of the Transmission of Original Sin. The comparison between the theoretical positions of Pascal and Malebranche on the opportunity to shed light rationally on the ways of original sin proves to be highly instructive from three perspectives. On the one hand, it enlightens us on the strategy adopted in each of these apologetic projects towards the mobilization of physiological arguments with strong materialistic undertones. In return, it injects a little dynamism into their (...) thwarted reception, especially at the time of the Enlightenment. Finally, this comparison establishes a subtle link between two authors who have been dealt with very sparsely by traditional commentaries, concerning their conception of the use of skepticism in epistemology. Thus, through the problem of the ways of sin transmission, this is not a rethinking of the relationships between reason and faith, but is, rather, a particular use of reason and of Descartes’ analyses. (shrink)

The story of L’Homme is a true novel. Its plot weaves itself along three intersecting points: an unfinished text, a copied or plagiarised text, and a corrected text. Telling this whole and complex story helps us to understand the true place of Descartes in the history of modern anthropology and in the contemporary attempt to explain cognition, memory, sensation and human health. In a nutshell, it is probably the best way to understand the Cartesian contribution to the vast philosophical programme (...) of seeking to know oneself. (shrink)

This book is a critical and analytical survey of the major attempts, in modern philosophy, to deal with the phenomenon of intentionality—those of Descartes, Brentano, Meinong, Husserl, Frege, Russell, Bergmann, Chisholm, and Sellars. By coordinating the semantical approaches to the phenomenon, Dr. Aquila undertakes to provide a basis for dialogue among philosophers of different persuasions. "Intentionality" has become, since Franz Brentano revived its original medieval use, the standard term describing the mind's apparently paradoxical capacity to relate itself to objects existing (...) in the world. One approach to the phenomenon emphasizes the mental act. The author argues that the most adequate account involves elements of both approaches. Contemporary treatments tend to formulate problems of intentionality primarily in terms of logic and semantics rather than those of metaphysics and phenomenology. Dr. Aquila's effort to coordinate these approaches will make his book useful to students both of analytical philosophy of mind and also of phenomenology. (shrink)

This essay explores the reception and used of Suárez’s philosophy by two canonical early modern philosophers, René Descartes and Gottfried Leibniz. It is argued that Descartes’ theory of distinctions does not betray any indications of being Suárezian, despite many claims to the contrary. Leibniz, however, was a very different reader of Suárez’s works, it is argued, and his thinking about individuation was clearly influenced by Suárez even if he did not adopt the Suárezian position in the end.

Descartes' image of the tree of knowledge from the preface to the French edition of the Principles of Philosophy is usually taken to represent Descartes' break with the past and with the fragmentation of knowledge of the schools. But if Descartes' tree of knowledge is analyzed in its proper context, another interpretation emerges. A series of contrasts with other classifications of knowledge from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries raises some puzzles: claims of originality and radical break from the past do (...) not seem warranted. Further contrasts with Descartes' unpublished writings and with school doctrines lead to the ironic conclusion that, in the famous passage, Descartes is attempting to appeal to conventional wisdom and trying to avoid sounding novel. (shrink)