This volume is a translation from the French original which appeared in 1965. It is a concise and critical examination of Soviet philosophical thought since the death of Stalin. The study is restricted to dialectical materialism probably on the supposition that this crucial area would provide significant clues to the status of Marxist philosophy as a whole in the post-Stalin period. The author discloses that Soviet philosophers, even before the 20th Congress, had already begun to criticize as thought-stifling (...) Stalin's dogmatic views on diamat. De-Stalinization has encouraged the renewed serious study of Hegel and the rediscovery of the importance of the categories for philosophical synthesis. But the author finds Soviet philosophic thought still barren of originality. Soviet philosophy is found to be the least critical of all philosophies. The easiest way to discredit Soviet philosophy, the author asserts, would be to translate one of their contemporary texts on the history of philosophy! Planty-Bonjour does not make any comparisons between the interplay of philosophers and working scientists in the western world and in the U.S.S.R. He reports that diamat is of no particular use to working Soviet scientists and that it has lost practically all control over scientific activity. The main body of the book is devoted to a critique of the Soviet notion of category and to the dialectification of the categories. In the author's view, Soviet philosophers are inevitably led to a dead-end by the incompatible and nonjustified concepts that the real is rational and that the real is matter. This incompatibility makes diamat inherently incoherent. Hegel's dialectic cannot serve as a means of avoiding the problem of transcendence toward which the basically realistic attitude of Soviet philosophy is leading. A genuine dialogue between Soviet philosophers and spiritualist philosophers is possible only if the former drop the dialectic of nature and allow the realistic tendency in their philosophy to develop.--H. B. (shrink)

The report of B. M. Hessen at the I All-Union Congress of physicists. The Congress was held in Odessa from 19 to 24 August 1930. At the plenary meeting B. M. Hessen, made a report on methodological issues of quantum physics, the relationship of physics and philosophy. Mechanistic materialism in his time came to replace the scholastic physics. But he could not solve the problems of development and specificity of forms of movement. B. M. Hessen believed that the development (...) of the basic concepts of natural science (matter, space and time, motion, wave and particle, pattern and randomness) coincides with the approach of dialectical materialism. (shrink)

The Twenty-seventh Congress of the CPSU has set the course to guide the present development of our society and determine its short- and long-term prospects. The Congress took place at a watershed in the development of the country and the contemporary world as a whole. It generalized the accumulated domestic and international experience in socialist construction, formulated a strategy to achieve the triumph of the ideals of communism, peace, and progress, made a creative contribution to the development of Marxist-Leninist theory, (...) and formulated a complex of problems to be resolved by social scientists and philosophers.Prior to the Congress, the journal published a series of articles analyzing advances made by Soviet scholars over the previous five years in the main avenues of phibsophy-dialectical and historical materialism, socio-philosophical problems in the development of socialism, philosophical problems in the natural sciences, the problems of scientijk-technological and social progress, culture and the cultural heritage, the development of the individual and communist education, ethics and esthetics, the history of philosophy, and the ideological struggle in the modern world.Today, the guidepost defining the primary content of the work ofphilosophers must be those programmatic theses of the Twenty-seventh CPSU Congress that point to the need for a broader orientation of the social sciences toward the concrete needs ofpractical life, for quick reactions to the shifts currently occurring in our life, for the careful analysis of new phenomena, and, by virtue of this, for the attainment of impressive theoretical andpractical results. The basis for this is a creative application of materialist dialectics, particularly in striving for a deeper analysis of the problems of socialism, social progress, and the maintenance of peace. This gives rise to the need for ficndamental advances in philosophical theory. Of primary importance is the acceleration of the countrys socioeconomic development, which requires investigation into the economic, social, political, cultural, and other aspects of the acceleration of social progress and the elevation in it of the role of the masses and the human factor.The new CPSU Program concentrates the attention of social scientists on the study and comprehensive analysis of global development, the creation of a new society in the USSR and in other socialist countries, the dialectics of the productive forces and production relations, the material and intellectual spheres under socialism, patterns in the establishment of the communist formation, and the paths and means toward the gradual approach to its highest phase. The scientijic analysis of the objective contradictions in socialist society, the elaboration of well-founded recommendations on their resolution, of reliable economic and social prognoses, is an urgent task of the social sciences at the contemporary stage of development.In initiating a new rubric, we by tradition would like to share with readers our plans in this area. In this issue we enumerate the basic problems for the discussion and preparation of articles in light of the materials of the Twenty-seventh Congress. The journal plans to conduct a discussion of these problems and, with the help of its wide range of authors, to publish a series of articles.The editors will embark under this new rubric with an article from the vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician P. N. Fedoseev, entitled "Dialectics in the Contemporary World.". (shrink)

Indlæg ved CM's (Centrum för Marxistiska Samhällsstudier) seminar i filosofi i Lund, april 1978.

On February 24-25, 1956, in a closed session of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita S. Khrushchev made his now famous speech on the crimes of the Stalin era. That speech marked a break with the past and it marked the end of what J.M. Bochenski dubbed the "dead period" of Soviet philosophy. Soviet philosophy changed abruptly after 1956, especially in the area of dialectical materialism. Yet most philosophers in the West neither (...) noticed nor cared. For them, the resurrection of Soviet philosophy, even if believable, was of little interest. The reasons for the lack of belief and interest were multiple. Soviet philosophy had been dull for so long that subtle differences made little difference. The Cold War was in a frigid period and reinforced the attitude of avoiding anything Soviet. Phenomenology and exis tentialism were booming in Europe and analytic philosophy was king on the Anglo-American philosophical scene. Moreover, not many philosophers in the West knew or could read Russian or were motivated to learn it to be able to read Soviet philosophical works. The launching of Sputnik awakened the West from its self complacent slumbers. Academic interest in the Soviet Union grew. (shrink)

An introduction to the basic ideas of philosophy as a science, materialism, the categories and laws of motion of nature, society and human thought, dialectics, the theory of knowledge.

This essay asks why Chinese and North Vietnamese agricultural scientists in the 1950s and 1960s willingly adopted the Soviet agricultural sciences represented not only by agronomists Ivan Michurin and Trofim Lysenko but soil scientist Vasili Williams. The answer, I argue, is that they were fascinated by the promise of Soviet agrobiology that I conceptualize as a combination of dialectical materialism and voluntarist productivism: if one masters the interconnectivity between plants, microbes, organic and inorganic materials, and soil, one can (...) overcome the given biological and environmental limits, manipulate and optimize the material flow, and ceaselessly maximize agricultural production. Engaging the historiographical debate about Lysenkoism—which has mostly paid attention to the Euro-American cases, genetic controversies, and geopolitical specificities of each locale—as a global phenomenon, I shed fresh light on the understudied Chinese and North Vietnamese cases, the intersection between Lysenko’s theories and Williamsian soil science, and epistemic commonality across national differences. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Following an initial section, in which the relation of materialism to positivism and agnosticism is discussed, and the latter views criticized, a formal definition of dialectical materialism is given. Materialism is contrasted to idealism and dualism. Dialectics is contrasted to metaphysics. Some additional assumptions, usually included in dialectics, such as the interpenetrating character of the levels of science, and rationalism, are listed. In a section devoted to the relation between matter and spirit, the foundations of materialist (...) ethics are laid by stating the humanist axiom of purpose. In the last section, historical materialism is defined, and some reasons for the occasional entanglement of scientific, philosophical, and political controversies are discussed. (shrink)

This paper studies Bukharin’s Theory and Practice from the Standpoint of Dialectical Materialism presented at the 2nd International Congress of the History of Science in London, June 29–July 3, 1931. Bukharin’s paper has not received the attention it deserves despite the fact that it provides the theoretical framework for the paper mostly highlighted in this Congress, Boris Hessen’s The Social and Economic Roots of Newton’s Principia. In this work, I try to show that Bukharin’s main achievement is a (...) theory of science based on the concept of practice and at the same time present the internal coherence and the logical structure of Bukharin’s schema. Finally, I discuss what, in my opinion, is a drawback in Bukharin’s paper: his failure to discuss the possibility for scientific objectivity. (shrink)

Con el objetivo de contribuir al debate actual sobre la necesidad del esclarecimiento de los fundamentos filosóficos de la investigación científica y su declaración en el discurso que expone sus principales resultados, se valoró la forma en que se asume la perspectiva dialéctico-materialista y se precisó en torno a algunos enfoques polémicos sobre la necesidad de su empleo consecuente como referente cosmovisivo en la construcción de la ciencia y la legitimación de sus resultados. Se enfatizó en la necesidad de su (...) consecuente empleo en el proceso de investigación. In order to contribute to the current debate on the necessity for clarification of the philosophical foundations of scientific research and its interpretation in discourse that exposes its main results, it was assessed how dialectical materialistic perspective is assumed and it was clarified around some controversial approaches about the necessity of its consistent use as a comprehensive reference in building science and the legitimacy of its results. It was emphasized on the need of its consistent use in the research process. (shrink)

There is a sense in which a philosophic theory can be confirmed. We may ask what its effects were on the development of scientific theory,—did it clarify ideas and help open up new areas of research, or did it constrain the work of science? In this essay, we shall try to judge the significance of dialectical materialism from this standpoint. We shall be concerned with the bearing of this philosophy on scientific work, especially in the Soviet Union.Now (...) class='Hi'>dialectical materialism is not a “philosophy” in the same sense which the word has when applied to, let us say, logical empiricism. The difference is evident when a writer like Haldane asks, for instance, how far scientific discoveries have verified the principles of dialectical materialism.' We could not ask in a similar way whether scientific discoveries have confirmed the principles of logical empiricism. For the latter affirms no factual propositions concerning the world; it enunciates solely the principle of verifiability, and there is clearly no scientific discovery which could possibly refute the requirement of verification. If it makes sense to ask how far scientific discoveries verify dialectical materialism, then the latter must obviously contain factual propositions concerning nature which should be stated in a way to permit of confirmation of rejection. (shrink)

What is the relationship between the field of science and the philosophy of dialectical materialism in the Soviet Union? Ninety-five per cent of the fears and misgivings expressed by American writers in regard to this subject are quite unwarranted. They have been arrived at, not by any use of the scientific method of carefully examining observable facts, but by accepting the superficialities and distortions of the sensational press, and by making sweeping “deductions” from wholly unverified premises, or from (...) isolated and exceptional instances. Some scientists who would not dream of approaching their own field of specialty in any such manner apparently feel that the complex problem of the relations between science and a certain philosophy within a new society can be so approached. (shrink)