The article explores the fundamental difference between two aspects of justice: international and global. It is then argued that for the sake of global justice, the difference can be overcome by taking a closer look at the basic human right of self-preservation in relation to moral agency, human well-being and social/distributive justice at both global and national levels. In an endeavour to attain global justice, the article defends an absolute moral right to a human minimum.

In this thorough compendium, nineteen accomplished scholars explore, in some manner the values they find inherent in the world, their nature, and revelence through the thought of Frederick FerrZ. These essays, informed by the insights of FerrZ and coming from manifold perspectives—ethics, philosophy, theology, and environmental studies, advance an ambitious challenge to current intellectual and scholarly fashions.

This "festschrift" brings together authors from various countries who are specialists in different disciplines within the humanities and who share a common vision of human life. These essays in philosophical speculation, political theory, literary criticism, and historical analysis are rooted in the western cultural heritage and Christian religious tradition. Major figures examined include Aristotle, Aquinas, Thomas More, John of the Cross, Donoso Cortes, and the Spanish Carlists. The interdisciplinary and cosmopolitan nature of this "festschrift" reflects the approach and style of (...) the man honored, Dr. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen. A special feature of the volume is a selection of critical studies of Professor Wilhelmsen's own work. (shrink)

Es ist mir eine grosse Genugtuung, die vorliegende Sammlung von Ar­ beiten eines Autors einzufuhren, der es verdient hatte, dass seine philo­ sophischen Schriften schon Hingst ihren Weg zum Verleger gefunden hatten. Da Dr. Frederick Neumann aber, nach seiner Auswanderung nach Amerika, seine ganze Zeit seinen Theologiearbeiten in englischer Sprache gewidmet hatte, war es seiner Witwe, Edith Neumann, be­ schieden, dieselben erst nach seinem Tode an wiirdiger Stelle zu ver­ offentlichen. Ich selbst bin die Witwe seines Freundes Philip Merlan, (...) der, wie ich, diese Arbeiten unseres Studienkameraden aus der Wiener Universitats­ zeit ungemein hochgeschatzt und Frederick Neumann immer zur Aus­ gabe seiner J ugendschriften zugeredet hat. Frederick Neumann ist am IO. Januar I899, in Wien, geboren und hat, wahrend und nach Beendigung seiner Studienzeit, bei Gomperz, Husserl und Heidegger gearbeitet. Er ist spater seiner eigenen Ge­ dankenrichtung gefolgt und hat gehofft einmal, in Musse, seine philo­ sophischen Arbeiten, moglicherweise in kompletterer Fassung, dem Druck zu ubergeben. Sein Interesse fur Religionsphilosophie und Theologie leitete ihn fruh zur praktischen Seelsorge und, im Jahre I938, zur Ordination als Minister der "Congregational Union of England and Wales." Nach vielseitiger Tatigkeit als Pfarrer und Lehrer, wurde er, nach seiner Auswanderung nach Amerika, Pastor der Bushwick A venue Congrega­ tional Church in Brooklyn, New York und in den letzten sechs J ahren seines Lebens ubte er, als "Visiting Professor" der Hartford Seminary Foundation, einen besonderen Einfluss auf einen grossen Kreis von Student en und Kollegen aus. (shrink)

Vorwort von dr. H. Weber. -- Betrachtungen über das denken und träumen und über die Freudsche erklärung der träume. -- Die erstürmung des neuen Jerusalem: ein traum. -- über alpdrücken und Freudsche deutungen. -- Kurze bemerkungen über willensfreihet und erblichkeit. -- Spielleidenschaft. -- Körperbewegung, arbeit, ruhe und schalaf: Aussprüche in bezung auf ihren hygienischen und psychischen wert usw. -- Zur frage des therapeutischen fastens und der beschränkten nahrungsaufnahme. -- Eine betrachtung über den nutzen des schocks oder der aufnahme. -- Eine (...) betrafchtung über den autzen des schocks oder der "abwechslung" bei gewissen körperlichen und seelischen zuständen. -- Die ärztliche versorgung der allgemeinheit und ihre wahrscheinlichen folgen. -- Wirkungen und gegenwirkungen in der pathologie und therapie. -- Zur frage von selbsttätigen, lebenswichtigen, als ein sicherheitsventil anzusehenden wirkungen und gegenwirkungen bei erkrankungen. -- Über den circulus vitiosus bei krankheiten und über die anstrengungen der natur, ihn zu durchbrechen. -- Das teleologische bild des krebses und der neubildungen. -- Samuel Butlers anschauungen : Zellgedächtnis "mneme." -- Die "rechte" der völker im vergleich zu den "rechten" der einzelmenschen und die fragen zwischenstaatlicher schiedsgerichtshöfe. -- Grausamkeit, kriegsgreuel und greuelfabeln. -- Natur und Gott : Bemerkungen über "natur," lebensführung und pflicht vom entwicklungsgeschichtlichen standpunkt aus gesehen. (shrink)

For some time there have been appearing in the philosophical literature hints and suggestions that the so-called “problem of the external world” should be abandoned, not primarily because it is of little pragmatic significance, but rather because there is really no such problem to be solved. The publication of Reichenbach's Experience and Prediction has now stimulated a resurgence of these suggestions. In the course of his discussion of the book in the April Philosophy of Science Professor Ernest Nagel has taken (...) occasion to argue briefly that this problem, which Reichenbach attempts to solve, cannot even be stated unless one assumes its solution. And in a similar vein more recently Dr. William Barrett has also criticized Reichenbach and has then gone on to present certain fundamental logical considerations which, it is alleged, guarantee that the expression “Is there an external world?” cannot designate a legitimate philosophical problem. The situation, as he describes it, is as follows. The sentence “There is an external world” or the equivalent sentence “There is a physical object” can be confirmed in a physicalistic language only if one assumes the existence of certain physical objects. This procedure is of course circular. These sentences cannot therefore be confirmed, and, since the verifiability theory of meaning is accepted, the questions derived by transferring them into the interrogative mood cannot be meaningfully asked. A similar result is asserted to follow if one employs a perception language for science in place of a physicalistic language, since there is a parallelism between these two languages such that for every expression in the one there will be a corresponding expression in the other. (shrink)

In this study the author makes a comparison between the two main types of existentialism: the Christian and the non-Christian. Dr. Kingston handles the issues in a fair and honest way, neither concealing his own position nor dealing unfairly with those of whom he is most critical.

In a masterly study of the language and motifs of Theocritus’ Thalysia, Dr. G. Giangrande has demonstrated that what the poem relates is the mock-investiture of Simichidas, the naïve young townsman and littérateur, performed with almost malicious irony by the goatherd Lycidas, who sees through, and ridicules, Simichidas’ rustic and poetic pretensions.1 My object in this paper is to examine, in the light of Giangrande's findings, some aspects of the presentation of Lycidas; this examination will, I believe, enable us to (...) bring the poem into still sharper focus. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies.1.1 (2001) 129-130 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Sound of Liberating Truth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogues in Honor of Frederick J. Streng The Sound of Liberating Truth: Buddhist-Christian Dialogues in Honor of Frederick J. Streng.Edited by Sallie B. King and Paul O.Ingram. Surrey: Curzon Press, 1999. Fred Streng was a close friend of mine. We were born the same year, 1933, and shared many interests. The (...) last time I saw him was in 1992, in Boston.We both took part in the Society for Buddhist-Christian Studies' fourth Buddhist-Christian Dialogue Conference, we both also delivered sermons at Boston University's chapel, and both of us gave commemorative addresses at a memorial service for Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. I was in exile at the time, fleeing from the oppression of the Thai National Peacekeeping Council, which had staged a coup d'etat the year before. Fred offered sincere concern for my well-being and safety, and he encouraged me, when it was most needed, to complete my work on socially engaged Buddhism. Not long after that, I received the tragic news that Fred had died of cancer at age sixty.I've always admired Fred Streng's positive disposition. His metta karuna,.oving and compassionate way, deeply shone through him. And his religious views, though different from mine, were always captivating. Fred was a Christian, yet his attitude and works greatly benefited a Theravada Buddhist like me. I especially learned from his Emptiness: AStudy in Religious Meaning.1974) and the textbook series, "Understanding Religious Life," that he edited.We are in need of different ways of perceiving and understanding reality, ways in which the brain and mind/heart are able to unite as one. In his summary of Dr. Streng's thinking, Paul Ingram summarizes his commitment to interreligious dialogue as a path in itself: [H]e was convinced that religious knowledge and authentic living at their deepest level are dependent upon seeking out alternative forms of religious experience, comparing them, and entering into dialogue with them. Interreligious dialogue, he believed, may involve (1) a mystical sense of unity underlying the diversity of humanity's ways of being religious, (2) the perception that the religious ways of humanity are alternative or complementary means of ultimate transformation, (3) a focus on enriching one's personal faith and participation in one's own religious tradition, or (4) a combination of all three of [End Page 129] the above. Fred also developed these themes further in an essay entitled "Selfhood without Selfishness: Buddhist and Christian Approaches to Authentic Living" (pp. xiv-xv). Reading The Sound of Liberating Truth,.he new collection of writings in Frederick Streng's honor edited by Sallie King and Paul Ingram, evokes fond memories of this kayanamittata(spiritual friend). The book's title is not just appealing and meaningful, it was the "life koan" that Fred grappled with during his final years: what is the sound of liberating truth? Religions can be more harmful and corrupting than even Marx thought. But the highest intention of religions remains unsurpassed--the ultimate transformation from selfishness to selflessness. In a genuine way, this book is a vehicle for helping us realize this noble outcome.I am truly impressed by the wide range of ideas I have picked up reading this volume. In addition to the important contributions by the book's two editors, there are thought-provoking articles by David Chappell and Winston King on "Interreligious Dialogue," by Bonnie Thurston and Paula Cooey on "Nature and Ecology," by Sallie King and John Keenan on "Social and Political Issues of Liberation," and by Tom Kasulis and Ruben Habito on "Ultimate Transformation or Liberation." In each of these, there are challenging dialogues and good responses, too. The Buddhist and Christian epilogues by Taitetsu Unno and John Cobb, respectively, crown all the other dialogues in depth and thoughtfulness.This volume is a well-deserved tribute to Frederick J. Streng, whose memory will be with his many friends--Buddhists, Christians, and so many others... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 153 a number of common criticisms of the being/goodness tradition. Except by Stump's and Kretzmann's essays, I am not encouraged to explore the medieval resources in the tradition, but I expect more encouragement will be forthcoming from the authors in this anthology. Georgetown College Georgetown, Kentucky ROBERT B. KRUSCHWITZ Being and Knowing: Reflections of a Thomist. By FREDERICK D. WIL· HELMSEN. Albany, N.Y.: Preserving Christian Publications, (...) 1991. Pp. 282. $25.00 (cloth) ; $12.00 (paper). In this book Dr. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen has gathered many opuscula, most of them articles previously published in journals such as The Thomist. They are not, however, a random assortment of short works, herded together under a somewhat arbitrary rubric, as such collections are notoriously apt to be. They all fit happily under the heading, " Being and Knowing," and are arranged in an order that shows careful thought: the first chapter deals with the character of metaphysics, following chapters deal with the metaphysics of esse, then further chapters carry the principles already enunciated into various special fields (such as computers, the modern self, and communication), with two final chapters that take the reader into the borderland of philosophy and faith. Wilhelmsen is well known as a vigorous exponent of what is called "existential Thomism." Although acknowledging the influence of Etienne Gilson, Wilhelmsen develops his thought in a way that is his own; he does not deserve to be hailed or dismissed on the basis of a handy tag. Certainly, for him, the doctrine of Thomas on esse is at the center, and radiates its light upon the whole of philosophy (not to say theology). But not only does Wilhelmsen expound this doctrine with special clarity and trenchancy; he shows its illuminative power in many fields of special contemporary interest, not least in radical critique of modernity-of the Cartesian ego and of the demiurgic attitude towards the world. Polemic purposes, both with respect to the whole modern demarche in philosophy and with respect to Thomisms of other stripes, are often present, sometimes explicit, sometimes implicit. He obviously stands in opposition to the deep assumptions underlying the Cartesian revolution and exercising sway over later thought. :J3ut he also finds much to 154 BOOK REVIEWS fault in would-be Thomists who do not sufficiently subordinate essentia to esse or who adopt a transcendental approach. Chapters VIII and IX exemplify the former confrontation with regard to the modern ego and its self-consciousness. Chapter IV casts a disapproving eye upon the primacy of the question as this is upheld by some eminent transcendental Thomists. An especially fine piece of work, in this reviewer's opinion, is Wilhelmsen 's study in Chapter VI of the relation of creation. The author thinks along with St. Thomas in developing the paradox of two-way priority as between the creature as substance and its relation to the God who creates it. The result is a combination of sharpness in distinguishing and depth in penetrating the ingredients of the solution: esse, divine and creaturely; esse and essentia; substance and accident; relation, real and mental-a masterly exposition of notions at the core of Thomistic metaphysics. I would mention also, particularly for its provocative contrasting of the iconic with the ironic, Chapter X, " The Philosophy of Communication." Wilhelmsen shows that he is wide awake to the current cultural scene and familiar with those who represent it and shape it. Here and elsewhere we find the " creativity " which he sees, in Chapter One, as belonging to metaphysics. Being and Knowing is a work that belongs on the shelves of all persons interested in Thomas and Thomism, in metaphysics, and in the philosophic ailments of our time and their cure., (One should also, at least parenthetically, congratulate the publishers, Preserving Christian Publications, for their effort to make more accessible such studies as those assembled in this volume. And perhaps one could be forgiven if one noted that such publications as this provide a much healthier stimulation than the pills which share ·the publisher's acronym.) Dominican House of Studies _ washington, D.C. NORMAN FENTON, O.P.... (shrink)

Abstract This paper proposes that adopting a ?phenomenological stance? enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to (...) contemplate the possibility of structurally different ways of ?finding oneself in the world?. Such a stance, I suggest, can be incorporated into an empathetic appreciation of others' experiences, amounting to what we might call ?radical empathy? (shrink)

People with depression often report alterations in their experience of time, a common complaint being that time has slowed down or stopped. In this paper, I argue that depression can involve a range of qualitatively different changes in the structure of temporal experience, some of which I proceed to describe. In addition, I suggest that current diagnostic categories such as "major depression" are insensitive to the differences between these changes. I conclude by briefly considering whether the kinds of temporal experience (...) associated with depression are specific to depression. (shrink)

It is generally maintained that emotions consist of intentional states and /or bodily feelings. This paper offers a phenomenological analysis of guilt in severe depression, in order to illustrate how such conceptions fail to adequately accommodate a way in which some emotional experiences are said to be deeper than others. Many emotions are intentional states. However, I propose that the deepest emotions are not intentional but pre-intentional, meaning that they determine which kinds of intentional state are possible. I go on (...) to suggest that pre-intentional emotions are at the same time feelings. In so doing, I reject the distinction that is often made between bodily feelings and the world-oriented aspects of emotion. (shrink)

How we understand the nature and role of grief depends on what we take its object to be and vice versa. This paper focuses on recent claims by philosophers that grief is frequently or even inherently irrational or inappropriate in one or another respect, all of which hinge on assumptions concerning the proper object of grief. By emphasizing the temporally extended structure of grief, we offer an alternative account of its object that undermines these assumptions and dissolves the apparent problems. (...) The principal object of grief, we suggest, is a loss of life possibilities, which is experienced, understood, and engaged with over a prolonged period. Other descriptions of grief's object identify more specific aspects of this loss in ways that do not respect a straightforward distinction between concrete and formal objects. (shrink)

Various claims have been made concerning the role of narrative in grief. In this paper, we emphasize the need for a discerning approach, which acknowledges that narratives of different kinds relate to grief in different ways. We focus specifically on the positive contributions that narrative can make to sustaining, restoring and revising a sense of who one is. We argue that, although it is right to suggest that narratives provide structure and coherence, they also play a complementary role in disrupting (...) established structure and opening up new possibilities. We add that both of these roles point to the importance of interpersonal, social and cultural factors in shaping the trajectory of grief. We conclude by briefly considering the implications for distinguishing between typical and pathological forms of grief. (shrink)

I examine the way in which Daniel Dennett (1987, 1995) uses his 'intentional' and 'design' stances to make the claim that intentionality is derived from design. I suggest that Dennett is best understood as attempting to supply an objective, nonintentional, naturalistic rationale for our use of intentional concepts. However, I demonstrate that his overall picture presupposes prior application of the intentional stance in a preconditional, ineliminable,'sense-giving' role. Construed as such, Dennett's account is almost identical to the account of biological teleology (...) offered by Kant in The Critique of Judgement, with the consequence that Dennett's naturalism is untenable. My conclusions lead to doubts concerning the legitimacy of any account attempting to naturalise intentionality by extracting normativity from biology and also point to a novel account of biological function. (shrink)

This paper shows how phenomenological research can enhance our understanding of what it is to experience grief. I focus specifically on themes in the work of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty, in order to develop an account that emphasizes two importantly different ways of experiencing indeterminacy. This casts light on features of grief that are disorienting and difficult to describe, while also making explicit an aspect of experience upon which the possibility of phenomenological inquiry itself depends.

This paper seeks to illuminate the nature of empathy by reflecting upon the phenomenology of depression. I propose that depression involves alteration of an aspect of experience that is seldom reflected upon or discussed, thus making it hard to understand. This alteration involves impairment or loss of a capacity for interpersonal relatedness that mutual empathy depends upon. The sufferer thus feels cut off from other people, and may remark on their indifference, hostility or inability to understand. Drawing upon the example (...) of depression, I argue that empathy is not principally a matter of ‘simulating’ another person’s experience. It is better conceived of as a perception-like exploration of others’ experiences that develops progressively through certain styles of interpersonal interaction. (shrink)

Phenomenologists such as Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty reject the kind of scientific naturalism or that takes empirical science to be epistemologically and metaphysically privileged over all other forms of enquiry. In this paper, I will consider one of their principal complaints against naturalism, that scientific accounts of things are oblivious to a that is presupposed by the intelligibility of science. Focusing mostly upon Husserl's work, I attempt to clarify the nature of this complaint and state it in the form of (...) an argument. I conclude that the argument is effective in exposing naturalism's reliance upon impoverished conceptions of human experience, and that it also weakens the more general case for naturalism. (shrink)

This paper addresses the nature of sensed-presence experiences that are commonplace among the bereaved and occur cross-culturally. Although these experiences are often labelled ‘‘bereavement hallucinations’’, it is unclear what they consist of. Some seem to involve sensory experiences in one or more modalities, while others involve a non-specificfeelingorsenseof presence. I focus on a puzzle concerning the latter: it is unclear how an experience of someone’s presence could arise without a more specific sensory content. I suggest that at least some of (...) these experiences consist in a dynamic and non-localized experience of significant and salientpossibilities. This can amount to the sense of currentlyrelating toa particular individual and, by implication, a sense of that person’s presence. Where an experience of this kind also includes sensory qualities, they are inessential to the sense of relatedness and perhaps symptomatic of it. (shrink)

This volume addresses the question of what it is like to be depressed. Despite the vast amount of research that has been conducted into the causes and treatment of depression, the experience of depression remains poorly understood. Indeed, many depression memoirs state that the experience is impossible for others to understand. However, it is at least clear that changes in emotion, mood, and bodily feeling are central to all forms of depression, and these are the book's principal focus. In recent (...) years, there has been a great deal of valuable philosophical and interdisciplinary research on the emotions, complemented by new developments in philosophy of psychiatry and scientifically-informed phenomenology. The book draws on all these areas, in order to offer a range of novel insights into the nature of depression experiences. To do so, it brings together a distinguished group of philosophers, psychiatrists, anthropologists, clinical psychologists and neuroscientists, all of whom have made important contributions to current research on emotion and/or psychiatric illness. (shrink)

This paper addresses how and why social restrictions imposed during the COVID-19 pandemic have affected people’s experiences of grief. To do so, I adopt a broadly phenomenological approach, one that emphasizes how our experiences, thoughts, and activities are shaped by relations with other people. Drawing on first-person accounts of grief during the pandemic, I identify two principal (and overlapping) themes: (a) deprivation and disruption of interpersonal processes that play important roles in comprehending and adapting to bereavement; (b) disturbance of an (...) experiential world in the context of which loss is more usually recognized and negotiated. The combination, I suggest, can amount to a sort of “grief within grief”, involving a sense of stasis consistent with clinical descriptions of prolonged grief disorder. (shrink)

This paper sketches an account of what distinguishes emotional intentionality from other forms of intentionality. I focus on the ‘two-sided’ structure of emotional experience. Emotions such as being afraid of something and being angry about something involve intentional states with specific contents. However, experiencing an entity, event, or situation in a distinctively emotional way also includes a wider-ranging disturbance of the experiential world within which the object of emotion is encountered. I consider the nature of this disturbance and its relationship (...) to the localized content of an emotional experience. (shrink)

Experiences of Depression is a philosophical exploration of what it is like to be depressed. In this important new book, Matthew Ratcliffe develops a detailed account of depression experiences by drawing on work in phenomenology, philosophy of mind and psychology, and several other disciplines.

This paper addresses the nature of touch or ?tactual perception?. I argue that touch encompasses a wide range of perceptual achievements, that treating it as a number of separate senses will not work, and that the permissive conception we are left with is so permissive that it is unclear how touch might be distinguished from the other senses. I conclude that no criteria will succeed in individuating touch. Although I do not rule out the possibility that this also applies to (...) other senses, I suggest that the heterogeneity of touch makes it both distinctive and particularly problematic. (shrink)

This paper addresses Bas van Fraassen’s claim that empiricism is a ‘stance’. I begin by distinguishing two different kinds of stance: an explicit epistemic policy and an implicit way of ‘finding oneself in a world’. At least some of van Fraassen’s claims, I suggest, refer to the latter. In explicating his ordinarily implicit ‘empirical stance’, he assumes the stance of the phenomenologist, describing the structure of his commitment to empiricism without committing to it in the process. This latter stance does (...) not incorporate the attitude that van Fraassen takes to be characteristic of empiricism. Thus its possibility serves to illustrate that empiricism as an all-encompassing philosophical orientation is untenable. I conclude by discussing the part played by feelings in philosophical stances and propose that they contribute to philosophical conviction, commitment and critique. (shrink)

This book proposes a series of interconnected arguments against the view that interpersonal understanding involves the use of a 'folk' or 'commonsense' psychology. Ratcliffe suggests that folk psychology, construed as the attribution of internal mental states in order to predict and explain behaviour, is a theoretically motivated and misleading abstraction from social life. He draws on phenomenology, neuroscience and developmental psychology to offer an alternative account that emphasizes patterned interactions between people in shared social situations.