This chapter studies the role of the will in Emil Kraepelin's writings. Kraeplin was a German neuropsychiatrist during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, and his reflections on German society are used as a basis for examining various issues in this chapter. The chapter also briefly reports a survey of the place of the will and pathologies of the will in Kraepelin's psychology and reflections on political and social issues in Germany after the First World War.

Emil Kraepelin's nosology has been reinvented, for better or worse. In the United States, the rise of the neo-Kraepelinian nosology of DSM-III resuscitated Kraepelin's work but also differed from many of his ideas, especially his overtly biological ontology. This neo-Kraepelinian system has led to concerns regarding overdiagnosis of psychiatric syndromes (.

Existing accounts of the early history of Alzheimer’s disease have focused on Alois Alzheimer’s (1864–1915) publications of two ‘peculiar cases’ of middle-aged patients who showed symptoms associated with senile dementia, and Emil Kraepelin’s (1856–1926) discussion of these and a few other cases under the newly introduced name of ‘Alzheimer’s disease’ in his Textbook of Psychiatry. This article questions the underpinnings of these accounts that rely mainly on publications and describe ‘presenility’ as a defining characteristic of the disease. Drawing on (...) archival research in the Munich psychiatric clinic, in which Alzheimer and Kraepelin practised, this article looks at the use of the category as a diagnostic label in practice. It argues that the first cases only got their exemplary status as key referents of Alzheimer’s disease in later readings of the original publications. In the 1900s, the published cases rather functioned as material to think about the limits of the category of senile dementia. The examination of paper technologies in the Munich psychiatric clinic reveals that the use of the clinical diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease was not limited to patients of a certain age and did not exclude ‘senile’ cases. Moreover, the archival records reflect that many diagnoses of Alzheimer’s disease were noted in the medical records as suspicions rather than conclusions. Against this background, the article argues that in theory and practice, Alzheimer’s disease was not treated as a well-defined disease entity in the Munich clinic, but as an exploratory category for the clinical and histopathological investigation of varieties of organic brain diseases. (shrink)

The promises of the Prozac century have fallen short; the number of novel, therapeutically significant medications successfully completing development shrinks every year; and the demand for better treatments constantly grows. Answering these hardships is a renewed optimism concerning the efficacy of controlled psychedelic therapy, a renaissance that has seen the resurgence of a familiar concept: intoxication as model psychosis. And yet, little has been made of where this peculiar idea originates. Why did we come to liken psychosis to intoxication, and (...) why is this an idea we find so hard to shake? Questioning the conventional narrative that identifies the concept as emerging in the mid 19th century, this article seeks to uncover the conceptual foundations underlying what is now intended by ‘model psychosis’. This investigation begins with an assessment of both Moreau de Tours’s concept of hashish madness in 1845 and Emil Kraepelin’s study of artificial insanity in the 1880s–90s. In seeking to contextualize these ideas, this article further considers the deeper historical association between intoxication and psychosis, instead proposing that intoxication represents an originary conception of madness. Bringing this examination into the 19th century, it becomes apparent that perceptions of intoxicants, and intoxication, were immanently participatory in the emerging understanding of psychosis. The contemporary understanding of model psychosis comes into focus when these elements coalesce with the advent of psychological modelling. Ultimately, the goal is not merely to understand how and why model psychosis became thinkable, but to examine how overlooked concepts have engendered new ways of being neuro-psychiatric subjects. (shrink)

Between Theory and Interpretation of the Hereditary Transmission Process of Mental Disease. The Introduction of Mendelism in German and North American Psychiatry, 1911–19301911 saw the beginning of decisive developments in psychiatric genetic research. During that year, two expert papers dealing with the application of the Mendelian Theory were published in Germany and in the United States. Only a decade after the “rediscovery” of the Mendelian Laws simultaneous efforts were being made to better understand the hereditary transmission process of mental diseases (...) by means of the Mendelian Theory. The results of these efforts were disparate. While in the United States, the Mendelian theory was used to support the polymorphous theory of the hereditary transmission process of mental diseases, by which a common hereditary origin of mental diseases was assumed, the introduction of Mendelism in psychiatry in Germany focused on corroborating Emil Kraepelin’s concept of a disease entity. The Mendelian Theory especially helps to underpin the idea of a specific genetic origin of the clinical diseases described by Kraepelin. As German and North American psychiatric genetics were inspired by diverse disease and genetic concepts, so too was their use of the Mendelian Theory very divergent. Research linked to the use of the Mendelian Theory was both dissimilar and hotly contested. This was due to the fact that it was difficult, if not impossible to identify Mendelian patterns by studying the hereditary transmission process. As a result, the approach of studying the genetic basis of mental diseases was further developed in Germany. (shrink)

The reorganization of psychiatric knowledge at the turn of the twentieth century derived from Emil Kraepelin’s clinical classification of psychoses. Surprisingly, within just few years, Kraepelin’s simple dichotomy between dementia praecox (schizophrenias) and manic-depressive psychosis (bipolar disorders) succeeded in giving psychiatry a new framework that is still used until the present day. Unexpectedly, Kraepelin’s simple clinical scheme based on the dichotomy replaced the significantly more differentiated nosography that dominated psychiatric research in the last three decades of the (...) nineteenth century (Janzarik in Themen und Tendenzen der deutschsprachigen Psychiatrie. Springer, Berlin, 1974 ). Moreover, although all the components of the future development were already available shortly after 1868, the real course, which led to Kraepelin’s dichotomy, was unpredictable then. This paper explores the ways in which the unpredictability of psychiatric knowledge and the postulate of a rationality underlying psychopathological phenomena interacted in the debates regarding the classification of psychoses. It examines the “natural antagonism” between the practical aspirations of an increasingly specialized medical nosology and unitary conceptions, which, in a psychopathological countermovement, emphasized that no somatic criteria can be specified for the majority of psychic abnormalities and that all nosological distinctions are not binding (Janzarik 1974, 20). In this context, this paper investigates the revival of unitary theories of psychosis in postwar German psychiatry and seeks to understand why the forms of thinking that dominated nineteenth-century psychiatry have proved to be very lasting. Furthermore, this paper emphasizes the perspectivity underlying psychiatric research on psychoses and explores the ways in which writing the history of the schizophrenia concept involves inevitably writing the history of the entire psychiatry. (shrink)

This paper focuses on the make-up of different cultures in experimental neurology, neuroanatomy, and clinical psychiatry. These cultures served as important research bases for early regenerative concepts and projects in the area of neurology and psychiatry at the beginning of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the developments in brain research and clinical neurology cannot be regarded to be isolated from broader societal developments, as the discourses on social de- and regeneration, neurasthenia, nerve-weakness and experiences of the brain-injured after WWI show. Societal (...) and cultural developments directly influenced researchers’ conceptualisation, scientific ideas, and even their experimental and clinical orientation. They directly reflect which scientific problems the neuroscientists felt inclined to address and what areas they began to leave aside. Using the concept of socio-technical experiments, it is demonstrated that research methodologies in neuronal de- and regeneration studies were not simply a product of recent advances in the scientific differentiation of somatic neurology or brain-psychiatry. Moreover, they resulted in important interdisciplinary attempts which emerged from great collaborative work including neuroscientists from various areas of investigation in both basic and clinical contexts. (shrink)

Eugen Bleuler, in 1911, renamed the group of mental disorders with poor prognosis which Emil Kraepel in had called ``dementia praecox'' ``group of schizophrenias'',because for him the splitting of personality was the main symptom.Biographical, scientific and methodological influences on Bleuler's concept of schizophrenia are shown with special reference to Kraepelin and Freud.Bleuler was a passionate and very experienced clinician. He lived with his patients, taking care of them and writing down his observations. Methodologically he was an empiricist and an (...) eclecticist with a wide reading knowledge.In an impaired association of ideas, in disordered affectivity, in marked ambivalence and autism Bleuler saw the main symptoms of schizophrenia. For him these so-called pathological phenomena actually seemed to be only exaggerations of normal psychic functions. So there were only a quantitative, not a qualitative difference between schizophrenia and normal psychic processes and studies on schizophrenic ``pathology'' –seen as a disturbance, not as a disease – might analogously illustrate normal psychic reactions and vice versa.In etiology as well as in therapy Bleuler took into account psychological and (neuro)physiological(somatic) mechanisms – thus combining organicism and dynamic psychiatry and coming very close to modern concepts, e.g. the one of stress and vulnerability. Bleuler's main merit is the stressing of an idiographic ``understanding'' of the patient and a plausible and subtle explanation of schizophrenia which helped to reduce the alienation of the affected persons. (shrink)

In this influential work, first published in English in 1963, Durkheim and Mauss claim that the individual mind is capable of classification and they seek the origin of the ‘classificatory function’ in society. On the basis of an intensive examination of forms and principles of symbolic classification reported from the Australian aborigines, the Zuñi and traditional China, they try to establish a formal correspondence between social and symbolic classification. From this they argue that the mode of classification is determined by (...) the form of society and that the notions of space, time, hierarchy, number, class and other such cognitive categories are products of society. Dr Needham’s introduction assesses the validity of Durkhiem and Mauss’s argument, traces its continued influence in various disciplines, and indicates its analytical value for future researches in social anthropology. (shrink)

In this influential work, first published in English in 1963, Durkheim and Mauss claim that the individual mind is capable of classification and they seek the origin of the ‘classificatory function’ in society. On the basis of an intensive examination of forms and principles of symbolic classification reported from the Australian aborigines, the Zuñi and traditional China, they try to establish a formal correspondence between social and symbolic classification. From this they argue that the mode of classification is determined by (...) the form of society and that the notions of space, time, hierarchy, number, class and other such cognitive categories are products of society. Dr Needham’s introduction assesses the validity of Durkhiem and Mauss’s argument, traces its continued influence in various disciplines, and indicates its analytical value for future researches in social anthropology. (shrink)

The vital status of patients who are a part of controlled donation after circulatory death (cDCD) is widely debated in bioethical literature. Opponents to currently applied cDCD protocols argue that they violate the dead donor rule, while proponents of the protocols advocate compatibility. In this article, we argue that both parties often misinterpret the moral implications of the dead donor rule. The rule as such does not require an assessment of a donor’s vital status, we contend, but rather an assessment (...) of whether procurement of organs in cDCD cause the death of the donor or not. We then argue that commonly practiced cDCD protocols do not violate the dead donor rule, since the donation does not trigger or cause the death of the donors. (shrink)

The Elementary Forms Of The Religious Life: Translated From The French By Joseph Ward Swain, M.A. This book is a result of an effort made by us towards making a contribution to the preservation and repair of original classic literature. In an attempt to preserve, improve and recreate the original content, we have worked towards: 1. Type-setting & Reformatting: The complete work has been re-designed via professional layout, formatting and type-setting tools to re-create the same edition with rich typography, graphics, (...) high quality images, and table elements, giving our readers the feel of holding a 'fresh and newly' reprinted and/or revised edition, as opposed to other scanned & printed (Optical Character Recognition - OCR) reproductions. 2. Correction of imperfections: As the work was re-created from the scratch, therefore, it was vetted to rectify certain conventional norms with regard to typographical mistakes, hyphenations, punctuations, blurred images, missing content/pages, and/or other related subject matters, upon our consideration. Every attempt was made to rectify the imperfections related to omitted constructs in the original edition via other references. However, a few of such imperfections which could not be rectified due to intentional\unintentional omission of content in the original edition, were inherited and preserved from the original work to maintain the authenticity and construct, relevant to the work. We believe that this work holds historical, cultural and/or intellectual importance in the literary works community, therefore despite the oddities, we accounted the work for print as a part of our continuing effort towards preservation of literary work and our contribution towards the development of the society as a whole, driven by our beliefs. We are grateful to our readers for putting their faith in us and accepting our imperfections with regard to preservation of the historical content. HAPPY READING! (shrink)

The author confronts the place of today's world in the context of human history. He focuses on such major issues of the twentieth century as human progress, fanaticism, & science.

This paper does not present an advocacy of a passive education as opposed to an active education nor does it propose that passive education is in any way ‘better’ or more important than active education. Through readings of Maurice Blanchot, Jacques Derrida and B.S. Johnson, and gentle critiques of Jacques Rancière and John Dewey, passive education is instead described and outlined as an education which occurs whether we attempt it or not. As such, the object of critique for this essay (...) are forms of educational thought which, through fate or design, exclude the passive dimension, either within or outside of formal educational settings. An underlying component of this argument is therefore also that education does occur outside of formal educational settings and that, contra Gert Biesta and his critique of ‘learnification’, we may gain rather than lose something by attending to it as education. (shrink)

Paru pour la premiere fois en 1908, l'essai d'Emile Meyerson Identite et realite demeure aujourd'hui un classique de la philosophie des sciences, dont A. Koyre a salue l'importance. Un premier aspect important de cet ouvrage concerne la conception et le statut meme de la science (physique, biologie, etc.). Meyerson developpe une critique profonde de la conception positiviste de la science formulee par Auguste Comte, en montrant l'impossibilite de penser des rapports phenomenaux sans leur presupposer des supports: la legalite ne (...) peut pas se resoudre dans la causalite. C'est la raison pour laquelle l'auteur s'efforce de definir un substantialisme renouvele, apte a echapper aux critiques positivistes. L'autre these essentielle de cet essai se rapporte bien entendu au celebre concept de causalite scientifique : le concept de legalite mis en jeu dans la conception positiviste de la science ne suffit pas, car la science cherche egalement a expliquer les phenomenes; et c'est precisement cette explication, qui consiste dans l'identification de l'antecedent au conequent, que l'auteur appelle la causalite scientifique, et qu'il distingue et oppose a la causalite theologique aussi bien qu'a la causalite efficiente. (shrink)

When the author of Identity and Reality accepted Langevin's suggestion that Meyerson "identify the thought processes" of Einstein's relativity theory, he turned from his assured perspective as historian of the sciences to the risky bias of contemporary philosophical critic. But Emile Meyerson, the epis temologist as historian, could not find a more rigorous test of his conclusions from historical learning than the interpretation of Einstein's work, unless perhaps he were to turn from the classical revolution of Einstein's relativity to (...) the non-classical quantum theory. Meyerson captures our sympathy in all his writings: "... the role of the epistemologist is... in following the development of science" (250); the study of the evolution of reason leads us to see that "man does not experience himself reasoning... which is carried on unconsciously," and as the summation of his empirical studies of the works and practices of scientists, "reason... behaves in an altogether predict able way:... first by making the consequent equivalent to the antecedent, and then by actually denying all diversity in space" (202). If logic - and to Meyerson the epistemologist is logician - is to understand reason, then "logic proceeds a posteriori. " And so we are faced with an empirically based Par menides, and, as we shall see, with an ineliminable 'irrational' within science. Meyerson's story, written in 1924, is still exciting, 60 years later. (shrink)

Emile Durkheim's "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale," written in 1899 during the Dreyfus Affair in France, is introduced. The introduction summarizes the principal contributions that "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale" makes to the sociology of anti-Semitism, relates those contributions to Durkheim's broader theoretical assumptions and concerns, situates his analysis of anti-Semitism in its social and historical context, contrasts it to other analyses of anti-Semitism (Marxist and Zionist) that were prominent in Durkheim's time, indicates some of the revisions and additions that a (...) fuller and more complete Durkheimian theory of anti-Semitism would entail, and highlights the significance of Durkheim's ideas for the contemporary study of ethnic and racial antagonism. While noting the limitations of Durkheim's analysis, the introduction concludes that "Antis?mitisme et crise sociale" has sadly regained its relevance in the light of a revival of anti-Semitism at the turn of the millennium. (shrink)

D’une double formation de naturaliste et de philosophe, Émile Callot a consacré une partie de ses travaux à étudier les relations entre ces deux disciplines : à les définir d’abord, à les légitimer ensuite et, enfin, à les constater dans diverses œuvres de savants et de philosophes. Dans cet esprit, il commença par dresser un tableau de la Renaissance des sciences de la vie au XVIe siècle, où il fit apparaître le caractère novateur des premiers Naturalistes européens. Il s’attacha ensuite (...) à déterminer cet esprit et cet objet d’une façon théorique dans sa "Philosophie biologique", et d’une façon historique dans son "Histoire de la philosophie biologique par les textes". C’est également dans le contexte historique, qu’il décrivit la Philosophie de la vie au XVIIIe siècle, visant à dégager les idées biologiques chez des auteurs aussi différents que d’Holbach, Montesquieu et Linné. Dans cette voie, il mit en valeur Maupertuis, le savant et le philosophe, en donnant de cet auteur une étude où l’œuvre est analysée et illustrée par les extraits les plus significatifs. Enfin, il consacra à la Philosophie biologique de Cournot une monographie, où il souligna la part déterminante du vitalisme dans la pensée de cet auteur. C’est de la même façon que, dans sa Philosophie biologique de Gœthe, Émile Callot cherche, à partir des travaux scientifiques de Gœthe, à dégager les grandes lignes de sa méthode et les principes directeurs de sa conception du monde vivant. Mais ce monde prend place dans la Nature, dont le philosophe et l’artiste se sont fait également les interprètes. Il convenait donc, après l’analyse de ce domaine restreint, de montrer comment celui-ci se situe dans la vision globale et unificatrice de la pensée et de la sensibilité gœthéennes. Aussi, cet ouvrage apporte-t-il une contribution importante, non seulement à l’étude des idées biologiques qui eurent cours à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, mais encore à une compréhension mieux informée de cet esprit génial. (shrink)

Résumé – Les diverses définitions communément admises pour caractériser le raisonnement par analogic sont tout d'abord discutées et critiquées – ceci relativement aux sciences biologiques. Puis, à propos notamment de la taxomonie, de la cytologie et de la physiologie, l'importance relative de l'analogie est commentée à l'aide de quelques exemples. Il est ensuite fait état de l'analogie‐conclusion, de l'analogie‐hypothèse et de l'analogie‐invention – divers aspects du raisonnement analogique, qui ont joué un rôle essentiel dans les découvertes les plus marquantes de (...) la biologie descriptive et dans la biologie expérimentale de ces dernières années. (shrink)

Selections from Durkheim's writings focus on the nature of his conception of society and its moral context.

Emile Meyerson's writings on the philosophy of science are a rich source of ideas and information concerning many philosophical and historical aspects of the development of modem science. Meyerson's works are not widely read or cited today by philosophers or even philosophers of science, in part because they have long been out of print and are often not available even in research libraries. There are additional chevaux de!rise for all but the hardiest scholars: Meyerson's books are written in French (...) (and do not all exist in English versions) and deal with the subject matter of science - ideas or concepts, laws or principles, theories - and epis temological questions rather than today's more fashionable topics of the social matrix and external influences on science with the concomitant neglect of the intellectual content of science. Born in Lublin, Poland, in 1859, Meyerson received most of his education in Germany, where he studied from the age of 12 to 23, preparing himself for a career in chemistry.! He moved to Paris in 1882, where he began a career as an industrial chemist. Changing his profession, he then worked for a time as the foreign news editor of the HAVAS News Agency in Paris. In 1898 he joined the agency established by Edmond Rothschild that had as its purpose the settling of Jews in Palestine and became the Director of the Jewish Colonization Association for Europe and Asia Minor. These activities represent Meyerson's formal career. (shrink)

This article proceeds from a consideration of what John Baldacchino calls ‘viable ignorance’, attempting to take leave from the critical and pedagogical obligations of certain elements of Barbara Johnson's ‘positive ignorance’. It considers Friedrich Nietzsche, Jean-François Lyotard and the composer, Karlheinz Stockhausen's reflections on modes of experience, and the cultivation of complementary dispositions, where the knowing, egocentric subject is transformed into, or undermined as, what Nietzsche calls ‘a medium of overpowering forces’. The disposition itself is outlined through close readings of (...) key elements of Nietzsche's notebooks, Lyotard's final chapter of Libidinal Economy (1993), and Stockhausen's lecture, ‘Intuitive Music’ (1971) and developed through supplemental practice-as-research activity in sound. The intention of this paper is to explore the space of aesthetic ignorance as committedly as possible, without reverting constantly to positive ignorance. (shrink)

Through readings of Jacques Derrida's Of Grammatology and 'The Age of Hegel', attention is given to two of the problematic types of relationships that philosophy can have with education. These engagements, alongside a reading of 'The Antinomies of the Philosophical Discipline: Letter Preface', show how Derrida’s thought can prescribe no educational programme and instead troubles educational proclamations and certainties. Throughout his life, Derrida negotiated his relationships to the educational systems and institutions to which he was responsible, these negotiations, though, were (...) not indicative of a belief in any ontologically grounded educational truth. Quite to the contrary, as I will claim, Derrida’s thought is remarkable for its deflation of the myth, stretching at least as far back to Plato’s Republic, that philosophy can discover and prescribe the practical means for its own educational good. The argument presented in this article is that Derrida’s thought is particularly fertile when it comes to educational reflection precisely because it does not close down, presuppose, or prescribe, and that these characteristics also allow for generative contradictions in Derrida's educational and philosophical thought and practice. (shrink)

ldquo;Archaeology has revolutionized the study of history. It has broadened the horizons almost as much as the telescope did for the vision of astronomy in space; just as the microscope revealed to biology that under the form of large organisms is hidden the life of infinitesimal cells. Finally it has modified historic study in the same manner that radioactivity altered chemistry.”V. Gordon Childe,Progress and Archaeology,London, 1945, p. 2.Fifteen years ago, at the XII International Congress of Historic Sciences (Vienna, 1965), when (...) historians finally decided to address the problem of “acculturation” (a concept and term first formulated and defined by sociologists), their reaction, with few exceptions, proved to be rather hesitant. (shrink)