This submission is addressed to the symposium on Prof. André Abath’s book “Knowing What Things Are: An Erotetic-Based Account” (2022).

An erotetic calculus for a given logic constitutes a sequent-style proof-theoretical formalization of the logic grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic ). In this paper, a new erotetic calculus for Classical Propositional Logic ), dual with respect to the existing ones, is given. We modify the calculus to obtain complete proof systems for the propositional part of paraconsistent logic CLuN and its extensions CLuNs and mbC. The method is based on dual resolution. Moreover, the resolution rule is non-clausal. (...) According to the authors knowledge, this is the first account of resolution for mbC. Last but not least, as the method is grounded in IEL, it constitutes an important tool for the so-called question-processing. (shrink)

Inferential erotetic logic and inquisitive semantics give accounts of questions and model various aspects of questioning. In this paper we concentrate upon connections between inquisitiveness, being the core concept of INQ, and question raising, characterized in IEL by means of the concepts of question evocation and erotetic implication. We consider the basic system InqB of INQ, remain at the propositional level and show, inter alia, that: a disjunction of all the direct answers to an evoked question is always (...) inquisitive; a formula is inquisitive if, and only if it evokes a yes–no question whose affirmative answer expresses a possibility for the formula; inquisitive formulas evoke questions whose direct answers express all the possibilities for the formulas, and each question erotetically implies a question whose direct answers express the possibilities for the direct answers to the implying question. (shrink)

Attention has a role in much of perception, thought, and action. On the erotetic theory, the functional role of attention is a matter of the relationship between questions and what counts as answers to those questions. Questions encode the completion conditions of tasks for cognitive control purposes, and degrees of attention are degrees of sensitivity to the occurrence of answers. Questions and answers are representational contents given precise characterizations using tools from formal semantics, though attention does not depend on (...) language. The erotetic theory proposes an integrated account of attention in cognitive control and of attentional focus in perception. The functional role of attentional focus on objects, properties, and locations has to do with picking out something that corresponds to what a task is ‘about’. The erotetic theory of attention opens new avenues in theorizing about the relationship between attention, representational content, phenomenal character, and practical reason. A novel representationalist account of salience is proposed. The theory also provides an account of distraction that suggests when distraction is a defect in practical reasoning. (shrink)

In non-causal explanations, some non-causal facts (such as mathematical, modal or metaphysical) are used to explain some physical facts. However, precisely because these explanations abstract away from causal facts, they face two challenges: 1) it is not clear why would one rather than the other non-causal explanantia be relevant for the explanandum; and 2) why would standing in a particular explanatory relation (e.g., “counterfactual dependence”, “constraint”, “entailment”, “constitution”, “grounding”, and so on), and not in some other, be explanatory. I develop (...) an explanatory relevance account which is based on erotetic constraints and show how it addresses these two challenges. (shrink)

This book presents a unified theory of the human capacity for reasoning and decision-making. The erotetic theory accounts for a diverse range of empirically documented fallacies and framing effects and shows how the same mental processes that yield fallacies can yield what logicians call first-order validity and probabilistic coherence in reasoning, as well as rational decision-making as conceived by economists. The central idea is that our minds naturally aim at resolving issues, and if we are sufficiently inquisitive in the (...) process, we can avoid mistakes. The erotetic theory holds that both the successes and the failures of reason are due to this aim. Rationality is secured if we reach what will be called erotetic equilibrium. (shrink)

In recent years, the e ffort to formalize erotetic inferences (i.e., inferences to and from questions) has become a central concern for those working in erotetic logic. However, few have sought to formulate a proof theory for these inferences. To fill this lacuna, we construct a calculus for (classes of) sequents that are sound and complete for two species of erotetic inferences studied by Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL): erotetic evocation and regular erotetic implication. While (...) an attempt has been made to axiomatize the former in a sequent system, there is currently no proof theory for the latter. Moreover, the extant axiomatization of erotetic evocation fails to capture its defeasible character and provides no rules for introducing or eliminating question-forming operators. In contrast, our calculus encodes defeasibility conditions on sequents and provides rules governing the introduction and elimination of erotetic formulas. We demonstrate that an elimination theorem holds for a version of the cut rule that applies to both declarative and erotetic formulas and that the rules for the axiomatic account of question evocation in IEL are admissible in our system. (shrink)

It’s commonly thought that, in conversation, speakers accept and reject propositions that have been asserted by others. Do speakers accept and reject questions as well? Intuitively, it seems that they do. But what does it mean to accept or reject a question? What is the relationship between these acts and those of asking and answering questions? Are there clear and distinct classes of reasons that speakers have for acceptance and rejection of questions? This chapter seeks to address these issues. Beyond (...) their intrinsic interest to those working on the nature of questions, solutions to these problems may aid the extension of inferentialist approaches to logic and language. Inferentialists who think that inferences should be conceived in terms of the norms we are subject to in virtue of both the sentences we accept or assert as well as those we reject or deny are known as bilateralists. A coherent account of accepting and rejecting questions raises the prospects for a bilateralism that interprets question-involving or erotetic inferences according to these additional primitives. While a full-blown bilateralism for erotetic inferences and ultimately for question-forming operators themselves far exceeds this chapter’s scope, the work presented here does sketch the first steps in that direction. (shrink)

The increasing preponderance of opinion that some natural phenomena can be explained mathematically has inspired a search for a viable account of distinctively mathematical explanation. Among the desiderata for an adequate account is that it should solve the problem of directionality and the reversals of distinctively mathematical explanations should not count as members among the explanatory fold but any solution must also avoid the exclusion of genuine explanations. In what follows, I introduce and defend what I refer to (...) as a quasi-erotetic solution which provides a remedy to the problem in the form of an additional necessary condition on explanation. (shrink)

Research into the cognition of conditionals has predominantly focused on conditional reasoning, producing a range of theories which explain associated phenomena with considerable success. However, such theories have been less successful in accommodating experimental data concerning how agents assess the probability of indicative conditionals. Since an acceptable account of conditional reasoning should be compatible with evidence regarding how we evaluate conditionals’ likelihoods, this constitutes a failing of such theories. Section 1 introduces the most dominant established approach to conditional reasoning: (...) mental models theory. Surveying a range of experimental results, I show that mental models theory (along with competing theories) is incapable of fully accounting for findings regarding judgements about conditionals’ probabilities. Section 2 introduces an alternative account of deductive reasoning, the erotetic theory, recently proposed by Koralus and Mascarenhas (2013). Section 3 argues that, given a natural extension, this theory is able to explain the otherwise unaccounted for data. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the compatibility of inference to the best explanation (IBE) with several influential models and accounts of scientific explanation. First, I explore the different conceptions of IBE and limit my discussion to two: the heuristic conception and the objective Bayesian conception. Next, I discuss five models of scientific explanation with regard to each model’s compatibility with IBE. I argue that Kitcher’s unificationist account supports IBE; Railton’s deductive–nomological–probabilistic model, Salmon’s statistical-relevance model, and van Fraassen’s erotetic (...) account are incompatible with IBE; and Salmon’s causal–mechanical model is merely consistent with IBE. In short, many influential models of scientific explanation do not support IBE. I end by outlining three possible conclusions to draw: (1) either philosophers of science or defenders of IBE have seriously misconstrued the concept of explanation, (2) philosophers of science and defenders of IBE do not use the term ‘explanation’ univocally, and (3) the ampliative conception of IBE, which is compatible with any model of scientific explanation, deserves a closer look. (shrink)

The article addresses the problem of how semantic information can be upgraded to knowledge. The introductory section explains the technical terminology and the relevant background. Section 2 argues that, for semantic information to be upgraded to knowledge, it is necessary and sufficient to be embedded in a network of questions and answers that correctly accounts for it. Section 3 shows that an information flow network of type A fulfils such a requirement, by warranting that the erotetic deficit, characterising the (...) target semantic information t by default, is correctly satisfied by the information flow of correct answers provided by an informational source s. Section 4 illustrates some of the major advantages of such a Network Theory of Account (NTA) and clears the ground of a few potential difficulties. Section 5 clarifies why NTA and an informational analysis of knowledge, according to which knowledge is accounted semantic information, is not subject to Gettier-type counterexamples. A concluding section briefly summarises the results obtained. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Nāgārjuna's Affective Account of MisknowingRoshni PatelIt is maintained that all beings and (their) qualitiesAre the fuel for the fire of awareness.Having been incinerated by brilliantTrue analysis, they are (all) pacified.—Ratnāvalī (RV)1.971In Nāgārjuna's formulation, ignorance about the nature of existents is scorching and thereby needs the alleviation that true analysis offers. This article explores what ignorance feels like from the subjective side of a knower in the Madhyamaka Buddhist (...) tradition through an analysis of epistemic affect. I borrow two affective concepts—"epistemic emotion" and "epistemic feeling"—from theorists in Anglo-American analytic epistemology to discuss affectively charged misknowing.2 In this literature, epistemic emotions are affective experiences that participate in a knower's epistemic activity in positive or negative ways, but are not necessary for that activity to proceed. In contrast, epistemic feelings are affectively qualitative experiences that are integral to a knower's activity. With a focus on texts by Nāgārjuna, I present fear as a paradoxical epistemic emotion that correlates with a similarly pathogenic and instigative function in Buddhist moral psychology. I then present determinacy as a more subtly operating epistemic feeling in reificatory ignorance. In addition to expanding epistemologically oriented discussions within Buddhist philosophy, this article also contributes to scholarly discussion of epistemic affect by introducing determinacy as a new epistemic feeling. [End Page 44]Diffuse and Complex IgnoranceThe central role of ignorance in formulating the problem of suffering and its cessation implies that in many ways all of Buddhism is interested in how we know and understand. This centrality is evident in the Avijja Sutta when the Buddha states:Bhikkhus, ignorance is the forerunner in the entry upon unwholesome states, with shamelessness and fearlessness of wrongdoing following along. For an unwise person immersed in ignorance, wrong view springs up. For one of wrong view, wrong intention springs up. For one of wrong intention, wrong speech springs up. For one of wrong speech, wrong action springs up. For one of wrong action, wrong livelihood springs up. For one of wrong livelihood, wrong effort springs up. For one of wrong effort, wrong mindfulness springs up. For one of wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration springs up.(Saṃyutta Nikāya (SN) 45.1)Here we see that avijjā, or ignorance, impedes the path of removing suffering. Similarly, in the twelve links of dependent origination, ignorance is at the start of the chain conditioning the other links that culminate in suffering (SN 12.2). Nāgārjuna also positions ignorance as a potential gatekeeper when he says that ignorance (ajñāna) causes some people to be intolerant of the wisdom of the Mahāyāna path taught by the Buddhas (RV 4.83).3 While we have ample exposition on the role of ignorance in various causal chains, what remains elusive is how to recognize our own ignorance as such in the experiential folds of seeing, feeling, and knowing. This is especially the case in the early works of the critical project of Madhyamaka ("Middle Way") philosophy by Nāgārjuna. The bulk of these works presents arguments against any ignorant metaphysics that essentializes existents in efforts to claim epistemic access to an objective ultimate reality. This article argues that through a certain way of reading Madhyamaka philosophical texts, we find helpful information for recognizing what ignorance feels like. I develop the phenomenology of epistemic emotions and feelings that coincide with the ignorant practices centrally targeted by Madhyamaka critical analysis.The encompassing scope of ignorance motivates us to conceive of it as entangled with a range of elements, including the affective components of knowing. While the terms avijjā or avidyā, are most often translated as "ignorance" this term can be problematically imprecise in philosophical contexts. In the subfield of ignorance studies within current Western philosophy, ignorance is often classified according to the object of which a subject lacks knowledge. By this paradigm, ignorance can be (1) factual in [End Page 45] the case of not knowing a particular fact, (2) erotetic when a subject does not know the answer to a question, or (3) practical when a subject does... (shrink)

In Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation (2022), Arturs Logins provides a novel reductivist account of normative reasons, what he calls the Erotetic View of Reasons. In this paper, I provide three challenges to this view. The first two concern the extensional adequacy of the Erotetic View. The view may fail to count as normative reasons all and only considerations that are such. In particular, the view seems to both overgenerate and undergenerate reasons. My third concern is (...) that the view may fail to capture the essential, practice-independent nature of reasons, as well as reasons’ constitutive and grounding role with respect to other normative properties. (shrink)

The epistemic value of models has traditionally been approached from a representational perspective. This paper argues that the artifactual approach evades the problem of accounting for representation and better accommodates the modal dimension of modeling. From an artifactual perspective, models are viewed as erotetic vehicles constrained by their construction and available representational tools. The modal dimension of modeling is approached through two case studies. The first portrays mathematical modeling in economics, while the other discusses the modeling practice of synthetic (...) biology, which exploits and combines models in various modes and media. Neither model intends to represent any actual target system. Rather, they are constructed to study possible mechanisms through the construction of a model system with built-in dependencies. (shrink)

In his book _Normative Reasons_ (Logins A in Normative reasons: between reasoning and explanation. Cambridge University Press, 2022), Artürs Logins accepts that a normative reason to do A is always an answer to a ‘Why A?’ question, but rejects the unifying explanationist theory which identifies reasons always as explanations. On his Erotetic Theory, ‘Why A?’ questions sometimes seek an explanation (in No-Challenge contexts) but sometimes seek rather an argument (in Challenge contexts). This article defends a unifying, end-relational explanationist theory (...) by interpreting ‘Why A?’ as being elliptical for different questions, with different explananda. I also respond inter alia to Logins’ claim that end-relational explanationism is extensionally inadequate because it fails to account for normative reasons for attitudes. Finally, I consider the objection that explanationism fails to account for normative reasons’ characteristic functional role of settling deliberation, introducing a “chicken or egg” dilemma over the order of discovery of reasons and options, resolved by suggesting that in open-ended deliberation reasons guide us to options without being represented under the guise of “reasons”. (shrink)

In this article I explore two accounts of the Fallacy of Many Questions made famous by the question "Have you stopped beating your wife?" The accounts are from the works of Lennart Aqvist and Noel Belnap, and the two authors differ in their accounts of the fallacy. Then I give my own account based on understanding a facet of erotetic logic, i. e., the logic of questions.

Reasons matter greatly to us in both ordinary and theoretical contexts, being connected to two fundamental normative concerns: figuring out what we should do and what attitudes to have, and understanding the duties and responsibilities that apply to us. This book introduces and critiques most of the contemporary theories of normative reasons considerations that speak in favor of an action, belief, or emotion - to explore how they work. Artūrs Logins develops and defends a new theory: the Erotetic view (...) of reasons, according to which normative reasons are appropriate answers to normative why questions (Why should I do this?). This theory draws on evidence of how why-questions work in informal logic, language and philosophy of science. The resulting view is able to avoid the problems of previous accounts, while retaining all of their attractive features, and it also suggests exciting directions for future research. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core. (shrink)

Puzzle-solving, like several other everyday activities, appears in a more sophisticated and ramified form in the realm of natural science. Improving on Thomas Kuhn's rudimentary account of puzzles in science, this paper formulates logical and functional criteria for the occurrence of scientific puzzles, and examines the two-fold nature of their solutions. Then, with the aid of erotetic logic, puzzle-posing questions are identified, their presuppositional relations to scientific theory and explanations are explored, and a new tool for history of (...) science research is developed. (shrink)

In Knowing What Things Are, Abath shifts the focus of epistemology from propositional knowledge to the capacity to answer questions, emphasizing knowledge as an outcome of human activity. He highlights the role of interrogatives in epistemic evaluation. However, his emphasis on Socratic questions ("What is X?") overlooks the interconnectedness of different types of questions within an inquiry. This paper examines two Socratic questions: "What is a gene?" and "What is a marriage?" In the case of "What is a gene?" advances (...) in molecular biology challenge the classical molecular gene concept, leading to a pluralistic or emergent definition. Inquiry into genes involves meta-level questions concerning the concept’s definition and the role of related terms such as "heritable." Similarly, "What is a marriage?" encompasses both descriptive and normative dimensions, requiring an understanding of legal, social, and cultural definitions. Abath’s erotetic framework, which aims to refine answers to Socratic questions, must account for these meta-level inquiries and the various ways an inquiry can be directed to provide a more comprehensive depiction of knowledge as an activity. (shrink)

Attention influences the character of conscious perceptual experience in intricate and surprising ways, including our experience of contrast, space, and time. These patterns of influence have been argued to cause trouble for the attractive thesis that differences in the character of conscious experience flow from differences in what we represent. I present a novel theory of the functional role of attention that has the resources for a systematic representationalist account of these phenomena. On the erotetic theory of attention, (...) we bring an interest to the task of perception, captured as a question we seek to answer. Questions, as understood here, are contents that cognitive systems can represent rather than sentences. We process perceptual input as a putative answer to our question in a way that is modulated by attentional focus; attentional focus aims to pick out something that matches what our question is “about.” In certain cases, this yields a form of predictive coding: if the contribution of focus matches what our question is about, we take it to select one of the possible answers we are entertaining, even though our perceptual input by itself does not supply a full answer. The proposed account also provides a new account of the phenomenology of salience. (shrink)

This paper discusses modeling from the artifactual perspective. The artifactual approach conceives models as erotetic devices. They are purpose-built systems of dependencies that are constrained in view of answering a pending scientific question, motivated by theoretical or empirical considerations. In treating models as artifacts, the artifactual approach is able to address the various languages of sciences that are overlooked by the traditional accounts that concentrate on the relationship of representation in an abstract and general manner. In contrast, the artifactual (...) approach focuses on epistemic affordances of different kinds of external representational and other tools employed in model construction. In doing so, the artifactual account gives a unified treatment of different model types as it circumvents the tendency of the fictional and other representational approaches to separate model systems from their “model descriptions”. (shrink)

We investigate the articulation between domain-general reasoning and interpretive processes in failures of deductive reasoning. We focus on illusory inferences from disjunction-like elements, a broad class of deductive fallacies studied in some detail over the past 15 years. These fallacies have received accounts grounded in reasoning processes, holding that human reasoning diverges from normative standards. A subset of these fallacies, however, can be analyzed differently: human reasoning is not to blame, instead the premises were interpreted in a nonobvious, yet perfectly (...) predictable and reasonable way. Once we consider these interpretations, the apparent fallacious conclusion is no mistake at all. We give a two-factor account of these fallacies that incorporates both reasoning-based elements and interpretive elements, showing that they are not in real competition. We present novel experimental evidence in favor of our theory. Cognitive load such as induced by a dual-task design is known to hinder the interpretive mechanisms at the core of interpretation-based accounts of the fallacies of interest. In the first experiment of its kind using this paradigm with an inferential task instead of a simpler truth-value-judgment task, we found that the manipulation affected more strongly those illusions where our theory predicts that interpretive processes are at play. We conclude that the best way forward for the field to investigate the elusive line between reasoning and interpretation requires combining theories and methodologies from linguistic semantics and the psychology of reasoning. (shrink)

Floridi’s chapter on relevant information bridges the analysis of “being informed” with the analysis of knowledge as “relevant information that is accounted for” by analysing subjective or epistemic relevance in terms of the questions that an agent might ask in certain circumstances. In this paper, I scrutinise this analysis, identify a number of problems with it, and finally propose an improvement. By way of epilogue, I offer some more general remarks on the relation between (bounded) rationality, the need to ask (...) the right questions, and the ability to ask the right questions. (shrink)

Our aim is to model the behaviour of a cognitive agent trying to solve a complex problem by dividing it into sub-problems, but failing to solve some of these sub-problems. We use the powerful framework of erotetic search scenarios combined with Kleene’s strong three-valued logic. ESS, defined on the grounds of Inferential Erotetic Logic, has appeared to be a useful logical tool for modelling cognitive goal-directed processes. Using the logical tools of ESS and the three-valued logic, we will (...) show how an agent could solve the initial problem despite the fact that the sub-problems remain unsolved. Thus our model not only indicates missing information but also specifies the contexts in which the problem-solving process may end in success despite the lack of information. We will also show that this model of problem solving may find use in an analysis of natural language dialogues. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce erotetic search scenarios known from Inferential Erotetic Logic by using the framework of epistemic erotetic logic. The key notions used in this system are those of askability and epistemic erotetic implication. Scenarios are supposed to represent all rational strategies of an agent solving the problem posed by the initial question where the interaction with an external information source is seen as a series of updates of the agent’s knowledge.

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might prohibit having certain inquiring attitudes (“norms of restriction”), while ignoring those that might require having them (“norms of expansion”). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...) The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields—some sympathetically, others unsympathetically. (shrink)

A fascinating recent turn in epistemology focuses on inquiring attitudes like wondering and being curious. Many have argued that these attitudes are governed by norms similar to those that govern our doxastic attitudes. Yet, to date, this work has only considered norms that might *prohibit* having certain inquiring attitudes (``norms of restriction''), while ignoring those that might *require* having them (``norms of expansion''). We aim to address that omission by offering a framework that generates norms of expansion for inquiring attitudes. (...) The framework draws on inferential erotetic logic, which we explain and augment with some theorems. We explore several of the norms that it yields - some sympathetically, others unsympathetically. (shrink)

Critics of the erotetic model of explanation question its ability to discriminate significant from spurious explanations. One response to these criticisms has been to impose contextual restrictions on a case-by-case basis. In this article, the author argues that these approaches have overestimated the role of interests at the expense of other contextual aspects characteristic of social-scientific explanation. For this reason, he shows how procedures of measuring occupational status and social mobility affected different aspects of one explanation that Peter Blau (...) and Otis Dudley Duncan offered in their sociological classic, The American Occupational Structure. He uses the findings from this case study to meet objections to the erotetic model. Key Words: explanation • social science • erotetic • why-question • context. (shrink)

Nottelman (2016) and Peels (2023) identify several categories of ignorance: factive, objectual, and practical, with erotetic ignorance —understood as the lack of knowledge of answers to questions—viewed as reducible to factive ignorance. This paper argues that erotetic ignorance is not in fact reducible to factive ignorance. More precisely, erotetic knowledge does not solely involve a relationship between a subject and a true proposition or set of propositions; instead, it involves a relationship between a subject, a true proposition (...) or set of propositions and epistemic goals of inquiry. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the calculization of evocation and erotetic implication as defined by Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL). There is a straightforward approach to calculizing (propositional) erotetic implication which cannot be applied to evocation. First-order evocation is proven to be uncalculizable, i.e. there is no proof system, say FOE, such that for all X, Q: X evokes Q iff there is an FOE-proof for the evocation of Q by X. These results suggest a critique of the represented (...) approaches to calculizing IEL. This critique is expanded into a programmatic reconsideration of the IEL-definitions of evocation and erotetic implication. From a different point of view these definitions should be seen as desiderata that may or may not play the role of a point of orientation when setting up "rules of asking". (shrink)

In earlier publications of the first author it was shown that intentional explanation of actions, functional explanation of biological traits and causal explanation of abnormal events share a common structure. They are called explanation by specification (of a goal, a biological function, an abnormal causal factor, respectively) as opposed to explanation by subsumption under a law. Explanation by specification is guided by a schematic train of thought, of which the argumentative steps not concerning questions were already shown to be logically (...) valid (elementary) arguments.Independently, the second author developed a new, inferential approach to erotetic logic, the logic of questions. In this approach arguments resulting in questions, with declarative sentences and/or other questions as premises, are analyzed, and validity of such arguments is defined. (shrink)

The concept of erotetic argument is introduced. Two relations between sets of declarative sentences and questions are analysed; and two classes of erotetic arguments are characterized.

The concept of search scenario is explicated in terms of erotetic logic, i.e., the logic of questions. Different kinds of erotetic search scenarios are characterized. The basic logical properties of erotetic search scenarios are analyzed.

Este artículo propone un enfoque erotético para definir el programa de investigación ecocrítico, analizando la interrelación entre los marcos conceptuales de la ecología y la teoría crítica literaria. Se sugiere una estructuracomún basada en agendas de problemas que enriquecen, tanto la práctica científica como la enseñanza. El objetivoprincipal es mostrar cómo la formulación de preguntas contribuye de manera significativa a la creación de agendasde problemas abiertos que guían la investigación, fomentando el desarrollo de nuevas hipótesis y promoviendo la interdisciplinariedad en (...) los programas de investigación ante los desafíos ecológicos. La metodología incluyeuna revisión de la estructura teórica de la ecocrítica y de cómo las agendas de problemas aportan flexibilidadmetodológica, permitiendo reformular preguntas a medida que surgen nuevos datos, tecnologías y enfoques. Los resultados destacan la importancia de los cuestionamientos en las ciencias ambientales para redefinir nuevas agendas de investigación, integrando marcos conceptuales no unificados por una teoría central. La ecocrítica se configura como un programa de investigación estructurado de manera erotética, al igual que la ecología. Lasconclusiones subrayan la interdependencia entre preguntas, agendas de problemas y la reflexión crítica sobre el método científico, enfatizando en la creatividad y utilidad de los cuestionamientos e hipótesis retroductivas, para una práctica científica más adecuada y ajustada a la urgencia de la crisis ecológica. (shrink)

Developmental biology is the science of explaining how a variety of interacting processes generate the heterogeneous shapes, size, and structural features of an organism as it develops rom embryo to adult, or more generally throughout its life cycle (Love, 2008b; Minelli, 2011a). Although it is commonplace in philosophy to associate sciences with theories such that the individuation of a science is dependent on a constitutive theory or group of models, it is uncommon to find presentations of developmental biology making reference (...) to a theory or theories of development. For example, in the third edition of Essential Developmental Biology (Slack, 2013), three families of approaches are described (developmental genetics, experimental embryology, and molecular and cell biology), and the appendix contains a catalogue of ‘key molecular components’ (genes, transcription factor, families, inducing factor families, cytoskeleton, cell adhesion molecules, and extracellular matrix components); however, no standard theory or group of models provides a theoretical scaffolding to the book nor is any mentioned. (shrink)

Three semantic relations are analyzed: the relation of implication of a question by a question and a set of declarative sentences, the relation of implication of a question by a question, and the relation of strong implication of a question by a question and a set of declarative sentences. The connections between these concepts and the concepts of relative soundness, partial answerhood and presupposition are examined. The principal results are theorems about, to speak generally, epistemic reducibility of well-posed questions to (...) sequences of implied yes-no questions. (shrink)

By and large, Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL, for short) is an approach to the logic of questions which puts in the centre of attention inferential aspects of questioning. IEL is not an enterprise of the last few years only. The idea originates from the late 1980s. It evolved through time. Initially, the stress was put on the phenomenon of question raising. This changed gradually, as some forms of reasoning that involve questions have appeared to be analyzable by means of (...) the conceptual apparatus developed. In this essay I present the basics of IEL and comment on them. Most, though not all, of the ideas discussed here have been scattered across my earlier publications. The invitation from the organizers of the Asking and Answering workshop (Greifswald, September 2020) resulted in an attempt of presenting the themes of IEL in a concise but, as I hope, also comprehensible way. (shrink)

The concept of cooperative question-responses as an extension of cooperative behaviours used by interfaces for databases and information systems is proposed. A procedure to generate question-responses based on question dependency and erotetic search scenarios is presented. The procedure is implemented in Prolog.

It is hard to imagine our life without questions. They facilitate orientation in our environment, enable interpersonal communication and make the acquisition of knowledge possible. Questions direct scientific research, are used as research tools and are an important medium of transferring knowledge in teaching. The book is intended as a par excellence philosophical monograph of the theory of questions, presenting the most important erotetic problems, their general background and selected practical applications. It is prepared in all fairness to results (...) acquired in the framework of the logical theories of questions but goes beyond this framework. (shrink)