This essay broaches pedagogical key themes in Rousseau’s writings, primarily sourced from Émile, a book that 250 years after its first publication offers up a strikingly relevant critique of the current neo-liberal politics of schooling in the Western world. Rousseau was a keen observer of human folly, a sharp critic of Enlightenment culture, and an imaginative author with an acute sense of the vagaries of mind and feeling. I recount how he treats feelings, particularly the inner voice of conscience, as (...) a core element in education. His idea of “negative pedagogy” is a lasting contribution to educational thinking in general and highly relevant for our discussion today about self-regulation and discipline in education. Rousseau’s idea about authenticity leads directly to the question of individual character and the relation between self-love and amour-propre. Here we are presented to a positive pedagogy, which is to foster the first and to foil the second. After having touched the conflict between theory and practice in Rousseau’s own life, I observe that the woman in Émile’s life, Sophie, comes forth as naturally healthy person, fit to face society’s temptations, while Émile in comparison must be protected from its harms by his well-meaning tutor until he turns 15. In a longer section I present the pedagogical paradox, which says that you cannot force a child to be independent. Rousseau interestingly disregards the paradox, which seems to cast doubt on his reputation as a radical reformer of modern pedagogy. (shrink)

The thesis explored in this essay is that contemporary educational thought has suffered a loss of significance, manifested when our language and concepts fail to be experienced as signifiers of commitment. A certain reluctance can be observed, among academics and others, against the notion of defending any cause or idea – with notable exceptions such as “respect for difference”. One may of course contest that a special kind of commitment is needed in education; but problems emerge when the educational values (...) in place are no longer experienced as very significant for education itself, because the lack of investment in turn reduces the need to criticize and question these values. The problem concerns the lack of reflexive creativity, not the lack of ideals per se. The idea of a loss of signification is elaborated in two examples: “dannelse” and “kritikk”. In a further step, the loss of signification is discussed in relation to the lack of a larger, social project, where the discussion of the Anthropocene is one example of how such a project might be formulated today. (shrink)

V této studii se pokouším předložit postoj Margaret Cavendishové (1623-1673) ke zkoumání přírody ve druhé polovině 17. století. Pro tento účel jsem analyzovala především dílo Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666), které představuje nejucelenější filosofický výklad přírody této autorky. Prostřednictvím něho postihuji ontologické i epistemologické námitky Cavendishové k charakteru zkoumání přírody členy nově založeného vědeckého společenství – Royal Society. Z tohoto důvodu se zaměřuji rovněž na dílo Micrographia (1665) Roberta Hooka, který pro autorku tuto společnost reprezentuje. Cílem studie není rehabilitovat osobu (...) a dílo Margaret Cavendishové, nýbrž charakterizovat způsob, jímž se pokusila zhodnotit myšlenky nové experimentální, tj. zkušenostní vědy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Filosofi e animali in Roma antica: Modelli di animalità e umanità in Lucrezio e Seneca by Fabio TutroneJo-Ann SheltonFabio Tutrone. Filosofi e animali in Roma antica: Modelli di animalità e umanità in Lucrezio e Seneca. Pubblicazioni della Facoltà di Lettere e Filosofia dell’Università di Pavia 126. Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2012. 388pp. Paper, €34.The last decade has witnessed a proliferation, in many academic disciplines including Classics, of research into (...) the relationships between humans and other animals. Classical scholars have investigated the significance of other animals, whether utilized for food, labor, religious sacrifice, or entertainment, or, as Levi-Strauss declared, because they are good to think with. For millennia, we humans have sought to understand ourselves and our culture in large part by identifying both analogy with and the alterity of other animals. Fabio Tutrone, in his book, Filosofi e animali in Roma antica: Modelli di animalità e umanità in Lucrezio e Seneca, examines how two Roman authors explicated their theories of humanitas by references to other animals. There is only occasional discussion of other Roman philosophical writers, particularly Cicero. Tutrone’s main thesis is that both Lucretius and Seneca presented views about the nature and status of animals which differed from the orthodox views of their philosophical schools.The book is divided into two sections of equal length, the first about Lucretius (part 1, four chaps.), the second about Seneca (part 2, three chaps.). Throughout part 1, Tutrone analyzes the eclectic nature of Lucretius’ sources (also included as an appendix is a reprint of an article previously published by Tutrone on Lucretius’ use of Aristotle’s biological theory). Tutrone describes Lucretius’ De Rerum Natura as one of the most astonishing attempts to repudiate traditional anthropocentrism in the history of ancient culture (22). According to Tutrone, in order to persuade readers of the Epicurean doctrine that they, and the universe around them, were entirely material, Lucretius depicted the biological relationship between humans and other animals as one of parity. Comprehension of this parity was, in Lucretius’ view, fundamental to the acceptance of Epicurean physics and thus the attainment of the desired ataraxia. Anthropocentrism and anthropic hierarchy were essential elements in the Stoic and Aristotelian doctrines of teleology which Lucretius was attempting to refute. However, Epicurus, although opposed to teleology, had not renounced anthropic hierarchy. Classical scholars have generally believed that Lucretius presented in his De [End Page 709] Rerum Natura a very orthodox exposition of Epicureanism. Tutrone, however, argues that Lucretius deviated significantly from the teachings of Epicurus in his emphasis on the similarities between humans and animals. In contrast both to his Epicurean predecessors and to his anti-Epicurean contemporaries, Lucretius advocated an ethical theory based on the biological and cognitive proximity of humans to other animals.Tutrone’s insightful examinations of several passages of De Rerum Natura demonstrate their contributions to Lucretius’ advancement of his ethical arguments. For example, on Book 1.244–64, a passage explaining the Epicurean theory that, in the material universe, nothing disintegrates into nothing, Tutrone comments that Lucretius demystifies this process by employing illustrations which remind readers of what they already know: animals acquire nutrients by consuming plants which have in turn gained nutrients from rain water. The picture of contented cows in a lush pasture, providing milk for their calves, brings pleasure to readers even as it helps them comprehend the reality of the material universe. Tutrone contends, however, that animal images in Lucretius’ poem do more than delight, or reveal, by analogy, the correctness of Epicurean physics. Lucretius’ phrase, hinc alitur porro nostrum genus atque ferarum (l. 254), denotes a parity between humans and animals: both groups are nourished in the same ways. Lucretius thereby reveals the status of humans in the material universe: we are parallel to animals.In Tutrone’s view, Lucretius did not limit his attribution of similarities between humans and animals to physical features. In Book 2.352–66, Lucretius creates a scene of a cow searching for her calf who has been killed at a sacrifice. One function of the image is to illustrate a scientific statement about the individual nature of each atomic form. The image also reinforces Lucretius’ criticism... (shrink)

The Natural Philosophy of Jan Bayer The main focus of this study is a reconstruction of the natural philosophy of the early modern Prešov's scholar Jan (Johannes) Bayer (1630–1674), with special regard to its Mosaic profile. After a critical reading of the research done on Bayer up to this point, the author concludes that Bayer’s natural-philosophical work, as such, has not yet been satisfactorily analyzed, nor has its connection to its supposedly two most important sources, Francis Bacon and Jan Amos (...) Comenius, been sufficiently explored. The study therefore concentrates on a critical analysis of Bayer’s interpretation of creation and his natural history, which are then both situated in the philosophical context of their time. The author then notes that although Bayer’s project of erecting an original and on the (especially Aristotelian) tradition independent Mosaic natural philosophy ended in failure, the thinker’s work can be assessed as a valuable attempt to synthesize Baconian and Comenian motifs while at the same time reflecting broader intellectual contexts of the period. (shrink)

[Philosophy of Nature of St. Thomas Aquinas:. Nature, the Universe, Man].

Three essays on the nature of the philosophical task. The author's view is that the primary focus of philosophy should be critical.

Western philosophy and the tightrope between faith and knowledge In Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie (2019), Habermas develops a new view of the history of philosophy. Dating philosophy back to the axial age, he presents its history as the result of a collective learning process, spanning a period of three millennia. In this new approach he highlights the crucial importance of faith and religion which resulted in a specific constellation of belief and knowledge that, though unique to the West, has (...) universal import, and led to greater ‘reasonable freedom (Vernüftige Freiheit). In Habermas’ view The West’s Judeo-Christian heritage was not a passing phase in the emergence of modern thought and politics, but contributed its essential core. Though sympathetic to the idea of learning processes spanning many centuries, one may ask whether reasoning and learning processes always tend to lead, as Habermas claims, in the direction of greater freedom instead of its opposite. In this respect Habermas could have learnt more from the sceptical tradition in philosophy and its persistent interest in the various ways in which reasoning processes are non-cognitively embedded in human nature and society and influence the direction these processes take. (shrink)

This article1 I 2014 hadde nærmere én av tre høyere utdanning. Blant folk mellom 25 og 39 år har mer enn halvparten av kvinnene høyere utdanning, noe som gjør denne aldersgruppen til den høyest utdannede i Norge.2 presents reflections on women's presence in Norwegian philosophy, partly as a result of input from key persons in the Norwegian philosophy environment. We discuss the low proportion of women among students and staff in the field, then we investigate whether gender perspectives are present (...) in the study of philosophy and why women's low participation in the study of philosophy is regarded as a vital challenge. We argue that awareness of the impact history of categorization of gender is important and it is necessary to examine current direct and indirect stereotypes of gender, rationality and natural properties and their role in Norwegian philosophy today. We identify characteristics of the Norwegian post-war philosophy, such as diversity and openness, power struggles and gender blindness, and argue that women throughout the postwar period and until today been a minority in philosophy. Our material shows that measures to improve gender balance in philosophy, and attempts to integrate gender perspectives, has met fierce resistance. The article also shows how the study of feminist philosophy and its influence and position in Norway, is well suited to give us a richer and more complex picture of the Norwegian philosophy. It may tell us something about how open-minded or closed the philosophical communities are, but it can also throw light on how philosophy itself plays the role as critical and self-reflective. (shrink)

The issue of philosophy’s contribution to theology is an old and much disputed one. This article posits philosophy as the 'conscience' of theology. It takes 'conscience' in the heideggerian sense of existential 'being-aware-of' and applies this to our finitude and the ultimate meaning of being. A living theology has therefore to be based on a successful encounter between our understanding of the issue of our existence and the Word of 'revelation' — as Western tradition calls it —, spoken to us (...) 'from elsewhere'. This position is considered with reference to the theological thinking of Thomas Aquinas, and more specifically to his doctrine of human happiness and bliss, and the natural desire to see God. Attention is drawn to the fact that Thomas’ view on the supernatural is based on both a philosophical and a theological component. To further illustrate the point, three statements are developed. The first concerns a possible abuse of Heidegger’s deconstruction of metaphysics in order to support a 'pluralistic' approach of religious truth. Here the objection is raised that this conception disowns the proper nature of religious and theological truth as distinguished from metaphysical truth. The second statement is about any possible coalescence of philosophyand theology: whereas metaphysical truths show a 'representative' character, the properof religious and biblical truth appears to be 'a way of liberation'. Between both a 'mediation' needs to be found. The author claims that such may surface in man's inner belonging to 'another dimension', i.e., in an 'immanent transcendence'. The third statementproposes to update the synthesis of philosophy and theology as presented by Aquinas. A dialectical elucidation of man's craving for infinity still points to a possible way byrevealing an essential aspect of human 'conscienceawareness'. (shrink)

A compilation of articles on the philosophy of juridical thought on subjects such as war and terrorism, constitutional interpretation, the private life of judges, juridical thinking on 21st century challenges, etc.

Článek se soustředí na téma, jemuž dosud mezi českými badateli nebyla věnována patřičná pozornost. Uvádí do českého prostředí přírodní filosofii Tommasa Campanelly OP (1568–1639), přičemž se zaměřuje na jeho kosmologii, astrologii, magii, medicínu a prorocké vize. Jsou zdůrazněny některé z jeho antiaristotelských tezí a v neposlední řadě je poukázáno na zajímavé paralely, analogie a průniky se staršími autory (Dante, Ficino…) i současníky (Komenský, Galileo…). Závěrečné tvrzení, že Campanella nepatří k průkopníkům moderní vědy, ale spíše k starší renesanční hermeticko-magicko-platónské tradici, by (...) nemělo zastínit literární a rétorickou kvalitu jeho spisů, především jeho metaforiku a obraznost. (shrink)