Descendez avec M. Doyon dans les fondations de Vérité et méthode de Hans-Georg Gadamer, là où se dévoile la présence insoupçonnée de la métaphysique néoplatonicienne. En 'confrontant Gadamer à Heidegger, Platon et Plotin, l'auteur met en lumière l'usage innovant de l'émanation néoplatonicienne pour transcender les limites du subjectivisme moderne et redéfinir l'art comme source authentique de vérité. Découvrez comment Gadamer utilise les notions de lumière et d'émanation pour tisser un lien ontologique entre mots et choses. Ce livre n'est pas (...) seulement un commentaire sur Gadamer, il est un défi au (post)modernisme qui prive l'homme de son rapport réel à la vérité en faisant abstraction de la finitude humaine. Une lecture essentielle pour quiconque s'intéresse à la métaphysique, la philosophie du langage et la critique de la (post)modernité."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Le présent essai porte sur la question de la place de la critique des religions en philosophie et dans l'espace public. C'est une discussion franche avec des philosophes québécois qui défendent la liberté de religion comme si cette liberté était la forme exemplaire des libertés fondamentales d'une société démocratique. Les croyances religieuses échappent-elles à la science? Est-il vraiment rationnel de croire que la nature est l'œuvre d'une intelligence surnaturelle? Pourquoi la croyance religieuse est-elle érigée en norme? Quelle est la place (...) de la religion à l'école? Peut-on dissocier la morale de la religion? Sans aller jusqu'à conclure que les religions doivent être éliminées ou que la science détient le monopole de la vérité, il ressort de cette analyse rigoureuse que l'attitude de traitement préférentiel des religions est injuste envers les non-croyants et qu'elle est en bonne partie la cause de la querelle sur la laïcité. " La position que défend ici Doyon est somme toute pérenne : sans aller jusqu'à remonter à Lucrèce et à quelques autres auteurs de l'Antiquité, elle est nettement celle qui se déploie à partir du Siècle des Lumières, et que diversement et de manière complémentaire formulent en France des gens comme Condorcet, D'Holbach, Buisson et d'autres. L'incontournable question que nous laisse ce bel ouvrage est dès lors de savoir s'il faut modifier cette position canonique ou si ce n'est pas plutôt pour s'en être éloigné que nous faisons aujourd'hui face aux difficultés qui sont les nôtres." – Normand Baillargeon, extrait de la préface. (shrink)

The notions of perceptual normativity and optimality have generated much discussion in the last decade or so in the literature on Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s position on the topic has been far less extensively investigated. Surprisingly, however, Husserl wrote a great deal about the question of perceptual optimality. Not only are there a considerable number of important passages scattered throughout the manuscripts, the archive also contains a few important full texts on precisely this issue. Given the role of fulfillment for Husserl’s concept (...) of intentionality, this should not really come as a surprise, since the teleological nature of the fulfillment structure terminates in an experience of the optimum. Hence, however marginal this topic might seem at first glance, reflecting on it rapidly leads us to the heart of Husserl’s project and sheds further light on his conception of intentional experience. (shrink)

The idea that our perceptual openness to the world is normative can mean different things. In the Kantian tradition of Peter Strawson, Wilfrid Sellars and John McDowell, this openness is essentially tied to epistemic justification, that is to say, to our readiness to provide reasons for our actions and our beliefs about how things are. In the phenomenological tradition inaugurated by Edmund Husserl, the notion of norm-responsiveness that is relevant to perceptual experience has less to do with epistemic justification than (...) with perception’s capacity to guide action or elicit certain behaviors. In the lectures on Active and Passive Synthesis, Husserl explains how perception involves a pull towards gaining a more optimal view of the object by moving around it or scrutinizing it in various ways. On his part, Maurice Merleau-Ponty invokes the notion of norm in reference to our capacity to skillfully move our bodies and alter our points of view according to the particular demands of our perceptual situation. (shrink)

Most twentieth‐century European philosophers have attempted to think anew the Kantian question about the necessary conditions of experience. A rapid survey of last century's European philosophy would easily show that in spite of the various criticisms formulated against the very project of transcendental foundationalism, the vast majority of the philosophers in the so‐called Continental tradition have not abandoned the project of formulating transcendental arguments altogether. These transcendental inquiries into the conditions of possibility of all these phenomena are certainly more immediately (...) visible in the early works, especially those on Husserl, but a patient reading would show that they are still very much present in the later writings as well. The overcoming of classical transcendentalism at work in deconstruction is indeed the outcome of an ultra‐transcendental strategy. In Of Grammatology, Derrida exposes this ultra‐transcendental logic for the first time when he famously claims that a “pathway” through the transcendental is necessary. (shrink)

In several of his works, Immanuel Kant insists on the transcendental role of imagination in perception. In the Kantian scholarship, this claim has been interpreted in at least three ways: it is believed that the imagination is necessary to solve the riddle of the amodal character of perception, to justify the possibility of perceptual identity across time, and to explain the possibility of perceiving particular objects as such, viz. as belonging to a specific class of objects. The paper aims to (...) show how E. Husserl inherited these sets problems without however having recourse to the imagination at all. In the last section, I will briefly analyse two types of mixed acts where perception and imagination unite, namely image consciousness (Bildbewusstsein) and what Husserl calls perceptual phantasy (perzeptive Phantasie). I here argue that these analyses do not contradict, but rather strengthen the argument defended throughout the paper, namely that in Husserl's phenomenology, and contrary to Kant's, the imagination does not assume a synthetic or transcendental function in perception. (shrink)

Human activity is permeated by norms of all sorts: moral norms provide the 'code' for what we ought to do, norms of logic regulate how we ought to reason, scientific norms set the standards for what counts as knowledge, legal norms determine what is lawfully permitted and what isn't, aesthetic norms establish canons of beauty and shape artistic trends and practices, and socio-cultural norms provide criteria for what counts as tolerable, just, praiseworthy, or unacceptable in a community or milieu. Given (...) the diversity of norm-governed phenomena prevailing in our everyday experience, it is not surprising that the question of normativity has recently generated important debates in philosophy. However, the more specific question concerning the nature and function of 'norms in perceptual experience' has received comparatively little attention. This volume brings together scholars from philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception, and phenomenology to explore this question. (shrink)

In his collection of essays Having the World in View (2009), John McDowell draws a distinction between empirical experience (conceived as the conceptual activity relevant to judgment) and empirical judgment (i.e., the full-fledged assertoric content itself ). McDowell’s latest proposal is that the form of empirical experience is transferable into judgment, but it is not itself a judgment. Taking back the view he advanced in Mind and World, McDowell now believes that perception does not have propositional content as such, but (...) the content of perception can, however, always be actualized in a judgment. There is, in other words, a strict parallelism between the deliverances of sensibility and potential future judgments of experience. The early Husserl disagrees with this and recognizesexplicitly the existence of coherent forms of perceptual engagement with the world that is independent of the mastery of language and the use of concepts.Perception constitutes—together with certain other embodied practices—our primary mode of access to the world, and this occurs before and independently ofour thinking activity. However, the realization of the centrality of time for intentionality will lead Husserl after 1905 to recognize a kind of lawfulness internal tothe sensuous materials themselves, prior to any egoical achievement. The most immediate consequence of this paradigm change is that the very idea of non-conceptual content now seems unwarranted. Indeed, if time is that which keeps the process of sense formation unified even at the lowest levels of constitution, then the world-disclosing activity of the ego cannot be discontinuous with the conceptual realm. Against this background, it will be argued that the dialectic between the conceptual and non-conceptual ultimately makes no sense on a phenomenological basis. Once temporality has entered the scene, the only meaningful opposition that stands is that between the conceptual and pre-conceptual spheres. (shrink)

Chaos theory is a rapidly growing field. As a technical term, chaos refers to deterministic but unpredictable processes being sensitively dependent upon initial conditions. Neurobiological models and experimental results are very complicated and some research groups have tried to pursue the neuronal chaos. Babloyantz's group has studied the fractal dimension (d) of electroencephalograms (EEG) in various physiological and pathological states. From deep sleep (d=4) to full awakening (d>8), a hierarchy of strange attractors paralles the hierarchy of states of consciousness. In (...) epilepsy (petit mal), despite the turbulent aspect of a seizure, the attractor dimension was near to 2. In Creutzfeld-Jacob disease, the regular EEG activity corresponded to an attractor dimension less than the one measured in deep sleep. Is it healthy to be chaotic? An active desynchronisation could be favourable to a physiological system. Rapp's group reported variations of fractal dimension according to particular tasks. During a mental arithmetic task, this dimension increased. In another task, a P300 fractal index decreased when a target was identified. It is clear that the EEG is not representing noise. Its underlying dynamics depends on only a few degrees of freedom despite yet it is difficult to compute accurately the relevant parameters.What is the cognitive role of such a chaotic dynamics? Freeman has studied the olfactory bulb in rabbits and rats for 15 years. Multi-electrode recordings of a few mm2 showed a chaotic hierarchy from deep anaesthesia to alert state. When an animal identified a previously learned odour, the fractal dimension of the dynamics dropped off (near limit cycles). The chaotic activity corresponding to an alert-and-waiting state seems to be a field of all possibilities and a focused activity corresponds to a reduction of the attractor in state space. For a couple of years, Freeman has developed a model of the olfactory bulb-cortex system. The behaviour of the simple model without learning was quite similar to the real behaviour and a model with learning is developed. (shrink)

In the Fall of 2016, an international conference took place at Université de Montréal to reflect on the relation between the concepts of time and intentionality. Although the topic of intentionality has been very intensely investigated both within the analytic and the phenomenological traditions throughout the past century, little systematic work has been done with regard to intentionality’s temporal dimension per se. Our goal with this special issue – which contains a selection of the papers presented at the conference – (...) is to contribute to correct this shortcoming in the current philosophical literature. (shrink)

The main theme of Steve Crowell’s excellent Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger is ‘the connection between normativity and meaning’ (p. 1), a central issue in both Husserl’s and...

The recognition of a meaningful sensory foundation of perception is central to Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. If some commentators do not hesitate to see in the notion of perceptual Gestalt a notion applicable to all domains of being, it is not a priori easy to see how it must be conceived in the more specific context of the perception of others (autrui). However, Merleau-Ponty is very clear on this point: all perception manifests itself in the form of a Gestalt, including the (...) perception of other people. The ambition of this short study is to spell out in rough strokes how this injunction should be heard and thus to explain how others manifest themselves as Gestalts to perceptual consciousness. (shrink)

Despite all controversies that might otherwise divide them, most phenomenologists agree that consciousness entails some form of self-consciousness. In fact, they go even further, as they virtually all agree on the necessity of fleshing out this insight in bodily terms: from the phenomenological point of view, self-consciousness is primarily experienced as a form of bodily self-consciousness (or self-awareness). Following Edmund Husserl's insight that the lived body (Leib), i.e. the body as it is subjectively felt or experienced, must necessarily be presupposed (...) by all object consciousness, including the thematic consciousness of me as a body, there is a long-standing discussion within the phenomenological movement on how to conceive of this self-relation. This entry focuses on the French reception of Husserl and highlights the distinctive ways in which French phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry, Jean-Paul Sartre and Jacques Derrida have elaborated on and disputed this key insight. It will be shown that discussions on this question have open onto two further debates: one revolves around the paradigmatic role Husserl grants to touch in the analysis of consciousness, while the other concerns the differences between the experience of one's own body and the experience of the body of others. Finally, we point to the fact that one's body can be experienced and evaluated as other, as is shown in the critical analyses of Frantz Fanon, Simone de Beauvoir, Michel Foucault, and recent critical phenomenology. Here, it becomes clear that the bodily self-awareness of concrete subjects is shaped by the material conditions, norms, and discourses of their respective situation. (shrink)

This is a critical review of David Carr's Experience and history: phenomenological perspectives on the historical world. Oxford University Press, 2014.

Since its first formulation in the 1980s, the disjunctivist theory has changed the way philosophers think about perception. Fundamentally, the disjunctivist view is a negative metaphysical thesis about the nature of perceptual experience: it is based on a refutation of the so-called “common kind claim,” that is to say, the claim that perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations are conscious experiences of the same fundamental kind. Given the importance granted to perceptual experience in the phenomenological tradition, a few commentators have, in recent (...) years, attempted to situate the phenomenological point of view vis-à-vis these two positions. While Romano (2012) and Bower (2020) have argued that Husserl’s conception of illusions and hallucinations entails a form of conjunctive analysis, Smith (2008), Hopp (2011), and Overgaard (2018) attempted to show that Husserl’s theory of perception amounts to a kind of disjunctivism avant la lettre. In this chapter, I side with Staiti (2015) and Zahavi (2017) and argue that the very opposition between conjunctivism and disjunctivism is hardly thinkable on Husserlian grounds. After brushing in very rough strokes Husserl’s normative theory of perception, I defend this claim with two arguments. The first – dubbed the metaphysical argument – targets one core metaphysical commitment of both conjunctivism and disjunctivism, namely their defense of metaphysical realism, which I deem incompatible with Husserl’s phenomenology, whether before or after the transcendental turn. The second argument – called the phenomenological argument – targets another presupposition shared by both parties, namely the idea that “perfect hallucinations” are possible. I lay out a series of reasons as to why this idea should be resisted, and then explain how this impacts the discussion between disjunctivism and conjunctivism. (shrink)

Issus de deux journées d’étude organisées en 2008 et 2010 dans le cadre du programme de recherche « Modèles familiaux et cultures politiques » (École française de Rome), les neuf articles de ce volume examinent la construction des liens familiaux à l’époque moderne dans des territoires (Italie, France, espace germanique, péninsule Ibérique et son empire) et des configurations politiques, juridiques, sociales et économiques variées. La première partie s’attache à la formation du lien matrimon...

Contesting Antiquity in Egypt: Archaeologies, Museums and the Struggle for Identities from World War I to Nasser. By Donald Malcolm Reid. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2015. Pp. xxii + 491, illus. $59.95.

Um den phänomenologischen Anspruch der Dekonstruktion ans Licht zu bringen, hat sich der Autor der vorliegenden Studie vorgenommen, die Bedeutungsverschiebung des Begriffs,transzendental‘ in Jacques Derridas Werk zu verfolgen. Die Untersuchung legt nahe, dass die Dekonstruktion des Begriffs ‚transzendental’ nicht als eine bloße Zurückweisung des Erbe der Transzendentalphilosophie hinausläuft. Die durch Derridas ganzes Werk hinduch stets geübte Kritik dieser umfangreichen Tradition – in all ihren Formen: mittelalterliche Onto-Theo-Logie, Kritizismus oder Phänomenologie – geht seit den allerersten Werken Derridas mit einer immer wieder (...) betonten Notwendigkeit einher, transzendentale Fragen zu stellen, um überhaupt philosophieren zu können. Zwar gilt es, den Wert ‚transzendental’ zu dekonstruieren und die Geschichtlichkeit der transzendentalen Fragestellung kritisch zu untersuchen; es darf aber nicht vergessen werden, dass die Dekonstruktion ebenfalls nach den transzendentalen Bedingungen der Möglichkeit aller Art Phänomenen fragt. In diesem Zusammenhang bestand die Herausforderung dieser Studie darin, der doppeldeutigen Bewegung von Kritik und Aneignung der transzendentalphilosophischen Tradition am Leitfaden der in Derridas Werk erfahrenen Bedeutungsveränderung des Begriffs ‚transzendental’ in ‚ultra’ und ‚quasi transzendental’ die sorgfältigsten Analysen zu unterwerfen. (shrink)

Du renforcement de la « monarchie paternelle » à l’existence d’un « empire des mères », la confrontation des sources du droit civil et des archives criminelles du Châtelet, au premier XVIIIe siècle, donne une vision complexe des rapports noués entre l’expérience de la maternité et l’exercice de l’autorité. Statutairement, les mères légitimes sont associées, sur un mode mineur ou de plein droit dans le cas du veuvage et de l’institution tutélaire, à l’exercice de l’autorité paternelle. Mais en débordant ces (...) catégories juridiques admises, en les utilisant à leur avantage ou en les contournant, les mères de la société parisienne se révèlent plus autoritaires que tendres, usant des prérogatives du patriarche, tout en revendiquant l’existence d’une sphère d’autorité purement féminine, dont elles assurent d’ailleurs, avec leurs filles, la reproduction. Par le biais des statuts octroyés ou des rôles assumés, les mères jouissent ainsi de pouvoirs, qui participent de l’institution paternelle et de la culture féminine. (shrink)

The dynamical behaviour of a very general model of neural networks with random asymmetric synaptic weights is investigated in the presence of random thresholds. Using mean-field equations, the bifurcations of the fixed points and the change of regime when varying control parameters are established. Different areas with various regimes are defined in the parameter space. Chaos arises generically by a quasi-periodicity route.

Following Karni's seminal work, Walker and other researchers have recently provided gradually convincing evidence that sleep is critical for the consolidation-based enhancement (CBE) of motor sequence learning. Studies in our laboratory using a motor adaptation paradigm, however, show that CBE can also occur after the simple passage of time, suggesting that sleep effects on memory consolidation are task-related, and possibly dependent on anatomically dissociable circuits.

Chaos in nervous system is a fascinating but controversial field of investigation. To approach the role of chaos in the real brain, we theoretically and numerically investigate the occurrence of chaos inartificial neural networks. Most of the time, recurrent networks (with feedbacks) are fully connected. This architecture being not biologically plausible, the occurrence of chaos is studied here for a randomly diluted architecture. By normalizing the variance of synaptic weights, we produce a bifurcation parameter, dependent on this variance and on (...) the slope of the transfer function, that allows a sustained activity and the occurrence of chaos when reaching a critical value. Even for weak connectivity and small size, we find numerical results in accordance with the theoretical ones previously established for fully connected infinite sized networks. The route towards chaos is numerically checked to be a quasi-periodic one, whatever the type of the first bifurcation is. Our results suggest that such high-dimensional networks behave like low-dimensional dynamical systems. (shrink)