This article motivates a shift in certain strands of the debate over legitimate roles for nonepistemic values in scientific practice from investigating what is involved in taking cognitive attitudes like acceptance toward an empirical hypothesis to looking at a social understanding of assertion, the act of communicating that hypothesis. I argue that speech act theory’s account of assertion as a type of doing makes salient legitimate roles nonepistemic values can play in scientific practice. The article also shows how speech act (...) theory might provide a framework for fruitfully extending aspects of the social and pragmatic turns in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this paper we give a rather detailed algebraic investigation of interpolation and Beth’s property in propositional many-valued logics extending Hájek’s Basic Logic [P. Hájek, Metamathematics of Fuzzy Logic, Kluwer, 1998], and we connect such properties with amalgamation and strong amalgamation in the corresponding varieties of algebras. It turns out that, while the most interesting extensions of in the language of have deductive interpolation, very few of them have Beth’s property or Craig interpolation. Thus in the last part of the (...) paper we look for conservative extensions of having such properties. (shrink)

Taking a cue from remarks Thomas Kuhn makes in 1990 about the historical turn in philosophy of science, I examine the history of history and philosophy of science within parts of the British philosophical context in the 1950s and early 1960s. During this time, ordinary language philosophy's influence was at its peak. I argue that the ordinary language philosophers' methodological recommendation to analyze actual linguistic practice influences several prominent criticisms of the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation and that these criticisms (...) relate to the historical turn in philosophy of science. To show these connections, I primarily examine the work of Stephen Toulmin, who taught at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, and Michael Scriven, who completed a dissertation on explanation under Gilbert Ryle and R.B. Braithwaite in 1956. I also consider Mary Hesse's appeal to an ordinary language-influenced account of meaning in her account of the role of models and analogies in scientific reasoning, and W.H. Watson's Wittgensteinian philosophy of science, an early influence on Toulmin. I think there are two upshots to my historical sketch. First, it fills out details of the move away from logical positivism to more historical- and practice-focused philosophies of science. Second, questions about linguistic meaning and the proper targets and aims of philosophical analysis are part and parcel of the historical turn, as well as its reception. Looking at the philosophical background during which so-called linguistic philosophers also had a hand in bringing these questions to prominence helps us understand why. (shrink)

I argue that our everyday evaluations of architecture are primarily evaluations of spaces and, in particular, of their inhabitability— that is, whether they serve or can serve to the realization of our individual ideal of life. Inhabitability is not only a functional criterion but an aesthetic one as well. It is aesthetic insofar as the evaluations about inhabitability include evaluations about the quality of the experience of actually doing something in —or simply occupying—a particular space. This aesthetic aspect of our (...) everyday evaluations explains, on one hand, the distinctive features of our everyday preferences for some architectonic spaces over others—namely, their very personal nature; their noticeable value in our daily lives; their inseparability from the activities we plan to realize in those spaces; and the importance of the spaces which are contiguous to the one we are evaluating. And on the other, it both reveals architecture’s significance for the quality of our daily life and serves as a guide for us to choose spaces that improve that quality. (shrink)

Hermeneutics, also referred to as interpretive phenomenology, has led to important contributions to nursing research. The philosophy of Charles Taylor has been a major source in the development of contemporary hermeneutics, through his ontological and epistemological articulations of the human sciences. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that Taylor's ideas can further enrich hermeneutic inquiry in nursing research, particularly for investigations of ethical concerns. The paper begins with an outline of Taylor's hermeneutical framework, followed by a review of (...) his key ideas relevant for ethics research. The paper ends with a discussion of my empirical research with critically ill children in Canada and France in relation to Taylor's ideas, chiefly Social Imaginaries. I argue that Taylor's hermeneutics provides a substantive moral framework as well as a methodology for examining ethical concerns. (shrink)

I draw upon speech act theory to understand the speech acts appropriate to the multiple aims of scientific practice and the role of nonepistemic values in evaluating speech acts made relative to those aims. First, I look at work that distinguishes explaining from describing within scientific practices. I then argue speech act theory provides a framework to make sense of how explaining, describing, and other acts have different felicity conditions. Finally, I argue that if explaining aims to convey understanding to (...) particular audiences rather than describe literally across all contexts, then evaluating explanatory acts directed to the public or policymakers involves asking nonepistemic questions. (shrink)

Teachers are necessarily free. The present article discusses the dual meaning of this necessity. The first meaning relates to freedom as an inevitable aspect of the actual reality in the classroom ; the second to teachers’ freedom as the ideal condition, or a prerequisite for optimal teaching. Existentialist philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argued that human beings are “condemned to be free” and demanded that freedom be considered an imperative value. Philosopher of education Joseph Schwab, who analysed the practical nature of teaching, (...) concluded that teachers make choices every minute in the classroom, and demanded that their autonomy be expanded. This article identifies parallels between these two philosophical moves and suggests complementing features. Sartre adds universal depth to Schwab’s portrait of teachers, proving them to be an extreme expression of the human condition. Schwab provides Sartre’s analysis with concrete validation and practical suggestions for implementation. Combining these two approaches can further establish the importance of teacher autonomy and offer a unique conceptualisation of teacher agency as a partial response to the crisis of education in the postmodern era. (shrink)

From the beginning of the sixties untill the end of the seventies, an intense debate took place in Germany that has become famous under the title "The Rehabilitation of Practical Philosophy". Its origin is essentially found in the philosophical positions which, while fairly different from one another, were later brought together under the single designation "neo-Aristotelism". The recovery of the Aristotelian understanding of praxis and of the ethical and political knowledge with which it is concerned has offered itself as an (...) alternative paradigm for the unitary notion of science that characterizes modernity, and has opened a perspective from which it is once again possible to examine in a critical manner the identification of science with theory posited in modernity, as well as the paleomodern and modern notion of reason and its development in the direction of mere instrumentality and functionalism. Therefore, despite quite a few unilateral decisions, the considerations and problems brought to our attention by the rehabilitation of practical philosophy and the neo-Aristotelians retain a disturbing relevance. (shrink)

This paper presents the Futurium platform used by Digital Futures, a foresight project launched by the European Commission's Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology (DG CONNECT). Futurium was initially developed with the primary purpose of hosting and curating visions and policy ideas generated by Digital Futures (Digital Futures was launched in July 2011 by DG CONNECT's Director General Robert Madelin following a prior DG CONNECT exercise called Digital Science.). However, it has turned into a platform on which to (...) experiment with new policymaking models based on scientific evidence and stakeholder participation, referred to in this paper as ‘Policy Making 3.0’. The platform hosts an online foresight toolkit to facilitate the joint creation of ideas to help design future policies. It leverages the potential of social networks, open data, semantic and knowledge mining technologies as well as participatory brainstorming techniques to engage stakeholders and harness their views and creativity to better inform policies that matter to them. The Futurium distinguishes between different variables, reflecting the emotional vs. rational mindsets of the participants, and offers the possibility to frame the engagement and co-creation process into multiple phases of a workflow. Futurium was developed to support Digital Futures, but its open architecture makes it easily adaptable to any policymaking/decision-making context where thinking ahead, participation, scientific evidence and agility are needed. Futurium is an early prototype implementation of the Policy Making 3.0 model, which is a long-term vision requiring further investigation and experimentation. The Futurium production website can be seen here: ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/futurium. (shrink)

In this paper, I fill out the received view of logical positivism within professional philosophy against which Thomas Kuhn’s Structure appeared. To do this, I look at the methodological dimensions of ordinary language criticisms of logical positivist analysis from P.F. Strawson and J.L. Austin. While no one would confuse Strawson and Austin for philosophers of science, I look to their criticisms given the general porousness of sub-disciplinary boundaries in mid-20th century philosophy, the prominence of ordinary language philosophy in the 1950s, (...) and also because Kuhn was likely aware of their criticisms via Stanley Cavell. Their main charge is that the positivists base their ideal language analysis on an impoverished, yet overreaching account of meaning because they ignore ordinary linguistic practices. I then show how these methodological criticisms run parallel to points Kuhn makes against logical positivist approaches to the study of scientific knowledge. The parallels I draw emphasize methodological, rather than doctrinal dissatisfaction in mid-20th century philosophy with logical positivism’s perceived neglect of linguistic and scientific practices. An insight shared by these parallel criticisms is that logical positivists cannot declare linguistic and scientific practices irrelevant to their philosophical aims without an antecedent investigation of the practices under question. (shrink)

I defend that Cartesian passions are a function—in fact, the only function—of the mind-body union responsible for guiding us in the pursuit of our (natural) perfection, a perfection that we increase by joining goods that our nature deems to be so. This view is in conflict, on one hand, with those (a majority) who have emphasized either the epistemic or survival role of our passions and, on the other and more precisely, with a recent proposal according to which Cartesian passions (...) should not be even seen as guides for happiness. Against the latter, I will attempt to show that passions perform a guiding function (1) by discriminating what is “important” for us regarding the increase of our natural perfection (which includes informing the soul about the current state of perfection both of the body and of the mind-body union); and (2) by disposing us to act (which includes proposing to the will possible ways of action to increase or maintain our perfection). Our passions are, thus, both informative and motivational. Making explicit their informative role will require, negatively, showing that this does not mean they are reliable and, positively, undertaking a study—largely absent among commentaries—of their specific intentionality. (shrink)

In this paper we continue the study of the theories IΔ n+1 (T), initiated in [7]. We focus on the quantifier complexity of these fragments and theirs (non)finite axiomatization. A characterization is obtained for the class of theories such that IΔ n+1 (T) is Π n+2 –axiomatizable. In particular, IΔ n+1 (IΔ n+1 ) gives an axiomatization of Th Π n+2 (IΔ n+1 ) and is not finitely axiomatizable. This fact relates the fragment IΔ n+1 (IΔ n+1 ) to induction (...) rule for Δ n+1 –formulas. Our arguments, involving a construction due to R. Kaye (see [9]), provide proofs of Parsons’ conservativeness theorem (see [16]) and (a weak version) of a result of L.D. Beklemishev on unnested applications of induction rules for Π n+2 and Δ n+1 formulas (see [2]). (shrink)

Following some ideas of Roberto Magari, we propose trial and error probabilistic functions, i.e. probability measures on the sentences of arithmetic that evolve in time by trial and error. The set ℐ of the sentences that get limit probability 1 is a Π3—theory, in fact ℐ can be a Π3—complete set. We prove incompleteness results for this setting, by showing for instance that for every k > 0 there are true Π3—sentences that get limit probability less than 1/2k. No set (...) ℐ as above can contain the set of all true Π3—sentences, although we exhibit some ℐ containing all the true Σ2—sentences. We also consider an approach based on the notions of inner probability and outer probability, and we compare this approach with the one based on trial and error probabilistic functions. Although the two approaches are shown to be different, we single out an important case in which they are equivalent. (shrink)

O tema da natureza da virtude e de sua transmissibilidade atravessa quase todos os diálogos da juventude de Platão, isto é, os considerados “diálogos socráticos”. Este adquire uma relevância central no Protágoras e no Mênon, o qual se abre exatamente com a interrogação acerca da maneira de adquirir a virtude. No curso do diálogo, a arete assume um significado eminentemente político: Mênon pergunta a Sócrates como se pode obter sucesso no campo político, como se pode adquirir reconhecimento social. A tese (...) em torno a qual se desenvolve a conversação assume a identidade de virtude e conhecimento (episteme). Todavia, a consequência que deriva da assunção desta tese, isto é, o princípio com base no qual a virtude, enquanto conhecimento, seja ensinável, é refutado por meio do célebre “argumento empírico”: a ausência de homens capazes de transmitir a sua virtude aos filhos demonstra que essa não é ensinável, e ,portanto, não é conhecimento. Sócrates propõe, então, situar na opinião correta (orthe doxa) a fonte da virtude política. Todavia, a validade do argumento empírico resulta muito incerta, uma vez que parece fundar-se na ambiguidade do significado do termo didakton, que quer dizer seja “ensinável” seja efetivamente “ensinado”. Também a tentativa de fundar a virtude na theia moira deve ser tratada com certo ceticismo. Na realidade, Sócrates alude, no fim do diálogo, à possibilidade de que exista um homem que seja virtuoso e que seja também capaz de ensinar a virtude a outro homem: este homem extraordinário é naturalmente o próprio Sócrates. (shrink)

Esta investigación propone una revisión de la idea de lo apocalíptico presente en Fire Punch de Tatsuki Fujimoto a partir de la representación que se hace en ella de lo escatológico y los alcances que tiene la idea de lo apocalíptico dentro del relato. Así se analizarán las acciones y motivaciones de los personajes de esta obra según el sentido que tiene la destrucción retratada en la obra. Para esto hay dos momentos centrales de la investigación: primero, la problematización de (...) lo apocalíptico y los alcances que tiene este fenómeno en este manga (Deleuze, Kant y Parkinson Zamora) y segundo, la aparición de la presencia y la ausencia en Fire Punch (Heidegger, Derrida, Fisher) y su función iluminadora o reveladora. (shrink)

In the proem that precedes the account of the generation of the world, Timaeus provides very important elements for understanding the discourse he is about to delivery. It is a complex text that displays at least three different levels: dialectical, analogical (or metaphorical) and epistemological. In the dialectical section, Timaeus establishes that the sensible universe is a generated reality and as such has a cause; in the metaphorical section, he indicates the analogical schemes he will use to explain the genesis (...) of the cosmos (technical and biological) and the causes on which it depends. Finally, in the epistemological section he explains the reason why this exposition cannot achieve truth but must be content with likeness. (shrink)

Although the term ontology is absent from Plato’s works, his thinking undoubtedly belongs to the prehistory of this discipline. In his dialogues, one finds many observations concerning what exists and how it exists. Plato’s metaphysics is based on the fundamental distinction between two kinds of entities, namely intelligible forms and sensible particulars. This diairesis is presented in different but all compatible ways. The ontological difference between forms and sensible objects implies a causal priority: according to Plato, this priority corresponds to (...) the proteron-hysteron scheme mentioned by Aristotle. The last part of the essay is devoted to the idea of the good and the problems related to its ontological status. (shrink)

Este texto se propone la lectura de la novela Pedro Páramo a la luz de algunos de los conceptos que, a fin de caracterizar la hermenéutica literaria, y la teoría de la interpretación, elabora Paul Ricoeur en su texto Teoría de la argumentación. La primera parte consiste en una breve presentación de los mismos y la segunda en la lectura a partir de estos conceptos, y en particular del concepto de referente, de algunos pasajes de la novela de Juan Rulfo.

According to one of the most fundamental tenets in Indian Buddhist epistemology, there are only two means of knowledge - perception and inference - because there are only two objects of knowledge: the particular and the universal. This book deals with this tenet as it was expounded and substantiated in Dharmakirti's (7th c.) magnum opus, the Pramanavarttika, a work that has exerted lasting influence on Buddhist philosophy in India and Tibet up to the present day. (Series: Leipzig Studies on Culture (...) and History of South and Central Asia / Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens - Vol. 5) [Subject: Buddhism, Religious Studies, Philosophy]. (shrink)

Cet article est consacré à la théorie des causes de Plutarque dans ses rapports avec le platonisme des premiers siècles de l’époque impériale. Le texte le plus important se trouve dans les chapitres 47-48 du dialogue De defectu oraculorum, où Plutarque présente une théorie dualiste des causes, qui admet deux genres de cause : d’une part la cause divine et rationnelle, qui comprend la cause finale et la cause efficiente, d’autre part la cause nécessaire et matérielle, qui comprend la matière (...) et la cause instrumentale. Cette version de la théorie des causes dépend, de manière directe ou indirecte, du Timée de Platon. Dans d’autres ouvrages, comme le De animae procreatione, Plutarque ajoute deux causes différentes, à savoir la cause paradigmatique, qui s’identifie avec le monde des idées ou avec dieu lui-même, et la cause du mouvement, représentée par l’âme pré-cosmique irrationnelle. Il est intéressant de remarquer que, dans son exposition de la théorie des causes, Plutarque emploie la description prépositionnelle, très répandue dans les écoles philosophiques : l’agent est donc to hyph’hou, le paradigme to pros ho, la matière to ex hou, alors que la cause finale est indiquée avec la formule to dia ho. (shrink)

In van Benthem (2008), van Benthem proposes a dynamic consequence relation defined as${\psi _1}, \ldots,{\psi _n}{ \models ^d}\phi \,{\rm{iff}}{ \models ^{pa}}[{\psi _1}] \ldots [{\psi _n}]\phi,$where the latter denotes consequence in public announcement logic, a dynamic epistemic logic. In this paper we investigate the structural properties of a conditional dynamic consequence relation$\models _{\rm{\Gamma }}^d$extending van Benthem’s proposal. It takes into account a set of background conditions Γ, inspired by Makinson (2003) wherein Makinson calls this reasoning ‘modulo’ a set Γ. In the (...) presence of common knowledge, conditional dynamic consequence is definable from (unconditional) dynamic consequence. An open question is whether dynamic consequence is compact. We further investigate a dynamic consequence relation for soft instead of hard announcements. Surprisingly, it shares many properties with (hard) dynamic consequence. Dynamic consequence relations provide a novel perspective on reasoning about protocols in multi-agent systems. (shrink)

Résumé Dans sa configuration actuelle, l’intellect général est à la fois fragmenté et dépourvu de perception collective et de conscience de soi. Seule l’émergence consciente du travail cognitif comme incarnation sensible et sociale de l’intellect général permettra l’avènement d’une recomposition de notre connaissance commune, scientifique, technique, affective, organisatrice, ainsi que de notre intérêt commun.