This article considers Kierkegaard's contribution to our understanding of the political. Building on previous scholarship exploring the social dimensions of Kierkegaard's thought, I argue that for Kierkegaard the modern understanding and practice of politics should be understood as ?despair?. Thus, whilst Kierkegaard's criticisms of politics might have been produced in an ad hoc fashion, this article argues that there is an underlying principle which guides these criticisms: that politics is subordinate to, and must be grounded in, spiritual or religious selfhood. (...) In this way the modern phenomena of democracy, liberalism, the press, and the crowd can all be seen as representative of a form of community which falls far short of the potential that human beings can and should achieve. Such a community would see individuals recognising themselves and each other as spiritual beings, and taking responsibility for themselves and others. That modern politics fails to understand the human being as an essentially spiritual entity related to others through God can only lead us to conclude that, from Kierkegaard's point of view, modern politics suffers from the sickness of despair. Whilst Kierkegaard might be criticised for failing to provide us with a more detailed picture of a polity shaped by the religious contours he promotes, he clearly offers an intriguing and suggestive contribution to our understanding not only of the limitations of politics, but also the relationship between a normative human and political ontology, with the former providing the basis for the latter. (shrink)

This article offers a political reading of Franz Kafka's posthumous work The Trial. In this novel, the main protagonist (Joseph K.) is subject to an arrest and trial conducted by the ambiguous authority of a shadowy court and its officials. This article explores Joseph K.'s experience of being subject to the Law, and relates this to our own understanding and experience of political subjectivity in modern times. K.'s doomed search for order through a ‘permanent resolution’ of his case is related (...) to the modern desire for order: Specifically, the desire for both philosophical and political frameworks that provide narratives or certainty. Here modernity is understood to be characterized by an anxiety brought about by a crisis in authorship and authority. The article then considers K.'s desire for justice and the Law, and his entanglement with the power of the court, as analogous to the modern experience of the triad of justice–law–power, which is subsumed under the banner of ‘sovereignty’. In particular, the article explores K.'s inability to locate, read, or fix the Law; a problem that is also reflected in the aporia of sovereignty as justice–law–power. K.'s experience alerts us to the contradictions in the triad justice–law–power; contradictions that occur as although each member of the triad is dependent upon the other two, each member of the triad also seeks to exclude or deny this dependency. Thus, read politically, K.'s struggle in The Trial can be seen as a reflection of the modern struggle with sovereignty as the triad justice–law–power, and the impasse that K. reaches is also the impasse that modernity has reached. (shrink)

Given his attention to the existential elements of our existence, it is not surprising that Søren Kierkegaard offers us an account of friendship. Like much of Kierkegaard’s thought, the account is insightful, rigorous and uncompromising. Kierkegaard entertains the idea of friendship, because those who have theorised and praised this form of sociality promote it as a forum in which a genuine and ethical concern with the other can be fostered. In this sense, friendship can be considered an ‘alternative’ response to (...) the other. Kierkegaard challenges this understanding. What is particularly striking about his reconstruction and criticisms of the traditional account of friendship is that he finds it deficient not only by the light of his own Christian viewpoint; he also finds friendship deficient when judged from the perspective of its own self‐proclaimed ethical foundations. Thus, Kierkegaard concludes that the reciprocity involved in friendship actually betrays its essential selfishness. In considering Kierkegaard’s account of friendship this article argues that his criticisms make serious difficulties for the traditional concept stretching back to the Ancients. The article also argues that Kierkegaard’s alternative, ‘neighbourliness’, is constructed in such a way as to be insufficiently grounded in human sociality and perhaps comes to represent an empty formalism towards the other. It concludes that whilst Kierkegaard’s thought opens up a space for a sociality based on the responsibility to others, Kierkegaard fails to occupy this space. Despite this failure, Kierkegaard sets the task for any future theorisation of friendship as a centre for responsibility towards self and others. (shrink)

Augustine’s early works Against the Academicians (386) and The Teacher (389) belong together. In the former, which is directed at Cicero’s Academica, he defends the possibility of knowledge against the skeptical arguments of the New Academy;1 in the latter, directed at Plato’s Meno, he offers his theory of illumination to explain how knowledge is acquired. As a pair, they present Augustine’s alternative to the pose of ironical detachment fashionable among late Roman intellectuals.

In this chapter we theoretically analyse the most prominent emotional states that derive from postmodernity, and which, exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, affect individuals and societies. When differentiating emotions in their social aspect as either isolating or binding, it becomes apparent that isolating emotional states such as fear, mistrust and loneliness have been especially intense in this sociocultural situation. Due to their isolating character, they negatively affect social cohesion. We propose that the social fabric can be strengthened through relationships of (...) civic friendship, because this is based on the development of binding emotions (trust, empathy, care for well-being, and compassion, which are other-oriented emotions), as well as consisting of a bond of reciprocal good will between citizens. Without forgetting that, under certain conditions, it can also be a risk for social cohesion, civic friendship brings consistency to society, not only because of the kinds of binding emotions that it involves, but also because, being based on other-oriented emotions, it protects emotional rationality from emotionalism. (shrink)