The article reviews the book Elementy etyki lekarskiej [Issues in Physician Ethics], by Tadeusz Biesaga.

This book provides an incisive, basic introduction to many-valued logics and to the constructions that are "many-valued" at their origin. Using the matrix method, the author sheds light on the profound problems of many-valuedness criteria and its classical characterizations. The book also includes information concerning the main systems of many-valued logic, related axiomatic constructions, and conceptions inspired by many-valuedness. With its selective bibliography and many useful historical references, this book provides logicians, computer scientists, philosophers, and mathematicians with a valuable survey (...) of the subject. (shrink)

The speech act of inquiry is generally treated as a default kind of asking questions. The widespread norm states that one inquires whether p only if one does not know that p. However, the fact that inquiring is just one kind of asking questions has received little to no attention. Just as in the declarative mood we can perform not only assertions, but various other speech acts, like guesses or predictions, so in the interrogative mood we can also make various (...) speech act types. I propose a speech-act-theoretic account of a distinct kind of question that I label exam questions. According to the proposed account, one performs an exam question p only if (i) one has access to the answer to p, and (ii) one does not officially know whether the hearer knows the answer to p. Exam questions satisfy all the necessary requirements of being a distinct kind of speech act. Additionally, my proposal contributes to the recent expansion of the normative approach to a variety of speech acts. (shrink)

I propose an analysis of lying with uninformative speech acts. The orthodox view states that lying is restricted to assertions. However, the growing case for non-assertoric lies made by presuppositions or conventional implicatures challenges this orthodoxy. So far, the only presuppositions to have been considered as lies were informative presuppositions. In fact, uninformative lies were not discussed in the philosophical literature. However, limiting the possibility of lying to informative speech acts is too restrictive. Firstly, I show that standard, uninformative presuppositions (...) can also be lies. Secondly, I extend this picture into uninformative lies made by declarative statements. To implement my proposal, I do not need a new definition of lying. Recently popular commitment-based definitions of lying are able to properly handle uninformative lies. (shrink)

According to the normative approach, speech acts are governed by certain norms. Interestingly, the same is true for classes of speech acts. This paper considers the normative treatment of constatives, consisting of such classes as assertives, predictives, suggestives, and more. The classical approach is to treat these classes of illocutions as species of constatives. Recently, however, Simion (Shifty Speech and Independent Thought: Epistemic Normativity in Context, Oxford University Press, 2021) has proposed that all constatives (i) are species of assertion, and (...) (ii) are governed by the knowledge norm. I defend the classical treatment of constatives and show that Simion’s conclusion is untenable. No taxonomy of speech acts can accommodate such a view. More importantly, we can test whether a particular speech act is an assertion or not. I propose five tests of assertion, the passing of which is a necessary condition for being an assertion. Some constative speech acts fail these tests. Thus, contrary to Simion, not all constatives can be regarded as species of assertion. (shrink)

This paper offers a systematic classification and characterization of speech acts and their norms. Recently, the normative approach has been applied to various speech acts, most notably to constatives. I start by showing how the work on the norms of assertion has influenced various approaches to the norms of other speech acts. I focus on the fact that various norms of assertion have different extensions, i.e., they denote different clusters of illocutions as belonging to an assertion. I argue that this (...) has consequences for theorising about norms of other speech acts and generates certain arbitrary divisions. In the central part, I analyse two groups of speech acts. Firstly, ordinary speech acts, like predictions or retractions. Secondly, I indicate how the normative view can be extended to so-called ancillary speech acts, like presuppositions or implicatures. I end with a discussion of possible extensions of the normative approach, focusing on the debate on lying. (shrink)

We investigate definable topological dynamics of groups definable in an o‐minimal expansion of the field of reals. Assuming that a definable group G admits a model‐theoretic analogue of Iwasawa decomposition, namely the compact‐torsion‐free decomposition, we give a description of minimal subflows and the Ellis group of its universal definable flow in terms of this decomposition. In particular, the Ellis group of this flow is isomorphic to. This provides a range of counterexamples to a question by Newelski whether the Ellis group (...) is isomorphic to. We further extend the results to universal topological covers of definable groups, interpreted in a two‐sorted structure containing the o‐minimal sort and a sort for an abelian group. (shrink)

The widely accepted view states that an intention to deceive is not necessary for lying. Proponents of this view, the so-called non-deceptionists, argue that lies are simply insincere assertions. We conducted three experimental studies with false explanations, the results of which put some pressure on non-deceptionist analyses. We present cases of explanations that one knows are false and compare them with analogical explanations that differ only in having a deceptive intention. The results show that lay people distinguish between such false (...) explanations and to a higher degree classify as lies those explanations that are made with the intention to deceive. Non-deceptionists fail to distinguish between such cases and wrongly classify both as lies. This novel empirical finding indicates the need for supplementing non-deceptionist definitions of lying, at least in some cases, with an additional condition, such as an intention to deceive. (shrink)

I argue against Milić's (2017) proposal of analyzing “selfless assertions” (Lackey 2007) as proper, i.e., as assertions which satisfy the norm of assertion. In his view, selfless assertions are hedged assertions governed by the knowledge norm. In my critique, I show that Milić does not make a case that selfless assertions constitute such a special class of assertions. Moreover, he does not deliver a clear criterion for differentiating between flat-out assertions and hedged ones. What is more, his proposal leaves some (...) cases of selfless assertions unexplained. The outcome is that we are still left without a satisfactory account of selfless assertions as proper assertions. (shrink)

Although assertions are often characterised as essentially informative speech acts, there is a widespread disagreement concerning how the informativeness of assertions should be understood. This paper proposes the informativeness norm of assertion, which posits that assertions are speech acts that essentially deliver new information. As a result, if one asserts something that is already commonly known, one’s assertion is improper. The norm is motivated by appealing to unique conversational patterns associated with informative and uninformative uses of assertions, an analogy between (...) assertions and inquiries, and a distinction between assertions and uninformative speech acts. By focusing on the normative approach to speech acts, the paper discusses how particular norms of assertion deal with the data supporting the norm of informativeness. To be informative, the speaker must consider the epistemic position of the audience. Since the majority of norms proposed in the literature are speaker-centred, they fail to explain the submitted data. Looking more broadly, focusing on the informativeness of assertions underscores the crucial role of the audience in construing adequate speech act accounts. (shrink)

Grzegorz W. Kolodko, one of the world's leading authorities on economics and development policy and a key architect of Poland's successful economic reforms, applies his far-reaching knowledge to the past and future of the world economy, introducing a framework for understanding our global situation that transcends any single discipline or paradigm. Deploying a novel mix of scientific evaluation and personal observation, Kolodko begins with a brief discussion of misinformation and its perpetuation in economics and politics. He criticizes the simplification (...) of complex economic and social issues and investigates the link between developments in the global economy and cultural change, scientific discoveries, and political fluctuations. Underscoring the necessity of conceptual and theoretical innovation in understanding our global economic situation, Kolodko offers a provocative study of globalization and the possibility of coming out ahead in an era of worldwide interdependence. Deeply critical of neoliberalism, which sought to transfer economic control exclusively to the private sector, Kolodko explores the virtues of social-economic development and the new rules of the economic game. He concludes with a look at our near and distant future, questioning whether we have a say in its making. (shrink)

The following article begins with my recollection of the only academic conference on Zdziechowski that was organised still under the communist regime in the autumn of 1984 at the Jagiellonian University and ends with a description of the discussion on the genesis and power of evil, with the participation of Czesław Miłosz and Leszek Kołakowski, which was triggered in Poland immediately after the publication of the last edition of On Cruelty in 1993. On Cruelty was first published in 1928 in (...) the journal Przegla̧d Współczesny [Contemporary Review] in Krakow, a second time in 1938 in the volume of articles In the Face of the End, Krakow 1938, and a third – and so far last – time also in Krakow in 1993. On Cruelty, published three times but so far only in Polish, has never been thoroughly analysed or even discussed, which is why this article focuses on discussing it and related questions about the origins and nature of evil, mainly in Europe and Asia, from the earliest times to the present. Zdziechowski was particularly outraged when the cruelty he condemned was justified by religion, especially Christianity (Catholic and Protestant). From these condemnations, he described the activities of the Inquisition, the witch trials, cruelty to animals, and – in the introduction – the “psychology of cruelty.” At the same time, however, he meticulously listed the names of those political and spiritual leaders in Europe and Asia, theologians and thinkers, who, over many centuries, up to the present day, have resolutely spoken out against evil, including cruelty, within and outside the Church. A separate and important issue is Zdziechowski’s attitude to Tsarist Russia and Bolshevism, as outlined in his work On Cruelty. On the one hand, he pointed out that at least two rulers of Russia before 1917 – Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great – had made major contributions to the history of cruelty in Europe and Asia. But Bolshevism, which Zdziechowski condemned in the strongest terms, was in his eyes not a continuation of pre-1917 Russian despotism, but emanated from the depths of Asia. (shrink)

Opracowanie ma charakter poglądowo-teoretyczny, powstało bowiem na podstawie przeglądu dostępnej literatury przedmiotu. Publikacja skierowana jest zarówno do naukowców jak i studentów zajmujących się tematyką starzenia się ludności, starości i osób starszych oraz do coraz szerszego grona zainteresowanych tymi zagadnieniami praktyków, w tym polityków i decydentów oraz reprezentantów usług publicznych, przedstawicieli mediów i organizacji pozarządowych. ** The study is illustrative and theoretical in nature, as it was based on a review of the available literature on the subject. The publication is addressed (...) to both scholars and students dealing with the subjects of population ageing, old age, and older adults, as well as to a growing group of practitioners interested in these issues, including politicians and decision-makers as well as representatives of public services, the media, and non-governmental organizations. (shrink)

Referential matrix semantics of R. W´ojcicki [5] and [4] is extended to cover the class of all structural propositional calculi.

We consider definable topological dynamics forNIPgroups admitting certain decompositions in terms of specific classes of definably amenable groups. For such a group, we find a description of the Ellis group of its universal definable flow. This description shows that the Ellis group is of bounded size. Under additional assumptions, it is shown to be independent of the model, proving a conjecture proposed by Newelski. Finally we apply the results to new classes of groups definable in o-minimal structures, generalizing all of (...) the previous results for this setting. (shrink)

Referential semantics importantly subscribes to the programme of theory of logical calculi. Defined by Wójcicki in [8], it has been subsequently studied in a series of papers of the author, till the full exposition of the framework in [9] and its intuitive characterisation in [10]. The aim of the article is to present several generalizations of referential semantics as compared and related to the matrix semantics for propositional logics. We show, in a uniform way, some own generalizations of referentiality: the (...) first, directed to unrestricted cluster referential semantics, [4], its "discrete" version, a counterpart of algebraic semantics and a many-valued referentiality based on matrices, whose elements are functions from the set of indices to a finite n-element set of values, n≥2, [3]. Next to this we outline pragmatic matrices introduced by Tokarz in [6] as an alternative for cluster referential approach and discuss together all presented versions of referential semantics. (shrink)

The paper is concerned with the problem of characterization of strengthenings of the so-called Łukasiewicz-like sentential calculi. The calculi under consideration are determined by n-valued Łukasiewicz matrices with superdesignated logical values. In general, Łukasiewicz-like sentential calculi are not implicative in the sense of [7]. Despite of this fact, in our considerations we use matrices analogous to S-algebras of Rasiowa. The main result of the paper says that the degree of maximality of any n-valued Łukasiewicz-like sentential calculus is finite and equal (...) to the degree of maximality of the corresponding n-valued Łukasiewicz calculus. (shrink)

The most natural and straightforward step beyond two‐valued logic is to introduce more logical values, thereby rejecting the principle of bivalence. Another, indirect, way consists in challenging the classical laws concerning the sentence connectives and introducing other non‐two‐valued connectives into the language. Either way, prepositional logic seems fundamental to many‐valuedness, rather than its first‐order extension. Hence, although there has been interesting research into first‐order many‐valued logics, we shall confine our discussion here to the 0‐order case.

Celem artykułu jest poszukiwanie takiej interpretacji obecności i działania Boga w świecie, jaka pozwoliłaby zharmonizować istotne prawdy wiary z naukowym obrazem świata, którego ewolucja jest rządzona przypadkiem i pozbawiona kierunku. Poszukiwanie to jest realizowane w kilku krokach. Odwołując się do różnych koncepcji celowości wskazuje się najpierw, że jeśli można mówić o tym, że świat ma taką cechę, to nie w sensie zmierzania w określonym kierunku, lecz w sensie celowości wewnętrznej: świat ze swej natury jest skierowany na Boga. Współcześnie o Bożej (...) celowości w świecie mówi się często w kategoriach ogólnego lub szczególnego działania Boga. Artykuł, podejmując tę kwestię zmierza do wniosku, że odróżnienie aspektu naturalnego od nadnaturalnego w danym zdarzeniu jest przypuszczalnie niemożliwe. Na jeden z powodów tej niemożliwości wskazuje tzw. zasada domknięcia przyczynowego, dlatego jest ona analizowana w kolejnym punkcie artykułu. Wskazuje się tutaj między innymi na konieczność zrewidowania niektórych klasycznych koncepcji cudu. W odniesieniu zaś do takich przełomowych zdarzeń z dziejów świata, jak powstanie życia czy pojawienie się człowieka, proponuje się hipotezę niedookreśloności celu stworzenia: Bóg może realizować swoje cele w świecie rządzonym przez autentyczny przypadek, jeśli cele te są rozumiane odpowiednio subtelnie. Na przykład, jeśli celem Boga jest pojawienie się w świecie istoty zdolnej do nawiązania z nim świadomego kontaktu, to istota taka niekoniecznie musiała przyjąć postać przedstawiciela gatunku Homo sapiens. Na koniec wskazuje się na panenteizm jako na właściwą, prawdziwie chrześcijańską wizję świata, który jest „losem i przeznaczeniem” samego Boga. W tej perspektywie, detale ewolucyjnego rozwoju świata przestają być religijnie istotne, a sama religia uwalnia się ostatecznie—po części pod wpływem współczesnej nauki—„od błędu i przesądu”. (shrink)

The paper is an extended version of a talk given to the XXXth Conference on the History of Logic devoted to the work of Professor Roman Suszko . Its aim is to present Sentential Calculus with Identity in comparison with other formalizations of propositional identity.

This paper offers a normative account of the speech act of explanation with understanding as its norm. The previous accounts of the speech act of explanation rely on the factive notion of understanding and maintain that proper explanations require knowledge. I argue, however, that such accounts are too demanding and do not reflect the everyday practice of explanation and the attribution of understanding. Instead, I argue that the non-factive, objectual attitude of understanding is sufficient for a proper explanation. On the (...) normative level, explanations are governed by an audience-centred norm, i.e., they are sensitive to the epistemic position of the audience. According to the proposed account, an explanation is a communicative act in which one puts the audience in a position to understand the explained phenomenon. This proposal fits into the recent wave of applications of the normative account and makes space for the pluralism of illocutionary acts. (shrink)

The paper is a study of properties of quasi-consequence operation which is a key notion of the so-called inferential approach in the theory of sentential calculi established in [5]. The principal motivation behind the quasi-consequence, q-consequence for short, stems from the mathematical practice which treats some auxiliary assumptions as mere hypotheses rather than axioms and their further occurrence in place of conclusions may be justified or not. The main semantic feature of the q-consequence reflecting the idea is that its rules (...) lead from the non-rejected assumptions to the accepted conclusions.First, we focus on the syntactic features of the framework and present the q-consequence as related to the notion of proof. Such a presentation uncovers the reasons for which the adjective inferential is used to characterize the approach and, possibly, the term inference operation replaces q-consequence. It also shows that the inferential approach is a generalisation of the Tarski setting and, therefore, it may potentially absorb several concepts from the theory of sentential calculi, cf. [10]. However, as some concrete applications show, see e.g.[4], the new approach opens perspectives for further exploration. (shrink)

In the paper Weaver's method is adapted to prove interpolation properties of many-valued propositional calculi standard in the sense of Rosser and Turquette. The case of n-valued Lukasiewicz calculi is discussed in connection with the results obtained.