In the 21st century, Carl Gustav Jung (1875-1961) remains one of the key figures in the field of analytical psychology - and Psychological Types, or The Psychology of Individuation, published in 1921, is one of his most influential works. It was written during the decade after the publication of Psychology of the Unconscious (1912), which effectively ended his friendship and collaboration with Sigmund Freud. Whereas the earlier work had clearly marked Jung's psychoanalytical divergence from Freud it is the Psychology (...) of Types that fully clarifies and presents the nature, quality and characteristics of his analytical psychology. The work, which was in part a consequence of his need to reconcile the competing theories of Freud, whom he regarded as extraverted, and Alfred Adler, whom he saw as introverted, develops his concept of descriptive categories for understanding the human mind in terms of the two essential attitude types: introversion and extraversion. These basic attitudes operate in tandem with four principal interacting functions of consciousness which Jung identifies as sensation and intuition, which are functions of perception, and thinking and feeling, which are functions of judgment. The eight resulting psychological types are then explored, described, identified, characterised and explained in considerable detail, with a soaring range of examples drawn from the whole of human history, culture and experience. In his efforts to explore and illuminate the nature of the unconscious mind and indeed the collective unconscious, he investigates the problems posed by the differing psychological types and how these have manifested from classical and medieval times to the 20th century. His observations range from Aristotle, Socrates and Plato to Tertullian and Origen, and from Abélard and Master Eckhart to Martin Luther and the problem of transubstantiation. Jung takes the listener on an odyssey of human thinking. He considers the problem of types in the works of Schiller and Goethe, and Spitteler and his treatment of the Prometheus myth. He contrasts idealism and realism, the Apollonian and the Dionysian in Nietzsche, and explores a host of philosophical and religious sources from the Bible to Taoism to Brahminism. He considers the nature of the reconciling symbol in Spitteler before analysing the nature of types in modern philosophy, aesthetics and biography, giving detailed consideration to William James' characteristic pairs of opposites and Furneaux Jordan's 'character sketch of the emotional types'. Jung goes on to fully identify and describe the characteristic differences between the extraverted and introverted types and provides an extensive chapter on definitions to fully clarify the meaning of the language he employs and make his meaning more accessible. Authoritatively read by Martyn Swain for Ukemi Audiobooks, Psychological Types is an inexhaustible treasure chest of ideas and creative inspiration worth listening to time and time again. (shrink)

To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function (...) and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation. In the present essay, an attempt will be made to shed some light on these issues by means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation and a subsequent more rigorous analysis of the concept of law and of the logical structure of explanatory arguments. (shrink)

Schlick schreibt der empirischen Erkenntnis ein unerschütterliches Fundament zu: es bestehe aus "Konstatierungen", d.h. Aussagen, die unmittelbar Erfahrenes ausdrücken und durch die alle empirischen Aussagen hypothetisch-deduktiv überprüfbar sein müssen. Neuraths Auffassung dagegen war diese: (1) Aussagen können logisch nicht durch Vergleich mit "Erfahrungstatsachen" beurteüt werden, sondern nur durch Prüfung ihres Zusammenpassens mit anderen, bereits akzeptierten Aussagen; (2) der Empkismus verlangt, daß die letzteren "Protokollsätze" enthalten müssen, die (etwa von experimentierenden Wissenschaftlern) dkekt akzeptiert wurden; (3) jeder akzeptierte Satz, selbst ein Protokollsatz, (...) ist revisionsfähig: es gibt kein festes Fundament der Erkenntnis.Beide Denker vermischen den semantischen Begriff der Wahrheit mit dem epistemologischen Begriff der Akzeptierbarkeit von Sätzen. Schlicks Einwand, Neuraths "Kohärenztheorie" identifiziere die Wahrheit eines Hypothesensystems mit logischer Widerspruchsfreiheit, übersieht Neuraths empiristische Bedingung (2), die der Akzeptierbarkeit implizit kausale Bedingungen auferlegt. Ähnlich haben Schlicks Konstatierungen einen kausalen Aspekt: hier liegt der empiristische Charakter beider Auffassungen. Neuraths Grundideen wurden in der neueren soziologisch-pragmatischen Wendung der Wissenschaftstheorie weitergeführt. (shrink)

The classic logical positivist account of historical explanation, putting forward what is variously called the "regularity interpretation" (#Gardiner, The Nature of Historical Explanation), the "covering law model" (#Dray, Laws and Explanation in History), or the "deductive model" (Michael #Scriven, "Truisms as Grounds for Historical Explanations"). See also #Danto, Narration and Knowledge, for further criticisms of the model. Hempel formalizes historical explanation as involving (a) statements of determining (initial and boundary) conditions for the event to be explained, and (b) statements of (...) general laws that imply that whenever events of the kind described in (a) occur, an event of the kind to be explained will take place. He admits that in practice historians rarely explain historical events in this way, but instead give only fragmentary "explanation sketches." Such sketches can, however, be "scientifically acceptable," providing it points to where "more specific statements" are to be found (351). An interesting aspect of the article is its "late" positivist, proto‑Kuhnian assertion that "the separation of 'pure description' and 'hypothetical generalization and theory construction' in empirical science is unwarranted" (356). But Hempel does not work out the wider implications of this important conclusion. It is also worth noting that he himself was not much interested in the philosophy of history; other authors took up his model and discussed it within that context. Usefully discussed by #Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 1:112‑17. (shrink)

Das erste systematische Hauptwerk Gustav Teichmüllers, Die wirkliche und die scheinbare Welt. Neue Grundlegung der Metaphysik aus dem Jahr 1882, ist einer der bedeutenden philosophischen Entwürfe seiner Zeit und zugleich eine Gründungsschrift des philosophischen Personalismus. Teichmüller kritisiert darin die Selbstvergessenheit der philosophischen Systeme, die nur die sinnlichen und abstrakten Inhalte des Bewusstseins beachteten, diese durch Projektion externalisierten und zur Realität erklärten und darüber das Ich vergässen, das diese Inhalte denkt und zum Gegenstand seiner Gefühle und Handlungen macht. Er versucht (...) zu zeigen, dass sich die Begriffe von Sein und Substanz dem unmittelbaren Wissen des Ich von sich selbst verdanken und nur auf seelische Individuen wie das Ich rechtmässig anwendbar sind. Diese seien die einzige Wirklichkeit. Ihre Wechselwirkung erzeuge aber die sinnlichen Empfindungen. Aus diesen konstruierten sie mit Hilfe der perspektivischen Anschauungsformen von Zeit, Raum, Bewegung und Ding die materielle Welt, die nur durch Projektion scheinbare Wirklichkeit erhalte. Mit seiner Lehre der Relativität von Zeit und Raum nimmt Teichmüller Grundgedanken der Relativitätstheorie Einsteins vorweg. Das Werk zeichnet sich durch hohes Methodenbewusstsein, Scharfsinnigkeit und Systematizität der Argumentation, herausragende philosophiehistorische Fundierung und interdisziplinäre Kenntnisse aus. (shrink)

Carl Gustav Hempel (1905-1997) was one of the preeminent figures in the philosophical movement of logical empiricism. He was a member of both the Berlin and Vienna circles, fled Germany in 1934 and finally settled in the US where he taught for many years in New York, Princeton, and Pittsburgh. The essays in this collection come from the early and late periods of Hempel's career and chart his intellectual odyssey from a rigorous commitment to logical positivism in the 1930s (...) (when Hempel allied himself closely with Carnap) to a more sociological approach close in spirit to the work of Neurath and Kuhn. The collection brings together essays which have up till now been difficult to find, four of which are appearing in English for the first time. Cumulatively they offer a fresh perspective on Hempel's intellectual development and on the rise and demise of logical empiricism. (shrink)

Over the centuries, magicians have developed extensive knowledge about the manipulation of the human mind—knowledge that has been largely ignored by psychology. It has recently been argued that this knowledge could help improve our understanding of human cognition and consciousness. But how might this be done? And how much could it ultimately contribute to the exploration of the human mind? We propose here a framework outlining how knowledge about magic can be used to help us understand the human mind. Various (...) approaches—both old and new—are surveyed, in terms of four different levels. The first focuses on the methods in magic, using these to suggest new approaches to existing issues in psychology. The second focuses on the effects that magic can produce, such as the sense of wonder induced by seeing an apparently impossible event. Third is the consideration of magic tricks—methods and effects together—as phenomena of scientific interest in their own right. Finally, there is the organization of knowledge about magic into an informative whole, including the possibility of a science centered around the experience of wonder. (shrink)

The article is a reappraisal of the requirement of maximal specificity (RMS) proposed by the author as a means of avoiding "ambiguity" in probabilistic explanation. The author argues that RMS is not, as he had held in one earlier publication, a rough substitute for the requirement of total evidence, but is independent of it and has quite a different rationale. A group of recent objections to RMS is answered by stressing that the statistical generalizations invoked in probabilistic explanations must be (...) lawlike, and by arguing that predicates fit for occurrence in lawlike statistical probability statements must meet two conditions, at least one of which is violated in each of the counterexamples adduced in the objections. These considerations suggest the conception that probabilistic-statistical laws concern the long-run frequency of some characteristic within a reference class as characterized by some particular "description" or predicate expression, and that replacement of such a description by a coextensive one may turn a statement that is lawlike into another that is not. Finally, to repair a defect noted by Grandy, the author's earlier formulation of RMS is replaced by a modified version. (shrink)

The eminent philosopher of science Carl G. Hempel, Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University and a Past President of the American Philosophical Association, has had a long and distinguished academic career in the course of which he has been professorial mentor to some of America's most distinguished philosophers. This volume gathers together twelve original papers by Hempel's students and associates into a volume intended to do homage to Hempel on the occasion of his 65th year in 1970. The papers (...) are grouped around the unifying topic of Hempel's own interests in logic and philosophy of science, the great majority dealing with issues on inductive logic and the theory of scientific explanatio- problems to which Hempel has devoted the bulk of his outstandingly fruitful efforts. With the approach of 'Peter' Hempel's 65th birthday, an editorial committee sprang into being by an uncannily spontaneous process to prepare to commemorate this event with an appropriate Festschrift. The editors were pleased to receive unfailingly prompt and efficient coopera tion on the part of all contributors. The responsibility of seeing the work through the press was assumed by Nicholas Rescher. The editors are grateful to all concerned for their collaboration. ALAN ROSS ANDERSON PAUL BENACERRAF ADOLF GRUNBAUM GERALD J. MASSEY NICHOLAS RESCHER RICHARD S. RUDNER TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE V PAUL OPPENHEIM: Reminiscences of Peter 1 w. v. QUINE: Natural Kinds 5 JAAKKO HINTIKKA: Inductive Independence and the Paradoxes of Confirmation 24 WESLEY c. (shrink)

_Aion_ is one of a number of major works that Jung wrote during his seventies that were concerned with the relations between psychology, alchemy and religion. He is particularly concerned in this volume with the rise of Christianity and with the figure of Christ. He explores how Christianity came about when it did, the importance of the figure of Christ and the identification of the figure of Christ with the archetype of the Self. A matter of special importance to Jung (...) in his seventies - the problem of opposites, particularly good and evil - is further discussed and the importance of the symbolism of the fish, which recurs as a symbol of both Christ and the devil, is examined. As a study of the archetype of the self, _Aion_ complements _The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious_, which is also published in paperback. (shrink)

This survey set out to explore occupational health professionals' courses of action with respect to privacy in a situation of dual loyalty between employees and employers. A postal questionnaire was sent to randomly selected potential respondents. The overall response rate was 64%: 140 nurses and 94 physicians returned the questionnaire. Eight imaginary cases involving an ethical dilemma of privacy were presented to the respondents. Six different courses of action were constructed within the set alternatives proposed. The study indicated that privacy (...) as an absolute value is not in the interest of either employees or employers. It also showed that, where dual loyalty is concerned, the most valid course of action in dealing with sensitive subjects such as drug and work community problems, sexual harassment and sick leave is to rely on tripartite co-operation. If they maintain their professional independence and impartiality, health professionals are well placed to succeed in this challenging task; if not, there are bound to be severe violations of privacy. (shrink)

Large parts of the Western philosophical tradition, powerful in Kant’s transcendental conception, have reserved the concept of autonomy for rational subjects that think and act on reasons. While this captures an essential aspect of autonomy, the dimensions of embodiment and vulnerability remain unreflected or are subsumed under the heteronomous conditions of the human subject. If the conception of autonomy, though, doesn’t start with the concept of a rational subject but from the perspective of living beings, autonomy and vulnerability seem intrinsically (...) connected, as Jonas’ (1973; 1997) concept of “needful freedom” suggests. This article argues for a deep connection between human autonomy and vulnerability. Methodologically, the argument follows the life-mind-continuity thesis (Thompson, 2007) and lays out the embodied account of autonomy that enactivism offers. Two crucial moments are: 1. The organism can distance itself from the environment. 2. This enables it to establish its own norms. However, the norms of bodily self-regulation also render the organism vulnerable. This conception, though, needs specification for capturing human autonomy. As enactivists like E. Thompson assume, phenomenology is essential to theorizing about human autonomy. I will develop a phenomenological concept of autonomy starting from three notions of selfhood (Zahavi, 2008) and arguing for a central role of the reflective self for human autonomy. Reflection grounds both moments of autonomy: Self-distancing and the possibility of taking a stance by relying on reasons. In the phenomenological sense, autonomy is thus the ability to respond to reasons for which reflection is necessary. However, this ability is bound to a particular form of vulnerability that manifests in some psychopathologies. This vulnerability will be shown in conclusion by Blankenburg’s reflections on the role of autonomy in mental diseases. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to gain a deeper understanding of privacy in occupational health services. Data were collected through in-depth theme interviews with occupational health professionals (n=15), employees (n=15) and employers (n=14). Our findings indicate that privacy, in this context, is a complex and multilayered concept, and that companies as well as individual employees have their own core secrets. Co-operation between the three groups proved challenging: occupational health professionals have to consider carefully in which situations and how much (...) they are entitled to release private information on individual employees for the benefit of the whole company. Privacy is thus not an absolute right of an individual, but involves the idea of sharing responsibility. The findings open up useful new perspectives on ethical questions of privacy and on the development of occupational health practices. (shrink)

Written three years before his death, The Undiscovered Self combines acuity with concision in masterly fashion and is Jung at his very best. Offering clear and crisp insights into some of his major theories, such as the duality of human nature, the unconscious, human instinct and spirituality, Jung warns against the threats of totalitarianism and political and social propaganda to the free-thinking individual. As timely now as when it was first written, Jung's vision is a salutary reminder of why we (...) should not become passive members of the herd. With a new foreword by Sonu Shamdasani. (shrink)

The relation between Kant’s conception of modalities in the Postulates of Empirical Thought and Hegel’s conception in the Logic of Essence has not been addressed in the current scholarship. I argue that there is in fact a close connection that becomes visible if the desideratum which is implied by Kant’s conceptions is understood. Thus, after an analysis of the Kantian modal postulates, the article shows that they are sufficient to characterize the necessity of Kant’s Grundsätze and, hence, a specific form (...) of synthetic propositions a priori. However, I will prove that they are insufficient to characterize Kant’s synthetic propositions a priori about transcendental philosophy. This insufficiency in the characterization of transcendental philosophy itself brings into the arena Hegel, who supplements the Kantian modalities with a self-reflexive form of transcendental modality. (shrink)