The reappearance of Professor Alasdair MacIntyre's far-ranging and provocative article, ‘Hume on “is” and “ought”’, is the proximate cause of this short excursion to an old, well-scarred, and still fascinating battleground. Re-reading MacIntyre's brilliant offensive thrust led me to review the counter-attacks and diversionary movements that followed its first appearance. They in turn sent me back, inevitably and ultimately, to look again at the cause of this philosophic skirmishing: Section 1 of Part i of Book III of Hume's Treatise of (...) Human Nature, entitled ‘Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason’. The battles of the past have been waged chiefly round the last paragraph of this Section (pp. 469–470 in Selby-Bigge's edition), but my primary concern here is going to be with those ‘reasonings’ that precede the celebrated ‘is-ought’ paragraph. Closer attention to the bulk of Book III, Part i, Section 1, to which ‘reasonings’ Hume says he ‘cannot forbear adding … an observation’ on ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and some selective attention as well to Books I and II of the Treatise, should help to scale down the exaggerated importance attached to the ‘is-ought’ passage. Unless this is done, one runs the risk of permitting a tailpiece to wag the body of the chapter, if not the whole Book ‘Of Morals’. (shrink)

1. Zwischen den Kulturen -- 2. Die Zeichen -- 3. Lehrgänge -- 4. Die Chiffren -- 5. Musik und Mythos.

l investigate versions of the Maximality Principles for the classes of forcings which are <κ-closed. <κ-directed-closed, or of the form Col (κ. <Λ). These principles come in many variants, depending on the parameters which are allowed. I shall write MPΓ(A) for the maximality principle for forcings in Γ, with parameters from A. The main results of this paper are: • The principles have many consequences, such as <κ-closed-generic $\Sigma _{2}^{1}(H_{\kappa})$ absoluteness, and imply. e.g., that ◇κ holds. I give an application (...) to the automorphism tower problem, showing that there are Souslin trees which are able to realize any equivalence relation, and hence that there are groups whose automorphism tower is highly sensitive to forcing. • The principles can be separated into a hierarchy which is strict, for many κ. • Some of the principles can be combined, in the sense that they can hold at many different κ simultaneously. The possibilities of combining the principles are limited, though: While it is consistent that MP<κ-closed(HκT) holds at all regular κ below any fixed α. the "global" maximality principle, stating that MP<κ-closed(Hκ ∪ {κ}) holds at every regular κ. is inconsistent. In contrast to this, it is equiconsistent with ZFC that the maximality principle for directed-closed forcings without any parameters holds at every regular cardinal. It is also consistent that every local statement with parameters from HκT that's provably <κ-closed-forceably necessary is true, for all regular κ. (shrink)

Every philosophical belief has its presuppositions; no philosopher can operate without them. Some of mine are these: that the expression of a thought and the thought expressed are distinguishable but inseparable; that one’s thought about something and one’s feeling about that something are distinguishable but inseparable; that we humans have a nature but that it consists of psycho-physical dispositions, or capacities, of such vaguely defined sorts and limits that, from a spectator’s point of view, I eschew a priori pronouncements about (...) what human beings can or cannot do and await developments, and that, as an agent, I act in the spirit of Sartre’s self-creating chooser. In short, and skipping the refinements—failures of philosophical nerve—a person, a human being, a philosopher is what he does. (shrink)

‘Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.’—Hume, Treatise , I, iv, 7. Several years have elapsed since Professor Malcolm's astonishing revival of St Anselm's ontological argument . The first shock-wave of criticism has likewise passed, having been absorbed by now into the bound volumes of the periodical literature. This note is not intended to add much weight to the common conclusion of that impressive body of criticism, for, though interesting and important logical issues remain (...) to be discussed in connection with the ontological argument, there can be little doubt that it fails as a demonstration of God's existence. Nevertheless, there is one move made by Malcolm in his determined defence of Anselm which may have had unfortunate repercussions far beyond the reaches of philosophical theology. Perhaps a discussion of this one step in the argument will help to dispel some erroneous impressions. (shrink)

The knockdown argument, the logically impregnable position are rarities in philosophy. Indeed, there are some who might argue that no philosophical argument or position is immune from damaging criticism: what seems utterly convincing to one generation of philosophers is 1iable to be held up as a classic blunder by the next. Nevertheless, Hume's presentation of the problem of evil and his allied criticisms of a Christian-type theism have seemed conclusive to an impressive array of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers, and both (...) his efforts, consequently, might be regarded as likely exceptions to the principle of philosophical fallibility. But now, in a fairly recent article, Professor Nelson Pike has seen fit to challenge even these supposedly reliable cornerstones of our philosophical heritage. More recently still, Pike has included this article, unchanged, in an anthology which he has edited, and he has backed it up with an introductory note which reaffirms his challenge to Hume on evil. (shrink)

The contribution examines the aesthetic aspect of cognition in Kant by exploring the central function of the power of the imagination (Einbildungskraft) in Kant’s critical epistemology, first featured in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781; 1787) and revisited in the Critique of the Power of Judgment (1790). First, the focus will be on the relationship between the power of the imagination and the two main sources of (theoretical) cognition in Kant, viz., sensibility and the understanding. Second, special attention will be (...) devoted to the distinction between schema and symbol, as alternative products of the power of the imagination in the service of rendering discursive concepts intuitive – with schemata serving to make sensible the concepts of the understanding (Verstand) and symbols suited to provide intuitional counterparts to the concepts of reason (Vernunft). (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDie prospektive Analyse der ethischen Implikationen medizinisch-technischer Innovationen läuft immer auch Gefahr, sich in den Wunschbildern von Marketingexperten zu verfangen. Vor diesem Hintergrund könnte es durchaus nützlich sein, die Erkenntnisse der Wissenschafts- und Technikforschung zur Genese und Entwicklung neuer Techniken auszuschöpfen. Dies erscheint gerade auch für die ins Phantastische weisende Zukunft der Individualisierung medikamentöser Therapie, wie man ihr häufig in der Beschreibung pharmakogenetischer Behandlungskonzepte begegnet, angebracht. Techniken, die sich noch im Entwicklungsstadium befinden und deren breite Anwendung noch einige Jahre auf (...) sich warten lassen wird, sollten sehr sorgfältig auf ihren Realitätsgehalt und das zu erwartende Leistungspotenzial hin analysiert werden. Dazu gehört v. a. auch eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit den Leitbildern, Visionen und Nutzenversprechen, mit denen technische Innovationen oft sehr absichtsvoll ausgestattet werden. Wird dabei die Distanz zur Rhetorik der Protagonisten der neuen Techniken nicht gewahrt, gerät die ethische Reflexion unvermittelt in die Rolle, profane Marketingstrategien wortgewandt und ideenreich zu veredeln. (shrink)

"Dionysos" ist in Nietzsches Spätwerk das "Gegenwort" zum "Willen zur Macht". Anders als der philosophische Begriff des Dionysischen in der Geburt der Tragödie bündelt der Name "Dionysos" die Erfahrungen des Ewigen im menschlichen Leben. Dieses entdeckt Nietzsche in den Möglichkeiten, sich zum Gedanken der "ewigen Wiederkehr" zu verhalten. Diesem Gedanken vernag weder Gleichgültigkeit noch das Festhalten an einer moralischen Instanz, sondern allein die religiöse, aber nicht mehr christliche Erfahrung des "ungeheuren Augenblicks" grecht zu werden. Eine solche Erfahrung des Göttlichen lässt (...) aus dem "grössten Schwergewicht" die "leichte" Freheit von der letztlich noch moralisch gebundenen Selbstüberwindung werden. Während der philosophische "Lehrer der weigen Wiederkunft" Zarathustra - als "alter Atheist", der er für Nietzsche ist - nur den "Begriff des Dionysos" kennt, zielt Nietzsche selbst mit dem Namen des griechischen Gottes des "grossen Zweideutigen und Versuchers", auf ein Erfahrung des Göttlichen, das als "Genie des Herzens" jenseits des "moralischen Gottes" ist.In Nietzsche's later work, "Dionysos" is the counterconcept to the "will to power". Unlike the philosophical concept of Dionysos in The Birth of Tragedy, the name "Dionysos" in this later work signifies that which is eternal in human life. Nietzsche discovers this in the possibility of taking an attitude towards the thought of "eternal recurrence." Neither indifference nor retreat to a moral authority is appropriate when facing this thought. The correct attitude is rather an embrace of a religious yet no longer Christian experience of the "terrible moment." Such an experience of godliness allows "the most heavy weight" to become the "light" freedom of a self-overcoming still bound to mortality. While Zarathustra, the "teacher of eternal recurrance," only know the "concept of Dionysos," Nietzsche himself is in touch with the experience of the divine. This experience, with the name of the Greek God who is "the most ambiguous and seductive" and a "genius of the heart," is beyond the "mortal God.". (shrink)

Earth possesses a double-character: it supports life and grounds perception and experience, but because of being this very base, also restricts these stances, since as base of any activity, theoretical or practical, it cannot be overstepped. Thus, earth itself is also groundless. Nevertheless, this duplicity is not contradictory, is no dualism, when formulated as earth being both a space of movement and a space of sense. Understanding this duplicity means understanding the intertwining of these two spaces by articulating the possibilities (...) of movements within sense; it means an understanding of sense and meaning in moving. This is the task of philosophy: both alienation from earth and the matter-of-course of its sense and return to it by taking part in its sense of moving and becoming. This is gained by interpretation, of which we draw on as a model reading Nietzsche on 'Will to Power' and perspectivity, and Plato's conception of dialectic. Thus, interpretation represents itself sensibly in earth's duplicity. (shrink)

In den letzten Jahren hat sich der internationale Sport so grundlegend gewandelt, dass er in Gefahr ist, seine historisch gewachsene Identität aufzugeben. Nicht seine bildliche Qualität, seine Intensität und Spannung haben sich verändert; sie haben im Gegenteil noch zugenommen. Auf einem anderen Feld haben sich Dinge ereignet, die dem Sport einen neuen Charakter geben. Doch diese Veränderungen gehören zu einem Ausschnitt der Wirklichkeit, der auf den Fernsehbildern und in den Kommentaren nicht erkennbar ist; für die meisten Zuschauer bleibt er unsichtbar.