This review shows that there is now a solid scientific evidence base for the “expert” evaluation of disputed confession cases in judicial proceedings. Real-life cases have driven the science by stimulating research into “coercive” police questioning techniques, psychological vulnerabilities to false confession, and the development and validation of psychometric tests of interrogative suggestibility and compliance. Mandatory electronic recording of police interviews has helped with identifying the situational and personal “risk factors” involved in false confessions and how these interact. It is (...) the combination of a detailed evaluation and analysis of real-life cases, experimental work, and community (and prison/police station) studies that have greatly advanced the science over the past 40 years. In this review, the story of the development of the science during this “golden era” is told through the three established error pathways to false confessions and wrongful convictions: misclassification, coercion, and contamination. A case study of a major miscarriage of justice is used to highlight the key issues at each stage of the error pathways and it shows the continued resistance of the judiciary to admit mistakes and learn from them. Science is a powerful platform from which to educate the police and the judiciary. (shrink)

In this brief commentary the author concentrates on the treatment perspectives of Mealey's model. The main weakness of the model is that it does not provide a satisfactory theoretical connection between treatment and different types of target behavior. Even within the primary-secondary distinction, there are large individual differences that should not be overlooked in the planning of treatment.

This article discusses language universality and language variation, and suggests that there is no feature variation in initial syntax, featural variation arising by metamorphosis under transfer from syntax to PF-morphology. In particular, it explores the Zero Hypothesis, stating that Universal Grammar, UG, only provides two building elements, Root Zero and Edge Feature Zero, zero, as they are purely structural/formal elements with no semantic content in UG. Their potential content is provided by the Concept Mine, a mind-internal but language-external department. UG (...) and narrow syntax has access to the Concept Mine, and this Syntax-Concept Access is unique to humans, a prerequisite for the evolution of language (Section 1). A related idea (also inSection 1) is coined the Generalized Edge Feature Approach, GEFA. It states that Merge always involves at least one edge feature, which precludes symmetric structures and enables Simplest Merge (no Pair-Merge, no Hilbert epsilon operator). The article advocates that there is no syntactic feature selection (Section 2), all syntactic features being universally accessible in the Concept Mine, via Root Zero and Edge Feature Zero. In contrast, there is feature selection in PF (including morphology), yielding variation (Section 3), Gender being a clear example (Section 4). However, there is a widely neglected syntax-to-PF-morphology metamorphosis (Section 5), such that morphological features like [past] are distinct from albeit related to syntactic features like Speech Time. Parameters operate on selected PF features, and not on purely syntactic features, so parameter setting is plausibly closely tied to the syntax-to-PF-morphology metamorphosis (the concludingSection 6). It is suggested that parameters are on the externalization side of language, part of or related to the sensory-motor system, facilitating motoric learning in language acquisition. (shrink)

This book is a significant accomplishment, and for now the most comprehensive intervention in a debate that has been more than three hundred years in the making. At least since Pierre Bayle, commentators have imagined a sort of paradox in the pairing of Spinoza’s irreproachable way of life with his scandalous philosophy, in contrast with the perfect fit between Leibniz’s optimism for the status quo with his supposedly opportunistic relation to his courtly benefactors. Together with these biographical coordinates, to which (...) Lærke’s work is attentive and sensitive, there is a philosophical opposition that is supposed to be absolute: each philosopher is the other’s perfect opposite. Matthew Stewart’s bestseller The Courtier and the Heretic is the latest iteration of this myth, and Lærke’s study might best be summed up as the perfect antidote to Stewart’s: it is a rigorous, dense, and, most importantly, a just treatment of the authors themselves, whose own words often belie the roles in which they would posthumously be cast. While Lærke acknowledges that there is indeed an easy opposition one can construct between the major metaphysical commitments of the two thinkers, he nonetheless wants to know how their systematic differences might have grown out of an intense engagement on Leibniz’s part with a philosophy he indeed ended up opposing, yet against which he felt compelled to articulate his own views, and back to which he often seemed in danger of returning. (shrink)

In very recent Leibniz commentary, there has been a movement among some commentators toward the view that Leibniz was not an unwavering monadological immaterialist, committed to the substantiality only of absolutely simple, immaterial nodes of perception and appetite. It has been conceded that Leibniz was also partially sympathetic to an ontology that would concede full substantiality to composite entities. Most commentators who have been willing to concede as much have confined this alternative metaphysics to Leibniz's middle period, roughly 1676--1694. These (...) commentators, moreover, have remained fairly silent as to the reasons why Leibniz might wish to consider an ontology at such odds with his well-known immaterialism. In this dissertation, I contribute to the discussion of Leibniz's composite-substance metaphysics in three ways. First of all, I am going to argue that we should see the composite-substance metaphysics as an alternative Leibniz sustained until the very end of his career. Second of all, I provide an account of Leibniz's motivation for sustaining this alternative metaphysics, arguing that the composite-substance metaphysics is first and foremost the result of Leibniz's effort to provide a philosophical interpretation of the recent discovery of the apparent ubiquity of microscopic life. Finally, I vindicate a number of 18th-century, microorganic and physicalistic interpretations of Leibniz's theory of monads, particularly those of the Francophone natural scientists, against the view among 20th-century commentators that Leibniz was grossly misinterpreted in the decades following his death in 1716. I show that 18th-century, thinkers didn't so much misinterpret Leibniz, as they did emphasize one, currently very unfamiliar, tendency in Leibniz's thought on the nature of substance. (shrink)

If anyone ever lived up to our image of a baroque Universalgelehrter, it may have been the Jesuit natural philosopher Athanasius Kircher, whose life and interests spanned most of the 17th century. In his prolific career, Kircher wrote at least 14 major works, on subjects as varied as light, magnetism, music, geology, combinatorics, and Sinology. Thomas Leinkauf’s thorough, penetrating study of Kircher’s life and work does a tremendous job of making the Jesuit’s work both comprehensible and fascinating, as well as (...) granting us a vision of the inner workings of Kircher’s mind, a mind formed both by his period and his position in the history of ideas, and driven by an unusual creativity and capacity for synthesis. (shrink)