Informed by medical science and biotechnology, Karoline Georges’s novel Under the Stone offers a reflection on suffering bodies and imagines responses to an overwhelming sense of fear and passivity that embodied trauma and the world’s many crises can create. In line with the editors’ reclaiming of the milieu for the medical humanities, I draw on Deleuze and Guattari’s geophilosophy and Sara Ahmed’s notions of stranger and encounter for reading the novel’s spatialization of oppressive power dynamics and its imagination of subversive (...) emergence. I also complicate the literary text’s discourse on space and body by relying on wonder studies to examine further its alternative forms of careful attunement enacted through the protagonist’s affective and disembodied awakening, the latter fueled by his escape from “the incessant movement of automatic components that delineat[e] [his] presence in the world” (Georges 2016, 61). Happening from and because of the Tower’s milieu, this escape becomes a mitigating force to physical, affective, and social struggles. I thus contend that Georges’s text provides thought-provoking material about the functions and effects of art for addressing the dangers and promises of bioethics, body sovereignty, and life protection. (shrink)

이 글은 우주의 본체와 상에 관한 연구이며, 구체적으로 하도낙서를 통한 상수원리와 괘상의 변화과정, 나아가 一夫????正易????이 나오기까지의 우주변화론에 관한 담론이라 할 수 있다. 실제 우주론에 관해 동양의 수많은 성현들에 의해 河圖·洛書, 周易 등을 통해 우주의 실체와 본질에 관한 많은 연구가 있었다. 그러나 구체적으로 우주가 변화하는 궁극의 힘은 무엇이며, 그 근원적 힘은 어떻게 천지만물을 조화롭게 낳게 하고 자라게 하는지 변화의 실제 모습을 설명하는 이는 많지 않았다. 그런데 一夫가 황극을 말하면서 無極, 太極, 皇極이라는 우주 본체론에 관한 개념이 논변되자 우주와 인간, 그리고 지구상의 모든 (...) 만물이 생장하고 변화되는 모습을 좀더 구체적으로 체계적인 정리가 가능해진다. 하도의 數象을 보면 자연수가 통일되는 상을 나타내고 있으며, 낙서는 자연수가 발전해 나가는 실질적인 변화의 과정을 보여준다. 즉, 하도는 합해서 통일된 상이며, 낙서는 흩어진 散合의 상인 것이다. 그러므로 분산과 통일이라는 봄·여름의 생장과 가을·겨울에 통일로 가는 음양의 양면운동을 찾을 수 있다. 그것은 구체적으로 음양오행, 오운과 육기의 변화, 대화, 자화작용을 통하여 하도·낙서에 연원을 둔 복희.문왕괘도를 통해 正易에 이르기까지의 삼변논리로 우주의 本體와 象에 관한 연구가 가능해졌음을 말한다. (shrink)

주자의 에 관한 관점은 주로 유목의 영향 하에 형성되었다. 유목은 ‘易數’ 즉 ‘수리의 보편타당성’이 의 본질이라고 보았으며, 이는 주자에게 그대로 계승ㆍ발전된다. 유목의 河洛學은 『주역』 경전에 대한 해석의 차원을 넘어 『주역』의 근원이 어디에 있는가에 대한 탐색이었으며, 따라서 종래의 ‘경전 해석’이나 ‘괘기론적 역학’과는 달리 세계의 본원과 본질에 대한 물음이라는 성격을 갖는다. 그가 본 세계의 본원과 본질은 數理였으며 이는 세계에 대한 모사요 상징인 象보다 우선하는 것이었다. 주자는 유목의 數理를 다시 ‘理’로 일반화 하여, 이 세계의 균형과 질서를 설명하는 근거로 삼고자 하였다. 만약 유목과 주자의 (...) 하락학을 의 수적 조합으로부터 『주역』과 「홍범」이 도출되는 과정으로 읽는다면 ‘과도한 해석’이라고 밖에 할 수 없을 것이다. 그러나 이를 거꾸로, 세계의 균형과 질서를 수리의 보편타당성으로 치환하고 그것을 라는 도상으로 구현해 낸 것이라고 한다면 이러한 해석은 의도와 의미의 차원에서 충분한 가독성을 지닌다고 하겠다. (shrink)

A reasoned argument or tarka is essential for a wholesome vāda that aims at establishing the truth. A strong tarka constitutes of a number of elements including an anumāna based on a valid hetu. Several scholars, such as Dharmakīrti, Vasubandhu and Dignāga, have worked on theories for the establishment of a valid hetu to distinguish it from an invalid one. This paper aims to interpret Dignāga’s hetu-cakra, called the wheel of grounds, from a modern philosophical perspective by (...) deconstructing it into a simple probabilistic mathematical model. The objective is to understand how and why a vāda based on a probabilistically weaker hetu can degrade into a Jalpa or vitaṇḍā. To do so, the paper maps the concept of ‘Bounded Rationality’ onto the hetu-cakra. Bounded Rationality, an idea coined by the management thinker Herbert Simon, is often employed in understanding decision-making processes of rational agents. In the context of this paper, the concept would state that the prativādin and ālocaka (debater) may not hold unbounded information to back their pratijñā (proposition). The paper argues that within the probabilistically deconstructed hetu-cakra model, most people argue in the ‘Zone of Bounded Rationality’, and thus, the probability of a debate degrading into Jalpa or vitaṇḍā is high. -/- . (shrink)

Comparing the three-form reasoning of new Hetu-vidya with Western logic, scholars have put forward four perspectives. Combining their strengths and shortcomings, and the examples of Hetu-vidya reasoning, we can conclude that the three-form reasoning should have four forms: (1) the affirmative expression of formal implication; (2) the modus ponens of hypothetical reasoning concerning sufficient conditions after universal instantiation; (3) the negative expression of a formal implication; and (4) the modus tollens of hypothetical reasoning concerning sufficient conditions after universal (...) instantiation. (shrink)

The paper discusses anumāna and its variety in general from the point of view of inferential cognition for the sake of oneself as well as for the sake of others; i.e. svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna as given in the Buddhist tradition of logic, especially with parārthānumāna, its nature and role. The paper argues that the Buddhist intent of division of anumāna into svārthānumāna and parārthānumāna was to bring Buddha-vacanas under the category of parārthānumāna and to save them from being classified under (...) śabda pramāṇa. It contends that such a division was not just an epistemological demand, but had a deeper philosophical significance in the Buddhist conceptual framework. Such a division is, therefore, intended to reject the role of śabda as an extra causal means or pramāṇa. The paper identifies the logical commitment in Buddhist tradition as hetu-centric commitment as it differs from the Nyāya tradition of vyāpti-centric one. (shrink)

본고는 『주역』의 河圖洛書論에 근거하여 선진유학에서 논의된 方圓(規矩)의 역학적 의미를 고찰하였다. 『주역』에서는 天地之數와 大衍之數를 통해 天地之道를 표상하는 河圖․洛書를 논하고, 이것을 方圓으로 상징됨을 밝히고 있다. 天地人 三才之道로 논한 『주역』의 학문적 체계에서 天道는 시작과 끝을 알 수 없는 영원한 시간의 세계이기 때문에 圓으로 상징하고, 地道(人道 포함)는 上下 四方으로 확산되는 공간의 세계이기 때문에 方으로 상징하였다. 특히 『맹자』에서 논한 ‘規矩는 方圓의 지극함이오 聖人은 人倫의 지극함이다’는 선진유학에서 方圓의 철학적 의미를 직접 밝힌 것으로 하도․낙서와 方圓의 관계를 이해할 수 있다. ‘그림쇠는 방의 지극함이다’는 시작과 끝이 없는 영원한 시간의 (...) 세계가 상하 사방의 공간 세계가 드러남을 밝힌 것인데, 이는 河圖의 작용이 10을 본체로 하여 9 → 8 → 7 → 6 → 5 → 4 → 3 → 2으로 전개되어 마지막에는 1(洛書, 작용의 기본수)로 전개되는 것을 의미하는 것이다. 또 ‘곱자는 원의 지극함이다’는 상하 사방의 공간의 세계를 그리는 곱자를 통해 하늘의 뜻이 밝혀지게 됨을 밝힌 것인데, 이는 洛書의 작용이 1에서 2 → 3 → 4 → 5 → 6 → 7 → 8 → 9로 전개되어 마지막에는 10(河圖, 본체수)으로 완성되는 것을 의미하고 있다. 또한 『周易』 重地坤卦()에서 논한 ‘곧고 방정하고 위대한 것이다’를 통해 인간과 天地의 관계를 이해할 수 있다. 즉, 方圓의 그림을 통해 보면, 直은 그대로 직각(└ )으로 인간을 상징하고, 이것이 상(┐)․하(└ )로 합해져 方의 사방(□)이 그려져 地道를 상징하고, 이 四方에서 다시 大인 乾道가 원( ○ )으로 그려져지면서 直과 方이 天道로 완성되는 것이다. 따라서 인간이 자기 자각을 통해 地道와 天道가 완성된다는 철학적 의미로 이해할 수 있다. 또 하늘은 圓( ○)으로 그리고 땅은 方(□)으로 표시되어 天地와 乾坤의 관계가 이루어지기 때문에 天地人 三才之道의 내용이 되고 있지만, 인간을 중심으로 天地의 관계에 있어서 중요한 사실은 圓은 方을 내포하는 관계이어야 하지, 圓이 方에 내포되어서는 안 된다는 것이다. (shrink)

Nyaya and Buddhism as the two-important traditions of Indian Philosophical Thought distinguished themselves through a detailed inquiry into various aspects of Anumana. In both the traditions there flourished a long chain of logicians of great reputation and profound scholarship. Particularly in the Buddhist tradition Dharmakirti distinguished himself, through his scholarly works, as a renowned logician and exerted influence alike both on his adversaries and followers. Although he has discussed a number of issues concerning Anumana in his different works, no systematic (...) attempt has been made to formulate and present Dharmakirti`s unified theory of Anumana in its various aspects. The present work undertakes to do this for the first time in the world of Buddhist scholarship. Giving a sketch of the conceptual framework of Dharmakirti`s philosophy by way of background, it discusses epistemic, constitutive and regulative conditions of Anumana according to him, and dealing with the validity and, or soundness aspects of Anumana along with Hetvabhasas it may give rise to, brings out their important implications not only for Dharmakirti`s philosophy but also for Buddhist philosophy in general. (shrink)

In this paper, Nāgārjuna’s philosophical interpretation of the terms kāraṇa and kārya is analysed after having methodologically confined the specific field of interest to the MMK. From the study of all the occurrences of kāraṇa and kārya in the MMK (listed in paragraph 2), it emerges that Nāgārjuna makes use of these two terms to refer to skandhas as causes (kāraṇa) of further skandhas as effects (kārya), hence conveying with this words the idea of, so to speak, subjectivity and (re)birth. (...) From the principal commentaries on the MMK (particularly Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti), we know also that, even when the reference of kāraṇa and kārya to skandhas is not explicitly pointed out by Nāgārjuna, it nonetheless can be inferred from the peculiar context in which these terms are employed. This conclusion seems to be confirmed also by the crosscheck analysis of the philosophical usage of the parallel terms hetu and phala, which refer either to, so to speak, objective (i.e., concerning general bhāvas) causes and effects, or – in the case of phala as consequence of karman/kriyā – to moral results (these two meanings are confirmed also by some passages from the Vigrahavyāvartanī), but in no cases Nāgārjuna makes recurse to hetu and phala to refer to what could be called a subjective (i.e., concerning skandhas) level of causality. To the paper an addendum is added, in which the commentaries on MMK 8.4 are taken into consideration. From this excursus it appears that at least Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti, by ‘overinterpreting’ the meaning of hetu in the kārika, are consequently forced to readapt the philosophical significance of kāraṇa and kārya in a way that does not fit so much with Nāgārjuna’s original message. (shrink)

: Claus Oetke, in his "Ancient Indian Logic as a Theory of Non-monotonic Reasoning," presents a sweeping new interpretation of the early history of Indian logic. His main proposal is that Indian logic up until Dharmakirti was nonmonotonic in character-similar to some of the newer logics that have been explored in the field of Artificial Intelligence, such as default logic, which abandon deductive validity as a requirement for formally acceptable arguments; Dharmakirti, he suggests, was the first to consider that a (...) good argument should be one for which it is not possible for the property identified as the "reason" (hetu) to occur without the property to be proved (sadhya)-a requirement akin to deductive validity. Oetke's approach is challenged here, arguing that from the very beginning in India something like monotonic, that is, deductively valid, reasoning was the ideal or norm, but that the conception of that ideal was continually refined, in that the criteria for determining when it is realized were progressively sharpened. (shrink)

According to the Buddhist concept of ‘dependent origination’ (pratītyasamutpāda), discrete factors come into existence because of a combination of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya). Such discrete factors, further, are combinations of five aggregates (pañ caskandha) that, themselves, are subject to constant change. Discrete factors, therefore, lack a self-nature (ātman). The passing through time of discrete factors is characterized by the ‘characteristic marks of the conditioned’: birth (utpāda), change in continuance (sthityanyathātva), and passing away (vyaya); or, alternatively: birth (jāti), duration (...) (sthiti), decay (jarā), and impermanence (anityatā). In the interpretation of the precise nature of these characteristic marks of the conditioned, and their relation to the discrete factor they characterize, different opinions were prevalent within the Sarvāstivāda School of Buddhist philosophy, with, judging from later scholastic literature, the views of the Dārṣṭāntika/sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika sub-schools as most prominent ones. The Indian and Chinese Madhyamaka philosophers pointed to the fallacies in the Sarvāstivāda interpretations of the nature of the characteristic marks of the conditioned and their relation to the discrete factors they characterize, and, hence, to the fallacies in the Sarvāstivāda interpretations of the concepts ‘time’ and ‘temporality’. (shrink)

There are two major ways in which Buddhist logic is developed. The first one is represented by Nāgārjuna-Candrakῑrti tradition through the use of dialectics and the second way of development is found in the works of Diṅnāga and Dharmakῑrti through the use of hetu (probans). This second way of logic has further been developed by the works of Jinendrabuddhi and Ratnakῑrti. The paper is an attempt to show the historical development of epistemic logic as developed by the Buddhist philosophers (...) and their relevance for our time. (shrink)

According to the Navya Naiyāyikas, inference is the knowledge, which is produced out of consideration. But what is to be understood by the term ‘consideration’ or ‘parāmarśa’? According to them, parāmarśa or consideration is the factor through the operation of which the inferential conclusion can be attained. Parāmarśa has been defined as the knowledge of the existence of the hetu or reason in the pakṣa or subject, which reason is characterized by its being concomitant with the sādhya, the knowledge (...) in the form of parāmarśa is actually caused by the knowledge of invariable concomitance of probans (hetu) with the probandum (sādhya) and the knowledge of the existence of the hetu in the subject (pakṣa). It has been said by Viśvanātha that the cognition of the existence of probans or hetu in the subject of inference along with the cognition of the prabans or hetu as pervaded by sādhya is called parāmarśa (pakṣasya vyāpyavṛttitvadhīḥ parāmarśa ucyate). The invariable co-existence in the form ‘where there is smoke, there is fire’ is known as vyāpti or invariable concomitance. Here the invariable coexistence (avyabhicārī sāhacarya) between the probans and probandum (i.e., smoke and fire) is the definition of vyāpti. The term ‘co-existence’ means remaining in the same locus of the probans with the probandum, which is not the counter positive of the absolute negation existing in the locus of the hetu. To Gangeśa, the knowledge of the co-existence of the probans and probandum along with the absence of the knowledge of deviation of the probans is the cause of ascertaining vyāpti. Repeated observations, of course, sometimes act as a promoter (prayojaka) in ascertaining vyāpti by removing the doubt of deviation. The doubt of deviation can be removed sometimes by Tarka or sometimes by the absence of the collocation of causes of doubt, which is called svataḥsiddhaḥ. Gangeśa admits sāmānyalakṣaṇā as a pratyāsatti in ascertaining vyāpti between smoke-in-general and fire-in-general. To him, the super-normal connection through universal (sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti) has got a prominent role in ascertaining vyāpti. If somebody challenges about the validity of the syllogistic argument in the form “The mountain is fiery as it possesses smoke” (parvato vahnimān dhūmāt), the philosophers of Nyāya and Navya-nyāya persuasion will justify the same with the help of five constituents (avayava-s). The process is called parāthānumāna (syllogistic argument for making others understand). The constituents of a syllogism are proposition (pratijňā), reason (hetu), example (udāharaṇa), application (upanaya), and conclusion (nigamana). (shrink)

This paper revisits the longstanding tradition concerning the dual authorship of the Light on Literature (Kāvyaprakāśa), the dominant treatise on Sanskrit poetics in the second millennium CE. The discussion focuses on one case study, a brief comment dismissing the ornament “cause” (hetu), found in the latter part of chapter 10 in the portion traditionally attributed to Mammaṭa’s successor Allaṭa (aka Alaka). This passage is analyzed in the broader context of the Light’s discussion of semantic capacities (chapter 2), suggestion (chapter (...) 4), and other ornaments (chapter 10). The essay also looks at the way generations of commentators have dealt with this topic and the potential inconsistencies in its treatment in the Light. The paper thus throws light on the question of the work’s overall integration, seamless or not so seamless, both in its genetic and receptive histories. (shrink)

Vaiśeşikas are realist philosophers of classical India. They admit time (kāla) as a ubiquitous real substance. In this paper, our aim is to discuss such a determination of time following sixth century Vaiśeşika scholar Praśastapāda and a few of his interpreters, Vyomaśivācārya and Udayanācārya. This paper is an effort to state realist philosophers’ understanding of time and also to highlight how in classical Indian tradition, interpretations paved the way for proving the reality of time. The application of logical methods by (...) the Vaiśeşika interpreters is also worth studying. These methods show the internal development occurring in the system of Vaiśeşika. Praśastapāda stated different notions like priority etc. (paratvādi) as the linga or hetu of kāla. Vyomaśiva and Udayana have established this statement of Praśastapāda as the lakşaņa of kāla by virtue of different forms of inference. (shrink)

In Classical Indian philosophy, except Cārvākas all other schools unanimously recognize inference as an instrument of valid knowledge. However, the validity of an inference depends on the validity of hetu and its relation to pakṣa on the one hand and sādhya on the other. If the relation in question is dubious, the inference, which is based on it, turns out to be invalid. In Buddhist epistemology, inference is accepted as a legitimate valid source of knowledge along with perception and (...) they felt it necessary to draw a distinction between proper inference and a fallacious inference. The validity of an inference depends on the validity of the pratijñā and other constituent parts of it. If there is anything wrong with any of its members, the syllogism as a whole becomes fallacious. Hence, there will be as many fallacies of inference as there are fallacies of its component parts, from the first proposition down to the conclusion. Therefore, we may speak of fallacies of the pratijñā, fallacies of hetu, and fallacies of udāharaṇa. Accordingly, in the Buddhist logical tradition Dignāga and Dharmakīrti onward these three kinds of fallacies are recognized. In against to the Buddhist tradition, the Naiyāyikas holds that the fallacies of inference ultimately arise out of the fallacious hetu. The Naiyāyikas bring out the fallacies of inference under the fallacies of the reason (hetvābhāsa) and consider a separate treatment of the inferential fallacies due to the propositum, example, etc. (i.e., pratijñābhāsa, dṛṣṭāntābhāsa) as unnecessary and superfluous. An attempt has been made in this paper to do a philosophical exposition and discuss critically each fallacy with reference to the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhists in general and among Buddhist logicians, namely Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in particular. (shrink)

This paper examines the philosophical debate on Seng Zhao ’s Thesis on No-Motion of Things, a debate which took place approximately at the turn of the late sixteenth and the early seventeenth centuries. Without doubt the Zhao Treatise is the most precious gem in the early Chinese Madhyamaka legacy. The sterling reputation of this seminal treatise had never been challenged until Zhencheng published the Logical Investigation of the Thesis of No-Motion of Things during 1588–1589. The following focuses on Zhencheng’s WBQZLL (...) to see how he applied hetu-vidyā in his hermeneutical project. How did Zhencheng employ the syllogism in his critique of the Zhao Treatise? Is his critique justifiable? How is the role of syllogism employed as a hermeneutic tool to understand classical Buddhist texts? In highlighting the innovative features in the application of hetu-vidyā in the late Ming Chinese Buddhist scholasticism as showcased in Zhencheng’s WBQZLL, The controversies swirling around Zhencheng’s challenge to traditional doctrinal authority reveal the distinctive contrast between two forms of Buddhist hermeneutics in the late Ming Buddhist scholasticism: experiential hermeneutics and analytical hermeneutics. While the former has long been practiced in the mainstream of Chinese Buddhism, the latter has received little attention. (shrink)

Study on Budhist Pramāṇa-vāda (doctrine of proof: an epistemological study of the nature of knowledge) and Hetu-vidya (science of causes: a system of logic).

From this detailed analysis, comparison and study of the treatises of G. and S., we are in a position to arrivent certain conclusions. The similarity between the treatises of G. and S. is so close, both in structure and content, that we cannot explain it in any way other than to conclude that G. depends on S. for the composition of his work. It can further be concluded that, in the present state of research, there is no reason to suppose (...) that both S. and G. depended on a third source. There is no other work on the proof for the existence of God which has come down to us and which shows any structural similarity with the work of S. In fact it can be asserted with a fair amount of certainty that the work of S. is the first treatise on the existence of God in Post-Udayana Navyanyāya which exhibits the systematic plan of first discussing the pak $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ a, sādhya and hetu of the syllogism proving the existence of God in the pūrvapak $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ a and then establishing in the uttarapak $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ a, the author's own pak $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ a, sādhya and hetu of the syllogism. Further, the similarities in the expressions and often of argument in G. to those of S. lead us to conclude with reasonable certainty that G. depends directly on S. However, this does not at all mean that both G. and S. do not belong to the long Nyāya tradition of philosophers and hence many of the concepts of these thinkers do not have long and often complicated background. We only mean to assert that in the present state of research, we seem to be justified in saying that S. is the first philosopher in the Nyāya tradition who developed the treatise on the existence of God in this systematic way of first discussing the pak $$\underset{\raise0.3em\hbox{$\smash{\scriptscriptstyle\cdot}$}}{s}$$ a, sādhya and hetu of the syllogism, which was brought forward to prove the existence of God. We also assert that G. depends on S. for the composition of this part of his work. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Works cited.