In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Historiography of Philosophy by Michael FredeClaude PanaccioMichael Frede. The Historiography of Philosophy. Edited by Katerina Ierodiakonou, with a postface by Jonathan Barnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. 256. Hardback, $80.00.From the 1970s until his tragic death in 2007, Michael Frede was one of the most prominent scholars in ancient Greek philosophy, with landmark contributions to the study of Aristotle and of (...) Hellenistic thought in particular. This volume contains his theoretical reflections on the work of historians of philosophy. The main part of the book reproduces with minor corrections the previously unpublished text of the Nellie Wallace Lectures that Frede gave in 1989–90 in Oxford (1–135). Then come three papers that he published on pretty much the same topic between 1987 and 1992 (137–88). Jonathan Barnes's postface, finally, launches an exciting discussion of Frede's proposals by raising a number of questions and critical remarks about them (189–230).Frede's main claim throughout the book is that there is, and should be, a distinctively historical approach to the history of philosophy that has not yet been sufficiently recognized as such in the academic world. This is not to say that he considers more philosophical approaches to be illegitimate. His point is that we have to be clear about the distinction and what it involves in terms of requirements and methods. What Frede calls the "historical history of philosophy" is thus contrasted by him with two varieties of philosophical approaches. One of them he identifies as the "philosophical history of philosophy." It consists in retrospectively studying the past of philosophy as a kind of maturation toward some more recent doctrinal stage, as Aristotle or Hegel saliently did with their respective predecessors. Frede takes this to be "a perfectly intelligible and legitimate, though perhaps not particularly interesting or fruitful, enterprise" (41). Most of the time, he thinks, it would be led by its own philosophical presuppositions to be too selective and to provide a badly distorted picture of past philosophy.Frede is much more sympathetic to the other philosophical approach to the history of philosophy he acknowledges, the one he calls "doxography." This is the study of past philosophers with the aim of finding something of interest in them for ongoing philosophical discussions—a familiar practice, indeed, in the philosophical discipline as we know it. There is an inevitable amount of anachronism in such endeavors, according to Frede, insofar as the commentators will have to reformulate the old views in contemporary terms to a certain extent and to look at them in connection with the questions that are currently debated in the field. But Frede deems this kind of anachronism acceptable as long as sufficient care is taken to correctly identify the views of the past we are interested in and to report them in the best available way. He strongly insists, however, that there are inherent risks of distortion in this approach. This might not be a problem if we are prepared to deal, as philosophers, with views that were not exactly those of the past; but we then run the risk of leaving out something of great philosophical interest, even to us, since "as a rule the philosopher subjected to doxographical treatment was a much better philosopher than the doxographer" (34). If we turn to the past for philosophical inspiration, we should also do it seriously, and this presupposes a historical study of past authors that is pursued for its own sake. [End Page 317]The latter is what Frede is really interested in, and he wants this historical approach to be "as independent as possible from philosophy and not just an ancilla to philosophy" (60). Its practitioners must have a strong philosophical training, of course, in order to understand the views they study and the arguments that were adduced in support of them, but Frede insists that they nevertheless are historians first and foremost: they strive to provide a correct account of "the actual, historical evolution of these views and positions" (14) and of how new doctrines actually grew out of previous ones given the historical context. Insofar as this is what they are doing, historians of... (shrink)

"This volume presents stimulating and provocative work on how the history of philosophy is done and how it should be done, by Michael Frede, a pre-eminent figure in ancient philosophy until his early death in 2007. His Nellie Wallace lectures are published here accompanied by three related articles."--Publisher.

One of the traditional subjects of discussion among historians of philosophy is the question of the status of the history of philosophy as well as a discipline, as well as the tasks, possibilities, and limitations of some approaches and genres of the historiography of philosophy. The article focuses on the analysis of the contribution to these discussions of studies in the historiography of philosophy, which began in Francophone philosophy in the 1970s with the (...) publication of the studies of L. Braun and M. Gueroult, in particular, the answers to the mentioned questions, proposed within the framework of these studies. The starting point of the article is the historical scheme of the attitude of philosophers to the past of philosophy, proposed by Y. Lafrance, which makes it possible to determine the place of the history of philosophy as a discipline in philosophical activity and to study the historiography of philosophy as an element of such activity. In this article, three research projects of the historiography of philosophy were analyzed – the «history of the history of philosophy» by L. Braun, the studies in the doxography by A. Laks and M. Frede, the social history of the historiography of philosophy by C. König-Pralong. Based on the analysis of the mentioned projects, the article support the conclusion that the history of philosophy cannot be considered either only as a historical or only as a philosophical discipline, and also that a historian of philosophy cannot investigate a subject without simultaneously constructing it on the basis of historical data, which always remain outside the historiographic construction. (shrink)

Volume 28, Issue 3, May 2020, Page 431-441.

This paper examines the striking absence of women philosophers from German historiography of philosophy during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. While the general topic has been considered before, additional documents and considerations are presented that will help us better understand the omission of women philosophers in the German context. Firstly, material is presented showing that women philosophers were widely discussed in Germany prior to 1800. These discussions stand sharply in contrast with the silence about women in subsequent (...) general histories of philosophy. Secondly, it is shown that the absence of women philosophers in German historiography of philosophy during the nineteenth century is not entirely new but has to be seen as a continuation of tendencies characteristic for the historiography of philosophy already during the eighteenth century. Thirdly, it is argued that, towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a new stimulus for thinking about women in the history of philosophy, namely women’s emancipation and, more specifically, the right to a university education. Seen in this light, the renewed and intensified effort to diminish women philosophers can be understood as a symptomatic attempt to keep women out of academia in general, and out of philosophy in particular. (shrink)

Paradigms of historiography of philosophy in India have being changed since late 19th c. till present, depending on the social and cultural context of the history of Indian philosophy as a part of contemporary Indian culture. This change manifests itself in the conceptions of Indian historians concerning the teaching of Buddhist Mahāyāna school of Yogācāra (4th c. and later). Historians of colonial times, basing themselves on the philosophy of Neovedаntism (S. Radhakrishnan, S. Dasgupta), regarded Buddhism as (...) a derivate of late Vedic culture and Yogācāra as a teaching that reflected - though in an essentially transmuted form - the ideology of Upaniṣads. The latter, according to Neovedantists, was based on the postulate of the existence of the single cosmic soul - Brahman, the true human Self (Ātman) being identical to it. Historians of the late colonial and early postcolonial times (P.T. Raju, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, A.K. Chatterjee, partly also S. Dasgupta) brought Yogācāra closer to the teachings of European idealism, mainly to conceptions of G. Berkeley, G.W.F. Hegel, F. Bradley, J.E. McTaggart, trying to demonstrate a principal identity of fundamental problems in Indian and Western philosophy. At the same time, they brought Yogācāra together with the teaching of Brāhmaṇic school, Advaita Vedānta, regarded as another form of Indian idealism. In later times, following the evolution of contemporary Indian culture and changings in its social and political context, historians like D.J. Kalupahana became to analyze Yogācāra as a kind of philosophy of mind. All these facts show the dependence of strategies of historico-philosophical studies in India on its social, political and cultural context: in the Yogācāra teaching mainly those aspects call attention that a historian sees as the closest to the problematic field of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Histories of philosophy represent a relatively new form of historical study» and some observations are made concerning the changes in style that they have tinder gone. A crucial question for the historian of philosophy is "Who is to count as a philosopher?” An answer to this question is suggested. The question of the extent to which historians falsify the doctrines of individual philosophers by viewing them in terms of their predecessors and successors is then raised. In the second (...) section of the paper» monistic views of social and cultural life are re» jected, and a pluralistic approach is developed. This approach» it is contended, allows for emphasis on both originality and continuity in philosophic thought, and shows how philosophy is related to its social and cultural milieu without losing its identity. (shrink)

Drawing on recent publications on studies in historiography of philosophy in French-, English-, and German-speaking philosophy, the author clarifies the subject matter and tasks of studies in historiography of philosophy as a historico-philosophical approach, in particular, counting among such subjects the images of philosophy's past constructed by histories of philosophy, as well as the historiographical attitudes of historians of philosophy and the contexts and factors that determine these historiographical attitudes. The article analyses (...) the conceptions and implementations of three projects of studies in historiography of philosophy that have taken place in Ukraine in recent decades: the project of “History of Historico-philosophical Science”, led by Yu. Kushakov in the 1980s and 2000s and dedicated to the study of historico-philosophical conceptions of German and Russian philosophers of the 19th and early 20th; S. Rudenko's study of post-Soviet methodological approaches to the history of Ukrainian philosophy (2012); and the Ukrainian part of the bilateral project “Philosophy in the system of national culture: comparative analysis of historico-philosophical studies in Belarus and Ukraine” (2011-2012), led by V. Yevarousky and S. Yosypenko. Based on the results of the latter project and on his more recent research, the author outlines the socio-political, general philosophical and institutional context in which the historiography of Ukrainian philosophy was formed and functioned during the 20th century; analyses the images of the history of Ukrainian philosophy created by D. Tschižewskij and V. Horskyi, which embody two extreme points in the development of the historiography of Ukrainian philosophy in the 20th century; and points out the changes in the general philosophical and institutional context of historico-philosophical research in independent Ukraine and the consequences of these changes for the further development of the historiography of Ukrainian philosophy. (shrink)

This paper examines the formation of the philosophical canon in the period immediately after Kant. After a general introduction to the “historiography of philosophy,” it brings together three strands of contemporary scholarship in this area: a historical criticism of the empiricism/rationalism distinction that is often still used to understand early modern philosophy (Vanzo), histories of the exclusion of women from the history of philosophy in the late eighteenth century (O’Neill), and histories of the exclusion of non-European (...) philosophy (Park). Though these scholars have different agendas, their studies share many conclusions, including the key claim that the little-known Kantian historian of philosophy Wilhelm Tennemann is the central figure in the formation of the standard story. The paper closes by comparing the main outline of Tennemann’s surprisingly familiar narrative of the history of philosophy with the standard text from before the Kantian revolution in the historiography of philosophy. (shrink)

The idea of a unity of intellectual history (Geistesgeschichte) is a genuinely philosophical thought. In the shadow of Hegel, it is about the legitimation of historiographical work in a universal perspective thought centered in Europe. The legitimation strategies are complex and amount to the formation of a canon of philosophy. This project is associated with the name of the philosopher and historian of philosophy Wilhelm Dilthey. Dilthey saw it as his task to secure the unity of intellectual history. (...) To this end, he introduced a pluralism of methods – logic, psychology, anthropology, philosophy of history, hermeneutics, literary research and others – into the study of intellectual history. I am speaking here of the Dilthey project, whose actuality, chances and risks are discussed in the article. (shrink)

Change in the human past, studied by historians, includes changes in philosophy's past, which can be explained by causes, motives and reasons. In the case of philosophy, must explanatory antecedents of change always be philosophical? Should philosophers ever treat non-philosophical reasons as belonging to the history of philosophy? Saying ‘never’ is absolutely internalist, while ‘sometimes’ rejects this absolutely internalist rule. To show that ‘sometimes’ is the better answer, I examine two case histories from the early modern period: (...) these cases, framed by a taxonomy of historical narrative, eliminate absolute internalism. (shrink)

In the 19th century, the history of philosophy becomes the history of a particular science. Modern philosophical historiography is an ambivalent project. On the one hand, we find an affirmative concept of Bildung through tradition and historical insight; on the other, there arises a critical reflection on historical education in the light of an emerging critique of modern culture. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the debate.

This article outlines the leading trends in contemporary English-language historiography of philosophy. It is shown that the anti-historicity, which was characteristic of analytic philosophy in its classical versions was only a moment in its development. A historical turn that began in English-language philosophical world as early as the 1960s, during the first decades of the 21st century has led to a true flourishing of the history of philosophy - both at the conceptual and institutional level. Contemporary (...) English-speaking historians of philosophy pay considerable attention to the methodologically important distinction between real historical process, i.e., facts that took place in the past (history of philosophy), and reflections concerning means, goals, and epistemological foundations for the understanding of these facts (historiography of philosophy). It is also shown that one of the main results of a careful study of history of philosophy is inclusiveness – drawing attention to those pages or aspects of the past that, for some reason, were marginalized or completely forgotten. Factors that were traditionally dismissed as external and unimportant, now acquire the same significance as those that were previously considered as exclusively internal and important. Due to this fact traditional history of philosophy, focused primarily on the study of the most prominent representatives of Western thought, usually men by gender, is replaced by a much broader historically-philosophical canon, which includes a much wider circle of thinkers, representatives of different cultures and types of philosophizing. (shrink)

It is widely believed that the ancient Greeks thought that Thales was the first philosopher, and that they therefore maintained that philosophy had a Greek origin. This paper challenges these assumptions, arguing that most ancient Greek thinkers who expressed views about the history and development of philosophy rejected both positions. I argue that not even Aristotle presented Thales as the first philosopher, and that doing so would have undermined his philosophical commitments and interests. Beyond Aristotle, the view that (...) Thales was the first philosopher is attested almost nowhere in antiquity. In the classical, Hellenistic, and post-Hellenistic periods, we witness a marked tendency to locate the beginning of philosophy in a time going back further than Thales. Remarkably, ancient Greek thinkers most often traced the origins of philosophy to earlier non-Greek peoples. Contrary to the received view, then, I argue that (1) vanishingly few Greek writers pronounced Thales the first philosopher; and (2) most Greek thinkers did not even advocate a Greek origin of philosophy. Finally, I show that the view that philosophy originated with Thales (along with its misleading attribution to the Greeks in general) has roots in problematic, and in some cases manifestly racist, eighteenth-century historiography of philosophy. (shrink)

Around 1900, historiography of philosophy faced the challenge of opening itself to scientific, social, and cultural history, without giving up what is unique to philosophy: its exclusive claim to i...

The sixteen essays in this volume confront the current debate about the relationship between philosophy and its history. On the one hand intellectual historians commonly accuse philosophers of writing bad - anachronistic - history of philosophy, and on the other, philosophers have accused intellectual historians of writing bad - antiquarian - history of philosophy. The essays here address this controversy and ask what purpose the history of philosophy should serve. Part I contains more purely theoretical and (...) methodological discussion, of such questions as whether there are 'timeless' philosophical problems, whether the issues of one epoch are commensurable with those of another, and what style is appropriate to the historiography of the subject. The essays in Part II consider a number of case-histories. They present important revisionist scholarship and original contributions on topics drawn from ancient, early modern and more recent philosophy. All the essays have been specially commissioned, and the contributors include many of the leading figures in the field. The volume as a whole will be of vital interest to everyone concerned with the study of philosophy and of its history. (shrink)

The article aims at clarifying the historical status and cognitive potentials of such a genre of contemporary historiography of philosophy as biographical encyclopedia (dictionary). Based on extensive bibliographic material, the author demonstrates that in the late XX – early XXI centuries in the English-speaking countries there was a real outbreak of interest in encyclopedias and dictionaries, compiled from personalized articles about the life and works of philosophers of certain epochs, countries, trends, etc. According to the author, the increasing (...) popularity of this genre can be considered as a logical continuation of the historical and biographical turns that took place in the Anglo-American (analytic) philosophy in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. The author specifically emphasizes that it caused the appearance of a significant number of encyclopedias and dictionaries, which contain the well-known facts as well as the significant elements of scholar novelty. The article also shows that similar tendencies have taken place in the contemporary Ukrainian historiography of philosophy. It is shown that Ukrainian experts also made their own significant contribution to the development of this genre. They have successfully developed a special approach, which presupposes the focus on life and works of the representatives of a particular academic institution. The intellectual value of this approach is demonstrated by the example of the recently published two-volume encyclopedia “Kyiv Theological Academy in Names: 1819-1924”. It contains a systematic and very informative presentation of the biographies of many representatives of the national philosophy, whose activities were associated with this institution. The author also shows that from the perspective of the historiography of philosophy, the general methodological foundations of this encyclopedic research is a matter of special interest. (shrink)

The paper aims to disclosure of key points in the development of the German tradition of historiography of philosophy after the 90s of the 18th century. The starting point was the so-called «dispute about the method» of historiography, which erupted in the last decade of the 18th century not without the influence of Kant’s «critical philosophy». Its participants (Reinhold, Fülleborn, Goess, Grohmann, Tennemann, and others) put forward different theses, but they agreed that it is Kant’s (...) class='Hi'>philosophy that makes it possible to create a «philosophical history of philosophy». A type of historiography was formed, which was based on the criterion of «progress of philosophy» and Kant’s position was considered as a standard for any historiography. Subsequently, other types of historiography were formed, which followed either the opposite criterion of «regress» or «decadence», or tried to combine both of these criteria (Hegel). In the second half of the 19th century «history of problems» becomes widespread as a principle of research and presentation of the history of philosophy, its main representatives were W. Windelband, N. Hartmann, H. Heimsoeth. Instead, in the second half of the 20th century the dominant type of historiography is the «history of concepts», which finds linguistic and philosophical justification in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. In recent decades, the German tradition of historiography has been enriched by K. Flasсh’s project «historical philosophy» and by D. Henrich program «constellation research». In both of these projects, there is a noticeable attraction to microhistory, going beyond the «classic» texts, discovering hitherto unknown figures and sources that significantly expand the established practice of the historiography of philosophy. (shrink)

This article contends that an adequate investigation of the role and effects of race in the history of philosophy requires an elucidation of the ways in which the history of philosophy functions as a “territorial” structure. This argument is developed through an extensive cross-examination of Peter Park's Africa, Asia and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical Canon 1780–1830 and Catherine König-Pralong's La colonie philosophique. Écrire l'histoire de la philosophie aux XVIIIe et XIXe (...) siècles. I show that although the two studies inquire into the fixation of the history of philosophy on Europe that took place in German and French philosophy at the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, they do so via different explanatory frameworks, highlighting diverging critical strategies in the dismantling of Eurocentrism in the discipline. In the final part I contrast three broad critical strategies against the Eurocentric orientation of the historiography of philosophy based on opposite problematizations of the territoriality of the history of philosophy: the territory as jurisdiction, relational field, and space of address. (shrink)

Kant considered it a scandal that philosophy, unlike science, had been spending its time in fruitless debates, which hindered its progress. In this session, we question Kant’s assessment, and suggest an approach to the history of philosophy that considers controversy as essential in the evolution of philosophical ideas. In his recent work on the Enlightenment, Jonathan Israel has demonstrated the role of the intense debate around radically new philosophical ideas in creating the conceptual underpinnings of revolution and of (...) a new social order. Randall Collins, from another perspective, has highlighted the role of debate in the rise and fall of philosophical schools. Both have thus shown that, without a decidedly ‘dialectical’ approach to intellectual history, especially to the history of philosophy, its understanding and influence can hardly be grasped. As this session will show, this is true not only at the macro-level of relatively long term intellectual conflicts and their effects, but also at the micro-level of detailed analysis and understanding of philosophical texts – their concepts, theses, arguments, theories, and relevance. What we mean by ‘dialectical reframing’ owes much, of course, to the various traditional meanings of ‘dialectics’. Yet, emphasizing the actual activity of debate as the engine of philosophical and intellectual change, permits to investigate how key ideas, such as rationality, emerge through debate, rather than being its given a priori condition. (shrink)

No doubt most philosophers who spend time on the history of philosophy are familiar with that question asked to embarrass (and liable to be asked by scientists in particular) why the history of the subject should be thought a significant part of the subject itself. Either there is progress in philosophy, it is said, or there is not. If there is progress, why the laborious backward glances? How can the past be so important? Why aren’t philosophers like psychologists, (...) given perhaps a short historical orientation before being brought up to the nitty-gritty of the present? If, on the other hand, there is no progress, if we might as well be discussing Locke as Quine, doesn’t that imply that philosophy consists in a set of questions for which there is no way of establishing even that some answers are better than others? Wouldn’t it be more profitable to pursue questions to which at least provisional answers can be established, approximating to the truth? Wouldn’t it be better to be a scientist? (shrink)

In this article I explore Maimon’s role in the evolution of Kant’s understanding of the function of the history of philosophy in philosophical enquiry. Kant is often viewed as holding an ambivalent...

This article considers the implications of inferentialist philosophy of language for debates in the historiography of philosophy. My intention is to mediate and refine the polemics between contextualist historians and ‘analytic’ or presentist historians. I claim that much of Robert Brandom’s nuanced defence of presentism can be accepted and even adopted by contextualists, so that inferentialism turns out to provide an important justification for orthodox history of philosophy. In the concluding sections I argue that the application (...) of Brandom’s theory has important limits, and that some polemics by contextualists against presentists are therefore justified. (shrink)

This book investigates how, from the seventeenth century onward, philosophers, philologists and historians described various world "cultures", colonized the past (or national pasts), and thus invented Europe's philosophical nature. In the recent past, critical discussions concerning notions such as "cultural area" and "area studies", as well as their relativizations by means of conceptions that avoid splitting clearly identified areas (inter alia, "third space", "hybridity", "diaspora", or "cosmopolitism"), drew attention to the long history of cultural territorialization. This book attempts to open (...) the history of philosophy to reflexive and globalizing tendencies elaborated in the field of "world history". From the seventeenth century onward, in both modern Europe and North America, historical sciences - notably philosophical historiography and cultural history - colonized both the past (or national pasts) and the "rest" of the world. The contributions gathered in the present volume address both phenomena to the extent that they have been linked with modern historicization of philosophy, sciences, and culture. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to sketch an approach for integrating the historiography of the sciences and of philosophy. More precisely, the paper suggests a method for investigating interactions within transdisciplinary constellations of researchers working in philosophy and in the exact sciences. I start off by introducing specific notions of analogy, variation, and conceptual space which provide the main ingredients of this method. The notion of a conceptual space, as well as other characteristics of the present (...) approach, are adaptations from so-called constellation research. Originally, constellation research was developed for the historiography of philosophy – especially in the context of the origins of German idealism. However, as I will argue in the second half of the paper, it is adaptable to the historiography of science, especially of the exact sciences. To support this claim and to illustrate the integrative power of the present approach, I will compare the notions of a constellation and a conceptual space with Ludwik Fleck’s notions of a »thought collective« and a »style of thought«, critically evaluate the distinction between contexts of discovery and of justification in a historiographical context, and relate the notions of analogy and variation, as introduced in the first part of the paper, to current debates about what is sometimes called »invariantism« in the philosophy of science. (shrink)

The founders of reformational philosophy, H. Dooyeweerd and D.H.Th. Vollenhoven, each published in short succession, viz. 1949 and 1950, a voluminous study in the history of philosophy. Whoever reads both works is struck by the remarkable differences in treatment. In this contribution these differences are analysed, but there is also indication of agreement. The article ends with a number of conclusions based on the analysis.

20世纪初是德语世界正式出版关于中国哲学史著作的起点。1909—1924年之间德语世界出版了若干关于中国哲学史的论文和专著，通过调查作者们的教育背景和研究成果，以及其代表作的写作背景、内容框架及其影响 ，可以勾勒出这一时期德语学界中国哲学研究的概况。从分析当时德语学界对中国哲学的认识范围和中国哲学史框架构建的一般情况，可以看出欧洲对中国哲学和哲学史研究的一些核心问题所在。前现代中国哲学史在德语地区接 纳和传播的过程与方式，这一至今德国与中国学界尚未涉足的空白领域，值得研究并填补。[The beginning of the twentieth century was the starting point for the production of works on the history of Chinese philosophy in the German-speaking world. Between 1909 and 1924, a number of essays and monographs on the history of Chinese philosophy were published in the German-speaking contexts, and by investigating the educational backgrounds and research results of the authors, as well as the backgrounds of the authors, the frameworks for presenting the content, and the influence of these works, (...) an overview of the study of Chinese philosophy in in the German language during that period can be outlined. By analyzing the scope of knowledge of Chinese philosophy and the general construction of the framework for the history of Chinese philosophy in German-speaking academia at that time, it is possible to discern some of the core issues at stake in the study of Chinese philosophy and the history of philosophy in Europe. The process and manner of the reception and dissemination of the history of pre-modern Chinese philosophy in the German-speaking region, a field that has not yet been addressed sufficiently by German and Chinese academics, deserves to be studied and completed.]. (shrink)

In this essay I examine and discuss the concept “system of philosophy” as a methodological tool in the history of philosophy; I do so in two moves. First I analyze the historical origin of the concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Thereafter I undertake a discussion of its methodological weaknesses—a discussion that is not only relevant to the writing of history of philosophy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also to the writing of history of (...) philosophy in our times, where the concept remains an important methodological tool. My first move is to analyze Jacob Brucker’s employment of the concept in his influential history of philosophy, Historia critica philosophiae, dating from 1742–1744. To Brucker, a “system of philosophy” is characterized by the following four features: it is autonomous in regard to other, non-philosophical disciplines; all doctrines stated within the various branches of philosophy can be deduced from one principle; as an autonomous system it comprises all branches of philosophy; the doctrines stated within these various branches of philosophy are internally coherent. Brucker employed the concept on the entire history of philosophy, and he gave it a defining role in regard to two other methodological concepts, namely “eclecticism” and “syncretism,” which he regarded as more or less successful forms of systematic philosophy. My second move is to point out the weakness of the concept of “system of philosophy” as a methodological tool in the history of philosophy. I argue that the interdisciplinary nature of much premodern philosophy makes Brucker’s methodological concept “system of philosophy” inadequate, and that we may be better off leaving it behind in our future exploration of premodern philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 217 [Access article in PDF] Bogoljub Sijakovic. Bibliographica Praesocratica: A Bibliographical Guide to the Studies of Early Greek Philosophy in its Religious and Scientific Contexts with an Introductory Bibliography on the Historiography of Philosophy. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2001. Pp. 700. Cloth, €18,00. Professor Sijakovic has given us an invaluable reference work for the Presocratics and for (...) early Greek thought generally: a bibliography of 17,664 entries covering the period 1450-2000. It has some advantages over its principal predecessor, Paquet et al., Les Présocratiques: Bibliographie Analytique (Montreal and Paris, 1988-95), which covers work up to 1980. Sijakovic includes more recent material and aims at complete coverage of works in the Slavic languages and Modern Greek. He does not cover the Sophists, but does include works on topics that extend more widely than the Presocratics. Unlike Paquet, Sijakovic does not provide summaries of articles nor does he list reviews of books, unless they have interest in their own right, or include translations of works into other modern languages. He provides indexes of subjects, Greek terms, proper names, and authors.The ambition of the work is revealed by the subject headings other than those on familiar Presocratic thinkers and the issues they treated. The bibliography begins with a long section on Historiography and Philosophy of the History of Philosophy (with 932 entries) and concludes with one on Presocratics in the Intellectual Tradition (590) from before Plato to the present, with subsections on figures such as Francis Bacon (5), Nietzsche (74), Heidegger (56), and Popper (6). Other sections are labelled Theories of Myth (550), Greek Mythmaking and Religion (667), Orpheus and Orphism (642), Homer (154), Hesiod (147), Theogonies, Greek and Oriental (159), From Myth to Philosophy (365), Mathematics (137), Medicine (86), and Hippocrates of Cos (199). It is here that ambition leads to weakness, since the section on Homer, for example, is obviously not a complete bibliography of Homeric studies, and yet it is not restricted to works on Homer that bear on "presocratic" topics. The absence of an explanatory preface to these sections leaves the principles of selection mysterious and decreases their usefulness.Another feature that limits the value of the book is the arrangement within sections. This is generally chronological, but not always. The irregularities are so pervasive that the cause must be due to some unannounced division into unlabelled subsections, and the result is that we must read through more entries than we should have to. Two other minor complaints: the language of the book is English (aside from the trilingual prefatory material), but there are mistakes of usage and grammar which a copyreader should have caught; and there are occasional unexplained words at the end of entries, frequently in a different type-face, that are not part of the bibliographical entry.I do not mean to detract from the great service Professor Sijakovic has done (seemingly laboring alone over many years) for all who work in the area of early Greek thought—and principally, he notes in a preface, written as NATO was bombing his country, scholars from Western Europe and the United States. We are deeply indebted to him. The book has replaced Paquet as my primary bibliographical resource on the Presocratics. Richard McKirahan Pomona College... (shrink)

This is the first special issue of the British Journal of the History of Philosophy to be devoted to the thought of the Middle Ages. Its topic is relations. The articles have been chosen to give an...