No presente artigo são examinadas duas noções centrais da fenomenologia-hermenêutica apresentadas em Ser e tempo de Martin Heidegger: os conceitos de indicação formal e de possibilidade existencial. Ambas as noções são postas em conexão com a problemática da filosofia moral, ou seja, sustenta-se a tese de que um conceito existencial de moral contém problemas e uma metodologia específica, originados da indicação formal da estrutura ontológica do Dasein enquanto possibilidade existencial. O autor também afirma que a modificação (...) existencial da inautenticidade para o modo de ser autêntico não deve ser vista como sendo em si mesma de significação moral ou normativa, mas representa o desenvolvimento da individualidade no interior de um domínio de entes que não são instâncias de tipos.In this paper are examinated two central notions of hermeneutic phenomenology, exposed in Heidegger's Being and Time: the concepts of formal indication and existential possibility. Both notions are connected with the problematic of moral philosophy, that is, the author mantains that a existential concept of moral entails both a set of problems and a specific methodology, that arise from the formal indication of Dasein's ontological structure as existencial possibility. The author also asserts that the existential modification from inautenticity to the autentic way of being should not be viewed as bearing a moral or normativ meaning by it self, but represents the development of individuality within a realm of beings that are not instances of a type. (shrink)

No presente artigo, é apresentado um aspecto central da concepção heideggeriana da fenomenologia nos escritos posteriores a 1919, que, à luz dos textos disponíveis na Gesamtausgabe de Martin Heidegger, revela um componente dialógico específico do método filosófico. A tese de que os conceitos e enunciados próprios da filosofia têm um caráter indicativo-formal conduz a uma noção de verdade filosófica, que tem na recepção produtiva e conversacional das sinalizações formais o seu traço definitório. Associada com a noção especulativa de jogo, (...) apresentada por Heidegger no livro Introdução à Filosofia, a doutrina das indicações formais permite reconhecer um traço dialógico já na hermenêutica da facticidade do primeiro Heidegger. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta uma reunião dos principais elementos potencialmente hermenêuticos presentes em quatro momentos ao longo do pensamento de Martin Heidegger: a indicação formal, a ciência do possível, a verdade e o acontecimento de apropriação. Estes elementos serão apresentados e conjugados visando favorecer a linguagem poética como modalidade de acesso ao fenômeno do sagrado.

Esse artigo examina as chamadas “funções” das indicações formais heideggerianas, tal como desenvolvidas pelo filósofo nos anos 20. Primeiramente, é apresentado o modo como a função proibitivo-referencial e a função reversivo-transformacional desempenham um papel fundamental no projeto elaborado por Heidegger nesse período. A seguir, são analisadas suas implicações filosóficas, como a modificação da concepção tradicional de fenomenologia e sua aproximação do aspecto existencial da atividade filosófica.

o objetivo do presente artigo consiste em apresentar, em linhas gerais, as características da noção de normatividade, que resulta da fenomenologia do paramundo de animais delineada esquematicamente por Heidegger no “Conceitos Fundamentais da Metafísica”. Iniciarei com a reconstrução da fenomenologia do paramundo dos animais, que tem como foco a determinação formal de três momentos: os comportamentos, os seus correlatos ambientais e a estrutura antecipatória do âmbito de acessibilidade do organismo. Em seguida, caracterizarei a normatividade no paramundo a partir dos (...) conceitos de desinibição de pulsões e regulagem pulsional. O artigo é concluído com a indicação de problemas para o desenvolvimento ulterior da fenomenologia do paramundo dos animais. (shrink)

As reflexões de Heidegger em relação à metafísica são particularmente importantes não apenas para se compreender devidamente seu pensamento filosófico, mas, sobretudo, para estimar a contribuição que tais reflexões propiciaram para o redimensionamento da concepção de filosofia no século XX. Nessa perspectiva, este trabalho explicita aspectos importantes do percurso filosófico de Heidegger em relação ao conceito de metafísica. Argumenta-se que, nos textos escritos até os anos 1930, Heidegger visava discutir e apresentar os problemas da metafísica na pretensão de elaborar as (...) condições de possibilidade de toda investigação ontológica sem ainda conceber a metafísica como questão propriamente dita e, portanto, sem interrogá-la em seus pressupostos. Indicamos que, nesse período, os problemas da metafísica eram tratados como questão de método, isto é, em relação ao caminho e ao modo da metafísica desenvolver sua pesquisa e elaborar suas questões. Nos textos posteriores a 1930, o conceito de metafísica assume um lugar privilegiado na reflexão do filósofo, como cerne da problemática em questão. Objetiva-se ainda apresentar a problemática do conceito de metafísica da metafísica tradicional. (shrink)

Este estudo busca discutir e analisar a construção da opinião pública no Twitter, tomando como estudo de caso a nomeação de Alexandre de Moraes para substituir Teori Zavascki como ministro do Supremo Tribunal Federal. A base teórica é formada a partir das relações entre o conceito de esfera pública e os sites de redes sociais. Para realizar esta análise, foram adotados métodos mistos, baseados na análise de contingência e na análise de redes. O corpus deste estudo é composto por 15.125 (...) tweets, coletados do Twitter utilizando “Alexandre de Moraes” como termo de coleta. Os dados foram analisados por meio das coocorrências entre os conceitos dos tweets, sendo possível observar os principais assuntos discutidos e posicionamentos dos usuários, em sua maioria contrários à indicação de Moraes. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

We consider two formalisations of the notion of a compositionalsemantics for a language, and find some equivalent statements in termsof substitutions. We prove a theorem stating necessary and sufficientconditions for the existence of a canonical compositional semanticsextending a given partial semantics, after discussing what features onewould want such an extension to have. The theorem involves someassumptions about semantical categories in the spirit of Husserl andTarski.

We extend the monotonic and regular modal logics to the multi-modal cue, and give semantical characterization w.r.t. a semantics of minimal frames. For this we introduce a calculus over neighbourhoods and we obtain simpler conditions than those from the literature.

There is an old meta-philosophical worry: very roughly, metaphysical theories have no observational consequences and so the study of metaphysics has no value. The worry has been around in some form since the rise of logical positivism in the early twentieth century but has seen a bit of a renaissance recently. In this paper, I provide an apology for metaphysics in the face of this kind of concern. The core of the argument is this: pure mathematics detaches from science in (...) much the same manner as metaphysics and yet it is valuable nonetheless. The source of value enjoyed by pure mathematics extends to metaphysics as well. Accordingly, if one denies that metaphysics has value, then one is forced to deny that pure mathematics has value. The argument places an added burden on the sceptic of metaphysics. If one truly believes that metaphysics is worthless (as some philosophers do), then one must give up on pure mathematics as well. (shrink)

In this article I tackle the question of how the hierarchical order of mechanisms can be represented within a causal graph framework. I illustrate an answer to this question proposed by Casini, Illari, Russo, and Williamson and provide an example that their formalism does not support two important features of nested mechanisms: (i) a mechanism’s submechanisms are typically causally interacting with other parts of said mechanism, and (ii) intervening in some of a mechanism’s parts should have some influence on the (...) phenomena the mechanism brings about. Finally, I sketch an alternative approach taking (i) and (ii) into account. (shrink)

The term ‘formal ontology’ was first used by the philosopher Edmund Husserl in his Logical Investigations to signify the study of those formal structures and relations – above all relations of part and whole – which are exemplified in the subject-matters of the different material sciences. We follow Husserl in presenting the basic concepts of formal ontology as falling into three groups: the theory of part and whole, the theory of dependence, and the theory of boundary, continuity (...) and contact. These basic concepts are presented in relation to the problem of providing an account of the formal ontology of the mesoscopic realm of everyday experience, and specifically of providing an account of the concept of individual substance. (shrink)

Central topics in medieval logic are here treated in a way that is congenial to the modern reader, without compromising historical reliability. The achievements of medieval logic are made available to a wider philosophical public then the medievalists themselves. The three genres of logica moderna arising in a later Middle Ages are covered: obligations, insolubles and consequences - the first time these have been treated in such a unified way. The articles on obligations look at the role of logical consistence (...) in medieval disputation techniques. Those on insolubles concentrate on medieval solutions to the Liar Paradox. There is also a systematic account of how medieval authors described the logical content of an inference, and how they thought that the validity of an inference could be guaranteed. (shrink)

In this article, after presenting the basic idea of causal accounts of implementation and the problems they are supposed to solve, I sketch the model of computation preferred by Chalmers and argue that it is too limited to do full justice to computational theories in cognitive science. I also argue that it does not suffice to replace Chalmers’ favorite model with a better abstract model of computation; it is necessary to acknowledge the causal structure of physical computers that is not (...) accommodated by the models used in computability theory. Additionally, an alternative mechanistic proposal is outlined. (shrink)

Logical consequence in first-order predicate logic is defined substitutionally in set theory augmented with a primitive satisfaction predicate: an argument is defined to be logically valid if and only if there is no substitution instance with true premises and a false conclusion. Substitution instances are permitted to contain parameters. Variants of this definition of logical consequence are given: logical validity can be defined with or without identity as a logical constant, and quantifiers can be relativized in substitution instances or not. (...) It is shown that the resulting notions of logical consequence are extensionally equivalent to versions of first-order provability and model-theoretic consequence. Every model-theoretic interpretation has a substitutional counterpart, but not vice versa. In particular, in contrast to the model-theoretic account, there is a trivial intended interpretation on the substitutional account, namely, the homophonic interpretation that does not substitute anything. Applications to free logic, and theories and languages other than set theory are sketched. (shrink)

One aim of the Critique of Practical Reason is to establish that reason alone can determine the will. To show that it can, it suffices to show that there are practical principles given by reason alone – what Kant terms ‘practical laws’, or (roughly) requirements of reason on action. Chapter I of the Analytic accomplishes this aim by arguing that the moral law is an authoritative practical principle given as a ‘fact of reason’. The chapter begins in section 1 with (...) a ‘Definition’ (Erklärung) of a practical law as a practical principle that.. (shrink)

This book offers a metaphysical development of the notion of perspective. By explaining the functional nature of point of view, and by providing a concrete definition of point of view as a window through which to see the world, it offers a scientific realist theory that explains that points of view are real structures that ground properties and objects as well as perspectives. The notion of point of view has been of key importance in the history of philosophy, and different (...) philosophical schools have used this notion to conduct analyses from the external reality to the inner phenomenal status, or even to construct an entire philosophical system. However, there has been a lack of systematic analysis of what a point of view is and what its structure is; this book fills the gap in the literature and makes the transition between semantics and epistemology, and the philosophy of science. (shrink)

This essay lays the groundwork for a novel conception of autonomy that may be called “effective autonomy”—a conception designed to be genuinely action guiding in bioethics. As empirical psychology research on the heuristics and biases approach shows, decision making commonly fails to correspond to people’s desires because of the biases arising from bounded cognition. People who are classified as autonomous on contemporary philosophical accounts may fail to be effectively autonomous because their decisions are uncoupled from their autonomous desires. Accordingly, continuing (...) attempts to value patient autonomy must go beyond existing philosophical conceptions of autonomy to consider the background conditions of human decision making. (shrink)

The traditional view is that 'now’ is a pure indexical, denoting the utterance time. Yet, despite its initial appeal, the view has faced criticism. A range of data reveal 'now’ allows for discourse-bound (i.e., anaphoric) uses, and can occur felicitously with the past tense. The reaction to this has typically been to treat ‘now’ as akin to a true demonstrative, selecting the prominent time supplied by the non-linguistic context or prior discourse. We argue this is doubly mistaken. The first mistake (...) concerns the semantic value of ‘now’, which is not a time, but a state — the consequent state of a prominent event. The second is that ‘now’ is a pure indexical after all, insofar as its interpretation is determined without recourse to extra-linguistic supplementation. Specifically, we argue that any occurrence of 'now’ selects the consequent state of the most prominent event, where event-prominence is linguistically maintained through prominence-affecting updates contributed by coherence relations. Our analysis accounts straightforwardly for a wide range of discourse initial and discourse bound uses of ‘now’, while giving it a simple indexical meaning. (shrink)