Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman (...) animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes. (shrink)

In my article, I delineate Friedrich Nietzsche’s influence on Estonian intellectual landscape. As it turns out, this influence has been quite remarkable and extends from literature to politics. I start with outlining several orientations of the reception of Nietzsche’s thought in the world and then suggest that with one exception, all those orientations are to some extent also present in Estonian Nietzsche reception. Nietzsche’s reception in Estonia started rather early and one can say that he was somewhat known in Tallinn (...) as well as in Tartu even in his lifetime. The first attempt to translate one of his works into Estonian was made already in 1901. Till the Soviet occupation in 1940, Nietzsche’s thought was rather actively appropriated by Estonian writers, intellectuals and even politicians. In Soviet Union, Nietzsche was prohibited and his works were not freely accessible in public libraries. With the restoration of Estonia’s independence in the beginning of 90s, a new, fresh and active wave of Nietzsche reception also begun. New translations appeared and the reception was generally more faithful and philosophical than in the first period. (shrink)

Normal 0 21 false false false ET X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} Man könnte sagen, dass Aristoteles so etwas wie eine traditionelle und dominierende Auffassung der Entscheidung in der westlichen Philosophie gründet. Das Ziel dieses Aufsatzes ist es, diese Auffassung von Aristoteles zu entwerfen, einige ihrer wichtigsten (...) Probleme anzusprechen, und sie damit zu kontrastieren, was ich Jacques Derridas häretische „Konzeptualisierung“ der Entscheidung nennen würde. Es wird gezeigt, dass diese häretische Thematisierung von Derrida nicht nur und einfach mit dem traditionellen aristotelischen Begriff bricht, sondern vielmehr auch zu Recht einige seiner wichtigsten Züge auf solcher Weise schärft, dass von diesem radikalisierten Standpunkt die Behandlung von Aristoteles als die Annullierung der Entscheidung zum Vorschein kommt. Es wird zudem impliziert, wie Derridas häretische Auffassung die Erneuerung der Ethik und Politik mit sich bringt. Normal 0 21 false false false ET X-NONE X-NONE /* Style Definitions */ table.MsoNormalTable {mso-style-name:"Table Normal"; mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0; mso-tstyle-colband-size:0; mso-style-noshow:yes; mso-style-priority:99; mso-style-qformat:yes; mso-style-parent:""; mso-padding-alt:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt; mso-para-margin-top:0cm; mso-para-margin-right:0cm; mso-para-margin-bottom:10.0pt; mso-para-margin-left:0cm; line-height:115%; mso-pagination:widow-orphan; font-size:11.0pt; font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif"; mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri; mso-ascii-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-fareast-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-fareast-theme-font:minor-fareast; mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri; mso-hansi-theme-font:minor-latin; mso-bidi-font-family:"Times New Roman"; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-bidi;} It might be said that Aristotle institutes something like a traditional and dominating concept of decision in the philosophical tradition of the West. The aim of this article is to outline that concept of Aristotle, touching on some of its most important problems, and contrast it with what I would call Jacques Derrida’s heretical understanding of decision. It will be shown that this heretical “conceptualization” by Derrida doesn’t simply and merely break with, or depart and differ from, the traditional Aristotelian concept but rather also justifiably sharpens some of its most central features in such a way that from that radicalized point of view the treatment of Aristotle comes to appear as the very annulment of decision. It is moreover implied how Derrida’s heretical understanding of decision entails a renewal of ethics and politics. (shrink)

Nietzsche is known as a great and poignant critic of the Judeo-Christian virtue and morality, but the motivation and aim of his criticisms might sometimes remain unclear. For instance, in _Twilight of the Idols_, he writes: “Are we harming virtue, we immoralists? – Just as little as anarchists _harm_ princes. Princes sit securely on their thrones only after they've been shot at. Moral: _morality must be shot at_.” This saying seems to suggest that Nietzsche criticized and attacked traditional virtue and (...) morality in order to consolidate and strengthen them. In the article, I provide an interpretation of this saying and, in the course of it, approach Nietzsche’s reconceptualization of virtue and morality more generally. (shrink)

Language and languages; linguistics; Arabic language; sufism.

Umûr-ı ‘âmme, küllî ilim denilen metafiziğin meselelerinin işlendiği kavram ve konulara giriş başlığıdır. Genel konular, genel durumlar, genel kavramlar gibi anlamlara gelen bu başlık, müteahhirûn dönemi kelâmının mütekaddîmûn dönemi kelâmından farklılaşmasına sebep olan en ayırt edici özelliklerin başında gelir. Çünkü kelâm ilmi, Kindî, Fârâbî ve İbn Sînâ gibi İslam filozoflarının temsil ettiği Meşşâî felsefeyle etkileşimi neticesinde bu konuları tevârüs etmiştir. Fahreddîn er-Râzî’den önce kelamcılar eserlerinde mevcûd, ma‘dûm, kadîm, muhdes, şey gibi genel isim ve sıfatlar olmaları cihetiyle yer verilen bazı kavramları (...) dağınık bir şekilde veyahut bir başlığa konu olmadan ele almışlardır. Umûr-ı ‘âmmeyi kendinden önceki birikimi de kullanarak kelâm-felsefe ilişkisine dayalı mezcedilmiş bir yöntem ve özgün bir içerikle ilk defa müstakil bir başlık olarak ele alan Râzî, umûr-ı ‘âmmeye kelâm ilminde önemli bir statü kazandırmıştır. Zira varlık, yokluk, mevcûd, ma‘dûm, mahiyet ve eklentileri, birlik, çokluk, zorunluluk, imkân, imkânsızlık, hudûs, kıdem, cevher, araz, illet ve ma‘lûl gibi soyut ve genel kavramların incelendiği bu başlık, Râzî’den sonraki kelamcılar tarafından yeniden ele alınmış ve eserlerinin başlangıç konuları haline gelmiştir. Nitekim ondan sonraki kelamcılar büyük oranda onun umûr-ı ‘âmme inşa ve düzenine uymuşlar veya oradan hareketle yeni bir tertip faaliyetinde olmuşlardır. Ayrıca onun çizdiği çerçeveye ek olarak umûr-ı ‘âmmeyi farklı şekillerde ve farklı açılardan tanımlamaya çalışmışlar ve beraberinde birtakım tartışmalara yer vermişlerdir. Umûr-ı ‘âmme kapsamında yer verilen kavramların umûr-ı ‘âmmeye hangi açıdan dâhil edildiği ya da hangi açıdan umûr-ı ‘âmmede inceleme (bahs) konusu yapıldığı, bu tanımlama çabalarının neticesinde oluşan tartışmalardan biridir. Söz konusu bu tartışma, bahsi geçen kavramlar silsilesinde bulunan mahiyet, imkânsız, yokluk gibi kavramlar etrafında gerçekleşmektedir. Tartışmaya konu olan bu kavramlar arasında özellikle yokluk kavramı başı çekmektedir. Bunun sebebi varlık kavramının hem en genel kavram olması hem de diğer kavramlarla olan ilişkisi nedeniyle umûr-ı ‘âmme içerisinde en çok yer verilen kavramlardan biri olmasıdır. Onun bu önemi kendisiyle birebir ilişkisi olan yokluk kavramını ön plana çıkartmıştır. Bu tartışmalar içerisinde yokluk kavramı bazen tek başına bazen imkânsızlık kavramıyla beraber bazen de dolaylı yoldan imkânsızlık kavramı üzerinden irdelenmiştir. Hatta öyle ki zamanla yokluk kavramının umûr-i ‘âmme içerisinde ne sebeple dâhil edileceği ve değerlendirileceği tek başına incelenen bir tartışmaya dönüşmüştür. Bu bağlamda çalışma, umûr-ı ‘âmmenin kavramsallaşma sürecine değindikten sonra, umûr-ı ‘âmmeyi farklı şekillerde tanımlayan filozof ve kelamcıların yokluk kavramını umûr-ı ‘âmmede inceleme biçimlerini ele alacak ve yokluğu umûr-ı ‘âmmeye hangi açıdan dâhil ettiklerini tespit etmeye çalışacaktır. (shrink)

There are numerous studies on the esoteric sects in Islam. Though in these studies they have been discussed from different respects, none of them draws attention to the place and importance of the theory of shadows (aẓilla) in the esoteric sects. In this article, after the identification of the meaning of the theory of shadows, it has been argued that the concept of shadows has a central role in understanding the esoteric system of thought. In this context, it has been (...) tried to reveal the central effect of the theory of shadows on the basic ideas of esoteric sects. -/- SUMMARY There are numerous studies on the esoteric sects in Islam. Though in these studies they have been discussed from different respects, none of them draws attention to the place and importance of the theory of shadows (aẓilla) in the esoteric sects. In this article, after the identification of the meaning of the theory of shadows, it has been argued that the concept of shadows has a central role in understanding the esoteric system of thought. In this context, it has been tried to reveal the central effect of the theory of shadows on the basic ideas of esoteric sects. The theory of shadows can be defined as the reflection of the shadows or non-material beings, which appear in the divine world, in this world in a material form. The origins of this view go back to the Plato’s theory of ideas that he formulated as ideas and forms and to his allegory of cave that he used to explain this theory. This theory which was formulated and developed by the pre-Islamic various religious and philosophical traditions took an Islamic form through the bāṭinī/esoteric schools. The theory of shadows was first developed by the extremist groups of shiʿa. Though the early classical works referred the theory of shadow to the extremist shiʿas, they do not give any detail thereof. Nevertheless, it is possible to find in some views of theirs and in the esoteric sects such as Ismailites, Nusayrites, Druzes and Yazidites some clues about the character of this theory. In addition, the later works like Kitāb al-Haft wa al- ʾAẓilla directly articulating the theory of shadows were composed. Although the theory of shadows was not mentioned sufficiently in the works produced within the bāṭinī/esoteric circles, it is witnessed that their understandings of religion were based, to a large extent, upon the theory of shadows. The most basic feature of this unnamed understanding is the claim that every being in the divine world has been reflected in this world in a material form. Since the essence of God generally was kept out from the manifestation (tajallī), reflection was not started with his essence. However, the first beings emanating from Almighty Creator brought the divine world into being and that world was reflected to this world in a material form. With this perception, a Gnostic understanding was developed that the material has no reality and the ultimate reality should be sought in the non-material. According to this, the material beings consisting of only reflection of reality are not possible to have an ultimate reality. The only truth is the meaning, inner (bātin) or shadow which reflects to the world in a material form. Naturally what a bāṭinī should do is to seek the non-material ultimate truth hidden behind the material form. The theory of shadows in this point argued compulsorily the distinction of ẓāhir-bātin (outer-inner). Accordingly, ẓāhir consists of a shell or reflection in which hides the truth. The duty one should do is to go beyond the outer meaning of religious text and to get the inner truth hidden behind the outer meaning. The theory of shadows made a dualist view point obligatory, because every being has an inner aspect which includes the truth and an outer respect in which the ultimate truth is reflected in a material form. God has the inner attributes through which the truth appears spiritually and material attributes to which they are reflected. Universe has a dualist character, a spiritual universe consisting of non-material realities and material universe consisting of its reflections. Human beings have a dualist character, a soul belonging to the divine world and a body belonging to this world. Religious texts which were sent for the salvation of mankind also have two aspects, the inner (bāṭin) belonging to the divine world and the outer (ẓāhir) belonging to this world. Since the Bāṭiniyya considered the divine world to be composed of sevenfold and each fold to be a divine being, they sought, as a result of the theory of shadow, to find in the material world the counterparts or reflections of these beings. Even if their names show differences, the bāṭinī/esoteric groups regarded in certain times some figures as the reflections of the divine world in the material world. Divine beings called al-ʿAql al-Kullī (the Universal Intellect), al-Nafs al-Kullī (the Universal Soul), al-Kalima, Sābiq and Tālī were reflected in the world as the material forms like the Prophet Muhammad, Ali, Salman al-Farisī, Miqdāt b. al-Aswad, Ammār b. Yāsir. This understanding resulted in the divinization of some figures in the world, because it was held that through the manifestation these figures differ from the ordinary people, thus having some divine features. These figures gaining a bipolar identity were outwardly human beings, while inwardly regarded as the forms of divine beings reflected in the world. In this point, what the other people should do is to comprehend, with reference to the figures and their forms, the divine truth reflecting them. This approach brought about a religious understanding in which an individual salvation was not possible and some figures were perceived as charismatic leaders. As a result, the religious understanding developed by the Bāṭiniyya schools is under the ultimate influence of the theory of shadows. With reference to this theory, they developed a new understanding of Islam called Esotericism. At the core of this perception lies the theory of shadows and dualism as its inseparable part. In this sense, Esotericism represents a religious understanding developed in this direction and having a wholeness and deepness. In order to understand this religious understanding correctly, the theory of shadows must be taken into consideration and the esoteric texts be read in this direction. This kind of way of reading, in which the outer is seen as the unique reality, fails to realize the duality behind it, will not enable us to comprehend the inner wholeness of Esotericism and cause to see it as a mass of contradictions. (shrink)

Following Avicenna, many Muslim philosophers and logicians have identified ‘intellectual universal’ (kullī ʿaqlī) with the very mental concept dependent on mind. Apart from the controversies about Platonic Forms, they argue that they cannot be the very universals in logic. Accordingly, Mullā Ṣadrā’s commentators have interpreted his view on intellectual universal in the Avicennian framework. In this interpretation, Mullā Ṣadrā has embraced Avicenna’s explanation about mind-dependent universal concepts; however, he has modified some details of the issue as per his theory of (...) the primacy of existence and Plato’s theory of Forms. Having explained Sabzawārī and Ṭabāṭabāʼī’s interpretation of Mullā Ṣadrā’s view in his article, the author goes to propose a different interpretation according to which intellectual universals are identical with Platonic Forms, rather than the mind-dependent universal concepts. This Platonic interpretation is supported by three sets of evidences from Mullā Ṣadrā’s own texts. It also shows how Mullā Ṣadrā has answered Avicenna’s objection about the use of Platonic universal in logic. (shrink)

İhvân-ı Safâ, X. yüzyılda yaşayan, yazdıkları Resâilu İhvâni’s-Safâ adlı dinî ve felsefî içerikli eserleriyle tanınan, ilk İslam felsefecileri arasında yer alan bir grup düşünürün ortak ismidir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, din ile felsefeyi uzlaştırmaya çalışan İhvân-ı Safâ’nın Faal Akıl teorisini değerlendirmektir. Sudûr teorisini benimseyen İhvân-ı Safâ’ya göre insani akıl ve Faal Akıl olmak üzere iki tür akıl vardır. Zorunlu varlık olan Yüce Yaratıcı, varlık âlemini, kendi nurundan taşırarak var etmektedir. Aynı zamanda planlı ve programlı bir yaratma fiili olan taşırma (feyezan) eyleminde (...) doğrudan Tanrı’nın nurundan taşırılan tek varlık, Faal Akıl’dır. Onun üzerinden taşırılan feyiz ile sırasıyla Küllî Nefs, ilk heyûlâ, tabiat ve cismânî âlem yaratılmıştır. İnsani nefisler de bu feyzin ürünü olarak Küllî Nefs’ten taşmaktadır. İnsani nefsin bir yetisi, hatta kendisi olan insani akıl, Küllî Nefs ve Faal Akıl vasıtasıyla Yüce Yaratıcı’nın feyzinden pay almaktadır. Dolayısıyla maddeden bağımsız, nûrânî bir cevher olan Faal Akıl, Yüce Yaratıcı ile diğer varlıklar arasındaki asıl vasıtadır. (shrink)

İbn Arabî’nin Fusûsü’l-hikem’in Âdem Fassı’nda yer verdiği umûr-ı külliye kavramı, Fusûs şârihleri tarafından muhtelif şekillerde alımlanmıştır. Kimi sufîler bu kavramı küllilere kimisi de zihnî varlık tartışmalarına hasretmek suretiyle ele alma taraftarı olmuştur. Yakın dönemde yapılan araştırmalar bunun izinden giderek söz konusu kavramla külliler tartışması arasında irtibat kurmaya çalışmaktadır. Biz bu çalışmamızda, Meşşâî felsefe geleneğinde metafiziğin ilm-i küllî kısmının temel meselelerine karşılık gelen umûr-ı âmme kavramı ile Fusûs’da yer alan umûr-ı külliye arasında bir irtibatın imkânını sorgulayacağız. Bunu yaparken özellikle ilk şârih (...) Cendî’nin umûr-ı külliyeyi umûr-ı âmme kavramı ile karşılamasından hareket ederek bu bakış açısının sonraki dönem şârihleri arasında nasıl yankı bulduğunu Afîfüddin Tilimsânî, Abdürrezzâk el-Kâşânî, Davud el-Kayserî, Sâinüddin İbn Türke, Yazıcıoğlu Mehmed Efendi, Molla Câmî gibi düşünürlerin yorumları eşliğinde ele alacağız. Bu bağlamda umûr-ı külliyenin Tanrı ile âlem arasındaki irtibatı kurma-daki metafiziksel yönü ve ikinci akledilirler olarak değerlendirilmesi gibi on-tolojik ve epistemolojik cihetleri dikkate alınarak, umûr-ı âmme kavramı etrafında yapılan tartışmalarla benzer yönleri ortaya konulmaya çalışılacaktır. Bu sayede söz konusu yorum ve benzerliklerden yola çıkarak, bu kavram çiftinin, dile getirildikleri düşünce geleneklerinin yakınlaşmasına bir zemin teşkil edip etmeyeceği tartışılacaktır. (shrink)

İslâm geleneğinin en akılcı fırkası kabul edilen Mu‘tezile’nin özellikle Kur’an kıssaları çerçevesinde tefsirlerde yer bulan israilî rivayetler karşısındaki tutumu merak uyandırıcıdır. Bazı çalışmalarda kimi Mu‘tezilî müfessirlerin isrâiliyyât karşısındaki tutumuna değinilse de İsrâilî rivayetlerin tenkidi söz konusu olduğunda Mu‘tezile’nin bir ekol olarak tutumu herhangi bir araştırmaya konu edilmemiştir. İsrâiliyyât üzerine yapılan son çalışmalarda isrâiliyyât eleştirisinin İbnü’l-Arabî öncesinde Tûsî, Mâverdî hatta Mâtürîdî gibi isimlere kadar geri götürülebileceği söylenirken tamamen Sünnî ve Şiî müfessirler üzerinden bir okuma yapılmakta Mu‘tezilî müfessirlerin görüşlerine yer verilmemektedir. Oysa (...) bu çalışmalarda bahsedildiği üzere erken dönem isrâiliyyât eleştirilerinin genelde ismet meselesi ekseninde yapılması, Mu‘tezilî müfessirler özelinde bir incelemeyi zorunlu kılmaktadır. Nitekim isrâiliyyât eleştirisinde ön plana çıkartılan Mâtürîdî (ö. 333/944, Mâverdî (ö. 450/1058), Tûsî (ö. 460/1067), İbnü’l-Arabî (ö. 543/1148) ve İbn Kesîr (ö. 774/1373) gibi Sünnî ve Şiî müfessirlerden önce Ebû Bekir el-Esam (ö. 200/816), Ebû Alî el-Cübbâî (ö. 303/916) ve Ebû Müslim el-İsfahânî (ö. 322/934) gibi Mu‘tezilî isimler tarafından isrâiliyyât eleştirisinin yapıldığı görülmektedir. Her ne kadar onlar eserlerinde isrâiliyyât kavramını kullanmasalar da bu eleştirileri bazen rivayetlerin kaynağına bazen de içeriğine yöneltmektedir. Daha sonraki Mu‘tezilî âlimlerin de belli âyetler üzerinden bu eleştiriyi sistematik olarak devam ettirdikleri söylenebilir. Çalışmada öncelikle hicrî 2-6. asırda yaşamış el-Esam, Ebû Ali el-Cübbâî, Ebû Müslim el-İsfahânî, Kâdî Abdülcebbâr (ö. 415/1025), Cüşemî (ö. 494/1101) ve Zemahşerî (ö. 538/1144) gibi müfessirlerin, israiliyata bakışına odaklanılmaktadır. Söz konusu müfessirlerin farklı israilî rivayetler karşısındaki tutumu betimsel analiz yöntemiyle değerlendirilmektedir. Ayrıca aynı dönemdeki Sünnî müfessirlerin bu rivayetlere yaklaşımına da atıfta bulunulmaktadır. Mu‘tezilî müfessirlerin isrâiliyyâta yaklaşımı ele alınırken; onların bu rivayetleri reddetmeleri, isrâilî rivayetleri yorumsuz aktarmaları, aklî yorumu isrâilî rivayetlere tercih etmeleri ve isrâiliyyâtla âyetleri tefsir etmeleri gibi farklı yaklaşımlar hususunda ayrıma gidilmektedir. Mu‘tezilî müfessirler eserlerinde birçok İsrâilî rivayet aktarsa da özellikle tefsir geleneğinde sorunlu bazı rivayetlerin te’vilinde eleştirel yaklaşımın ilk örneklerinin onlardan gelen tefsirlerde olduğu söylenebilir. Bu bağlamda çalışmada klasik dönemde isrâiliyyat eleştirisinde Mu‘tezilî müfessirlerin öncü olduğu, özellikle ismet-i enbiyâ ve ismet-i melâike ile ilgili bir takım rivayetlerin eleştirisinin ilk önce Mu‘tezilî müfessirlerle başladığı sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Yine Mâtürîdî, Mâverdî ve Tûsî gibi Sünnî ve Şiî müfessirlerin kimi yerlerde söz konusu rivayetleri eleştirirken Mu‘tezilî isimlere referansta bulunmasına da dikkat çekilmiştir. Son olarak Mu‘tezilî müfessirler, küllî bir isrâiliyyât eleştirisi yapmasalar da bazı yerlerde söz konusu rivayetleri “Yahudi uydurması ve Tevrat kaynaklı” olarak tanımlamaktadırlar. Bu da onların referans noktaları kendi kelâmî anlayışları olmakla birlikte rivayetleri kaynak açısından da eleştirdiklerini ortaya koymaktadır. Nitekim sistematik bir isrâiliyyât münekkidi olan İbn Kesîr de Peygamberlerin ismetiyle bağdaşmayan kimi rivayetlere tefsirinde yer vermeksizin reddettiği görülürken mucizevî olayları abartılı şekilde resmeden bazı isrâilî rivayetleri yorumsuz aktarmaktadır. Dolayısıyla Mu‘tezilî isimlerin İslâm inancıyla bağdaşmayan isrâilî rivayetlere erken dönemde eleştirel yaklaşması ve bunları nazara itibara almaması kayda değer bir tutumdur. (shrink)

jild-i 1. [Without special title] -- jild-i 2. Shāmil-i mustadrakāt va muṣṭalaḥāt va kullīyāt-i falsafah -- jild-i 3. Ilāhiyāt -- jildi 4. Ilāhiyāt bi-maʻnī-i akhaṣṣ -- jild-i 5. Dar Ilāhiyāt bi-maʻnī-i akhaṣṣ.

İdrak ve niteliği felsefenin en önemli problemlerinden biridir. İbn Sînâ hissî, hayalî, vehmî ve aklî olmak üzere dört farklı idrak mertebesi dillendirir. Buna göre insan nefsi nesnelerin suretlerini duyu yetileriyle algılar. Daha sonra bu suretleri hayal yetisine teslim eder. Akabinde akıl bu sureti barındırdığı maddî eklentilerden arındırarak aklî suretlerin oluşumu için gerekli zeminleri hazırlar. Daha sonra faal akıl insan nefsine aklî suretleri verir. İnsan zihninde duyularla algılanan bu kavramlardan başka kavramlar da vardır. Bu küllî kavramların yeri nesnel âlem değil öznel (...) âlemdir. İslam felsefesi geleneğinde Fârâbî ilk defa bu ayırımı yapar ve ma‘kūlleri birinci ve ikinci ma‘kūller diye iki kısma ayırır. İbn Sînâ da bu sınıflandırmayı benimser ve konu hakkında yeni açıklamalar getirir. İbn Sînâ, ikinci ma‘kūllerin sonraki dönemlerde yapılan felsefî ve mantıkî ayırımını her ne kadar dillendirmese de eserlerinden bu iki ma‘kūl türünün farklılığına teveccüh eder. Bu çalışmada İbn Sînâ felsefesinde idrak olgusunun gerçekleşme niteliği ele alınacak ve daha sonraki dönemlerde dillendirilen ikinci felsefî ma‘kūl anlamların İbn Sînâ felsefesindeki yeri açıklanacaktır. (shrink)

al-mujallad 1. Rasāʼil fī ḥaḍārat al-buʼs. Rasāʼil fī mabādiʼ al-ḥayāh -- al-mujallad 2. Taʼammulāt fī al-ḥayāh al- nafsīyah. Dirāsāt fī al-mithālīyah al-insānīyah -- al-mujallad 3. al-Ma[b]daʼ al-kullī. al-Māddah wa-al-rūḥ, taʼlīf jadīd.

Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism have a different position in the ancient philosophy tradition. The reason for this is the eclectical structure of Pythagoreanism which has syncretized from Orphism, Indian and Egyptian religions with philosophy. Orphism of these religions is especially important for affecting Pythagoreanism the most and giving to the ancient Greek religion a mystical content. Orphism which is a mystery cult is based on Orpheus, the poet, who sometimes is identified with Pythagoras in philosophy and the history of religions. Orpheus, (...) was attributed divine character by virtue of his beautiful voice and hymns in the ancient history, has brought many religious and philosophic elements such as reincarnation and unity with God to the Greek religion. The way of life and creeds of Orphism based on asceticism and wisdom, first affected Italian philosophy starting from Pythagoras and, later influenced both philosophy and the other religions such as Judaism and Christianity through Plato. The reason for this was the Orphism’s stronger theological structure than the Greek religion had. Thus, philosophy, the Miletus philosophers tried to purify from the Homeric religion, has regained some spirituality through Orphism and Pythagoras. Pythagoras, a philosopher and a religious leader, accepted students to his philosophy school by initiation in Crotone. In this way, Pythagoreanism gained the quality of both a school of philosophy and a community of mystery. In this school, Pythagoras constituted a strong natural philosophy based on the idea of arkhe consisting of numbers, and the system of mathematics and music. At the same time, for he was a religious leader, Pythagoras used his school both to teach philosophy and to celebrate the teletaic mystery rituals of Orphism. According to the Pythagoreans, as a master, Pythagoras has united with the spirit of Dionysos and has privileged to rise to the World-Soul of God. Due to this union, it has been believed that Pythagoras received revelations from Dionysos and knew the secrets of God’s spirit. Similarly, Pythagoras’ students of philosophy also joined these rituals. They, on the one hand, witnessed to the divine union of Pythagoras, on the other hand, experienced the communication with the subordinate gods, called daemons, allied to Dionysos. Through these mystical rituals in Pythagorean school, it was believed that the philosophical knowledge was not only a reasoning, but also a divine wisdom obtained from the divine word. Therefore, Pythagoreanism accepted that philosophy is from God and it is a way of life which rises the human to the divine level. According to Pythagoras philosophy, thinking about God is equal to dealing with natural philosophy. Because Pythagoreanism, that has a pantheistic belief in God, has acknowledged God and nature as the same. Additionally, the natural philosophy of the school was established on the Monad idea which has been accepted as the World-Soul. For Pythagoreanism, Monad is not a number, but it is the ONE as the source of all numbers and a theological principle. The ONE, which symbolizes God and the cosmic unity, brings into existence the life by limiting the chaos caused by the TWO. Similarly, the TWO, not a number but a principle, has been used in a positive sense in Anaximander and was called apeiron, meant “infiniteness”. But, for Pythagoras, infiniteness was a negative circumstance. For this reason, the TWO/Apeiron has been accepted as a female being which corresponds to limitless absence and evil. By Monad’s confinement the Apeiron had been passed into the cosmos, the cosmic harmony had been balanced and a spheric being had emerged. This is “unity” which corresponds with both the World Soul Monad and the nature in the Pythagorean philosophy. This study will discuss the notion of Monad which is known as the World-Soul and God in Pythagorean philosophy, from a perspective of the history of religions. In this context, the sources and knowledge of history of philosophy will be used by methods of the history of religions. Starting from Orphism, Monad will be discussed within similar mythical elements. Thus, the origin of the Pythagorean philosophy in ancient religions will be determined and the theological infrastructure will be shown. (shrink)

In this study, the preface and introduction of Ibn Juzay’s book at-Tasheel li ‘ulȗmi’t-tanzeel, have been examined in terms of his approach to style and methodology problems in commentary.Ibn Juzay, whose first works included useful topics and ashes; wrote two loyalties, a lexicon, later in which the meanings of the words frequently mentioned in the Qur'an were compiled; thus, he gave information about his style and methodology; In introduction of his book, he explained the underlying reasons to write his book (...) at-Tasheel. That his intention to do so, first of all is to reveal the importance of style and methodology in commentary and then to guide the reader on how to be read this concise work. In this context, he suggested some of the works of the classical commentary corpus, sometimes by giving a name, but in a more uncharacterized and criticism of how to overcome these suggestions about the problematic, so that he wanted to give a healthy perspective for those interested in academic commentary and plain readers. The importance of the article is also due here. In the article, a descriptive language is used in a style that is turned from the scientific personality to the conclusions of commentary; then a general evaluation has been made with an analysis-critic-axis approach. As a result, it has been determined that some commentators, especially the general principles regulating the science of commentary relations with other sciences, have some style and procedural errors. (shrink)

This article discusses the issue of arrangement /ordering of compulsory-comprehensive maqāsid. In this respect, the main purpose is to help clarify the ordering problem. To accomplish this task, the classical and contemporary studies on this subject were reviewed. Within the scope of this research, it has been determined that the universal principles are generally listed in the order of religion, nafs, mind, generation and property. However, alternative orderings can be found where the nafs is placed at the forefront. The focal (...) point of the ordering problem is emerges from the question of whether Allah's rights/otherworldly maqāsid should be priorities or servants' rights/worldly maqāsid. The conflict between religion, which is an otherworldly value, and other principles played an active role in this classification of maqāsid. Many legal scholars who placed religion in the first place in the classical period did not clearly explained the justification of their arrangement. Also, many of today's researchers also stated that religion should come first. The scholars who put both the religion and the nafs in the center have listed many evidence for their preference. The legal scholars who put religion at the center have pointed the verse " I have not created the jinn and men but they may worship Me" as the basis for their views. Accordingly, the main purpose of the creation of human being is to serve Allah. Because the most important right to be fulfilled is the right of Allah religion should take precedence over other virtues in maqasid. Religion is also the only essential way that leads to eternal happiness. According to the legal scholars who put religion into the center, other maqasid principles are secondary. Correlatively, other principles serve religion. The hadith "The debt to Allah is more worthy of being paid." has been made the basis. Since religion constitutes the essence of the maqāsid, it is also a requirement of reason to make religion essential. According to another reason they stated, the obligation of jihad also ensures that religion is at the center. The obligation of jihad causes lives to be sacrificed to protect the religion. This means that religion is superior to the nafs and other principles. Because jihad, which is the order of religion, is fard. The scholars who maintain that the rights of the servants should take precedence over the right of Allah have cited also a lot of evidence. We come across with their views presented as a weak view in the sources or as an answer to a possible question. There is no clear information about to whom these views belong. Therefore, it is stated that no one introduces the nafs to religion. As a matter of fact, it is stated that it is not correct to qualify these views as an independent view defended by scholars. In other words, the view putting the nafs at the center and the evidence to this preference at this point should be regarded as hypothetical. We are of the view that these claims of contemporary writers need to be proven. The basic reason of the views that puts the nafs in the center is based on the pre-acceptance that maslahahs like the nafs are the right of servants while religion is the right of Allah. The given reasons can be addressed under three main headings: punishments, mitigation of prayers, and concern with non-Muslims. In case where the rights of the servant and Allah unite, the rights of the servant should be preferred. Because, the rights of servants are on hardship, and the rights of Allah are on breadth and mercy. On the contrary to the rights of the servants, postponing or neglecting the right of Allah will not harm Allah. It is clear that if the rights of the servants face postponement, they will suffer serious damage. The fact that killing a man who both abandoned his religion and killed someone unfairly, not for his departure from religion, but for retaliation, that is, the right of a servant, is a concrete example of this. The shortening of the prayer during the journey, the patient’s abandoning standing in prayer and the fasting, and other examples also require the human to be in the center. Today, there are researchers who take the nafs to the center. The existence of religion for humans and society reflects the view of these researchers. Because it is clear that religion will remain dysfunctional where there is no human and society. When these evidences are examined carefully, it can be concluded that the opinion that defends the nafs to be at the center of comprehensive maqāsid is preferable. (shrink)