It is known that there are different concentrations of Muslims in European countries. However, Germany has a special importance in these countries due to the numerical excess of Muslims and the existence of our compatriots due to the economic migration from Turkey to Germany that started in the 1960s. For this reason, in our article, the educational activity carried out on Islamic theology, in particular kalam, in the example of Germany will be discussed. In Germany, Islamic religious (...) education departments were opened in three different universities to train teachers to teach Islamic religion in primary, secondary and high school schools, and to provide Imam education in order to eliminate the language and adaptation problems experienced by mosque officials coming from abroad. The process that started with Osnabrück University, Westfälische Wilhelm Münster University and Friedrich-Alexander University has progressed beyond the initial aim of training Islamic religion teachers with the seven universities reached today. In addition to the influence of the German Islamic Conference on the formation of the theoretical infrastructure of this process, the impact of the 2010 recommendation of the Scientific Committee is also known. The originality, scientific impartiality and conformity of Islamic Theology in Germany are the issues that are emphasized in the discussions. As a matter of fact, for this reason, the discussion of the science of of kalām in these centers is of particular importance in the debates. Because kalām is a science that shapes the understanding of religion and offers the opportunity to develop a correct intellectual perspective on religion. It is possible to say that the content of kalām in these centers and the studies carried out will affect the understanding of Islam that will emerge in Europe, especially in Germany, in the next century. For this reason, in our article, the study areas of theology professors in seven Islamic Theology centers and theses which they supervise will be discussed, on the other hand, researches, projects and collaborations that reflect the intellectual perspective of the Islamic Theology center will be highlighted. This article aims not only to criticize the said centers in Germany, but also to determine what kind of mutual contributions they might have with the theological accumulation in Turkey. As a matter of fact, it is obvious that the courses given, the theses managed and the fields of study will shape the future of Islamic theology in Europe, as well as having an impact on Islamic theology in Turkey given that today global scientific interaction is at the highest level. It is not possible to think the issues currently studied in Islamic Theology in Germany independently of the realities and needs of the country in which they flourish. As a matter of fact, although there are historical studies on Islamic theology schools, especially Maturidism, Ash'arism and Mu'taziliism, in different universities, the existence of studies on subjects that can be called “practical theology” draws attention. In addition, due to the fact that Germany creates a multi-religious and multicultural environment, it is seen that a supra-denominational approach is adopted and thus it is aimed to ensure a pluralism that allows different views. (shrink)

Newly accessible source material calls for a revision of our picture of the more technical transmission of sceptical epistemologies in the intellectual landscape of early Islam. Abū al‐Qāsim al‐Balkhīʼs (ninth/tenth century) Book of Doctrines shows that naẓar as the basic argumentative method of kalām is defined by the encounter with a broad spectrum of sceptical strategies. By the beginning of the tenth century, Greek traditions were amalgamated in a complex way with other intellectual traditions, most notably dualist ontologies. This (...) situation has shaped the evolution of kalām methodology decisively. Based on extensive paraphrases in Ibn al‐Malāḥimī (twelfth century) going back to Nawbakhtī (tenth century), it can be seen that arguments of the Greek sceptical tradition were accessible in Arabic in the early tenth century. The scarcity of coherent information on sceptical approaches before that time rather has to do with the problem that in general few sources of this earlier formative period of Islamic theology are preserved. Early Muʿtazilī treatises from this period are superseded by Ashʿarī texts in the later transmission. Sceptical approaches, being systematically involved in the very formation of early Muʿtazilī theology, are particularly invisible due to this process. (shrink)

This chapter examines various Islamic perspectives on natural theology, and briefly outlines the reasons why the philosophy of Ibn Rusdh does not represent a definition of natural theology in Islam. It then discusses varieties of natural theology and Islam; Kalām texts and revelation; al-Ghazālī's criticism of philosophers; Nizām al-Dīn al-Nīsābūrī's views on the reasoned study of nature; natural theology and religious obligations; Sharī'a and natural law; and reactions to Darwin in the nineteenth- and early (...) twentieth-century Near East. (shrink)

This article is about the place of kalām (theology) within the general structure of al-Fārābī's metaphysics. In this framework, the article consists of two parts. The first part examines the position of metaphysics within the framework of al-Fārābī's idea of perfection. In the second part, a close reading of al-Fārābī's al-Ibāna ʿan ġarażi Arisṭuṭālīs fī kitābi mā baʿda al-ṭabīʿa is made and al-Fārābī's approach to the theoretical aspect of theology within the theory of milla is analyzed. Since (...) al-Fārābī's theories of perfection and meaning are the theories that affect a major part of his philosophy, the article shows the effects of these two theories on al-Fārābī's analysis of metaphysics without examining their general position in al-Fārābī's philosophy. In this framework, the article examines the idea that al-Fārābī's metaphysics should be evaluated in view of the background of his theories of perfection and meaning, based on the secondary literature on the subject. As evidence for this claim, al-Fārābī's description of the philosophical sciences as the steps of intellectual perfection is shown in the article. The article emphasizes that al-Fārābī's evaluations of the relationship between kalām and metaphysics are based on the theory of perfection. A close reading of the relevant passages in Taḥṣīl al-saʿāda, Treatise on Intellect (Risāla fi-l ‘aql), and Kitāb al-Ḥurūf shows how al-Fārābī's theories of perfection and meaning form the background of his analysis of metaphysics through the philosopher's arguments. On the other hand, the article shows how al-Ibāna might be understood within al-Fārābī's metaphysical construct by showing the extensions of the theories of perfection and meaning in this work. For al-Fārābī, metaphysics, which constitutes the last step of intellectual perfection, is also the highest science. This process is indicated by the concept “al-naẓar al-ilāhī” (divine thinking/thought). In this framework, kalām cannot gain the title of metaphysics because it is a science that does not emerge in the course of intellectual perfection. In this article, this approach is justified by considering the relevant passages in al-Ibāna. Al-Fārābī's distinction between the science of divine oneness (tawḥīd) and metaphysics in this work has been a subject of debate among scholars. Regarding what al-Fārābī meant by the definition of universal knowledge, the article emphasizes that the relationship of metaphysics with the theories of perfection and meaning influenced al-Fārābī's approach to universal knowledge. In the last part of the article, al-Fārābī’s theory of milla is considered in the context of the theory of meaning. For this aim, the article suggests that al-Fārābī’s idea of milla as a copy or similitude of philosophy makes the science of kalām an intermediate science that acts between the verbal and the philosophical areas of meaning. (shrink)

Kalam philosophy, theological thought in Islam on postmodernism.

The latest in the series based on the popular History of Philosophy podcast, this volume presents the first full history of philosophy in the Islamic world for a broad readership. It takes an approach unprecedented among introductions to this subject, by providing full coverage of Jewish and Christian thinkers as well as Muslims, and by taking the story of philosophy from its beginnings in the world of early Islam all the way through to the twentieth century. Major figures like (...) Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides are covered in great detail, but the book also looks at less familiar thinkers, including women philosophers. Attention is also given to the philosophical relevance of Islamic theology (kalam) and mysticism--the Sufi tradition within Islam, and Kabbalah among Jews--and to science, with chapters on disciplines like optics and astronomy. The book is divided into three sections, with the first looking at the first blossoming of Islamic theology and responses to the Greek philosophical tradition in the world of Arabic learning. This 'formative period' culminates with the work of Avicenna, the pivotal figure to whom most later thinkers feel they must respond. The second part of the book discusses philosophy in Muslim Spain (Andalusia), where Jewish philosophers come to the fore, though this is also the setting for such thinkers as Averroes and Ibn Arabi. Finally, a third section looks in unusual detail at later developments, touching on philosophy in the Ottoman, Mughal, and Safavid empires and showing how thinkers in the nineteenth to the twentieth century were still concerned to respond to the ideas that had animated philosophy in the Islamic world for centuries, while also responding to political and intellectual challenges from the European colonial powers. (shrink)

This is a comprehensive study of the far-reaching changes that led to a re-shaping of the philosophical discourse in Islam during the sixth/twelfth century. Whereas earlier Western scholars thought that Islam's engagement with the tradition of Greek philosophy ended during that century, more recent analyses suggest its integration into the genre of rationalist Muslim theology (kalam). This book proposes a third view about the fate of philosophy in Islam. It argues that in addition to this integration, Muslim theologians picked (...) up the discourse of philosophy in Islam (falsafa) and began to produce books on philosophy. Written by the same authors, books in these two genres, kalām and philosophy, argue for opposing teachings on the nature of God, the world's creation, and on the afterlife. This study explains the emergence of a new genre of philosophical books called "hikma" that stand opposed to Islamic theology and at the same wishes to complement it. Offering a detailed history of philosophy in Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia during the sixth/twelfth century together with an analysis of the circumstances of practicing philosophy during this time, this study can show how reports of falsafa, written by major Muslim theologians such as al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), developed step-by-step into critical assessments of philosophy that try to improve philosophical teachings, and eventually become fully fledged philosophical summas in the work of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi (d. 606/1210). The book ends in a discussion of the different methods of kalam and hikma and the coherence and ambiguity of a Muslim post-classical philosopher's œuvre. (shrink)

There is a need for an extensive study on undergraduate students' attitudes towards the kalām course and its teaching process in the faculties of theology and Islamic studies, which are higher religious education institutions. In order to meet this need, a 30-item survey was prepared in a 5-point Likert structure that measures the attitude towards the kalām course. This questionnaire was applied to 1007 randomly selected undergraduate students studying in faculties of theology and Islamic (...) studies in Turkey in the 2021-2022 academic year. In this sample, 69.9% (N=704) of the participants were women, and 30.1% (N=303) were men. In the analyses made with the data obtained, it was seen that the questionnaire had a high incidence of internal consistency; and its suitability for factor extraction was calculated with the Bartlett Sphericity Test and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) sample adequacy test. The KMO value was 0.934, and the Chi-square value [X2= 8083,719 p. (shrink)

As a result of the developments in science and technology, humanity began to experience a digital transformation after the 19th century. With this digital transformation, it is seen that a serious change has occurred in human beings biologically, socially, and, more specifically, religiously. One could say that different trends have emerged at many points where human relations, the relationship of the human with the environment and with God are also affected. Among the most comprehensive and prominent of these trends is (...) transhumanism because of its aims for humanity and the world. Transhumanism, which views technology as the main point of reference for the future of humanity, is also considered a cultural, social, and ideological human movement with its statements intended for society. It considers immortality as a goal, along with such claims as improving welfare, extending human life, and wiping out diseases by using technology in every aspect of human life. Transhumanists, who claim that they can achieve immortality thanks to technology, argue that this will happen in two ways. The first is biological immortality. It will be achieved by eliminating all kinds of biological factors that lead to humans aging and death. The second is digital or virtual immortality, which is achieved by transferring human consciousness from the biological body to computer interfaces and installing it in any desired entity. This perspective must be critically examined as it can be considered an attempt to challenge death, which is the basic doctrine of classical religions. In the present study, human immortality, considered the most important claim made by transhumanists, is criticized within kalām, Islamic theology. Of course, transhumanists’ account of human immortality is impossible, according to kalām. It can be said that transhumanists view of immortal human can be considered in the category of created beings, which is defined in kalām as "the being created later and needs another being in order to exist and to continue its existence". Given that transhumanists base the idea of the immortal being upon biological healing or digital transmission, it is clear that both types of beings need someone else. Therefore, one could say that it would be more reasonable to define transhumanists’ notion of immortality as the act of prolonging human life. It is because the life of immortal beings, accepted as biological or digital entities, is shaped by many factors. If these factors disappear, so does the being. On the other hand, the attribute of immortality, which belongs to the eternal being only, according to kalām, must come from itself without needing any other being. Therefore, the notion of immortal being suggested by the transhumanists must be reexamined within kalām and be redefined as the extension of life. The redefined immortality as the extension of life hardly poses kalāmī (or theological) problems. In fact, Islam encourages using all types of tools and equipment to enable humans to have a healthy and blissful life. (shrink)

Theologians in some cases use the proof of miracle to prove the existence of God. This paper, surveying the relation of miracles to the proofs of the field, has intended to find the degree of miracle proof’s validity for the existence of God in Islamic and Christian theology. The conclusion would not only lead to the clearness of the real place of the proof and its usage but also help commentators to understand real meaning of the verses in (...) the field. In the paper, the nature of miracle is described in a religious approach at first and then, the usage of the proof of miracle in Muslim and Christian theologians’ works is studied. Finally, the usability of the proof and degree of its validity have been critically studied. (shrink)

Nazariyat, Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences, issued twice a year in English and Turkish (Nazariyat İslam Felsefe ve Bilim Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi), is a refereed international journal. It publishes original studies, critical editions of classical texts and book reviews on Islamic philosophy, kalām, theoretical aspects of Sufism and the history of sciences. The goal of Nazariyat is to contribute to the discovery, examination and reinterpretation of the theoretical traditions in the history of (...) class='Hi'>Islamic thought, by giving special attention to the post-classical period of it. **ISSN: 2148-8088 E-ISBN: 2547-9415**. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that al Ash'ari was a Theological Determinist whose position on free will and human responsibility was marred by his failure to distinguish between two senses of the word 'can' (yastati'u ). I also compare al Ash'ari's position with that of the Mu'tazilite thinker al Qadi 'Abd al Jabbar. I conclude that their positions may not have been so much opposed to each other as merely different. This, I suggest, should invite us to re evaluate the (...) nature and extent of the disagreement between the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites on the free will question. (shrink)

Abū Ishāq al-Ṣaffār was one of scholars of the Western Qarakhānids’ period who followed the Kalām thought of al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944). His theological works Talkhīs al-adilla and Risāla fī al-kalām, his method in kalām, and frequent reference to his works by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that al-Ṣaffār is a respected and authorative Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the kalām. By adding a long introduction to Talkhīs about the naming, importance, and religious (...) legitimacy of the science of kalām, Saffār asserted that the kalām should be learned. When systematical vindication of the science of kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the kalām among Ḥanafī-Māturīdīs. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation. Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania. In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists. His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- SUMMARY: Abū Ishāq Ibrahīm b. Ismāil Zāhid al-Ṣaffār al-Bukhārī is a scholar belonging to the Ḥanafī theological tradition which was improved by the contribution of Ḥanafī theologians who used thinking system of Abū Ḥanīfa (d. 150/767) as base and adopted Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d. 333/944) and his thoughts in historical process. The contents of his theological works Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd and Risāla fī al-Kalām, the method that he used, and references to his works made by Ottoman and Arab scholars indicate that he is an important Māturīdī theologian. The article focuses on his defense of the science of Kalām. -/- In Talkhīs al-adilla, there are two sections including the subject of naming, and importance and necessity of Kalām discipline. Here, the necessity of learning Kalām and its value are defended in detail. -/- Besides, rumors “Abū Ḥanīfa turned away from the science of Kalām in his doomsdays” and that “He prohibited to make occupation with Kalām completely” are evaluated. -/- When systematical vindication of the science of Kalām is examined, it is understood that al-Ṣaffār is the first theologian who reserved a private and voluminous part for defensing the Kalām among Ḥanafī Māturīdīs. Even if Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī, Abū al-Yusr al-Bazdawī (d. 493/1100) and Abū Muʿīn al-Nasafī (d. 508/1115) defend that the science of Kalām is not wrong for religion; yet, the vindication of Kalām does not take a place under a separate title and in a detailed manner in any of Māturīdī theologians works. -/- The method that al-Ṣaffār used when he is defending the science of Kalām, differs from strategy of Abū Ḥanīfa. While Abū Ḥanīfa has mentioned that there is a need for the science of Kalām under these new circumstances, al-Ṣaffār has defended theologians who were charged with being Ahl al-Bidaʿ, by trying to prove that the prophets especially the Prophet Ibrāhīm, even the Companions of the Prophet Muḥammad (Ṣaḥāba) and the Successors of the Companions (Tābiʿūn) scholars use their minds and make arguments in religious matters. In this respect, he emphasizes that the Qurʾān orders to think and discuss gently, not to be stay in silence: “And dispute with them, using what is best” (16.125-126). Therefore, he states that this discipline which took a mission to explain and defend the creed of Islam (ʿaqīda), cannot be characterized as an innovation (bidʿah) or illicit. -/- His vindication method can be defined as a more developed type of method that Abu’l-Ḥasan al-Ash’arī’s (d. 324/935) used in Risāla fī istiḥsān al-khawḍ fī ʿilm al-kalām. Even though he does not state its systematic, it can be understood that vindication of Kalām in al-Ṣaffār divides into three parts as of explanation, demonstration and refutation: -/- a) Explanation: Explaining the necessity and importance of the science of Kalām by giving information about its definition, names, value and place among other principles. -/- b) Demonstration: Revealing the religious basics of the science of Kalām from the Qurʾān, the Sunna of the Prophet Muḥammad, the Companions of the Prophet, and the Successors of the Companions thus specifying that it is legitimate for religion. -/- c) Refutation: Replying the claims having aim to weaken the value of Kalām principle and its religious legality. -/- Al-Ṣaffār describes ‘the science of Kalām’ as ‘Knowing the Real with the evidences which help to reach the absolute information’. By allocating the concept of 'Ḥaqq', he repeats the definition of Kalām as “it is to know God with certain evidences” in a part of his work, and “it is to know the principles of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) with certain evidences” in another part. He describes Kalām as “Knowing ḥaqq / God / uṣūl al-dīn by depending on evidence”, and tries to prove that it is wrong to consider a science which performs the stated duty, as illicit and abominable and thus turn away from it. -/- Al-Ṣaffār thinks that it is right to call this principle as ‘Kalām’ because of the certain evidences leading to the truth that this science has used. This thought was defended by other theologians as well. -/- For example, according to Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd al-Taftazānī (d. 792/1310) it seems like to say “This is the word (kalām), not the other knowings” by the way of the power of evidences used in Kalām.Thus, it is appropriate to give name Kalām for this science which based on certain evidences. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s explanations revealed in scope of vindication of the Kalām are adopted by some of following scholars. Ḥusām al-Dīn al-Sighnāqī (d. 714/1314) in his book called al-Tasdīd sharḥ al-Tamhīd fī qawāʿid al-tawḥīd quotes Saffâr’s explanations as the same. -/- Al-Ṣaffār indicates that the method told in the Qurʾān is to reply questions about religion, beliefs and rejection instead of remaining in silence. The duty taken on by Kalām is this vindication activity performed by the prophets whose examples are described in the Qurʾān and which is legal and demanded. His way of thinking and vindication of the Kalām resembles that of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī. Al-Māturīdī says, “Prophets and we were ordered to invite infidels to Islam. When this invitation happens, the respondents will ask for evidence and explanation, and discussion will be inevitable. Therefore, discussing and talking about subjects of Kalām is not objectionable”. -/- Thoughts of al-Māturīdī and al-Ṣaffār regarding the vindication of the Kalām were repeated by Nūr al-Dīn al-Ṣābūnī (d. 580/1184), and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) later. According to al-Ṣābūnī, the evidences put against deniers and especially the discussion made by the Prophet Ibrāhīm to defend his own belief, prove the legality of Kalām discipline. Likewise, according to al-Rāzī, the duty of Kalām is just an activity performed already in the Qurʾān and ordered to the prophets. At this point of view, since the prophets were leading to Kalām, banning this activity is nonsense. -/- According to al-Ṣaffār, the reason for why Abu Hanifa avoids his son Hammād from these discussions is that Abu Hanifa does not like discussions based on obstinate. Otherwise, it cannot be that Abū Ḥanīfa prohibits to learn Kalām and make discussion about Kalām. According to him, this behavior of Abū Ḥanīfa results from that people discussing with him are ignorant about the subject of Kalām, discussion turns to an obstinate, and coming to an end of discussion seems impossible. This comment of al-Ṣaffār is quoted in Miftāḥ al-saʿāda wa-miṣbāḥ al-siyāda by ʿIṣām al-Dīn Aḥmed b. Muṣṭafā Tashköprüzāde (d. 968/1561) and in Minaḥ al-rawḍ al-azhar fī sharḥ al-Fiqh al-akbar by ʿAlī b. Sulṭān Muḥammad al-Qārī (d. 1014/1606) as same as his words. -/- Al-Ṣaffār’s defending the science of Kalām shows that there were opposite thoughts against Kalām in the 4th/10th and 5th/11th centuries throughout in Transoxania.In this period Aṣḥāb al-Ḥadīth and Ikhwān al-Ṣafāʾ were the opposite fronts of Kalām. In addition, he was trying to go beyond the oppositions of Ḥanafī jurists (fuqahāʾ). Because some of the Ḥanafī jurists thought that Abū Ḥanīfa forsook occupation with the science of Kalām and even he prohibited his son to have interest in this discipline. But some of Ḥanafī theologians such as al-Māturīdī, al-Nasafī and al-Ṣaffār protested this thought which describes Abū Ḥanīfa as a banner for Kalām. -/- His vindication is consistent and has scholarly depth because it is able to be against a strong opposition. -/- His book Talkhīs al-adilla li-qawāʿid al-tawḥīd is a unique source in terms of containing vindication of the Kalām in detail and also influencing the approaches of the next period scholars. (shrink)

Many assumptions believe that classical Islamic theology is no longer relevant in the contemporary era, either because its discussion tends to be theocentric and far from the progress of humanism or because it is considered no longer relevant to answer contemporary issues such as secularism, pluralism, globalization, or neo-atheism. Departing from these problems, efforts have emerged for new readings of classical theology by paying more attention to the context and needs of the times. Among these efforts is (...) the renewal of theology by highlighting its methodological aspects, as was done by a contemporary Moroccan theologian and philosopher, Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This study attempts to describe and analyze the style of renewal of theology from the perspective of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān. This research is a character study using qualitative methods, in which the existing data is analyzed critically. This article shows that Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s style of renewal of ‘ilm al-kalām focuses on efforts to reform the methodology of classical kalam by reforming the method of dialogue science (munaẓarah) through contemporary linguistic and logical tools, rearranging analogy patterns (qiyas), and building a logic of kalam based on the principle’s logic and morality as well as the amalgamation of theoretical aspect and practical aspect. The significance of Ṭahā ‘Abdurraḥmān’s renewal in contemporary Islamic theology lies in the theorizing of concepts in classical theology with a contemporary approach as well as the construction of the methodology of contemporary Islamic theology to answer ever-evolving theological issues. (shrink)

Ash’arism, which emerged in the first quarter of the fourth century of Hijra, is a theological sect that has been accepted by the majority of hadith scholars throughout Islamic history. This fact, which has important consequences for the history of hadith, raises the question of the extent to which the hadith scholars belonging to the Ash’arite sect were interested in theology. This is because theology, which is considered an heretical innovation according to the traditional understanding of Ahl (...) al-hadīth, was severely criticised by hadith scholars representing Salafī thought and positioned as the opposite pole of hadith. Accordingly, Ash’arism could not escape from being the target of the anti-theological Ahl al-hadīth. However, this did not prevent the adoption of the Ash’arite sect by hadith scholars and the emergence of a group of Ash’arite hadith scholars who engaged in theology. Thus, from the fourth century of Hijra, Ash’arite theology, like other Islamic sciences, became a natural part of education and teaching activities. Andalusia and the Maghrib, one of the regions where the Ash’arite sect was widespread, provide a favourable ground for determining the place of theology in the scholarly life of the hadith scholars. The famous hadith scholars who lived in this region in the fifth and sixth centuries of Hijra are analysed in this study in terms of their affiliation with Ash’arism and their interest in the science of kalām. By analysing the education and training lives of the hadith scholars subject to the research, the details that highlight their Ash’arite identities were determined. Issues such as how the Ash’arite tradition was inherited by hadith scholars in the Western Islamic region, what roles hadith scholars played in the spread of the Ash’arite sect in this region, which books were most widely used by hadith scholars in the study of kalām, and which methods were used to read and transmit theological texts are clarified within the framework of available data. As a result, it was revealed that in the Western Islamic world of the fifth and sixth centuries of Hijra, the science of kalām was in great demand among the Ash’arite hadith scholars and that important texts of Ash’arite theology remained in circulation among hadith scholars through reading and transmission. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy in Islam by Frank GriffelRosabel AnsariFrank Griffel. The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy in Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. x + 651. Hardback, $135.00.In this monumental work, Frank Griffel provides a wide-ranging and methodologically diverse investigation into the nature and formation of philosophy in the Eastern Islamic world in the twelfth century. Griffel explores institutionally, biographically, and [End Page 502] textually (...) how philosophy continued to be practiced in the century following the death of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111), a time previously associated with the decline of philosophy in the Islamic world. The astonishing breadth of content is organized with great clarity into three principal sections: (1) “Post-classical philosophy in its Islamic context,” itself divided into three chapters covering the historical context, the meanings and conceptual frameworks of the two Arabic words for ‘philosophy’ (falsafa and ḥikma), and the relation of religious law to philosophy; (2) “Philosophers and philosophies: a biographical history of philosophy in the sixth/twelfth century Islamic East”; and (3) “The formation of ḥikma as a new philosophical genre,” which is subdivided into multiple chapters and subsections to examine key questions and methods of philosophy during this period. The book is encyclopedic in its scope. Researched over a ten-year period, it offers contributions to a vast array of issues, themes, and problematics that have been raised by modern and recent scholarship, both historical and philosophical. Instead of covering the book’s vast content in detail, this review will focus on one aspect of its argumentation.For this reviewer, the book’s most significant and exciting aspect is its metalevel discussions concerning the falsafa tradition (classical Arabic Aristotelianism) and its fate. From the outset, Griffel is careful to argue that philosophy in the Islamic world is much more than falsafa (10), and the reduction of the former to the latter is why Western scholars for so long thought philosophy found its demise after the fateful blow Ghazālī leveled against the practitioners of falsafa. The conflict was not, however, one of faith versus reason. Rather, Griffel surmises, it was a question of two competing perspectives concerning God’s relation to the world: an impersonal deity, or a creator-God. Both positions were philosophical, and both sides understood themselves to be grounded in an interpretation of the Quran (10–13).Moreover, Griffel goes on to demonstrate that falsafa would be conceptualized and discussed as a quasireligion with its own set of doctrines (80–94). It was not, therefore, synonymous with what we today call “philosophy,” but had the limited sense of one school of philosophy associated with Avicenna (d. 1037). The demise of self-identified practitioners of falsafa was not the demise of philosophers; it was the demise of a term that was associated with a particular school that had been discredited for its slavish imitation, as well as the moral shortcomings and impiety of its principal exponent, Avicenna.Yet Griffel’s principal thesis is that irrespective of the decline in use of the term ‘falsafa’ as a self-description, its approach to the nature of God and the relation of God to the world remained and continued to be discussed in the rebranded discipline of ḥikma (“philosophy,” or more broadly, “wisdom”). In fact, Griffel shows that numerous theologians and philosophers wrote and discussed contradictory positions under the guise of different disciplines, composing texts in both kalām (rational theology) and ḥikma, chief among whom was Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210). A large portion of the book is devoted to documenting and unpacking this phenomenon. The value of this investigation lies not only in uncovering the ḥikma tradition and its continuity with falsafa, but in Griffel’s insistence on presenting the two textual traditions of ḥikma and kalām side-by-side as counterparts to philosophical questions, such as the principle of sufficient reason (524–41). The approach is rich in its demonstration of the philosophical stakes in both positions concerning, for example, the status of God’s will.In its conclusion, the book returns to the question of what counts as philosophy. Griffel argues that while... (shrink)

The question of how the relationship between metaphysics and theology should be understood is one of the main topics of debate on the agenda of philosophers and theologians from Aristotle (d. 322 BCE) to Avicenna (d. 428/1037), from Avicenna to the late Islamic theological tradition, and even to medieval Jewish and Christian thought. Avicenna criticized Aristotle for identifying metaphysics with theology and presented a new perspective on the relationship between those two disciplines. He argues that God is (...) not the subject but the goal of metaphysics, in other words — metaphysics is an ontological science in terms of its subject matter and a theological science in terms of its goal. In Islamic thought after Avicenna, the relationship between metaphysics and kalam continued to be one of the most heated topics of debate. Trying to explain the relationship between those two disciplines, thinkers such as Imam al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111), Shams al-Din Samarqandi (d. 702/1303), and Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani (d. 816/1413) made a distinction between “Islamic science and rational science” and argued that metaphysics is an intellectual science while kalam is a religious (Islamic) science. On the other hand, Siraj al-Din al-Urmawi (d. 682/1283), who dealt with the relationship between metaphysics and kalam in his treatise On the Difference between Metaphysics (God-Science) and Kalam, revised Avicenna’s approach and criticized theologians who tried to explain the problem in terms of the distinction between religious and rational sciences. The aim of this article is to analyze Avicenna’s and Urmawi’s views on the relationship between metaphysics and theology, taking into account the historical-problematic context of the issue. (shrink)

The common periodisation in Ash‘ari kalām is Ibn Khaldun's distinction between the early and late periods over al-Ghazālī. Although some consider this as an artificial and unrealistic periodisation, we do not think so. For, it is not possible to understand and make sense of the logic and necessity of periodisation without knowing what exactly distinguishes these periods from each other and what kind of great differences and changes occurred in the latter period. The most important factor that distinguishes the (...) theological activities of the two periods is undoubtedly the Peripatetic philosophy that left its mark on the second period. The direct relationship established by the Ash‘ari theologians of the late period with philosophy has been the source of many changes in theology. These changes have manifested themselves in many areas from the understanding of method in theology to the theory of definition, from the use of evidence to the theories of nature, intellect and soul, most importantly from the notion of the Omnipotent God (al-Fā‘il al-Mukhtār) to the metaphysics of possibility-necessity, and from the cosmology of substance-accident to al-umūr al-‘āmma as the main subject-matter of metaphysics. Finally, the changes in the process that started with al-Ghazālī and evolved with Fakhruddīn al-Rāzī brought theology to the brink of philosophization, and at the end of the process, theology turned into a universal (metaphysical) discipline. This situation naturally led to a convergence between the metaphysical thought and theological thought. It is one thing to say that theology is the most honourable and supreme science, and it is another to reveal that it is universal. In this context, al-Ghazālī declared and substituted the Islamic theology as a religious universal discipline for the first time. Actually, this substitution has a hidden philosophical/metaphysical meaning and message. Al-Ghazālī 's characterisation of theology as a universal science can also be interpreted as a challenge to both the sciences of the field it belongs to and the sciences outside itself, with its disciplinary encompassing and priority for theology. It should not be forgotten that theology, while confronting and coming to terms with philosophy and metaphysics, integrating with the subjects it has taken into the field of study, on the other hand, it has to maintain and protect the religious character it belongs to and represents. (shrink)

Bu makale, Ebu’l-Muʿîn en-Nesefî’nin peygamberliğin aklî olarak gerekçelendirilmesine yönelik ortaya koyduğu rasyonel argümanlarını ele almaktadır. Makale, tartışmaya en-Nesefî’nin peygamberlik kavramından ne anladığını ele alarak başlar ve onun tarafından kavramın lügavî, felsefî ve kelâmî anlamlarına dair sunulan görüşler tasnif edilir. Ardından, en-Nesefî’de nübüvvetin, aklî açıdan mümkün ve Allah’ın hikmeti açısından vâcib olmak üzere, iki farklı kategorik açıdan ele alınışı işlenir. En-Nesefî nübüvvetin hem aklen mümkün oluşuna hem de onun Allah’ın hikmeti gereği gerekli oluşuna dair birçok argüman sunar. İnsan aklının bilgiye ulaşma (...) kapasitesinin sınırlı oluşu, dini bilginin açık ve sarih bir şekilde ortaya konulmasının gerekliliği ve yine gelecek nesiller için bu bilginin korunmasına ve depolanmasına duyulan ihtiyaç peygamberlik müessesesinin makul, mümkün ve gerekli oluşuna dair çok değerli iç görüler sunar. En-Nesefî’ye göre “yıldızların ilmi veya bilgisi” ve tıp bilimine dair insanlığın sahip olduğu malumat, yine insanların yaşamlarını devam ettirebilmeleri için gerekli olan kimi sanat ve zanaatkarlığa dair önemli bilgilerin öğrenilip bu güne aktarılmış olması peygamberlik müessesesinin tarihte gerçekleşmiş bir vakıa olduğunu gösteren aklî çıkarımlardandır. Dahası en-Nesefî’ye göre insanlar arasındaki ilk dil de bir peygamber tarafından öğretilmiş ve diğer diller bu ilk dilden türemiştir. Makalenin ikinci kısmı, en-Nesefî’nin nübüvvet iddiasında bulunan birinin iddiasının geçerli olup olmadığına dair sunduğu kriterler ya da kıstaslar üzerine yoğunlaşır. En-Nesefî peygamberlik iddiasında bulunan birisinin iddiasını temellendirmesinin en etkili yolunu mucize olarak görür. Ardından mucizenin tanımına ve onun kelâmî ve felsefî gelenekler içerisinde nasıl anlaşıldığına dair bazı açıklamalar yapar ve mucizenin sıhhatine dair şartları tartışır. Örneğin mucizeler, becerilerini mükemmelleştirmek için yıllarını harcamış sihirbazlar tarafından gerçekleştirilen illüzyonlardan veya sihir numaralarından ayrılır. Bu kişiler, el çabukluğu kullanarak olağanüstü görünen numaralar sergileyebilirler çünkü onlar göz yanılması sayesinde izleyicileri aldatmaya yönelik zengin bir deneyim ve uzmanlığa sahiptirler. Bununla birlikte, daha yakından incelenip derinlemesine düşünüldüğünde, illüzyon numaralarının ardındaki nedenler keşfedildikçe, hilelerinin gizemi ve gücü yavaş yavaş azalır. Fakat, mucizeler araştırıldıkça ve üzerine düşünüldükçe giderek daha kesin ve güçlü hale gelirler. Sonuç olarak en-Nesefî’ye göre sadece entelektüel bir Tanrı anlayışı ya da inancı kişiyi din tarafından müjdelenen mutluluğa ulaştırmak için yeterli değildir. Kişinin dünya üzerindeki varlığını tatmin edici bir anlama (hikmet) bağlayabilmesinin, yine hem bu dünyaya hem de öbür dünyaya dair menfaatlerinin farkında olup onları elde etmeyi öğrenmesinin yegâne yolu peygamberlik müessesesidir. Özetle, bu makale, en-Nesefî’de nübüvvet kavramının kapsamlı bir analizini ortaya koyarak ve onun nübüvveti destekleyen rasyonel argümanlarını tartışarak, İslam düşüncesinde nübüvvet kavramının ve nübüvvete getirilen aklî savunuların daha derin bir şekilde anlaşılmasına katkıda bulunmayı ve yapılacak olan muhtemel modern aklî savunuların hangi hususlara odaklanması ya da mecralara yönelmesi gerektiğinin ipuçlarını ortaya koymayı hedeflemektedir. (shrink)

The Coronavirus pandemic has been ongoing for almost two years now. Not only did it surprise the whole world in the initial stages of its occurrence, but also the world left it in shock. Therefore, the instant solution strategies included complete lockdowns in order to prevent the spread of such a disease. However, as the lockdowns lasted longer, it generated negative psychological effects on people globally. This being the case, collective endeavors and efforts were performed, in the hope of achieving (...) a concrete solution in order to overcome the bad repercussions that seemed visible on societal levels, which of course, included religious aspects; and in some cases resulted in social separation as well as a dramatic rise in suicide rates. On the one hand, this caused a retraction from the religion and religiously oriented rituals, but on the other hand, it also made people turn more to religion as it provided a psychological relief from the heavy burdens of the pandemic. These psychological conditions had theological resonances that made already complicated issues even more complex. Among them, the nature of God’s actions and the human position in this matter can be given as examples. This article is an attempt to place and define the issue of the pandemics and plagues from the perspective of Islamic theology, in particular, to shed light on three main points. The first is the problem of pains and aches, and how it was mentioned in theological literaturey and discussed by Islamic theologians (Mutakallimūn), as the issue of pandemics and plagues indisputably fall under this matter. The second point tackles the problem of whether “such calamities as pandemics and plagues come from God's Decree, or not?”. The last point focuses on the issue of fatalism and tries to show whether the de facto acceptance that pandemics are from God’s Decree would require the servant to stop taking measures in response to them. To answer the questions at stake, this paper will focus on four different perspectives of the Mu’tazila, Ash‛arī s, Māturīdis, and Ahl al-Hadīth, by using a selective methodology and focusing on their prominent and pioneering theologians (Mutakallimūn) of these schools. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology by Ramon HarveyArnold Yasin Mol (bio)Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology. By Ramon Harvey. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 280, Hardcover £90.00, isbn 978-1-4744-5164-2.When can it be claimed that a certain discipline is doing something so new and innovative, that it can be labeled as such? Or when is something so new and innovative that (...) it can no longer bear its original label? Either case signifies a level of discontinuity or rupture with the old ways of doing things. This is the fate of modern Islamic theology, which goes by the name kalām jadīd, New Theology.The discipline of Islamic philosophical or dialectical theology, ʿilm al-kalām, acquired its distinct methodology and themes in the first two centuries of Islam, becoming the defining intellectual voice of the Islamic worldview. Responding both to the developed theologies of Christianity and Zoroastrianism and other religions and philosophies, as well as responding to inner theological disputes, it combined comparative theology, philosophy of religion, and dogmatics. It developed its own indigenous rationalism, and integrated and adapted other philosophical ideas and methods, especially those of Aristotle and Neoplatonism. Islamicate civilization generated many native philosophers, like al-Kindī (d. 873) and al-Fārābī (d. 951), but it was Ibn Sīnā (Latin: Avicenna, d. 1037) who literally overturned metaphysical thought in such a radical way that theologians, including Jewish and Christian, speak of theology as before and after his influence.During the 750 years after the "Avicennian turn" many new philosophies have arisen, but none challenged the metaphysics of the Abrahamic theologies as much as Kant. Kalām can, similar to Christian Neo-Scholasticism, ignore the Kantian turn by restating their confidence in Peripatetic and Avicennian/Thomistic metaphysics, or it can integrate and adapt to it. The Muslim voices that have tried the latter are few but they have garnered more attention over the years. One of the biggest challenges of Kantian thought are towards retaining the classical proofs of God's existence, but also the possibility of speaking meaningfully of any type of metaphysical existence apart from empirical experience. The Ottoman theologian Muṣtafā Ṣabrī (d. 1954) emphasized that the Islamic ideas of prophethood and the unseen spiritual realm (ʿālam al-ghayb) would not fit the minimalistic metaphysics of Kant, as many Muslim modernists started to reject the idea of miracles, angels, and life after death. [End Page 1]Kalām jadīd, or (post-)Kantian kalām, has therefore the interesting challenge to either reconfigure Kantian metaphysics so that it can sustain traditional Islamic ideas to a certain degree, or the other way around. This challenge is not new as, although Peripatetic and Avicennian metaphysics provided the basis for proofs of God's existence, it also problematized Abrahamic theism, prophethood and resurrection of the body. Kalām jadīd can therefore learn much from its discursive tradition on how to deal with those challenges, if one's intent is to salvage the classical Islamic worldview.To this end, Ramon Harvey's Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology presents itself as a work of kalām jadīd but also as challenging important aspects of the discursive tradition it is using. When a discipline crystalizes into a certain epistemology and critical method, it attains a level of foundationalism whereby it becomes a tradition which is self-explanatory. This gives it a reasoning and stability which can be passed on over the centuries through certain core ideas and texts. Harvey sees this as the main problem explaining "why the kalām jadīd movement has been underwhelming." The Kantian turn upends the post-Avicennian foundationalism of kalam, forcing it to become an "open theology" that is "characterised by a receptiveness to diverse sources in its theological structure, prioritising meaning above systematic, foundationalist proof" (p. 5). The challenges for which a new theology has to be constructed are, according to Harvey, the developments in mathematics, logic, analytical philosophy, the phenomenological movement, and quantum mechanics (p. 2). Reality, and thinking about reality, are not the same anymore.The function of kalām is... (shrink)

Purpose: Transcendent theosophy or as known as Al-hikmah al-Muta’aliyah is the third school of Islamic philosophy founded by Mulla Sadra, and is the result of reconciliation of previous Islamic thoughts. This school is based on three main principles, namely: intellectual-intuition, rational proof, and Islamic sharia. The purpose of this paper was to uncover the reconciliation model of transcendent theosophy in reconciling various schools of Islamic thoughts, namely: traditional normative thought of Islamic sharia (Al-Qur’an and Sunnah), (...) classical tradition of dialectical theology (Kalam science), Peripatetic Islamic philosophy, the teachings of Sunni Sufi represented by al-Gazali, Philosophy of Suhrawardi illumination, as well as the mystical thought of Ibn ‘Arabi. This paper is a text analysis research using qualitative-descriptive analysis methods, namely: identifying, understanding, and interpreting texts. The text is carefully and systematically described to clearly portray the synthetic model or reconciliation carried out by Mulla Sadra on several previous Islamic thoughts. The results of this study indicate that Mulla Sadra elaborated and harmonized various Islamic thoughts with “integrative-complementary” model, which embraced the construction of new Islamic philosophical thoughts known as “transcendent theosophy”. This paper suggests to conduct further studies to find a correct format in reconciling various schools of the recent Islamic understanding in order to eliminate the claim truth among Muslims. (shrink)

The issue of power has been addressed as part of human actions, which form the basis of the discussions of destiny in Islamic theology. Various schools of kalām have extensively discussed the issue of power throughout history. The locus of power is also one of the critical concerns that have been emphasized within these discussions. The schools of the Mu'tazila, al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī have put forward different perspectives on whether the locus of power exists or not and (...) where it exists if it does so. Mutazilites are known to be in agreement with the view that te human body is the substrate of power. On the other hand, However, they hold different views, not only on the exact locus of power in the body but also on its type. While some argue that the locus of power in the body is the organs, others claim that it is not the organs. The schools of al-Ashʿarī and al-Māturīdī accept that there is no locus for power and emphasize that power is created by Allah the moment it would initiate action. When these views of the kalām schools are considered within the framework of the data from the modern science of anatomy, it is seen that what modern science has to say on this issue concurs well with the Mu'tazilite view that the locus of power is the body and that it creates the action by managing the organs from a single center. This is because, when considered from the lens of anatomy, what is meant by the schools of kalām with “power” is electrical activity (stimulus) that activates the muscles. Therefore, scientifically considered, for any movement to occur, an electrical activity must first begin in the brain and be transmitted to the muscles via motor nerves. If there were no electrical activity in the brain, the muscles and energy that make up the human movement system would not be active, so movement would hardly take locus. Therefore, the claim made some of the Mu'tazili scholars that the power is in the organs is scientifically not valid. As for the debates on whether the power in different organs is the same or different in terms of its type, the views of the scholars who argue that they are the same genus are apparently correct. This is because the electrical activity, which we accept as power, spreads to the organs after it is formed in the brain. This implies that the power which activates the organs is of the same type. However, it can be said that Mu'tazila’s idea of the constant presence of power in its locus conflicts with modern scientific data. The views of al-Ash'arite and al-Maturidite schools that power is free from being in a constant location are compatible with the findings of recent experiments on brain activities. That is, some experimental studies have indicated that the electrical activity that creates an act occurs in the brain before the act itself and outside the will of the human. In brief, the view of Ash'arite and Maturidite scholars that power is not constantly present in the body and that it is created by Allah each time it is needed is compatible with the creation of power, which we define as electrical activity. (shrink)

In Islam, there is a belief that Allah has a ‘throne’ [al-ʿArsh, the highest level of the heavens] in the sky and that Allah sent the Qurʾān directly from that throne or through an angel. According to this belief, the Qurʾān descended from the seventh level of the heavens to the first level and then completed its descent to the earth in pieces over 23 years. Accordingly, the Qurʾān descended from a certain place with determined borders, namely from the throne (...) [al-ʿArsh] of Allah. However, theological books [the literature and sources of ʿılm al-Kalām] contend that Allah is free from space and time and that a specific space cannot be attributed to Allah. The verses of the Qurʾān even suggest that Allah is not only above in the heavens but everywhere. Therefore, the main question of our article is why Allah wanted to send the Qurʾān specifically from the heavens if Allah is free from space. We show that the descent of the Qurʾān from the heavens to the earth is not realistic but is a symbolic and metaphorical narrative. (shrink)

The present article discusses the Department of Kalam, its foundation, academic structuring, philosophy, and contribution to religious thought at the national and international level since the establishment of Ankara University Faculty of Divinity. The process regarding the field of Kalam since the establishment of Ankara University Faculty of Divinity in 1949 has been studied over two historical periods. The first is the period from its being taught as a course under the Chair of the History of Islam and Sects during (...) the establishment of the Faculty of Divinity to 1974 when it turned into an independent chair, and the second is the process from 1974 to the present. Higher religious education was continued in the Faculty of Theology, established under the Istanbul Dārulfunūn, which was constructed in the western style instead of the madrasahs that were closed in accordance with the Law of Unification of Education (Tawhid Tadrisāt) adopted on March 3, 1924.The faculty in question was closed in 1933 due to the shortage of students. Until Ankara University Faculty of Theology, which started its teaching activities in November 1949, was opened, there was no higher religious education for 16 years in Turkey. During this time, the need for experts trained in the field of religion emerged. In order to meet this need, Ankara University Faculty of Theology was opened. In the newly opened faculty, it is aimed to train theologians with versatile knowledge and perspective by teaching philosophy, psychology, sociology, foreign languages, as well as teaching disciplines related to the field of theology. One of the chairs in the faculty’s academic structure opened for this purpose was the chair of History of Islam and Sects. In Ankara University Faculty of Theology, where the academic structuring was organized according to the chair system, the science of Kalam was taught as a course within the Chair of the History of Islam and Sects until 1974. Within this chair, the teachings of Principles of Islam, the history of Islamic sects, and Kalam lessons were carried out. The first instructor of the chair was Prof. Yusuf ZiyaYörükân. Although there were changes in the academic staff during the process, one of the important names that contributed to the field of kalam until 1974 was Muhammad Tavît al-Tanji. These scholars not only made significant contributions to the field of Kalam in terms of method and content with their own studies but also taught scholars to work in this field after them.The doctoral advisor of HüseyinAtay, who is the founder of the Kalam Chair/Department, is M. Tavît al-Tancî. In 1974, when HüseyinAtay became a professor, the Kalam course was separated from the Chair of Islam and Sects and gained the status of an independent chair. HüseyinAtay is the architect of the transformation of Kalam from a lecture to a chair.As a result of Atay’s efforts, being a theologian in Turkey has turned into an identity rather than being a member of an academic discipline. In the studies carried out by Yörükân, Tancî, Atay and the academicians taught by them in Ankara University Faculty of Theology Department of Kalam, the emphasis on the Quran and reason, the importance of critical thinking in the field of theology, the human-centered theological thought, the effort to find solutions to current problems, the researches on Mu‘tazila and Maturidism, the study and translation activities that are carried out to bring the classical theology to the present day come to the fore. In the essence of academic studies conducted within this framework, the importance of correctly determining the distinction between the divine and human in the analysis of religious thought is emphasized. In addition, it is aimed to give a perspective on the meaning and value of human life. In the Department of Kalam, where the human-centered understanding of kalam is systematically dealt with on the basis of individual, responsibility, and morality, the science of kalam is structured not only as a system of thought consisting of abstract fictions but a discipline that has the function of developing and gaining a perspective on what is happening around us and in the World. (shrink)

This chapter aims to draw on the critical threads of those vibrant theological conversations within the formative years of Islamic thought in considering the different theological models of the Divine within the broader Islamic tradition under the purview of classical theism as it is understood today in the contemporary philosophy of religion. In doing so, it makes reference to the major strands within the theological (‘ilm al- kalām & atharī scripturalism) and philosophical (falsafa) schools of the (...) class='Hi'>Islamic tradition. It aims to consider how these different trends, schools, and thinkers construct a model of God in light of the classical and neo-classical theistic model of God. (shrink)

U ovom clanku bice izlozena polemika o kalam kosmoloskom argumentu, koja je razvijena u srednjovekovnoj islamskoj teologiji i filozofiji. Glavni momenti ove polemike bili su izlozeni stolecima pre u Filoponovoj kritici Aristotelove teze da je svet vecan i da nije moguca aktuelna beskonacnost. Filopon prihvata tezu da je aktuelna beskonacnost nemoguca, ali on misli da, upravo zbog toga, svet ne moze biti vecan. Naime, prema Filoponu, nesto ne moze da nastane ako njegovo po?stojanje zahteva prethodno postojanje beskonacnog broja drugih stvari, (...) od kojih jedna dolazi posle druge. Filopon i njegovi sledbenici u srednjevekovnoj islamskoj teologiji, zvani kalam teolozi, ponudili su argumente protiv koncepcije temporalno beskonacnog univerzuma, koji bi bio shvacen kao sukcesivni kauzalni lanac. S druge strane, srednjovekovni islamski mislioci, zvani falasifah /filozofi/ ili aristotelijanci ponudili su argumente u prilog Aristotelove koncepcije vecnosti univerzuma. Odlucujuci problem u raspravi izmedju kalam i falsafa srednjovekovnih muslimanskih mislilaca bio je problem beskonacnosti. U ovom clanku bice prikazani neki od krucijalnih momenata tih argumenata. (shrink)

A contemporary to Thomas Aquinas in Latin Catholic Italy, and with a parallel motivation to stabilize each his own civilization in its flux and storm, 'Abd Allah Baydawi of Ilkhan Persia wrote a compact and memorable Arabic Summation of Islamic Natural and Traditional Theology. With the same strokes of his pen he presented the Islamic version of the Science of Theological Statement, bafflingly called "Kalam" while familiarly embracing "Theology". Baydawi's Tawali'al-Anwar min Matal'al-Anzar (Rays of Dawnlight Outstreaming (...) from Far Horizons of Logical Reasoning), with Mahmud Isfahani's commentary, is a formidably clear logical and mental vision of mankind's final completion as a spiritual structure in Islam. Reality - in nature's Possible mode, in an apodictic Divine mode, and in humanity's heroic Prophetic mode - comprises man's Worldview and is the Theme of the Baydawi/Isfahani discourse. The Edifice of Man and Humanity's evanescent Evidence within it are both hugely arresting and moving. The print edition is available as a set of two volumes (9789004121027). (shrink)

The Philosophy and logic in Islamic thought, unlike Christian culture, developed uncensored and as a result of great demand. After the biggest translation movement in history, important components of Ancient Greek, Syriac, Persian, Jewish and Hindu cultures were transferred to Arabic. Kalam, which developed earlier in Islamic culture, has also been effective in understanding and accepting the philosophical content. In the beginning, translations were made in fields such as medicine, chemistry, astronomy and mathematics. Philosophy literature was also translated (...) into Arabic due to its close relationship with other sciences and the need to fill the "gaps" in Islamic culture. The philosophy of logic was also transferred to Arab culture in its Aristotelian form. Especially the great influence of Aristotle helped strengthen the thought of logic among Arab philosophers and some theologians. As with other translation content, the logic has been translated into Arabic without any censorship. Contrary to the thinkers of Christian culture, Islamic philosophers learned all the subtleties of logic in a free intellectual environment, and as a result, this fact created a way for them to make a unique contribution to the discipline of logic. Logic, as it has been transformed into Arabic elements in Islamic culture, has been influential in basic areas such as theology, language, fiqh and kalam. In this process, logic, which was handled intertwined with traditional philosophy, has progressed to become a refined thought, especially with the influence of the first great philosopher Fârâbî. Fârâbî is not only a great philosopher but also a great Islamic scholar, and these qualities enabled him to adapt logic to Arab culture and Islamic sciences from his Aristotelian roots. Fârâbî, just like Aristotle, wanted to use logic as a criterion of truth for philosophical fields. Fârâbî, who designed logic under two main headings such as concepts and judgments, adapted logic to Arab culture for Muslims in the reasoning process. This solid construction of logic not only strengthened philosophical thought, but also contributed to the later establishment of a solid structure in Islamic sciences. In this context, the understanding of Islamic philosophy and its transformation with the effect of logic require a close examination of Fârâbî's thought. In our article, we will briefly discuss the pre-Islamic origins of philosophy and logic, and on this plane, we will examine Fârâbî's contribution to philosophy of some basic issues such as God, the classification of sciences, and the philosophical dimension of logic and try to reveal his effects on Islamic culture from a general point of view. (shrink)

Most scholars of Islamic intellectual history now agree on the distortedness of the traditional Western portrayal of al-Ġazālī as the defender of Muslim orthodoxy whose Incoherence of the Philosophers was such a powerful critique that it caused the annihilation of philosophical activity in Islamic civilization. Some in fact are coming to the conclusion that al-Ġazālī's importance in the history of Islamic philosophy and theology derives as much from his assiduous incorporation of basic metaphysical ideas into central (...) doctrines of Sunnī kalām, as from his far more celebrated bashing of the falāsifa. What is less well known is that al-Ġazālī's role in the ‘‘philosophizing” of Sunnī theology was not a lonely struggle by a single genius, but part of a broader trend that seems to have begun during Avicenna’s lifetime and that picked up speed in the first and second generations after Avicenna's death in 1037, with the work of al-Ġazālī's teacher, the Aš‘arite al-Gˇuwaynī, as well as of the Māturīdite al-Bazdawī, work that was carried forward by dozens of subsequent members of those two major Sunnī theological schools. It is clear, in fact, that the dividing line between the Sunnī theologians commonly referred to in the later Islamic tradition as mutaqaddimūn, and those referred to as muta’aḫhḫirūn, lies not with al-Ġazālī but with Avicenna himself, and that the turn in Sunnī kalām was therefore Avicennian, not Ġazālian. (shrink)

Sunni or Sunnism stands for Ahlu As-Sunnah wa al-Jamā`ah which is also called ASWAJA. Many people publish and debate it without clear meaning and reference. This article is a demonstrative-linguistic study that outlines the meaning and reference to the term "Sunni" to understand it clearly. This research shows that Sunnis have at least two groups. First, Sunni Ahlu Al- Ḥadīts, the path of Ibn Hanbal and Ibn Taimiyyah, which tends to be puritan and at some point raises hardline intolerant Muslims. (...) Second, moderate Sunnis, who opened the space for fiqh schools other than Ibn Hanbal, and chooses to refer to moderate Islamic thinkers, such as Ash-Shāfi'i in fiqh (Islamic law), Al-Asy`ari in kalam (Islamic theology) and Al -Ghazali in Sufism (Islamic mysticism). The two Sunni groups were both Ahlu as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā`ah. The first group tends to embody the phrase Ahlu as-Sunnah wa al-Jamā'ah terminologically (iṣṭilāḥan), while the second group tends to display the phrase linguistically (lughatan). (shrink)

Madrasas and academy can be defined as educational institutions known as schools that were established for different purposes in different periods. Madrasas are non-formal educational institutions where Islamic religious knowledge is taught. Madrasas, which hold an important place in Islamic civilization, are generally built in connection with mosques or prayer rooms. Education in madrasas is provided in areas related to the Islamic religion, such as fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), hadith (sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad), tafsir (...) (interpretation of the Quran), and kalam (Islamic theology). The duration of education in madrasas varies between 5-10 years on average and is generally aimed at male students. Since the sciences that madrasas want to teach are Islamic sciences, the language used in education is Arabic.On the other hand, theology academies are institutions recognized by the state in an official manner and cover various subjects. These include the interpretation of religious texts, philosophical and theological analysis of religions, the history of religions and their effects on society, the study of religious rituals and practices, and the social and political impact of religious thoughts. In addition, today's theological academic studies have a broader perspective. They describe the relationship between religion and society, religious freedoms, gender and religion, and contemporary interpretations. In fact, theological academic studies embrace an interdisciplinary approach to understand both the content of religion and the social and cultural effects of religion.These studies are concluded in the form of academic publications, articles, and books. In addition, theology academics participate in conferences, seminars, and discussions to specialize in their fields and share their research. Nowadays, theological academic studies aim to contribute to the development of religious knowledge and understanding, as well as to understand the effects of religion on society as a multidisciplinary discipline. It enables people to understand the diversity of religions and religious thoughts and to examine them in a deeper way.Currently, madrasas and academies continue to exist in different forms. Madrasas mostly operate as religious education institutions in Islamic countries, while academies bear the name of contemporary universities known as higher education institutions. Universities representing the academy offer undergraduate, postgraduate, and doctoral education in various fields of science. Academies are also used as institutions where scientific research is carried out and scientific meetings are organized. (shrink)

In terms of the Science of Theological Statement [Kalam] Abd Allah Baydawi concisely outlines perceived Islamic reality - in its modes of the naturally Possible, the apodictically Divine, and the humanly heroic Prophetic - as the process of perfecting man's spiritual structure.

This article offers an analysis, translation, and edition of a brief, recently uncovered Arabic text by the tenth-century CE Christian Aristotelian thinker Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī. Ibn ʿAdī here takes issue with an argument for the existence of God, widely used in kalām. According to this argument, bodies cannot exist without being either in motion or at rest; motion and rest must begin; therefore all bodies and hence the universe as a whole must have begun. Ibn ʿAdī diagnoses various flaws (...) in this reasoning, including a supposed part–whole fallacy. The analysis of the text shows how it fits into Ibn ʿAdī’s intellectual profile and the project of the Baghdad Aristotelian school. (shrink)

The title of this volume is somewhat misleading. Though the author begins his argument with a cursory account of medieval Islamic thought and of dialectical theology or kaläm, his subsequent exposition of the way three medieval thinkers adapted the basic features of kaläm tenets to their own arguments on behalf of God's existence is far less detailed or nuanced than his investigation of the shortcomings in nineteenth and twentieth century Western materialist explanations of the universe grounded in modern (...) mathematics and physics. Similarly misleading are the titles of the two appendices, for these are really detailed critiques of two bodies of literature the author repudiates lest his contention that "the universe had a beginning because an actual infinite cannot be formed by successive addition" be infirmed. Kaläm receives such a prominent billing here only because that contention and the reasoning behind it defended throughout this volume can be derived from the writings of certain authors associated with the movement. In other words, this book is less a scholarly investigation of kaläm doctrines than an attempt to identify a general set of arguments purporting to prove God's existence embraced by some of those who are traditionally called mutakallimün or dialectical theologians and to defend the soundness of those arguments against the skepticism of modern science. (shrink)

There have been many developments in the field of science and religion over the past few decades. One such development is referred to as ‘theology of nature’ (ToN), which is the activity of building or revising theological frameworks in light of contemporary scientific developments, e.g., evolution, chaos theory, and quantum mechanics. Ian Barbour, John Polkinghorne, and Arthur Peacocke, all of whom are Christian thinkers, are the most well-known advocates of this kind of thinking. However, this discourse has not been (...) examined from an Islamic perspective. Given this gap, in this article, we view this strand of thinking from the Ashʿarī school of thought that is part of the Sunnī Islamic kalām tradition. We first review how ToN manifests in the works of the thinkers mentioned earlier. Following this, we highlight the essential principles in Ashʿarism relevant to God, His interaction with the created world, and science. These are then compared with the ideas of the said thinkers. Two conclusions are reached. First, we demonstrate that atomism, which is generally understood as a long-held position in the Ashʿarī tradition, should not be held as a theological position but rather a philosophical or a scientific one. Second, an important distinction is made between science-informed theology (SIT) and contingency-informed theology (CIT). For Ashʿarīs, a CIT is sufficient for understanding God, but they would find the SIT displayed in ToN problematic. The motivation and methodology of localising or modifying God’s nature or attributes to fit the science of the day would be seen as theologically very costly and a form of scientism. (shrink)

Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yusuf b. Muhammad al-Miklâtî is an Ash’arî scholar who lived between the years 550-626 (1155-1229). He has a work entitled Lubāb al-ʿuqūl fī radd ʿalā al-falāsifa fī ʿilm al-uṣūl to defend the opinions of Ahl al-Sunnah by criticizing philosophical views. Miklātī is one of the most important figures who lived in the Muvahhidī state. He is a professor who contributed to learning of Ash’arī kalām system in the North Africa and Andalusia. But today it has not been demonstrated. (...) Therefore, in this article we looked at some theological views of Miklātī in the context of his criticism of the philosophical views.Ebu’l-Ḥajjāj Yûsuf b. Muhammad al-Miklātī is an Ash’arī scholar who lived in North Africa and Andalusia between the years 520-626 (1155-1229). He is one of the tutors working at madrasahs of the Muvahhidī state established by Ibn Tumart. Becoming meeting point of Salafī and philosophical understanding is one of the main factors which makes important the period and the region where he lived. Muvahhidīs on the one hand called for the returning to the Book and the Sunnah, and ordered to burn the works of Malikī fuqahā related to the branches (furūʿ) with the reason that they became distant from the Qur’an and the Sunnah. On the other hand, the last great represantatives of Islamic Philosophy, Ibn Tufayl and Averroes wrote their most precious works at Muvahhidî palace.Only extant work of al-Miklâtî is Lubâb al-‘uqûl fî radd ‘alâ al-falâsifa fî ‘ilm al-uṣûl. In Lubâb al-‘uqûl, al-Miklâtî by giving a place to the philosophical opinions about theology, prophethood and the hereafter criticizes the viewpoints of Aristotle, from Periphatetic philosophers al-Fârâbî and Avicenna, from Mu’tazilah Abu Hudhayl al-‘Allaf and Qa’bî. He has benefited from the works of Ash’arî theologians like Baqillanî, al-Juwaynî and al-Ghazzâlî when he make criticism. Especially in the theology section, when he considers some subjects he has followed the method which al-Ghazzalî used in his Tahâfut which was written to criticize the philosophers. However, with the impact of the fuqahâ, who has Salafî understanding, and that of the Islamic philosopher Averroes, the ruler of the region ordered to burn the works of al-Ghazzâlî and notify that whoever has these works will be killed and whose wealth will be seized. In this regard al-Miklâtî’s work has an important contribution to the settlement of Ash’arî theology against Salafî and philosophical opposition.The main reason of the opposition of Salafî understanding towards the science of Kalâm is the claim that Kalâm has been established through outward impacts at a philosophical basement. The main reason of opposition of Averroes towards Kalâm is that Kalâm follows argumentative (jadalî) methods not instead of demonstrative ones (burhânî). This work of al-Miklâtî provides benefits to the establishment of Kalâm with the hands of Muslims and on the Qur’anic base and also has contributed to the development of a demonstrative tradition against philosophical opposition. Because according to him, the purpose of a theologian is to declare the demonstrative proofs which help for the soundness of the religious creed. Principles of the science of Kalâm are introduction, by which a theologian establishes his demonstrative proofs. (shrink)

The subject of this study will be to analyze the contribution of an important figure of the period known as the period of new ilm al kalām in the history of kalām, which started in the mid-nineteenth century and included the first periods of the Republic. This person is Mehmet Şerafettin Yaltkaya (1880-1947). Yaltkaya stands out with his original aspects such as being both a school and a madrasa student, representing his scholar and government bureaucrat personality together and (...) strongly, and his open support for the changes and transformation periods of Republican Turkey. It is known that difficult and troubled times in history have been the source of the emergence of rich intellectual movements. Yaltkaya was also nourished by such a political and intellectual hinterland. As is known, the changes in Western thought in the nineteenth century led to the emergence of atheist and materialist worldviews, which was one of the important reasons that caused us to open a new era in kalām. It has even been interpreted that the Ottoman scholars' work on the criticism of materialism was the main reason for the opening of this new era in kalām. In this regard, before discussing Yaltkaya's point of view and his contributions, we have tried to briefly discuss the historical conditions, changes and transformations of the new period of kalām, accompanied by the views of some of its representatives, which will help us to recognize the period. Secondly, we have endeavored to deal with the main dynamics of Şerafettin Yaltkaya's theological views, especially his scholarly and actional aspects that came to the fore in the course of his life, and in particular his up to date understanding of isbāt al-wājib regarding the existence of God and the social theory of kalām (ictimaī ilm al-kalām) about which the debates intensified. As far as we have been able to determine, Yaltkaya's theological views are actually a multiple-polarized structure that draws from all schools of kalām, philosophy, and Sufism. His interest in different disciplines of Islamic sciences and his curiosity in modern sciences also contributed to his vigorous personality. On the other hand, it must be said that he was also influenced by Western intellectuals and evaluated the possibilities of reason and instinct. Yaltkaya's support for Ottoman modernization and Republic reforms are among the significant aspects of Yaltkaya, both an Islamist and a kind of cultural nationalist. He made great contributions to the world of scholarship and thought of his time with his knowledge and works in different disciplines such as kalām, philosophy, literature, sufism history of sects and history of medicine. In addition, we believe that his lectures on kalām, philosophy and history of sects in important high schools and universities that were newly opened at the time and his position as the second head of the Presidency of Religious Affairs supported the background of his ideas that we highlight in this article. We have determined that Yaltkaya, who criticized the theological views of the traditional scholars, was also closely familiar with and influenced by Western scholars and philosophers who were his contemporaries. (shrink)

It is necessary to take into account the data of science in the theoretical debates conducted by scientists contributing ontological theories in order to develop new approaches to theological issues in Islamic thought. Even, Kalam scholars with the duty of defending and basing the principles of Islam in the classical sense have established a theological understanding intertwined with science in understanding both existence philosophically and the Script theologically. With its discoveries and theories in the last century, it can be (...) argued that modern science has made a serious progress compared to the past. Maintaining its own methodology and paradigm, every scientific discipline has the opportunity to benefit from the methods and data of other disciplines. Consequently, it is possible to assert that Kalam can enjoy the same opportunity too, as long as staying in its own problem area. According to modern science, the motion system is the unity of structures that enable living things to move. Moreover, Bones and joints, which are the structures of the skeletal system, are passive elements of the movement system. Muscles, on the other hand, are the active elements of the movement system and provide the movement of the body by affecting the bones and joints. Muscle tissue shapes the body by adhering to the bones, besides enabling movement activity to occur. One of the most important systems that provide movement is the nervous system. Because for a person to have movement, the muscles must contract, and the muscles must be stimulated for the contraction of the muscles. The system that enables this contraction to occur is the nervous system. Energy is also required for contraction to occur in the human body. Muscles create energy for movement by first providing their energy from the ATP molecule present in the muscle cells. Considering the movement theories of classical theology scholars, it is seen that they shaped the occurrence of human actions through the concept of potency. While the scholars classify power as spiritual/mental and physical strength in terms of its structure, they have characterized it as accident in terms of its nature. In this context, we can say that the equivalent of the power, which is regarded as necessary for the formation of human acts by the theologians, is the movement system in today's science. The spirit/mental that scholars regard as a structure of power for the occurrence of human action can be regarded as the electrical activity that activates muscles when considered within the framework of the movement system of today's science. It is seen that Kalam scholars emphasize physical competence in their definitions of power as well. At this point, Ash'arians defined the power as the soundness of organs, Mu’tazila expressed it as the presence of organs and their being away from disasters, and the Mâturîdîs stated it as the organs being healthy. With these definitions, Kalam scholars mean that a person should also be physically competent to make a movement. The structures scientifically accepted as biological and physical competence in the movement system are the skeletal system, muscles and nervous system. Therefore, we can say that the strength of the physical fitness/well-being emphasized in the definition of power by theologians corresponds scientifically to the skeletal system, muscles and nervous system. One of the issues that Kalam scholars discuss about power is the issue of the accident of power. The reason why they describe power as an accident is to emphasize its impermanence and to show that it was created by Allah. So, in modern science, electrical activity must occur in the brain in order for human organs to move. The occurrence of this electrical activity is independent of the human being. The fact that electrical activity occurs independently from human beings shows that it conforms to Kalam scholars’ definition of the accident. As a result, we can say that the theory of power created by scholars for human movement has a counterpart in the movement system put forward by today's science. (shrink)

The need for renewal felt in various fields with the Tanẓīmat, and the changes and modernization activities realized in accordance with it, and the nature and boundaries of these activities are important issues that determine the period's intellectual agenda. Some of the proposals for a solution to save the state are related to the renewal of religious thought. The bad situation in the Ottoman Empire stems from the way religion is understood, not from religion itself, and one of the names (...) that produce ideas about the necessity of changing this way of thinking is Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri. He believes that Fiqh and Exegeticsshould be based on the work of updating the content of Islamic Sciences within the framework of contemporary needs. Claiming that the basic need of society is not Science of Kalām but Catechism, Kadri claims that the attempt of the science of Kalām, regulated to respond to the needs of the age will not result in even will cause religious conflict among people. In this article, Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri'sintellectual background, his suggestions for the renewal of religious thought and his objection to the new Science of Kalām are discussed.Summary: What defines the history of late Ottoman period is the concept called change. There have been reform attempts in order to canalise the military, economic, socio-cultural change and transformation due to political turmoil starting from the end of the 16th century and beginning of the 17th century. Basic argument regarding these reforms finds its base on Qanūn al-Qadīm and the idea of returning to Sharia. Along with the Declaration of the Imperial Edict of Reorganization (Edict of Gulhane) the previous reforms which were made earlier changed dimension and westernization became a government policy. During the ongoing process, the change in terms of Westernization became a current issue within every segment of Ottoman society. Need for innovation in various areas, and therefore the change and modernization movements and accordingly these movements’ nature and boundries set the intellectual agenda of the era. Some of the suggestions are associated with renewal of the religious thought which are to keep the State from difficult situation it is in. Solutions proposed in this context creates a rich intellectual discussion environment within Western, Islamist, and Turkist intellectuals. Islamists in general terms are of the opinion that the difficult situation Ottoman is in does not stem from the religion itself but the way of understanding religion; and they are of the opinion that this way of thinking should be altered; when they bring about their suggestions, it is seen that the way of thinking is their starting point. What causes the Islamists fall apart within themselves is the nature of renawal. Islamist intellectuals, supporting the idea which is the content of islamic knowledge should be updated according the needs of era, suggest various ideas in terms of which dicipline should be in charge for the needs in question. While some intellectuals are of the opinion Kalām should be prioritised, some are of the opinion Fiqh and Exegetics should be prioritised. Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadri, who wrote under the pseudonym of Shaykh Muḥsin-i Fānῑ ez-Ẓāhirῑ, is one of these intellectuals coming up with an idea. Kadri suggests a renawal in thinking based upon Fiqh and ExegeticsḤüseyin Kāẓım Kadriis one of the most prominent intellectuals of Constitutional Period. Working as a governor of an Ottoman province, deputy, and minister and engaging in journalism, Kadri compiles a series of work in religion, language and agriculture. All of his efforts are to find ways of saving Ottoman from its difficult situations. Thus, Kadri questions the quality of the knowledge which was brought about in religious thinking and proposes solutions. What lies under his solution is the need for a dicipline for society’ s practical problems. He bases his opinion on opposition to new theology movement. According to Kadri, ever since Kalām was codified, it has never been useful to Muslims, on the contrary it has impaired the Muslims. Renowation of Kalām creates nothing but problem. In his opinion, due to using Greek philosophy content and method, Kalām is not a dicipline authentic to Muslims, besides it is a harmful dicipline which aims to damage the essence of Islam.One of the reasons why Kalām is out of Islamic thinking tradition is because of the Mu'tazila wises are the founders of this dicipline. Kadri is of the opinion that the wises/intellectuals belonging to this school and their theories regarding to understand the existence do not contribute to the field of faith. Admitting the function of Ahl-al Sunnah school generated after the Mihna Period, Kadri states the insufficient side of that function. To him, hence the subjects such as substance (cevher) –accident (araz), hudûth-eternality, wujud (vücûd)-nothingness (adem) etc have been discussed but at that time the subject in question could not be renovated in regard to needs. Another criticism of Kadri raised against Kalām is he considers this field the reason why Muslims are divided. Especially during the times when Muslims need to be in unity and solidarity, Kadri is worried about new discursion which will occur due to the renovation of Kalām attempts. This concern of Kadri causes him to object Kalām with a pragmatic motive.Kalām which is called Usulu'd-Din is another reason why Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadriis against Kalām. In his opinion, theologians complicates the subjects such as amalgation and adjectives of Allah instead of making it clear with ijtihad. Kadri who considers offering proof in terms of faith as faithlessness is of the opinion that faith is not a matter of reason but a matter of sense which has no doubt among people. Criticising the struggle for the enquiry of faith, Kadri puts an emphasis on the significance of the reinterpretation of the principles, for example in the field of Fiqh which deals with the practical area and says it is the most prominent religious duty. He also criticises the imitation of the past and remarks the importance of reason in Fiqh. As an alternative to Ilm-i Kalām, he claims a new Catechism and adds, it is going to provide the religious knowledge people need. It is an ideological contrast of Ḥüseyin Kāẓım Kadrito think Kalām is the reason for all the misfortune Muslims encountered. This opposition causes him to ignore all the accumulation in Kalām field. Moreover, it is the reason why he makes emotional deductions conflicting with historical facts. Kalām plays a role just like the other fields who could not contribute to Islamic Thinking and its renovation process in accordance with the needs of time. However, it is not realistic and reasonable to think Kalām is the only one responsible. (shrink)

Muʽtazilah is one of the kalām schools in which intellectual freedom is seen the most and therefore divergences within the sect are the most common. Although al-usûl al-ḥamsa/five principles constitute the main framework on which Muʽtazilah has agreed, opposing ideas have emerged within the sect on the principles of ʽadl (divine justice) and al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn and on the issues of nature and imamah. As a matter of fact, Muʽtâzilī scholars wrote many refutations to each other on the disputed (...) issues. One of those who have opposing views within the Muʽtazilah is Muḥammad b. Shabīb al-Baṣrī (d. mid 3rd/9th century), who lived between the end of 2nd and the middle of the 3rd century of hijra. Ibn Shabīb is one of the students of Ibrāhīm Ibn Sayyār al-Naẓẓām (d. 231/845), who was one of the leading scholars of Muʽtazilah. He initially opposed the principle of al-manzilah bayna al-manzilatayn, while he was Muʽtezilî, and accepted the Murji’ah approach on this issue. However, after he accepted the idea of irjā’, he continued his loyalty to Muʽtazilah with regard to the principles of tawhīd (divine unity) and ʽadl. Ibn Shabīb, who had a theological assembly of his own and is respected by the people in Baṣra, was an important scholar who stands out with his comprehensive knowledge of religious and philosophical schools of his time. In the doxographical tradition, his adoption of Murjī’ ideas is generally emphasized, except that he has not been referred to much. However, when the sources of kalām are examined meticulously, it is understood that he influenced many Muslim theologians with his works and views and that he was a source for them regarding many topics. The most important reason for this is that he was one of the first scholars to defend the Islamic belief against various philosophical and religious movements. Naturally, this situation provided him with a wide knowledge of religious and philosophical trends. Considering the quotations made from him, it is understood that he recorded this accumulation in a doxographical work. Another remarkable feature of Ibn Shabīb is that he was one of the first scholars to write in the genre of Kitāb al-Tawhīd. It is possible to see both contextual and methodological effects of this work in the quotations and narratives of Al-Māturīdī's book with the same name. What makes him different is that he adopts Muʽtazilī and Murjī’ ideas at the same time and develops a unique discourse on the subjects of grave sins and waʽīd (divine warning). Although he was raised in a strong tradition of thought such as Muʽtazilah, his ability to oppose his sect and his teacher Al-Naẓẓām and also to develop a different definition of faith despite accepting the doctrine of irjā’, makes him stand out as an original and intellectual personality. His different definition of faith is important in that it represents a more moderate approach to the issue of takfīr. For, he drew an encompassing framework based on the Quran and the Sunnah regarding the definition of faith and the conditions of takfīr, thus, he tried to preserve the unity of Muslims. He did not consider the denial of controversial issues that are not explicitly included in the Quran and Sunnah as a reason for takfīr. With this attitude, Ibn Shabīb took an important approach in ensuring social peace and free thought. In this article, all the information contained in Muʽtazilī sources, and doxographical works related to the life, scientific personality and theological views of Ibn Shabīb are gathered and analyzed, and then his theological thought is reconstructed based on these data. From this point of view, identifications and evaluations have been made regarding the issues that make him different and unique in the history of Muslim thought. (shrink)

"This book brings together articles, which I previously published on my blog, Barrarsīhā-ye Tārīkhī, about the history of kalām and falsafa (Islamic theology and philosophy). Many of the articles contain research on the history of Muʿtazilī kalām, especially among the Shīʿa, whether Zaydīs or Imāmīs. Some articles also discuss the history of philosophical theology in Islam, the Avicennian tradition in Khurāsān and the relationship between the theologians and the philosophers, especially in the sixth and seventh (...) centuries hijrī. A chapter about the maktab-e tafkīk is also included, in which the relationship between the Akhbārī position and the philosophical approach among the Imāmiyya, is discussed. In addition, some of the articles treat the concept of imāma according to Zaydī and Muʿtazilī thinkers, and the genre of imāma in their literature, as well as the refutations that were written between Zaydīs and Muʿtazilīs, and also Imāmīs. Some articles on the history of Sunnī kalām are also included. Part of the book takes a bibliographical approach, or is based on texts, and part takes a historical approach to study the history of kalām and falsafa as well as the relationship between both. The purpose of this book is to provide readers a historical reading of the history of kalām and falsafa —mostly within the Shīʿī and Muʿtazilī traditions. Even at present, many Muʿtazilī texts have not been edited and studied. Although most of the texts of Ibn Sīnā and his students have already been edited, we still need to provide a historical approach to the falsafa of Ibn Sīnā in order to situate the philosophical questions in the Avicennian tradition in a broader context, among the theologians and the philosophers. Many of the topics which are discussed in the Avicennian tradition are also approached in theological texts by the Muʿtazilīs and the Ashʿarīs, and I hope that this book provides a basic foundation in preparation for future studies on this topic." -- from publishers. (shrink)

The problem of evil is the problem of reconciling the world's afflictions with the fundamental attributes and justice of God. Throughout their lives people encounter painful events originating from nature and other individuals. Furthermore, it is believed that God created everything, particularly in divine religions. Scholars and thinkers have debated for centuries why an omniscient, omnipotent, just, and compassionate God would create evil. The problem of evil is sometimes employed by atheists as evidence against religion, and at times as philosophical (...) proof for the absence of God. Nowadays, it exerts a profound impact on people's beliefs within social media platforms. This article aims to address doubts and objections surrounding the problem of evil. Numerous studies have been conducted on this current issue. The subject, which is basically examined as natural and moral evil in the philosophy of religion, has been examined under the titles such as justice and cruelty, goodness and evil, will and power in classical theology. In this study, the subject is examined in terms of the relationship between the subject of evil and its object, and attention is drawn to the role of man in the formation of evil. In this context, a general overview of the problem of evil is presented in the introduction. The second section delves into how the problem of evil is approached in philosophical and theological traditions, specifically examining the viewpoints of classical kalam schools. In the later parts of the study, the subject has been tried to be reinterpreted under different titles. Within this framework, it is suggested that some doubts and questions about the problem of evil arise from a lack of understanding of religion, while others stem from interpretations perceived as religious within the tradition. To propose a solution to the problem, the concept of God, known for its power and authority in classical times, should be reevaluated. In the context of Islam, God should be considered as an entity possessing complete knowledge, absolute will and power, and creating the universe for goodness, possesses justice and mercy and bestows numerous blessings upon humanity. This perspective finds ample support in the verses of the Qur'an. The problem of evil sometimes emerges from misconceiving the relationship between God and nature as equivalent to a God-human relationship. However, God designed the universe's order to support the emergence of life in nature and make it conducive to the lives of all living beings, particularly humans. Natural phenomena and events unfold by the laws set by Allah. Evils such as diseases, fires, earthquakes, floods, storms, volcanic eruptions, rain, and lightning are not events directly orchestrated by God to harm humans. The harm they cause is primarily a result of humans' negative interactions with nature. Precautions can mitigate these harms. Yet, humans who pollute air, water, and forests and build poorly located structures hastily attribute the resulting evils to God. A careful examination of the numerous blessings in nature underscores that the universe was created by God as a benevolent order. God created humanity to undergo tests within such a world, aiming for human happiness in both this world and the hereafter. Thus, the entirety of God's will be goodness. Evil, conversely, arises from humanity's exercise of free will and the potential to commit malevolent acts. Consequently, evil stems from human interactions with nature and fellow beings. Destiny is another frequently misconstrued aspect. It refers to the natural and moral laws established by Almighty Allah to govern the order of nature and human existence. Destiny presents a realm of possibilities and does not coerce anyone's actions. To address the problem of evil, the portrayal of God, whose sole intent is good, must be reconstructed. Additionally, concepts like testing, fate, death, and sustenance need to be reinterpreted in alignment with this conception. Furthermore, methods that facilitate the acquisition of accurate religious information through social media should be developed to suit contemporary requirements. (shrink)

Ijmā is ranked as the third shariah evidence after the Qur’ān and Sunnah in the science of Uṣūl. Shafi was the first one who made Uṣūl which had been known and used by the Islamic scholars, into a written document and who ascertained that Ijmā was the third of the shariah evidences. Kalām is one of the sciences in which Ijmā evidence is used. The scholars of Kalām used this evidence as far as the science of Uṣūl (...) made it possible. They always used it without changing any basics of religious beliefs and acceptances. That the aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been supported with Ijmā which is regarded as one of naqly evidences, played an important role in eliminating suspicions which were tried to be aroused in momins’ mind. In this article, the function and importance of Ijmā evidence, which is one of the primary sources of the science of Uṣūl, in the science of Kalām and Aqidah of Ahl al-Sunnah has been studied.SummaryWhat the Qur’ān demands from us is to emphasize the spirit of unity among ummah and to keep out the factors that could trigger separation and division. Indeed, Allah emphasizes in the following verses in the Qur’ān on the protection of the unitary structure of the ummah: “And hold firmly to the rope of Allah all together and do not become divided” (Āl a-Imrān 3/103) and “And do not be like the ones who became divided and differed after the clear proofs had come to them” (Āl al-Imrān 3/105). Allah has commanded the Ulul ‘Azm Prophets to hold the religion upright and to avoid division. (al-Shūrā 42/13). The command of holding the religion upright and not to be divided in this religion means to certify what needs to be confirmed in the religion of Allah and to obey those that must be obeyed. This is also the proclamation of the principle of religion that all the prophets have consensus over.Ahl al-Sunnah understanding of Islam is identical to the understanding of the Prophet and his companions. For this reason, Ahl al-Sunna is the school that represents the main backbone of Islam. In Ahl al-Sunna, in many subjects, be it usūlî / primary or furū’ī / secondary, there has been ijmā. These ijmās are Sahaba ijmās and deductive ijmās that come from mutakallimūn (theologians) ijtihāds. Therefore, ijmā and ijtihād are closely connected to each other. Ijmā is supported by ijtihād and ijtihād is also the source of ijmā. Thus, the issue is no longer just a pure ijtihād; it turns out to be a degree that gives a solid knowledge after it has risen to some degree just after the nass/texts.Ahl al- Sunnah theologians are talking about two kinds of ijmā. The first is “ijmā taṣdīqī” (approval consensus) which is the consensus based on Sahaba İjmā. These are the ijmās that occur on the principles called ḍaruratal-diniyya (necessities of the religion), and accepted as solid proofs in religion. Issues such as the principles of faith, obligation of prayer and the fasting are the subjects that are determined by the solid/definite ijmā. Such ijmās are valid approvals on existing provisions. These ijmās based on solid nass (verses and hadiths). Such ijmās do not give any new information. The existing information is strengthened by the alliance of Muslims. In these areas, ijtihād cannot be done and Muslims do not need ijtihād on these issues. There is an consensus of Ahl al-Sunnah scholars about the unfaithfulness of the one who denies one or more of the principles which are accepted as the main obligatory principles in Islam. The other is the “deductive ijmā which the ijtihāds have roles over. This kind of ijmās, are formed as a result of mujtahids’ consensus over the same opinion on the issue of theological secondary issues. The issues related to the secondary theological issues which were open to the ijtihāds and the different results obtained on matters are not accepted as the cause of takfīr. However, depending on the subject he/she can be a sinner. Istidlālī/deductive ijmās are not considered as an independent proofs in ‘Ilm al-Kalām, rather a supportive ones and are considered as textual evidences.Since, texts that are accepted as sources give supposed information. In this regard, the Ahl al-Sunnah scholars accepted other members of the sect who have in secondary theological issues opposed the ijmā of the salaf / predecessor as Ahl al-Qibla, but named them as Ahl al-Bid’a (innovator in religion) because of their opposition to Salaf’s İjmās. Moreover, the scholars of the Ahl al-Sunnah did not see them appropriate to participate in the Ijmās, which could occur between the generations that come after Sahābas/companions.Not all disputes have been criticized in Islam. It is a blessing for the ummah to claim different opinions on the issues subject to ijtihād. Since the ummah, in this way, will bring new solutions to emerging issues and as a result, Islam will have a mechanism to produce a dynamic solution. This can only be possible through ijtihād. Dispute is to propose different views on a subject. If this view is not in the actual matters that could harm the unity of the Ummah, rather in the case of ijtihādi issues, this conflict could turn to be mercy.The reason why the methodists evaluate the ijmā within the scope of the authorized evidence is that because they think it is essential that the ijmā be based on a proof. From this point of view, the alliances that occurred in mental matters were not considered as ijmā. The theologians always tried to support their claims with nass/textual proofs. When the ijmā is realized, whether known or not, they have stated that there is certainly a religious proof behind it. Because, the provisions that were reached through ijmā, cannot be against the provisions of the Prophet.Many issues in Islamic Belief and Kalām works are supported by the mental and textual evidences as well as by deductive ijmā. However, many of the claims of Ijmās in these works reflect the inter-sect ijmās of the Ahl al-Sunnah. The sects outside the Ahl al-Sunnah were excluded. This attitude is, above all, the aim of ensuring the integrity within the sect, and trying to protect the Ahl al-Sunnah belief. Since the ijmā evidence has a function that prevents all kinds of arbitrary and divisive thoughts and turns the supposed knowledge into the qat’ī/certain one, it raises the provision to the next level just after the nass, rather than merely being a ijtihādi provision. In the case of the forerunner of the Ahl al-Sunnah, the Māturīdes and Ash‘arites have not differed in in understanding of ijmā in terms of methodology.Although they have different views on the definition and content of the ijmā, they have a common understanding of alliances of Mujtahids on the same view. The mutakallims (theologians) of Māturīdī and Ash’arī schools have used the proof of ijmā as supportive evidence in the cases related to Kalām. al-Ash’arī not only adopted the proof of ijmā but also used it in practice in. He did not make any distinction in proof of ijmā as practical, theological, methodological or sub-divisional; he used it freely in every field. Māturīdī and Ash’arī scholars decided that the ijmā could occur in religious matters and that there would be evidence when it was formed; In the case of mental issues, they have required the knowledge to be based on solid information. In the case of ijmā in purely mental issues, they have disputed over the issue. While some Ahl al-Sunnah scholars stated that since purely mental matters were certain knowledge and therefore don’t need ijmā, they also ruled that because the mujtahids could get this knowledge from religious texts, therefore ijmā could occur in mental matters as well. (shrink)

This book basically traces the historical movements that saw Aristotelian thought introduced to Islamic studies. The most significant translation movement was begun in Baghdad in the eighth century and sporadically continued until the middle of the eleventh century. When this movement was completed, every extant work of Aristotle was translated into Arabic. Peters offers a formidable collection of bibliography, doxography, and gnomonology that appeals more to eastern classical scholars than to Aristotelian philosophers. No significant philosophical issues are raised--this is (...) really not the author's intention. Whenever a remote philosophical point does arise, however, it does so a bit arbitrarily. For example, when Peters introduces a chapter on the triumph of Kalam in Islamic thought, he asserts, "it was the Greeks themselves who reduced philosophy to its status of 'handmaiden of theology'." No further explanation is given and Peters continues on his more certain ground--Islamic culture.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Belief in destiny is one of the principles of faith. Although the belief in fate is not explicitly mentioned in the Qur’an, there are many verses that indicate this belief. There are many hadiths about fate that have reached us from the Prophet. Although there are schools that deny destiny, Ahl al-Sunnah schools Ash‘aris and Maturidis accept the existence of belief in destiny. The definitions of destiny of these schools are expressed with words that can be used interchangeably. However, fate (...) should not be evaluated in a single category. It also has varieties. If destiny is perceived as only one kind of Forced destiny, it is inevitable to cause misunderstandings. Forced fate; it is destiny that does not give freedom to beings; It happens with the knowledge, will, power and creation of Allah. Some destinies of inanimate substances, plants, animals and humans are of this type. Jabr and responsibility are incompatible. Although some actions take place in their own bodies, people are not responsible for their forced destiny. Man is a freely created being within certain limits. The ability of intellect, will, power, and carrying out actions has been granted to them. By using them, a person performs his acts of will, and as a result, he becomes responsible for his actions. Having free will and freedom distinguishes humans from other living things. Where there is no human freedom, there is no responsibility. Human life is not uniform, it is in a state of constant change and transformation. In addition to these two types of fate, there is also a type of fate that turns into willful fate, although it was forced in the beginning. In addition to this, there are some actions that start with the will of man and later turn into forced fate. There are also types of disability that we have examined in connection with the belief in destiny and its types. Allah has sent humans to the world to be tested. Illness and disability are also part of the test. Diseases; they may be due to genetic, environmental factors, and food-related. Congenital diseases and disabilities can sometimes cause the world test to be difficult. The biological rules set by Allah are also valid for humans. Genetic hereditary diseases and disabilities occur when the genes carried by the parents are passed on to the child. While some genes are recessive, some genes are dominant. Genes that cause hereditary diseases and disabilities show an uneven distribution depending on their geographical habitats, sharing the same environment in the historical process, and the extent of intermingling of their lineages through marriages. While recessive genes can be passed on from generation to generation, dominant genes that cause death generally do not have the opportunity to pass on to the next generation. In today’s context, the diagnosis of genetic diseases and disabilities is attainable, enabling the implementation of necessary precautions accordingly; furthermore, partial or even complete treatment opportunities can be available depending on the circumstances. In this respect, all of the congenital diseases and disabilities due to genes are a forced fate that is not in the hands of man. As for those diseases and disabilities for which treatment opportunities exist, they fall under the category of fate that transitions from forced fate to willful destiny. Some genetic diseases and disabilities of people may appear in later ages. However, non-genetic diseases and disabilities are also facts of life. Every individual can become ill and experience disability during certain periods of their life. Diseases and disabilities can occur with a number of factors that do not depend on an individual's will, actions, or behaviors. Such diseases are also within the scope of forced fate. A person can also be disabled due to one’s own mistakes and negligence. However, it is a behavior befitting a Muslim to be treated in cases of all kinds of diseases and disabilities. The treatment of diseases for which there is a cure is a willed destiny. Diseases and obstacles that cannot be cured are forced fate. (shrink)