The rise in the number of people on sick leave for common mental disorders is a growing concern, both from a societal and individual perspective. One common suggestion to improve the return-to-work process is increased cooperation between the relevant parties, including at least the employer, the social insurance agency and health care. This suggestion is often made on the presumption that all parties share the common goal of reintegrating the patient-employee back into the workplace. In this paper we investigate this (...) presumption by mapping out the ethical frameworks of these three key actors in any return-to-work process. We show that although the goals of these actors often, and to a large extent, overlap there are potential differences and tensions between their respective goals. Further, we emphasise that there may be other limitations to an actor’s participation in the process. In particular the health care system is required to respect patient autonomy and confidentiality. There is also an inherent tension in the dual roles of health care professionals as therapists and expert witnesses in work ability assessment. In conclusion, there are potential tensions between the key actors in the return-to-work process. These tensions need to be addressed in order to enable an increased cooperation between actors and to facilitate the development of a feasible plan of action for all parties, including the employee. (shrink)

The article is a reply to professor castaneda's criticism of a recursive formulation of act-utilitarianism which i have suggested in an earlier paper (analysis 29.2) and which was intended to satisfy the deontic principle that 'ought' is distributable over conjunctions. i argue that castaneda's arguments against my formulation are inconclusive.

Willard Van Orman Quine was born on 25 June 1908 in Akron, Ohio. For many years he was a professor of philosophy at Harvard University and is now emeritus. To some extent his views are connected with the American pragmatist tradition, but a more important influence comes from the empiricist tradition and, in particular, from the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle (see logical positivism). Quine has always remained faithful to the spirit of empiricism, but he has also criticized and (...) revised the empiricist doctrine in important ways. He has published 20 books and numerous articles, and he is perhaps the most influential analytical philosopher of the second half of the twentieth century. (shrink)

Abstract Criteria of scientific value are of different kinds. This paper concerns ultimate criteria, i.e. the axiology of science. Most ultimate criteria are multi?dimensional. This gives rise to an aggregation problem, which cannot be adequately solved with reference to attitudes and behaviour within the scientific community. Therefore, in many cases, there is no fact of the matter as to whether one theory is better than another. This, in turn, creates problems for methodology.

In Reason, Truth and History and certain related writings, Hilary Putnam attacked the fact-value distinction. This paper criticizes his arguments and defends the distinction. Putnam claims that factual statements presuppose values, that “the empirical world depends upon our criteria of rational acceptability,” and that “we must have criteria of rational acceptability to even have an empirical world.” The present paper argues that these claims are mistaken.

John P. Burgess: Quine's continuing struggles with epistemological and ontological problems about mathematics and logic are traced from his first rebellion against logicism, through his flirtation and subsequent disillusionment with nominalism, to his final endorsement of naturalism, with an eye throughout to tensions among different aspects of his overall philosophy.

Presumably, most scientists believe that scientific knowledge is intrinsically good, i.e. good in itself, apart from consequences. This doctrine should be rejected. The arguments which are usually given for it — e.g. by philosophers like W.D. Ross, R. Brandt, and W. Frankena — are quite inconclusive. In particular, it may be doubted whether knowledge is in fact desired for its own sake, and even i f it is, this would not support the doctrine. However, the doctrine is open to counter-examples. (...) The main counter-argument is that the doctrine has implications which are morally unacceptable. (shrink)

This paper argues that a naturalized epistemology of the kind presented by W.V. Quine preserves everything worthwhile in traditional epistemology. Arguments against Quinean naturalism by such writers as Laurence BonJour, Jaegwon Kim, Richard Rorty, Barry Stroud, and Donald Davidson are criticized. Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, Quinean naturalism does not reject a priori justification. The important point is that epistemology is contained in science. There is no ‘first philosophy’, and, in particular, epistemology is not a normative discipline. Nevertheless, there (...) is a sense in which Quinean naturalism provides an answer to Cartesian scepticism. (shrink)

Moral realism is defined here as the ontological view that there are moral facts. This is compared with traditional views in moral philosophy, such as naturalism, nonnaturalism, and noncognitivism. It is argued that we have no good reasons to avoid inconsistencies among our moral views unless (we believe that) moral realism is true. Various counter-arguments to this claim are criticized. Moreover, it is argued that, since we do not want to give up the practice of moral reasoning, we have a (...) good reason to believe that moral realism is true. (shrink)

Keywords: W.V.Quine claimed that relativism is paradoxical and unacceptable; nevertheless, his own views concerning truth and the underdetermination of theories by data amount to an interesting and plausible form of relativism.