This article outlines the motivations and main findings of Favela and Machery's “Investigating the concept of representation in the neural and psychological sciences”, and discusses what to do with the concept of representation in the brain sciences moving forward.

Much ado – and increased complexity – is generally the case when it comes to checking formally the (intended) meaning of programs, as formal semantics for programs are typically extrinsic to both them and the formal grammars that generate the programming languages in which they are written. The van Wijngaarden grammars, on the contrary, have an intrinsic semantics in the sense that their rules contain or express the (intended) meaning of the terminal strings generated by them. This intrinsicness allows for (...) preservation of meaning both in syntactic change and context-sensitive conditions. In order better to show the intrinsicness of the semantics of the van Wijngaarden grammars I contrast them with the attribute grammars, a frequent choice when the semantic analysis of programming languages is called for (e.g., in compilation). (shrink)

This paper discusses the possible classification of Aristotle’s syllogistic as a non-classical logical system, positing Aristotle himself as a non-classical logician. Initially, we find compelling arguments for this thesis, particularly regarding the expressive power and the rules governing logical inference inherent in Aristotle’s approach. My analysis nevertheless addresses two significant counterarguments. The first, the special case objection, posits that Aristotle’s syllogistic can be framed as a classical logic which deals with canonical syllogistic forms. I argue that this objection is insufficient, (...) as it is possible to point cases in which his system seems to differ from classical logic. The second counterargument, the formalisation gap objection, highlights that Aristotle’s syllogistic resists straightforward modern logical interpretations. This latter objection is evaluated as more compelling and substantial. In particular, a distinction between two concepts is proposed which could help us understand what Aristotle was aiming at in his theory of inference: the notions of ‘to follow from’ and ‘to be a conclusion of’. While the former aligns with the usual sense formal validity, the second requires an inferential structure connecting the premises to the conclusion, explaining why Aristotle excluded inferences like from A ⊢ A syllogisms despite acknowledging that A follows from A. (shrink)

El comentario se concentra en la práctica del voto como mecanismo de decisión y en las estrategias de disolución de las fuerzas antidemocráticas. El que las prácticas efectivas en ambos casos no difieran parece redundar en un déficit para el deliberacionismo, el cual, a diferencia del agonismo, no puede justificar claramente dichas prácticas. A su vez, se detiene en las diferencias epistemológicas que ambas posiciones presentan. The discussion concentrates on two aspects: the practice of voting as a decision mechanism and (...) the strategies for the dissolution of the anti-democratic forces. The fact that effective practices in both cases do not differ leads to a deficit for deliberationism, which, unlike agonism, seems to not be able to clearly justify such practices from its theoretical position. The discussion also pays attention to the differences between the epistemological assumptions that sustain both positions. (shrink)

George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) condemnation of freethinking arose from the social, political, and, above all, moral repercussions that he believed this heterogeneous group was bringing about in British society. In the first part of this paper, I set out the challenges posed by the freethinking movement, drawing extensively on Berkeley’s Alciphron. In the second part, I address both the reasons behind his aversion to freethinking and his response, which involved advocating for the union of Church and state and while rejecting secular (...) governance. This analysis relies primarily on lesser-known works from Berkeley’s socio-political writings. The paper argues that Berkeley’s opposition to freethinkers was driven by his concern for the public good and his belief that the Christian religion, particularly in its Anglican tradition, was the most effective means to achieve it. (shrink)

This paper examines the Hans Blumeberg’s philosophical program: the metaphorology. My intention is to show the importance of Blumenberg’s ideas into the current debate on the relations between philosophy and metaphor.

In this article, we respond to Rosa Cao's, Frances Egan's, and John Krakauer's comments, defending our interpretation of our experimental results and the significance of an epistemology of the imprecise.

Are philosophy and literature allies or enemies in Jorge Luis Borges's fictions? In this paper, I argue that Borges can satisfy membership in the allies camp because his fictions provide the imaginative scenarios the allies believe are so necessary to this coalition; however, because his stories question philosophy's hold on reality, they can also seem to fall into the enemies camp by countervailing any claim philosophy has on reality and truth; although, ultimately, the manner in which Borges forges an (...) alliance between philosophy and literature will be for reasons not traditionally accepted by those in either the allies or enemies camps. (shrink)

Cornelius de Pauw was very well known in the last decades of the eighteenth century for his Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains. That work was developed on a naturalist hypothesis that asserted that nature conditioned all living beings. From this, he analyzed and compared American nature, including its animals and inhabitants, and concluded that it was degenerated and inferior in all fields to that of the Old World. This article contends with an author that represents a central link in the (...) eighteenth-century process of indigenous dehumanization. For doing this, the article first points out de Pauw’s context and influences. Second, it expounds his description of American nature and then, as the outcome of this, his characterization of the indigenous “natural” condition. After that, the article considers his reasoning regarding indigenous non-adaptation to Western way of life as a case of moral disengagement. Finally, the author reflects about the type of work de Pauw wrote and stresses his role in promoting the dehumanization and annihilation of the indigenous Americans. (shrink)

El presente artículo se inscribe en el marco de la creación de una cultura del cuidado del otro, signo de civilización y humanización, cuyo objetivo es reflexionar sobre el papel de la compasión en la mejora de los vínculos terapéuticos. Se constata que el mundo de la medicina es rebasado frecuentemente por los avances de la técnica y la ciencia, quedando de lado la parte compasiva y humanista. Por lo anterior, es necesario volver a fundamentar la compasión en los vínculos (...) terapéuticos e insertarla en la dinámica del cuidado médico y terapéutico. Se propone a su vez una comprensión más completa de la persona y de los diferentes grados de vida que la integran. Finalmente, se busca introducir la compasión de manera concreta, a través de la “conversación lograda” es decir de una escucha y diálogo inteligente y compasivo. (shrink)

In this unique book, leading legal scholars and philosophers provide a breadth of perspectives and inspire stimulating debate around the transformations of jurisprudence in a globalized world. Traditionally the central debates surrounding jurisprudence and legal theory are concerned with the elucidation of the particularities of state-law. This innovative book considers that this orthodox picture may no longer be tenable, given the increasing standardization of technologies, systems and information worldwide.Split across four thematic parts, this timely book provides a broad overview of (...) the topic, followed by in depth analyses investigating the modifications to jurisprudence's methodological approaches driven by globalization, the concepts and theoretical tools required to account for putative new forms of legal phenomena, and normative issues relating to the legitimacy and democratic character of these legal orders. Chapters cover legal encounters with alterity in a post-monist mode, normative legal pluralism, relating law and power in a historical global context, cosmopolitan legitimacy and human rights and dignity in a corporate world.Jurisprudence in a Globalized World will be a key resource for students and scholars working in global transnational law, public international law and legal theory and philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper I present reasons for us to accept the hypothesis that suspended judgment has correctness conditions, just like beliefs do. Roughly put, the idea is that suspended judgment about p is correct when both p and ¬p might be true in view of certain facts that characterize the subject’s situation. The reasons to accept that hypothesis are broadly theoretical ones: it adds unifying power to our epistemological theories, it delivers good and conservative consequences, and it allows us to (...) assess processes of reasoning involving attitudes of suspended judgment. (shrink)

El presente trabajo busca analizar la relación de la propuesta de hermenéutica analógica de Mauricio Beuchot con sus estudios previos publicados para documentar la historia de la filosofía novohispana, encontrando en estos la raíz de la famosa propuesta Beuchot. Palabras clave: Beuchot, hermenéutica analógica, filosofía novohispana.

Foundational ontologies, central constructs in ontological investigations and engineering alike, are based on ontological categories. Firstly proposed by Aristotle as the very ur- elements from which the whole of reality can be derived, they are not easy to identify, let alone partition and/or hierarchize; in particular, the question of their number poses serious challenges. The late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg wrote around 1286 a tutorial that can help us today with this exceedingly difficult task. In this paper, I discuss (...) ontological categories and their importance for foundational ontologies from both the contemporary perspective and the original Aristotelian viewpoint, I provide the translation from the Latin into English of Dietrich's De origine II with an introductory elaboration, and I extract a foundational ontology–that is in fact a single-category one–from this text rooted in Dietrich's specification of types of subjecthood and his conception of intentionality as causal operation. (shrink)

Ontologies are some of the most central constructs in today's large plethora of knowledge technologies, namely in the context of the semantic web. As their coinage indicates, they are direct heirs to the ontological investigations in the long Western philosophical tradition, but it is not easy to make bridges between them. Contemporary ontological commitments often take causality as a central aspect for the ur-segregation of entities, especially in scientific upper ontologies; theories of causality and philosophical ontological investigations often go hand-in-hand, (...) and were essentially inseparable in medieval thought. This constitutes the foundation for a bridge, and this article analyzes the causality-based ontology of the late medieval philosopher Dietrich of Freiberg from the viewpoint of today's upper-ontology engineering. In this bridging attempt, it offers a translation into English of the first part of Dietrich's De origine (abbreviated title) that is a compromise between traditional scholarly translations of medieval Latin philosophical texts and contemporary ontology. (shrink)

A partir de la filosofía de Gilles Deleuze, en el presente artículo estudiaremos el proceso de sujeción, es decir, cómo cierto Poder reduce el potencial de los seres (humanos y otros), convirtiéndolos en súbditos de su ordenamiento autoritario. Tomando varios conceptos (plano de inmanencia, plano de consistencia, Cuerpo-Sin-Órganos) que atraviesan la ontología política deleuziana, analizaremos este proceso generador de impotencia señalando tres fases: cierre, sumisión y vigilancia. Explicaremos estos tres estadios (estratos) usando unos sencillos gráficos que facilitarán la comprensión y (...) promoverán su aplicación a problemáticas actuales concretas. Finalmente, en las conclusiones, enarbolaremos el concepto animal (antagonista del sujeto) como expresión del CsO. (shrink)

Este texto é uma leitura do conceito de comunicação proposto por Charles H. Cooley em seu livro “Social Organization”, publicado originalmente em 1909. Ao que tudo indica, trata-se de uma das primeiras abordagens teóricas da Comunicação enquanto objeto específico de conhecimento. Embora escrito há mais de um século, em um contexto diferente do atual, suas proposições antecipam algumas ideias em circulação na área. São destacadas três de suas proposições: (1) a diferenciação dos fenômenos comunicacionais em relação a outros processos individuais (...) e sociais; (2) a comunicação como relação humana primeira, vínculo mediador na formação dos sujeitos em articulação com o social e (3) cada mídia, da palavra ao impresso, atua com outros elementos na configuração de um ambiente sócio-cognitivo específico. Esses pontos são discutidos no contexto do debate epistemológico da Comunicação. (shrink)

En este trabajo se presenta un aspecto de las posibles relaciones entre “historia” y “acción” en la obra de Kant. Contra lo que usualmente es sostenido en la literatura, la obra de Kant parece mostrar, a partir del aspecto que se analiza aquí, una conexión íntima con algunos de los presupuestos básicos de la concepción hegeliana de la acción, que fundan la sensible concepción social que éste tiene de ella.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:.. MERELY A MAN OF LETTERS" an interview with Jorge Luis Borges* Philosophy and Literature: Why don't you tell us about some of the philosophers who have influenced your work and in whom you have been the most interested? Jorge Luis Borges: Well, I think that's an easy one. You might talk in terms of two: Berkeley and Schopenhauer. But I suppose Hume might be worked in (...) also, because, after all, Hume refutes Berkeley. Really, he comes from Berkeley—even if Berkeley comes from Locke. You might think of Locke, of Berkeley, and of Hume as being three links in an argument..... But I suppose that when someone refutes someone else in philosophy, he is carrying on the argument. P&L: And Schopenhauer? Borges: Schopenhauer is very different from Hume. Of course, Schopenhauer had his idea of the Will. That is not to be found in Hume.... The case of Berkeley was different. I suppose he thought of God as being aware of all things all the time, if I don't get him wrong. If we go away, does this room disappear? No, because God is thinking about it. Now, in the case of Schopenhauer, I was rereading Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, The World as Will and Idea, and I was rather taken aback, or baffled I should say, puzzled by something that keeps on recurring in Schopenhauer. Of course it may have been a slip of the pen, but as he goes back to it, and as he was a very careful writer, I wonder if it is a slip of the pen. For example, Schopenhauer begins by saying that the universe, the stars, the spaces in between, the planets, *On April 14, 1976, two editors of Philosophy and Literature, along with an interested colleague, interviewed Jorge Luis Borges at Michigan State University, where he held a position as visiting professor for the winter term. These remarks are edited from the transcript of that conversation. 337 338Philosophy and Literature this planet, those things, have no existence—except in the mind which perceives them. But then, to my surprise—and I suppose you can explain this to me, since you are philosophers and I am not—what Schopenhauer says is that all those things have no existence except in the brain. And that the universe—I remember these words, I don't think I'm inventing them now—"ist ein Gehirnphänomen," that the world is a cerebral phenomenon. Now, I was baffled. Because, of course, if you think of the universe, I suppose the brain is as much a part of the external world as the stars or the moon. The brain after all is a system of visual, of tactile, perceptions. He keeps on insisting on the brain. I don't think, for example, that Bishop Berkeley insists on the brain, or Hume, who would have insisted on the mind, consciousness. P&L: People sometimes say that they see Berkeley in stories like "Orbis Tertius." Borges: Yes, I suppose they do. Well, of course. But in that story I was led by literary means also. P&L: How do you distinguish the literary from the philosophical means in that story? Could you explain that? Borges: Very easily.... Encyclopedias have been my chief reading. I have always been interested in encyclopedias. I used to go to the Biblioteca National in Buenos Aires—and since I was so shy, I felt I could not cope with asking for a book, so I looked on the shelves for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. I would pick up any chance volume and I would read it. One night I was richly rewarded, because I read all about the Druses, Dryden and the Druids—a treasure trove, no?—all in the same volume, "Dr-." Then I came to the idea of how fine it would be to think of an encyclopedia... a very rigorous one of course, of an imaginary world, where everything should be linked. For example, you would have a language and then a literature, and then a history and so on. Then I thought I would write a story of a fancy encyclopedia. Of course that would require many different people to write it... (shrink)

Luis de Molina was a leading figure in the remarkable sixteenth-century revival of Scholasticism on the Iberian peninsula. Molina is best known for his innovative theory of middle knowledge. Alfred J. Freddoso's extensive introductory essay clears up common misconceptions about Molina's theory, defends it against both philosophical and theological objections, and makes it accessible to contemporary readers.

Deontological evidentialism is the claim that we ought to form and maintain our beliefs in accordance with our evidence. In this paper, I criticize two arguments in its defense. I begin by discussing Berit Broogard’s use of the distinction between narrow-scope and wide-scope requirements against W.K. Clifford’s moral defense of. I then use this very distinction against a defense of inspired by Stephen Grimm’s more recent claims about the moral source of epistemic normativity. I use this distinction once again to (...) argue that Hilary Kornblith’s criticism of Richard Feldman’s defense of is incomplete. Finally, I argue that Feldman’s defense is insensitive to the relation between normative requirements and privileged values: values that have normative authority over us. (shrink)

Este ensaio tratará da singularidade da Filosofia Africana no Brasil como um discurso em “pretuguês”. Para ilustrar esse discurso, partimos da narrativa akan de Kwaku Ananse e expomos como as diferentes temáticas compõem uma teia tal como uma troca de argumentações entre as dimensões da história, da política e da cultura. Essa composição é suscitada pela diáspora africana, interpretada aqui como um elemento provocador de uma percepção outra de filosofia e de um projeto de humanidade. Por fim, este ensaio apresenta (...) como o discurso filosófico em pretuguês faz da Filosofia Africana uma experiência pluriversal e repleta de diversas vozes. (shrink)

The following text looks at certain philosophical points of convergence and divergence between Novalis and Fichte with respect to their theories of nature. Somewhat notoriously, Fichte places nature in opposition to the I (Ich) of the human being, designating the natural world using the abstract formula “Not-I”. Yet Fichte also insists that this abstraction should be made concrete and particular, as both an “it” and as a “you”. This chapter argues that Novalis did not reject Fichte’s theory of nature as (...) a Not-I — as is often claimed in the research. Rather, the inverse is actually the case: Novalis positively adopted and expanded on the Fichtean conception of nature as a “you”. (shrink)

El concepto ‘sistema’, central en filosofía, sobre todo a partir de Brucker, tuvo un especial impulso con Leibniz, quien lo concibió como un conjunto de postulados organizado según principios taxonómicos que seguían el modelo del cálculo. En el sistema de Leibniz, Dios jugó un papel central al tratarse del ser que posibilitaba comprender el mundo y construir el conocimiento humano. Este artículo se propone mostrar, mediante un panorama amplio, qué se entiende por sistema leibniziano, cómo está configurado dicho sistema y (...) por qué es pertinente hablar de Leibniz como un filósofo sistemático. (shrink)

El presente artículo tiene como misión demostrar cómo la poesía mexicana, en especial la de los años sesenta, trabajó no únicamente el problema de la identidad, sino, además, cómo se apropió del giro lingüístico en su estructura para responder a dicha pregunta; todo ello enmarcado bajo el concepto histórico de lo moderno. Para ello, primero se abordará la redefinición de la literatura mexicana tras la Revolución de 1910; después, se abordará la idea de Octavio Paz sobre modernidad y su relación (...) con la poesía como un aparato crítico; y, al final, la exposición de los poemas de Ulalume González de León, para ahondar en cómo cuestiona y define el lenguaje y la identidad en su obra poética de 1968 y 1969. (shrink)

Why should we avoid incoherence? An influential view tells us that incoherent combinations of attitudes are such that it is impossible for all of those attitudes to be simultaneously vindicated by the evidence. But it is not clear whether this view successfully explains what is wrong with certain akratic doxastic states. In this paper I flesh out an alternative response to that question, one according to which the problem with incoherent combinations of attitudes is that it is impossible for all (...) of those attitudes to be simultaneously knowledgeable. This alternative response explains what is wrong with akratic combinations of attitudes using commonly accepted epistemological theses. The paper still shows how this proposal is able to explain the badness of incoherent combinations involving the absence of attitudes, suspended judgment and credence. These explanations deploy the notions of knowledge and being in a position to know, instead of the notion of responding properly to the evidence. Finally, I suggest that this picture can be generalized to the realm of practical rationality as well. (shrink)