매월당 김시습은 조선조를 대표하는 학자로서 수양대군의 왕위찬탈 사건의 불의함을 보 고 당시의 현실에 항거하여 은둔과 유랑의 삶을 선택한 생육신 가운데 한 명이다. 이 글은 매월당의 유불도 삼가사상 가운데 도가사상에 초점을 맞춰 그의 학문관을 살펴보고자 한 것이다. 이 글은 특히 매월당이 본 장자관의 기본입장이 무엇인지 살펴보는 것이 목표이다. 매월당은 자신의 시대가 장자가 언급한 인간세와 같다고 규정한다. 인간세란 기본적으 로 인간이 살아가는 세상을 가리킨다. 그러나 장자는 특히 정치적 혼란의 상황으로 야기된 난세를 지칭하여 인간세라고 규정한다. 매월당은 이러한 장자의 사상을 계승하여 자신의 시대를 인간세라고 (...) 규정한 후 그 위에서 펼쳐지는 갖가지 병폐들을 지적하면서 이에 대한 반성을 촉구한다. 여기서 대안으로 제시되는 것이 장자적 의미의 자연세계를 대변하는 도 교적 천상의 세계이며, 신선에로의 변화 가능성을 꿈꾸어보는 것이었다. 매월당은 인간세의 한계를 극복하는 방편으로써 인간세의 가치 덕목이라 할 수 있는 외 물에 대한 부정적인 태도와 이를 통한 거리두기의 입장을 취한다. 매월당은 외물에 대한 거리두기 차원에서 장자의 좌망에 주목하고 무사, 무려와 같은 무심의 마음상태를 간직해 야 함을 강조한다. 이러한 맥락에서 매월당은 방내인의 삶의 한계를 비판함과 동시에 방외 인의 삶이 가지고 있는 철학적 의의에 대해 주목하기도 한다. 그가 방내인이 이해하기에 곤란한 미친 행동을 보인 것이라던가, 평생 졸박한 삶의 태도로 일관한 것, 그리고 자기 자신을 가리켜 기형아와 같은 사람이라고 평가하면서 한 세상을 살아간 것은 매월당의 삶 의 자취가 장자철학과 밀접하게 연관된 방외인의 삶 그 자체였음을 알려준다. (shrink)

Recent scholars focus mainly on Paul’s use of ‘brothers (and sisters)’ or ‘brother (and sister)’ in Greco-Roman epistolary conventions and cultural backdrops. However, Jewish dimensions (particularly ethnic dimensions) of Paul’s sibling language still remain unexplored in current scholarship. Furthermore, scholars have not drawn much attention to how Jewish letter writers use sibling terms in their letters. This article offers a new interpretation on Paul’s sibling language in light of its Jewish usage. We should note that Jewish letter writers did not (...) address their Gentile letter recipients as ‘brother(s)’. However, Paul did call his recipients ‘brothers’. It is unlikely that Paul employed sibling language without being aware of its common Jewish usage. The author proposes that Paul’s sibling language is used in the context of an ethnic insider designation (shared ethnicity), and that ascribing the title of brother to believers including Gentiles signals the re-definition of the family of Abraham. (shrink)

What does it mean to read Ham Seok-heon in the 21st century? Furthermore, what does it mean to read the ‘East-Asian Classics’ through him? In this article, I would like to raise a few issues that existing discussions on the relationship between Ham Seok-heon and the East-Asian Classics have not paid attention to, in order to point out the points that we should give more weight to in the hermeneutics of Ham Seok-heon’s ‘Chewing on Old Classics’. First, Ham’s should be (...) read as an independent text in its own right, not as a commentary on the ‘Oriental Classics’. Second, his SSi-al’ Readings of Old Classics should be read in the context of life and place in contemporary Korea, rather than the Laozi and the Zhuangzi relationships it addresses. Third, the meanings and values in SSi-al’ Readings of Old Classics do not lie in its original interpretation of traditional commentaries, but rather in the “common sense” that guided the perceptions and practices of Ssi-al in the democratization process of twentieth-century Korea. To emphasize this aspect, I contrast it with the interpretation of the Zhuangzi in China during the same period. I want to argue that if Chinese intellectuals in the twentieth century anticipated their own destiny through the interpretation and discussion of the Zhuangzi, Ham Seok-heon’s reading of the Zhuangzi was expressed as the voice of Ssi-al, which changed the subject of interpretation and at the same time called for the values of modern freedom and equality and preached the ideology of democracy and self-government to realize them. In reading Ham Seok-heon in this way, I believe that we can properly evaluate the historical and philosophical meaning and value of SSi-al’ Readings of Old Classics. (shrink)

The main purpose of this article is to discuss the place of the ethics of virtues and char acter in nursing and health care in general, and in psychiatric nursing in particular. To attain this goal, the relationship between the ethics of duty (i.e. rule based ethics) and the ethics of virtue and character will be clarified in order to defend our main hypothe sis that these two types of ethics should complement each other, since both are necessary but neither (...) by itself is sufficient for nursing. This means that any applied ethics, as in nursing, should consider the importance of the agent's moral character. To support our arguments, we shall use cases from the empirical reality of psychiatric and mental health care. (shrink)

Shavelson et al. (2023) raise the familiar question of parity or fairness in the assisted dying1 debate: if we legally permit the practice for one person, should we not permit everyone similarly si...

Une des doctrines centrales de l’émergentisme est la thèse selon laquelle certaines propriétés d’un tout sont émergentes, en ce sens qu’elles sont irréductibles aux propriétés de base dont elles émergent — c’est-à-dire qu’elles ne peuvent ni être prédites, ni être expliquées à partir de leurs conditions sousjacentes. Pour comprendre et évaluer cette thèse correctement, il est essentiel que nous disposions d’un concept adéquat de réduction. Nous examinons d’abord le modèle classique de la réduction interthéorique de Nagel, et nous soutenons qu’il (...) ne nous fournit pas une base adéquate pour comprendre la thèse émergentiste. Nous proposons ensuite un autre modèle de réduction, celui de la « réduction fonctionnelle », et nous montrons qu’il constitue une base adéquate permettant d’évaluer la thèse émergentiste. Nous concluons avec une brève discussion de la question de savoir si les propriétés phénoménales d’expériences conscientes, ou qualia , sont émergentes.A central doctrine of emergentism is the thesis that some properties of wholes are emergent in the sense that they are irreducible to the “basal” properties from which they emerge — that is, they are neither predictable nor explainable in terms of their underlying conditions. To understand and properly evaluate this claim, it is essential that we have at hand an appropriate concept of reduction. This paper first examines the classic Nagel model of inter- theoretic reduction and finds it wanting as a basis for understanding the emergentist claim. Another model of reduction, “functional reduction”, is proposed, and it is argued that this model does provide an appropriate basis for evaluating the claim that certain properties of wholes are emergent. The paper closes with a brief discussion of the question whether qualia , or the phenomenal properties of conscious experience, are emergent. (shrink)

A lire attentivement Descartes, on se surprend à constater que l'inventeur de la philosophie du sujet pensant emploie rarement le mot de " sujet ", si ce n'est au sens traditionnel et scolastique de sujet des accidents ou des qualités, ou encore de substance. Le but de ce volume est donc d'aborder à nouveaux frais la question à partir de l'inventaire du vocabulaire cartésien de la " subjectivité ". Devons-nous dire ainsi que l'ego du cogito est sujet? Ou bien la (...) res cogitans? Ou encore la mens? Y a-t-il un sujet corporel chez Descartes, ou alors l'union est-elle le sujet? Y a-t-il, de la même manière, un sujet des passions? Un ipse, une ipséité serait-elle enfin le sujet chez Descartes? Multiples formes de la question de savoir s'il y a bien une philosophie du sujet chez Descartes. (shrink)

Riassunto: Lo statuto della psicologia come scienza speciale è l’oggetto del dibattito pluridecennale intercorso tra Jerry Fodor e Jaegwon Kim. La questione epistemologica delle leggi delle scienze cognitive si intreccia inestricabilmente con riflessioni di tipo metafisico sul dilemma mente-corpo: se Fodor ammette la validità delle leggi psicologiche, considerate irriducibili alle leggi della fisica, il fisicalismo riduzionista di Kim esclude invece tale possibilità. Così, il dialogo tra i due paradigmi funzionalisti delinea una serie di snodi problematici relativi sia allo status delle (...) proprietà mentali, come alla possibilità di una scienza che possa aprirsi alla inter-specificità, o alla trasversalità delle strutture di implementazione. Centrale, nel dibattito, è la nozione di realizzabilità multipla: tale argomento, che viene addotto a sostegno di un certo grado di autonomia del mentale, viene da Kim giudicato, invece, essenzialmente aporetico. Parole chiave: Filosofia della mente; Scienze cognitive; Realizzabilità multipla; Funzionalismo; Fisicalismo riduzionista Fodor, Kim and the autonomy of cognitive sciences: The status of psychology as a special science is the main topic of the debate between two of the most important philosophers of mind in our times: Jerry Fodor and Jaegwon Kim. The epistemology of psychological laws is inextricably intertwined with the metaphysical quarrel over the mind-body problem. Fodor argues for the validity of psychological laws and their irreducibility to physical ones, whereas Kim’s reductive physicalism rules out their validity. Therefore, the dialogue between these two functionalist paradigms covers a range of open questions concerning the status of mental properties within a physicalist framework, as well as questions concerning the possibility of cross-species cognitive sciences. The notion of multiple realization is a pivotal point in this debate: it should indicate that the mind enjoys a certain degree of autonomy, yet Kim judges it to be aporetic in nature. Keywords: Philosophy of Mind; Cognitive Sciences; Multiple Realization; Functionalism; Reductive Physicalism. (shrink)

Kichul Kim, né en 1969 à Séoul, a ceci de remarquable qu’il prétend — et réussit — à sculpter le son. En effet, il a une formation de sculpteur. Mais il se fascine très tôt pour le son, pour des raisons spirituelles. L’énigme du bodhisattva Gwan-eum qui, selon l’étymologie de son nom, « voit ou fait voir les sons », l’intrigue. Une intuition lui révèle — pense-t-il — de quoi il s’agit. Il va s’efforcer de le faire voir à son (...) tour. Le son fait voir, visualiser, évoquer, et on peut donc, en ce sens, voir le son. Ses installations sonores sont en général réalisées dans des formes minimales et simplifiées. Ces formes pures ne correspondent qu’au son qu’il veut diffuser. C’est le son qu’émettent des haut-parleurs, un son qu’il a enregistré et qui parle. En effet, le son, tout invisible et intangible qu’il est, par l’espace qu’il recrée et modèle, est tridimensionnel, et sculptable. Le spectateur ne peut certes pas voir ce travail sonore par ses yeux de chair, pas plus qu’il ne peut le toucher de sa main, mais son œil de l’imagination, son imagination visuelle, le construit, et en ce sens il le perçoit bien : à partir du son se crée une image, une image dont l’intensité frôle l’illusion. On a là un véritable environnement créé par le son. Inspiré par l’Extrême-Orient ancien, son art et sa pensée, Kichul Kim puise dans ses sites historiques, religieux souvent, et dans la nature, son inspiration et ses enregistrements. L’environnement particulier d’origine est rendu présent par son son, si puissamment que l’auditeur devient spectateur, recréant activement la scène originelle : spect-acteur. Plongé si profondément en lui-même, il est graduellement conduit aux portes d’une sorte de méditation, ici et ailleurs à la fois, comme hors du temps. Kichul Kim, born in 1969 in Seoul, is remarkable in that he claims—and succeeds—to carve the sound. He trained as a sculptor but was fascinated very early with the sound, for spiritual reasons. The enigma of the Bodhisattva Gwan-eum which, according to the etymology of its name, “sees or makes one see sounds”, intrigued him. He understood intuititvely what it means and tried to examplify it himself. The sound makes you see, visualize, evoke, and you can, in this sense, see the sound. His sound installations are generally performed in minimal and simplified forms. These pure forms correspond only to the sound he wants to produce. This is the sound emitted through loudspeakers, a sound that he recorded and that speaks. Indeed, the sound, as invisible and intangible as it is, thanks to the space it recreates and models, becomes three-dimensional, and “sculptable”. The spectator certainly cannot see this sonic work through his/her eyes of flesh, any more than he/she can touch it with his/her hand. But his/her eye of the imagination, the visual imagination, builds it, and in this sense he/she perceives it well: from the sound is created an image whose intensity borders on illusion. This is a real environment created by sound. Inspired by the ancient Far East, its art and thought, Kichul Kim draws from historical sites, often religious, and from nature, for his inspiration, and recordings. The particular environment of which the sounds originates is made present by the sound, so powerfully that the listener becomes a spectator, actively recreating the original scene: spect-actor. So deeply immersed in himself, he is gradually led to the gates of a kind of meditation, here and elsewhere at once, as if out of time. (shrink)

In this paper we reconstruct an argument, based on the observations of David Lewis and Jaegwon Kim, according to which, given that identities are necessary, they cannot be grounded; and given that they cannot be grounded, they cannot be explained either. We argue against two key premises of this argument. Furthermore, we present two counterexamples, in the form of two alleged sets of cases of explanation of identities. This argument against the explanation of identities is instrumental for a wider discussion (...) about the nature of explanation itself, in relation with other notions of recent philosophical interest such as grounding. (shrink)

Kim maintains that a physicalist has only two genuine options, eliminativism and reductionism. But physicalists can reject both by using the Strict Implication thesis (SI). Discussing his arguments will help to show what useful work SI can do.(1) His discussion of anomalous monism depends on an unexamined assumption to the effect that SI is false.

Jaegwon Kim définissait une propriété intrinsèque comme une propriété compatible avec le fait que l’objet ne serait accompagné d’aucun autre être contingent. Mais cela impliquerait que la solitude serait une propriété intrinsèque, or c’est une propriété extrinsèque. Les auteurs définissent une propriété intrinsèque de base comme une propriété indépendante de la solitude et de l’accompagnement et qui n’est ni une propriété disjonctive ni une négation de propriété disjonctive. Deux doubles intrinsèques sont des objets qui ont toutes les mêmes propriétés intrinsèques (...) de base. Une propriété intrinsèque peut dès lors être définie comme une propriété qui ne peut jamais différer entre deux doubles. Cette définition est ensuite appliquée à différents problèmes. Si les lois de la nature sont absolument nécessaires ou qu’un être nécessaire existe, de nombreuses connexions deviendraient alors des propriétés intrinsèques et il sera nécessaire de conserver un sens à la possibilité que ces connexions nécessaires auraient pu ne pas exister. Les propriétés dispositionnelles seront intrinsèques ou non, selon la conception des lois de la nature. Il est possible de suivre les conséquences de la définition, en amendant éventuellement d’autres concepts. La définition peut aussi s’appliquer aux relations. Les auteurs comparent aussi leur définition à d’autres définitions antérieurement données par David Lewis et Peter Vallentyne. (shrink)

In questo articolo si analizza la situazione della religione nativa popolare coreana, comunemente descritta col termine ombrello di “sciamanesimo”, durante la metà e la seconda parte del periodo Koryŏ. Lo studio tenta di espandere e correggere alcune assunzioni di base del lavoro di Lee Seog-Ju (2010), il quale ha descritto la dialettica esistente tra l’élite confuciana, la casa reale, il buddismo e lo sciamanesimo in epoca Koryŏ, correggendo come detto alcuni assunti storici dell’autore. Nello specifico si terrà conto de: la (...) pervasività della dottrina nell’aiuto esterno dei bodhisattva nella Corea medievale come notato da Yung Sung-chan (2016); l’esistenza di un sincretismo tra le dottrina confuciane e quelle buddiste, notato da Kim Jongmyung (2016) e Vermeersch (2020); la natura sincretica dello sciamanesimo in rapporto col buddismo, notata da più autori quali Grayson (1992) e McBride (2007), infine, l’importanza dello sciamanesimo nei riti nazionali preesistenti come l’Assemblea delle Otto Proibizioni, sottolineata da Vermeersch (2007). Tesi di questo articolo è dimostrare come lo scontro con lo sciamanesimo da parte degli intellettuali confuciani di Koryŏ fosse dovuto non tanto da una supposta devianza dall’ortodossia confuciana da parte della religione nativa, ma da una sua non aderenza ai canoni dei riti del buddismo di Stato. Lo scritto si muoverà secondo il seguente schema: anzitutto verrà brevemente analizzata la società del regno di Koryŏ nei suoi aspetti religiosi, culturali, sociali e politici, verrà poi data una descrizione della relazione trai due attori in campo, vale a dire lo sciamanesimo e il confucianesimo in relazione al buddismo, infine verranno fornite le conclusioni dello studio. (shrink)

1. Kant on the “Conditions of the Possibility” of Experience -- Claude Piché // 2. Plato and Kantian Transcendental Constructivism -- Tom Rockmore // 3. Kant and Fichte on the Notion of (Transcendental) Freedom -- Violetta L. Waibel // 4. Fichte, Transcendental Ontology, and the Ethics of Belief -- Steven Hoeltzel // 5. Transcendental Philosophy as “Therapy of the Mind”: Fichte’s “Facts of Consciousness” Lectures -- Benjamin D. Crowe // 6. From Transcendental Philosophy to Hegel’s Developmental Method -- William F. (...) Bristow // 7. How Transcendental Is Cohen’s Critical Idealism? -- Halla Kim // 8. Heidegger’s Failure to Overcome Transcendental Philosophy -- Eric S. Nelson // 9. Others as the Ground of Our Existence: Levinas, Løgstrup, and Transcendental Arguments in Ethics -- Robert Stern // 10. Raising Validity Claims for Reasons: Transcendental Reflection in Apel’s Argumentative Discourse -- Matthias Kettner // 11. Transcendental Arguments Based on Question-Answer Contradictions -- Yukio Irie // 12. Consequences of the Transcendental-Pragmatic Consensus Theory of Truth -- Michihito Yoshime // 13. On Jürgen Habermas’s Cognitive Theory of Morality -- Yasuyuki Funaba . (shrink)

There is a very striking difference between even the simplest ethnographically known human societies and those of the chimps and bonobos. Chimp and bonobo societies are closed societies: with the exception of adolescent females who disperse from their natal group and join a nearby group (never to return to their group of origin), a pan residential group is the whole social world of the agents who make it up. That is not true of forager bands, which have fluid memberships, and (...) regular associations with neighbouring bands. They are components of a larger social world. The open and fluid character of forager bands brings with it many advantages, so the stability of this more vertically complex form of social life is not difficult to explain, once it establishes. But how did it establish, if, as is likely, earlier hominin social worlds resemble those of our close pan relatives in the suspicion (even hostility) of one band to another? How did hominin social organisation transition from life in closed bands, each distrustful of its neighbours, to the much more open social lives of foragers? I will discuss and synthesise two approaches to this problem, one ecological, based on the work of Robert Layton and his colleagues, and another that is organised around an expansion of kin recognition, an idea primarily driven by Bernard Chapais. The paper closes by discussing potential archaeological signatures both of more open social worlds, and of the supposed causal drivers of such worlds. (shrink)

Who should have a right to participate in a polity’s decision-making? Although the answers to this ‘boundary problem’ in democratic theory remain controversial, it is widely believed that the enfranchisement of tourists and children is unacceptable. Yet, the two most prominent inclusion principles in the literature – Robert Goodin’s ‘all (possibly) affected interests’-principle and the ‘all subjected to law’-principle – both enfranchise those groups. Unsurprisingly, democratic theorists have therefore offered several reasons for nonetheless exempting tourists and children from the franchise. (...) In this paper, I argue that their attempts fail. None of the proposed rationales can do the job without having unacceptable implications for the voting rights of other groups. I then develop a new specification of the affected interests-view, one that avoids such problems. According to my life plan-principle, a person is entitled to participate in a polity’s decision-making if and only if its decisions will actually affect her autonomously chosen life plans, or prevent her from developing or revising plans of that kind. I show that this principle straightforwardly avoids enfranchising tourists and children, and thus improves upon its two prominent rivals. The paper ends by considering and rejecting two objections to my new principle. (shrink)

In this article we defend the view that, on the All Affected Principle of voting rights, the weight of a person’s vote on a decision should be determined by and only by the degree to which that dec...

Secession is again a hot political topic. Consider the recent events in Catalonia. In an illegal referendum in October 2017, amid large-scale demonstrations and violent interventions by the Spanish...

This anthology, intended to accompany _A Companion to Metaphysics_, brings together over 60 selections which represent the best and most important works in metaphysics during this century. The selections are grouped under ten major metaphysical problems and each section is preceded by an introduction by the editors.