Among many things, Simmel in his Philosophy of Money works out a cultural perspective on money. In reference to socio-historical examples, Simmel differentiates between the »Substanzwert« of those objects, which serve monetary purposes: Whereas the former quality stands for the equalization of material attributes and value, the later describes money's capability for universal exchange. With Ernst Cassirer's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, we can argue that this a »revolution of the way of thinking«: Drawing a parallel between Simmel's »Sustains-« and »Funktionswert« (...) and Cassirers »Ausdrucks-« und »Darstellungsfunktion« does not only point out characteristics of each thinkers cultural philosophy. It also shows how an argument for a monetary understanding of the world – money as a symbolic form – can be developed. (shrink)

Resource finitude, cost containment, and a purchaser monopsony market have created public concern-about the moral and legal responsibility for quality assurance in health plans. Resource allocation and standards of care represent a clash of moral values in intensive care treatment. This essay advances a procedural model, based on legislation passed in Oregon, that could govern the incorporation of private sector health insurance plans in Oregon to assure democratic input from consumers, providers, and employers into a limited vision of individual entitlement (...) to consume futile or inappropriate care in intensive care units. The model, which I call the Oregonian ICU, presumes that rationing of care is implicit and not publicly disclosed under managed care. It focuses on maximizing the quality of limited benefits available in the basic managed care insurance tier. Limitations to futile and inappropriate care are developed on the basis of morally weighted prognostic scoring systems that inform the creation of negotiated private sector contracts. (shrink)

During the 1970s, monetarism and the new classical macroeconomics ushered in an era of neoliberal economic policymaking. Keynesian economics was pushed aside. It was almost forgotten that when Keynesian thinking had dominated economic policymaking in the middle decades of the twentieth century, it had coincided with postwar economic reconstruction in both Europe and Japan, and the unprecedented prosperity and stable growth of the 1950s and 1960s. The global financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the recession that followed changed all that. (...) Influential voices in both academic economics and amongst policy-makers and commentators began to remind us how useful Keynesian ways of thinking could be, especially in coming to terms with our current economic predicaments. When politicians across the globe were confronted with economic crisis, they introduced pragmatic and workable measures that bore all the hallmarks of Keynesianism. This book is about the fall and rise of Keynesian economics.Eatwell and Milgate range widely across the landscape that defines their subject matter. They consider how powerful Keynesian ideas can be when applied to past and present economic problems. They show how helpful these ideas are in explaining why we came to find ourselves in the disorder we are in. They examine where and how the analytical and methodological foundations of conventional macroeconomic wisdom went wrong. They set out a blueprint for an alternative that provides a clearer, more consistent, and more applicable approach to understanding how markets work. They also highlight the interpretive shortcomings that have come to characterize Keynes scholarship itself. They do all of this within the context of a provocative reconsideration of some of the most pressing economic problems that confront financial markets and the global economy today. They conclude that Keynesian ideas are not just for crises, but for constructive economic policy making at all times. (shrink)

Book Description: First published in 1980, this contribution to political thought is a statement of the traditional conservative position. Roger Scruton challenges those who would regard themselves as conservatives, and also their opponents. Conservatism, he argues, has little in common with liberalism, and is only tenuously related to the market economy, to monetarism, to free enterprise or to capitalism. It involves neither hostility towards the state, nor the desire to limit the state's obligation towards the citizen. Its conceptions of (...) society, law and citizenship regard the individual not as the premise but as the conclusion of politics. At the same time it is fundamentally opposed to the ethic of social justice, to equality of station, opportunity, income and achievement, and to the attempt to bring major institutions of society such as schools and universities under government control. (shrink)

The basics of the state economic policy and its evolution in socio-historical progress in civilization process are analyzed; the author studies the approaches substantiated in their time by such famous thinkers likeNiccolo Machiavelli, ThomasHobbes, JohnLocke, GeorgHegel, KarlMarx, JohnRawls; liberal substantiations suggested byAdamSmith, DavidRicardo, JohnMaynardKeynes, Ludwig von Mises, MiltonFriedman,Friedrich von Hayek, R. Cokhane in their works; utilitarian theory of social welfareby Jeremy Bentham, arepresentative of classical political economical schoolJohnStuartMill didn't deny the possibility and eligibility of state's interference in the economic processes; (...) the utilitarian theory of social welfare by Jeremy Bentham, who suggested pleasures and suffering analysis concept according to which it is expedient to redistribute the income between the rich and the poor to provide the best welfare in the society that influenced thespreading of "marginalist revolution"ideasand which has changed the methodological and theoretical basics of economic policy. Aconsiderable and significant contribution to the economic welfare theory developing was made by Vilfredo Pareto. With the help of the curvesof indifference Vilfredo Paretoanalyzed effective conditions of resources placing based on whichthe first theorem of welfare economy“Pareto optimum”– thecriterion of economic effectiveness was developed. The conceptions of state economic policy suggested by the representatives of monetarism, keynesianism, marxism, economic nationalism and others are analyzed. There is a great range of intermediate ways of economic policy implementation between alternative models being analyzed within which the state regulation is restricted to certain spheres. (shrink)

The increasing standardization, specialisation and monetarization of academic publishing is designed to foster quality in research and expression. But these tendencies also pose serious challenges to the expression of cultural difference, particularly with regard to philosophy and religious studies. Scholars from various cultural backgrounds outside of mainstream universities often find themselves marginalised when the quality of their work is judged through the metrics of mainstream academic publishing. Smaller journals which give a forum to local research are gradually disappearing or becoming (...) irrelevant. The corporate control of publishing limits the access and distribution of information making it difficult for smaller regional universities to access and conduct research. But these challenges to the expression of cultural difference also reflect the deeper tendencies of the information age. To approach this problem, we need to consider the conflict between culture and spirit on the one hand, with the flows of information and capital on the other. I will introduce this problem through an idea of hermeneutics presented by George McLean. I will then discuss the approaches to this problem by such writers as Michel Serres, Jean Francois Lyotard, Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Derrida. I will show that these latter writers devise strategies to reach something outside of the cybernetic flows of information in the media age, but that their solutions are incomplete because they rely on intellectual concepts of redemption and ignore the concrete practices of spiritual redemption. The issue that cross-cultural journals must consider is how to emphasize something beyond the merely intellectual; how to amplify practice within its expression. I will address this issue in the spirit of a poem by Emily Dickinson entitled “Publication – is the Auction” which supplies the title of this essay. (shrink)

According to Xenophon, the hetaira "gratified" her patron as a philos, participating in an aristocratic network of gift exchange , while the pornê, as her name signified, trafficked in sex as a commodity. Recent writers on Greek prostitution have acknowledged that hetaira vs. pornê may be as much a discursive opposition as a real difference in status, but still, very little attention has been paid to the period of the "invention" of this binary. Hetaira meaning "courtesan" first occurs in Herodotus (...) and does not exist in Homer: hence, the conceptual category of the hetaira is an invention of the archaic period. What needs generated the constitution of this category? And what conceptual "work" was the opposition hetaira-pornê doing in Greek culture in the period of its inception? This paper addresses these questions through a reading of fragments of archaic lyric-predominantly those of Anakreon-as well as consideration of Attic vase painting. I suggest that the hetaira-pornê opposition participates in the overarching tension between the aristocratic symposium and the public sphere in archaic Greece. Oswyn Murray has suggested that the symposium constitutes itself as a kind of anti-city with its own rules and conventions. Part of the discursive exclusion of the public sphere is the complete suppression of the city's monetarized economy from the domain of the aristocratic symposium, and it is this impulse to mystify economic relations for sex that generates the category of the hetaira within a framework of gift exchange. But if the motives for this discursive invention are economic, they are also political: the hetaira affirms and embodies the circulation of charis within a privileged elite, while the pornê figures the debased and promiscuous exchanges of the agora. (shrink)

Monetary policy is a modern idea of which David Hume is generally considered a precursor. Moreover, thanks to Milton Friedman and Robert Lucas, he is often presented as one of the first and most illustrious endorser of monetarism. This paper argues against this view, and in agreement with Joseph Schumpeter, that Hume's contribution to economics, while not insignificant, cannot claim any real novelties. It offers an interpretation of Hume as a descendant of a pre-modern understanding of money rather than (...) a forerunner of modern monetary ideas, and as a scholar exposing common ideas of his time rather than a prophet of economic theories developed centuries later, and argues that there is little in Hume that resembles today's monetary policy prescriptions. (shrink)

Locke argues that the consent of market participants to the introduction of money justifies the economic inequalities resulting from monetarization. This paper shows that Locke’s argument fails to justify such inequalities. My critique proceeds in two parts. Regarding the consequences of the consent to money, neo-Lockeans wrongly take consent to justify inequalities in the original appropriation of land. In contrast, I defend the view that consent can only justify inequalities resulting directly from monetized commercial exchange. Secondly, regarding the nature of (...) consent, neo-Lockeans uncritically accept Locke’s account of money as a natural institution. In contrast, I argue that money is an irreducibly political institution and that monetary economies cannot develop in the state of nature. My political account of money has far-reaching implications for the normative analysis of the global monetary system and the justification of the economic inequalities consequent upon it. (shrink)

Für die zeitgenössische Philosophie ist das Vererben ein Vermögenstransfer, der unter Gesichtspunkten sozialer Gerechtigkeit zu behandeln ist. Diese Untersuchungsperspektive ist angesichts der massiven Verteilungseffekte, die das Vererben zeitigt, ohne Frage sehr wichtig. Allerdings lässt sie einen Punkt unberücksichtigt: Das testamentarische Vererben kann wichtige Beiträge dazu leisten, dass wir Verstorbene, denen wir zu Lebzeiten nahestanden, in Erinnerung behalten und wertschätzen. Hierbei ist der monetäre Wert der vererbten Güter nicht entscheidend. Wie ich in meinem Aufsatz darlege, lässt sich mit diesem Befund erklären, (...) warum die (von einer wachsenden Zahl von Gerechtigkeitstheoretikerinnen und -theoretikern geforderte) Abschaffung des Rechts zu vererben nicht nur von Vorteil sein würde, sondern auch mit ethischen Kosten verbunden wäre. Ein adäquater philosophischer Diskurs hätte diesen Befund (mit dem sich neoliberale oder rechtslibertaristische erbrechtliche Positionen nicht rechtfertigen lassen) angemessen zu berücksichtigen. (shrink)

Money undergirds market exchange, but the social significance of money goes well beyond the obvious importance of its highly uneven distribution in modern market economies. In addition, modern money imposes an ostensibly precise and unidimensional valuation on social products, processes and relations that often conflicts with other modes of social valuation. In this regard, monetarization is a particular instance of quantification. Money’s status as an official economic metric is the result of a long, contingent, and uneven historical process. Given alternative (...) forms of valuation, people manage and constrain the commensurability of money through a variety of individual, institutional and organizational practices. The social reception of money is active, not passive. A variety of examples are discussed to illustrate and develop these points. (shrink)

Der Begriff des »Zombie Formalismus« beschreibt eine Form der Kunst, welche die Intention verfolgt, die Bedürfnisse des Marktes zu erfüllen. Gegenwärtige Entwicklungen des Kunstmarkts fordern die institutionelle Theorie von Kunst heraus, da es zunehmend fraglich erscheint, dass ›die Kunstwelt‹ – das Kernstück der institutionellen Theorie – noch von einem tiefgehenden Kunstverständnis anstatt von ökonomischen Interessen geleitet wird. Da die institutionelle Theorie ›die Kunstwelt‹ an sich sehr vage definiert, könnte diese auch wirtschaftlich orientierte Sammlerinnen und Galeristen einschließen. Wenn der monetäre Wert (...) von Kunst aber die treibende Kraft für die Erschaffung von Kunst ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie dies die Kunstwelt als Institution, die darüber entscheidet, ob etwas als Kunst gelten kann, beeinflusst. Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werde ich mich mit neuesten Entwicklungen der zeitgenössischen Kunstwelt auseinandersetzen, da diese es erfordern, die institutionelle Theorie so zu modifizieren, dass sie auf gegenwärtige Phänomene anwendbar ist. Als Ausblick werde ich vorschlagen, dass David Humes allgemeiner Maßstab für das Geschmacksurteil zur Entwicklung eines Maßstabs für das kuratorische Urteil beitragen könnte. Möglicherweise könnte dieser kuratorische Maßstab dazu dienen, dass Kuratorinnen als unabhängige Gatekeeper fungieren. (shrink)

According to Ibn Khaldūn, man is a social entity deeply influenced by the geo-economics-politics of the environment in which he lives. The effect is seen as so strong that nearly all of these structures in their relationship to human beings are dominated by it. In this system, we see human beings as a creature who is both able to adapt himself to the environment and able to evolve in this harmony. From the perspective of Ibn Khaldūn, man cannot be evaluated (...) or defined separately from the environmental conditions, the technique and architecture he has developed. Ibn Khaldūn sees the primary source of this change to be the desire to make life both more prosperous and bearable. Therefore, the most natural motivations that affect man’s desire to alter the natural world are the environmental challenges that he encounters. The challenges that are imposed upon man in the natural world are those that have led to human progress. From badāwa (nomadic society) to ḥaḍāra (sedentary society) and so to the ceaseless drive of human progress that has served to make life more endurable, every effort in this sense leads to a physical and moral loosening as the incessant struggle to survive that defines human existence is made more bearable. Physical slack by breaking the resistance of man to resist the environmental conditions; and moral looseness by making man more vulnerable to the temptation of desires, pleasures and welfare that are the cause of moral dilemmas. Ibn Khaldūn’s moral thought with its social, political, and other fields of application are all contexts that enable an understanding of the devaluation of money-hedonist morality in all ways. This article aims to analyze the social, political and economic dilemmas and challenges that the capitalist, consumption-based money-hedonist morality (obesity, social media addiction, consumption, and moral devaluation in the face of financial, virtual and imagined valuations, etc.) from the perspective of Ibn Khaldūn. Summary: Man is endowed with both good and evil. Ibn Khaldūn notes that man tends to misuse these two orientations with a higher inclination towards evil, and that social conditions have an effect on this. He sees another characteristic of man, that they develop habits; accordingly, man is the child of his habits. Habits are second nature to man and affects all of his perceptions, particularly notions concerning truth. At the same time, human beings are under the constant influence of both habits, culture, and climate and geography; and all of these together affect our ethics, psychology and characteristics. Thus, man is a historical, social being that is changed, transformed and determined by adapting to these cultural, social, political and ecological conditions. The concept of Money-Hedonism is one that we have created by combining the terms monetarism, an economic concept, and hedonism, a concept in moral philosophy; the resulting term we seek to produce essentially translates as the adoration of Money. As is well known, hedonism refers to a philosophy of life that has its origins in the ancient Greek world which sees the purpose of life as one in which the pursuit of pleasure is the highest good. Whereas, Monetarism is an American-based economic view developed by Milton Friedman in 1970, linking all the balance in the economy to the supply and demand of money. According to this, the demand for money is operation, precaution and motives of speculation of individuals the amount of money they want to keep in cash on them. The power of an exchange tool increases with the amount and quality of what it is achievable in its utilization. In this respect, money has been an unprecedented source of power in modern society as a means by which change can be achieved. The increase in the power of money as an effective means as manifesting power has led to a socio-cultural and socio-economic superstructure around this power. In the life of an individual that is part of such a culture and is unable to isolate himself from the economy in which he lives, the values that can be expressed with money are consequently formed. In this structure, since the measure of life is money, money determines the quality of human life and human pleasure to a far greater degree than at any time in history. Thus, those living in this age have developed a new moral philosophy of value formed by the combination of these two concepts (monetarism and hedonism), which we have defined as Money-Hedonism. The money-hedonist individual is one that is in love with money, the joy of having it, the pleasure of using it, who desires it with immeasurable passion and ambition and is willing to use all legitimate and illegitimate methods of obtaining it. The most prominent characteristics of this type of individual is egoism, a desire to possess, hatred and mistrust. Ibn Khaldūn argues that the inhabitants of a city that live a settled life and who are living in the city have become economically prosperous and absorbed by consumption and pleasure, and, consequently morally degenerate as a result of the abuse of their evil nature. As can be understood from Ibn Khaldūn’s explanations, the basic element that determines the transition of people from the badāwi way of life to ḥaḍāri (settled) is the change in the livelihoods and related needs. He perceives this change as progressing from necessity to luxury, and, with this change, ethical concern in the nature of people being replaced by aesthetic care. In this way, since aesthetic concern reveals the dissatisfaction of the human self, man always pursues what is perceived to be better and more beautiful, and therefore he easily tends to any malignancy that may disrupt his religious and worldly peace. The ḥaḍāra community of Ibn Khaldūn versus the badāwa represent a modern society with a much more heterogeneous population, with a significant increase in lifestyle diversity along with urbanization. However, the determinative effect of the relationship with nature or the way in which society engage in economic activities have not changed. While modern people are urbanized, they are also heterogeneously shaped by psycho-social necessities demanded by urbanization. Man has created a new socio-psychological condition that not only affects the socio-economic but the way of forming a relationship through the accelerated development of new communication methods, facilitating access to information, and the opening of new methods of communication field between institutions. While man’s connection to nature has become disconnected, he no longer perceives himself as human being in nature but as a human within the city, the individual urban life and the law define this perception. The rupture from nature has created an inevitable result of alienation to nature as well as the estrangement of man with his own nature. The liberal policies adopted with capitalism have encouraged competition and free entrepreneurship. In the time that Ibn Khaldūn lived, man who created himself with his struggle in the nature brings himself / herself into the economic structure of competition in the modern period. Unlike in more traditional societies of the past, the modern way of life not only expresses itself in our new way of life and moral values, but also by statistical values. The exploitative and mathematical world, which forms the current economic science, shapes the socio-economic and socio-psychological structure of modern man. It is understood that the life brought by luxury renders the dynamic, subjective, disciplined sense of morality dysfunctional by destroying the moral values of man, particularly by reducing their feeling of shame. As a result, while the world of value of money-hedonism is solid, materialistic and cold; man in trying to exist in this world of value carries a flexible, spiritual and emotional nature. As such, human beings are pushed into social anomaly situations such as a constant conflict, dilemma, suicide, insecurity and solitude in this world of value. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Great Awakening: A Buddhist Social TheoryChristopher IvesThe Great Awakening: A Buddhist Social Theory. By David R. Loy. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. 228 pp.In recent decades, the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, the Buddhist Peace Fellowship, the International Network of Engaged Buddhists, and other "Engaged Buddhists" have been responding to a range of social, political, and economic issues. To date, however, they have not coupled their wide-ranging and (...) sustained praxis with an equal measure of systematic, rigorous theory. Granted, facing such urgent problems as war, poverty, and environmental degradation, few if any of us would urge them to put their activism on hold until they clarify their theoretical foundations. Yet given how these Buddhists have diverged on such issues as abortion, homosexuality, intoxicants, possible legitimate uses of violence, and sexual contact between Buddhist teachers and students, further theoretical labor would sharpen their praxis and develop Buddhist social ethics.In this respect, David Loy's The Great Awakening deserves a close read. Though not pursuing the degree of systematic theorizing implied by the subtitle, A Buddhist Social Theory, Loy takes a significant step in that direction. After expounding on Buddhist dukkha (suffering) and linking it to "social dukkha" (ch. 1), Loy offers discerning treatment of poverty (ch. 2), globalization (ch. 3), corporations (ch. 4), the "war on terror" (ch. 5), crime and punishment (ch. 6), violence (ch. 7), technology (ch. 8), and worldviews that exacerbate or help resolve our environmental crisis (ch.9). [End Page 170]Drawing on two of his previous books, Nonduality and Lack and Transcendence, Loy deploys the constructs of nonduality and lack to grapple with these issues. Working over the "three marks of existence" (suffering, impermanence, and no-self), Loy sketches adroitly how the vague recognition that we lack any substantial self or soul leads us to engage in fearful "reality projects," attempts to "ground" ourselves "by modifying the world" (p. 164) or by objectifying ourselves as something real in the world (p. 22). This response to "lack" is exacerbated by dualistic ways of knowing: "The sense of duality between ourselves and the world feeds our insecurity and therefore our preoccupation with power, which we seek in order to secure ourselves. The unfortunate fact that we never feel secure enough is experienced as a lack of sufficient power" (p. 29). Overall, Loy's presentation of the cause of suffering (dukkha) in terms of lack, fear, reality projects, and dualism augments well the traditional Buddhist focus on clinging and ignorance of impermanence.Loy develops his analysis by expounding on the three types of suffering outlined in the Pali canon and their connection to social dukkha. He amplifies the construct of the "three poisons" (greed, ill will, and delusion) by highlighting their "institutionalization" and the ways in which capitalism promotes and spreads these mental states (pp. 80–86). And, proceeding along this trajectory, he expands the scope of the traditional antidotes to the three poisons: "Collectively as well as individually, institutionally as well as personally, greed must be transformed into generosity, ill will into loving-kindness, ignorance into wisdom" (p. 29). Loy also deploys Buddhist critiques of dualistic conceptualization to point out that the problem of poverty concerns not only the lack of material things needed for physical well-being but several other dimensions: "the craving for wealth as haunted by fear of poverty, global poverty as necessary to monetarize and commodify the 'undeveloped' world, and poverty as a necessary benchmark for the wealthy to appreciate their own achievements" (p. 196).Other parts of the book deserving close attention are Loy's social interpretation of the five precepts (p. 38), his sketch of the common ground between Christianity and Buddhism (pp. 117–119), and his presentation of karma, about which he writes, "we construct ourselves by what we choose to do. My sense of self is a precipitate of my habitual ways of thinking, feeling, and acting. Just as my body is composed of the food I eat, so my character is built by my conscious decisions" (p. 7). And contrary to those who construe contemporary Engaged Buddhism as the first form of Buddhism to engage itself significantly with sociopolitical problems, Loy astutely... (shrink)

We live in an age dominated by money. As capitalism has intensified and expanded as a social form, money has increasingly colonised the production and reproduction of the human condition. We live in an age of monetarism: an age in which social and political regulation are increasingly subordinate to the dictates of ‘sound money'. We live in an age of national lotteries: an age where millions attempt each week to garner enough money to ‘free’ themselves from the grinding agony (...) of wage labour. We live in an age in which people increasingly grasp the alienation inherent in the domination of society by money and attempt to reassert a sense of human community through the introduction of local currency and barter schemes. But we also live in an age where Marxism is supposedly dead; where we can only gaze in ironic postmodern wonder at the increasing domination of the human condition by money and its social forms. In this paper we go beyond this postmodern orthodoxy to suggest that it is not only possible to develop a historically materialist analysis of money and its social forms but also that this project is essential if we are to reclaim our humanity from the deadening alienation of money and its social forms. We explore the magical qualities of money, the qualities which have enthralled and transfixed bourgeois social science from the classical economy of Adam Smith to the present day postmodernists. We argue that the lasting legacy of Marx was to uncover the historical materiality underlying the magical appearance of money: a discovery of the alchemic properties of money capital through which money becomes more money and which involves the material subordination of living labour to the valorisation of money capital. (shrink)

This article objects to two major economistic shortcomings of Philippe Van Parijs’s Real Freedom for All: (1) Van Parijs claims that market prices are the best metric for equal real freedom. This is challenged. Market prices admittedly are the best instrument for distributive purposes at hand. They are, however, a means of transport for supply and demand contingendes. Hence market prices are to be considered as an insufficient metric for equal freedom. (2) Van Parijs claims that Real Freedom for All (...) is all there is to social justice. This claim is rejected. Despite its demanding egalitarian ambition, Real Freedom for All fails to protect a flourishing human life. Basic human rights like the right to social recognition and, in part, the right to health care are violated. Curiously even the right to autonomy is in want of full protection. These lacks are caused by the monetarism and the Straightforward market optimism of Real Freedom for All. (shrink)

Die Idee, dass vor allem monetäre Anreize das Verhalten von Wirtschaftsakteuren in gewünschte Richtungen lenken und sogar dabei helfen können, durch Leistungssteigerung zusätzliche Wohlfahrtseffekte zu generieren, spielt in der politischen Ökonomie seit ihren Anfängen eine zentrale Rolle. Es spricht sogar einiges dafür, dass dieser Gedanke das verbindende Glied der Ökonomik als Gesellschaftstheorie im Gegensatz zu anderen gesellschaftstheoretischen Entwürfen ausmacht. Dennoch halte ich dieses Anreizargument aus normativer Perspektive für unterentwickelt, wie ich in Auseinandersetzung mit der Ökonomischen Ethik bzw. Ordnungsethik nach Karl (...) Homann und der Integrativen Wirtschaftsethik zeigen möchte. Weder gelingt es der Ordnungsethik nach Karl Homann, die Bedeutung von Anreizstrukturen hinreichend zu begründen, obwohl sie in Ansätzen wichtige Argumente formuliert. Noch gelingt es der Integrativen Wirtschaftsethik, die zentrale Rolle von Anreizstrukturen für die normative Theoriebildung überzeugend zurückzuweisen. Mir geht es nicht darum, den einen oder anderen wirtschaftsethischen Ansatz grundsätzlich zurückzuweisen, sondern vielmehr, auf Lücken in der Argumentation und sich daraus ergebende Forschungsfragen hinzuweisen. Vor diesem Hintergrund könnte es helfen, einen verwandten Diskurs aus der gegenwärtigen Gerechtigkeitstheorie in die Überlegungen mit einzubeziehen. Denn die grundlegende Idee der ökonomischen Gesellschaftstheorie einer Wohlfahrtssteigerung durch die gezielte Manipulation von Anreizstrukturen hat auch in der gegenwärtigen Gerechtigkeitstheorie ihre Wirkung entfaltet. In seiner Theorie der Gerechtigkeit hat John Rawls argumentiert, dass selbst Egalitaristen bestimmte Einkommensunterschiede zulassen müssen, wenn dadurch für Leistungsträgerinnen solche Anreize gesetzt werden, die gleichzeitig auch den Schlechtestgestellten zum Vorteil gereichen. Diese Argumentation ist von Gerald Cohen einer harschen Kritik ausgesetzt worden. Cohen behauptet, dass Rawls mit diesem Anreizargument seinen eigenen Egalitarismus unterläuft. Ich glaube, dass diese philosophische Diskussion des Anreizargumentes in der Gerechtigkeitstheorie für wirtschaftsethische Überlegungen relevant ist, obwohl sie innerhalb eines idealtheoretischen und egalitaristischen Bezugsrahmens geführt wird. Für diese Relevanz werde ich in vier Abschnitten argumentieren. In einem ersten Teil werde ich die Positionen der Ökonomischen Ethik von Karl Homann und der Integrativen Wirtschaftsethik von Peter Ulrich zur Rolle von Anreizen einführen und darlegen, warum ich beide Ansätze für normativ unterbestimmt halte. In einem zweiten Teil werde ich kurz die Argumentation von John Rawls und ausführlicher die Kritik von Gerald Cohen an dieser Position vorstellen. In einem dritten Teil werde ich einige Einwände gegen Cohen formulieren und die Notwendigkeit einer nichtidealen Theorie der Gerechtigkeit betonen. In einem vierten und abschließenden Teil werde ich vorschlagen, einen Teil der Wirtschaftsethik als nichtideale Gerechtigkeitstheorie zu verstehen und aus dieser Perspektive nur kurz andeuten, welche systematische Rolle dem Anreizargument zukommt. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:DAVID HUME AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MONETARY THOUGHT: A CRITICAL COMMENT ON RECENT VIEWS To the argument that it makes little difference what precise roles were played by various actors in a great movement, and that the busy modern reader cannot be bothered to go behind the scenes of popular successes, the answer is simple: it is on the whole better to call men and events by their right names; (...) it is on the whole wiser not to make false diagrams of the way things happen. What, after all, are we so busy about? Jacques Barzun, Darwin, Marx, Wagner The praise that has been bestowed upon David Hume's monetary thought in recent years would suggest that however little attention is paid to the history of economic thought otherwise, no one is averse to a long and respectable lineage.1 However, it is just when an individual is singled out and focused upon that the most misleading ideas can arise; furthermore, when the scholars who provide this attention are renowned authorities in specialized fields, their views receive very widespread circulation. It would not be easy to find a contemporary student of the eighteenth century who would assert that the mercantilists believed real wealth to consist of gold and silver, yet the late Harry Johnson made just such an assertion not very long ago, and the number of economists who read Harry Johnson must far outnumber those who read eighteenthcentury scholars.2 By the same token, the liberal praise bestowed upon those credited with having "demolished" mercantilism, such as David Hume, requires careful scrutiny. A recent article by Dietrich Fausten3 has shown how different Hume's analysis 157 actually was from modern monetarism, despite the many attempts to designate Hume the father of monetarist doctrines, and this critical approach can be taken farther. Before turning to an examination of Hume's position, it may be worthwhile to make a methodological point. There are those who consider delving into indebtedness and priorities "antiquarian" (but not if their own contributions are in question!). After all, they claim, Hume's views are there in black and white, he wrote elegantly and his philosophical merits are widely admired; does it really matter if Hume did not acknowledge his sources, that he was somewhat inconsistent, or that he caricatured his opponents? Surely some compassion is appropriate for someone who wrote at the very dawn of "economic science." This is to miss the point of such historical scrutiny altogether. If compassion were required, why should it be bestowed upon Hume, rather than on such predecessors as Gervaise, Cantillon or Vanderlint? Scholars employ certain critical standards in judging published work; let us employ these standards to Hume and if sympathy be required, let it follow and not precede the analysis. II The following passage is certainly one of the most frequently quoted in the history of economics but its importance for our argument makes repetition necessary. Suppose, that all the money of Great Britain were multiplied fivefold in a night, must not the contrary effect follow? Must not all labour and commodities rise to such an exorbitant height, that no neighbouring nations could afford to buy from us; while 158 their commodities, on the other hand, became comparatively so cheap, that, in spite of all the laws which could be formed, they would be run in upon us, and our money flow out; till we fall to a level with foreigners, and lose that great superiority of riches, which had laid us under such disadvantages?4 Two points should be noted about the above. First, Hume assumes a sudden, large inflow of money to make his point. This is a very different thing from the small [relative to the money stock] and steady inflow advocated by the so-called mercantilists. Secondly, Hume assumes that this sudden inflow is met by instantaneous adjustment in prices. Otherwise, if the change in, say, wages attracts more labour, there is no reason why the increased money supply could not lead to a greater output and thus avoid inflation. International labour mobility was a standard feature of mercantilist thought and so it will be seen that Hume's "new" result is obtained by his... (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Ziel dieses Beitrags ist es, mittels der Contingent Valuation Methode den Erlebniswert der Ausrichtung der Olympischen Winterspiele in München 2018 sowie den Stolz, diese Veranstaltung in Deutschland zu wissen, für die deutsche Bevölkerung monetär zu quantifizieren. Die Stichprobe zur Erfassung der sog. Zahlungsbereitschaft umfasst 1.011 Personen. Diese wurden mit Fragebögen dazu befragt, was sie dafür zu zahlen bereit wären, dass die Winterspiele 2018 in Deutschland stattfinden. Die Berechnung der gesamten aggregierten Zahlungsbereitschaft der deutschen Bevölkerung erfolgt mittels zweier Szenarien, wonach (...) sich insgesamt 535,4 Mio. € bzw. 787,4 Mio. € ergeben. Regressionsanalytische Auswertungen zeigen, dass die Sportbegeisterung und die Einstellung zu den Olympischen Spielen im Allgemeinen wesentliche Faktoren sind, die die ZB beeinflussen. Abschließend wird die CVM kritisch diskutiert und ihre Schwächen und Anwendungsrestriktionen dargestellt. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the pedagogical and political shift marked by the meaning and practice of diversity offered through New Labour education policy texts, specifically, the policy and practice of personalized learning (or personalization). The aim of this paper is to map the ways in which diversity relays and mobilizes a set of neoliberal positions and relationships in the field of education and seeks to govern education institutions and education users through politically circulating norms and values. These norms and (...) values, I want to argue, echo and redeem the kinds of frameworks, applications and rationalities typically aligned with modes of neoliberal or advanced liberal governance, e.g. marketization, monetarization, atomization and deregulation. I conclude the paper by considering how diversity in education renders problematic conventional antinomies of the citizen and consumer, public and private, state and civil society, etc., and forces us to confront the rhizomatic character of contemporary governance and education in the era of neoliberalism. (shrink)

Die Philosophie des Geldes und der Preise befasst sich mit sozialontologischen Fragen der Konstitution und Natur von Geldvorkommnissen, sowie der Bedeutung und der Bedingungen monetärer Wertzuschreibungen. Eine zentrale Demarkationslinie konkurrierender Positionen verläuft entlang der Frage, ob Geldvorkommnisse Warenwerte repräsentieren oder Verhältnisse von Kredit und Schuld anzeigen. Darüber hinaus werden in der Philosophie des Geldes moralphilosophische und politische Fragen thematisch. So kommt Geld eine zentrale Rolle in der Organisation ökonomischer Kooperation durch Märkte und in der Entwicklung und Innovation wirtschaftlicher Produktivkräfte zu. (...) Geld wird außerdem im Übergang von der Standesgesellschaft zur bürgerlichen Gesellschaft als freiheitsstiftende Institution wahrgenommen. So ersetzt die Geldvermittlung traditionelle Machtverhältnisse durch freiheitliche, und zumindest potenziell emanzipatorische Vertragsbeziehungen. Gleichzeitig erzeugt die zunehmende Bedeutung des Geldes soziale Ungleichheiten und neue Abhängigkeiten. Schließlich gehen das Streben nach Geld als Handlungsmotiv, die Verkäuflichkeit von nicht marktgeeigneten Gegenständen, sowie die Geldvermittlung außermarktlicher Verhältnisse mit moralischen Bedenken einher. (shrink)

Proponents of a monetary interpretation of Marx’s theory of value (monetäre Werttheorie) argue that one cannot estimate the amounts of socially necessary labour time that lie behind the prices, an interpretation usually ascribed to the West German Neue Marx‑Lektüre. As Hans-Georg Backhaus began fleshing out his monetary interpretation in the early 1970s, he referred explicitly to debate among economists in early‑1960s East Germany about the possibility of estimating quantities of labour value in terms of commodities’ labour content. In fact, scholars (...) who articulated a powerful position in the latter discussion closely approximated the Neue Marx-Lektüre’s ‘monetary interpretation’. They held that expressing labour value in terms of labour time is impossible: the substance of value is not a measurable quantity of labour time but, rather, a social relation. Hence, it is problematic that Neue Marx-Lektüre adherents today should maintain an inaccurate contrast between their reading of Capital and that of ‘traditional Marxism’. (shrink)

Business cycle theory is a broad and disparate field. Different schools of thought offer alternative explanations for cycles, often using different mathematical methods. This book provides academics and graduate students of economics with a compact and accessible exposition of business cycle theory since Keynes. The author places the main theories -- Keynesian economics, monetarism, new classical economics, the real business cycles theory, and new Keynesian economics -- in an historical context by presenting them in the chronological order of their (...) appearance and highlighting their differences and commonalities. He minimizes the necessary mathematical prerequisites by using a unifying mathematical approach: stochastic second-order difference equations, which is explained in detail. Throughout the book, the international dimension of business cycles is acknowledged. The theoretical results obtained are set alongside empirical facts in separate boxes. Each chapter finishes with a set of problems designed to deepen the reader's understanding of the theories presented, and further reading sections which provide access to related material. (shrink)

First published in 1984, this book carefully dissects and convincingly demonstrates that conservative economics is incoherent in theory and disastrous in practice. The three main schools of thought supporting "free-market" policies – supply side economics, monetarism and rational expectations – are examined in turn and each is found defective. Three case studies of conservative policy in action follow: Reagan’s U.S., Thatcher’s U.K. and Pinochet’s Chile and their courses are charted in depth. In addition, Robert Heilbroner and Edward Nell analyse (...) economic conservatism’s ideology and social policy, and the book concludes with an assessment of the political reasons for the continuing appeal of free-market conservatism despite its theoretical incoherence and practical failure. This is a careful and comprehensive look at this subject which tackles both the theory and the practice head-on. It will make useful and stimulating reading for students of economics and political economy on courses of economic policy and macro-economics and in addition will be of keen interest to all those involved in the debate about one of the major policy issues of our time. (shrink)