The essay is a written version of a talk Nakamura Yūjirō gave at the Collège international de philosophie in Paris in 1983. In the talk Nakamura connects the issue of common sense in his own work to that of place in Nishida Kitarō and the creative imagination in Miki Kiyoshi. He presents this connection between the notions of common sense, imagination, and place as constituting one important thread in contemporary Japanese philosophy. He begins by discussing the significance (...) of place (basho) that is being rediscovered today in response to the shortcomings of the modern Western paradigm, and discusses it in its various senses, such as ontological ground or substratum, the body, symbolic space, and linguistic or discursive topos in ancient rhetoric. He then relates this issue to the philosophy of place Nishida developed in the late 1920s, and after providing an explication of Nishida’s theory, discusses it further in light of some linguistic and psychological theories. Nakamura goes on to discuss his own interest in the notion of common sense traceable to Aristotle and its connection to the rhetorical concept of topos, and Miki’s development of the notion of the imagination in the 1930s in response to Nishida’s theory. And in doing so he ties all three—common sense, place, and imagination—together as suggestive of an alternative to the modern Cartesian standpoint of the rational subject that has constituted the traditional paradigm of the modern West. (shrink)

The essay is a written version of a talk Nakamura Yūjirō gave at the College international de philosophie in Paris in 1983. In the talk Nakamura connects the issue of common sense in his own work to that of place in Nishida Kitarō and the creative imagination in Miki Kiyoshi. He presents this connection between the notions of common sense, imagination, and place as constituting one important thread in contemporary Japanese philosophy. He begins by discussing the significance (...) of place (basho) that is being rediscovered today in response to the shortcomings of the modern Western paradigm, and discusses it in its various senses, such as ontological ground or substratum, the body, symbolic space, and linguistic or discursive topos in ancient rhetoric. He then relates this issue to the philosophy of place Nishida developed in the late 1920s, and after providing an explication of Nishida’s theory, discusses it further in light of some linguistic and psychological theories. Nakamura goes on to discuss his own interest in the notion of common sense traceable to Aristotle and its connection to the rhetorical concept of topos, and Miki’s development of the notion of the imagination in the 1930s in response to Nishida’s theory. And in doing so he ties all three—common sense, place, and imagination—together as suggestive of an alternative to the modern Cartesian standpoint of the rational subject that has constituted the traditional paradigm of the modern West. (shrink)

This chapter examines the imagination, its relationship to “common sense,” and its recent development in the notion of the social imaginary in Western philosophy and the contributions Miki Kiyoshi and Nakamura Yūjirō can make in this regard. I trace the historical evolution of the notion of the productive imagination from its seeds in Aristotle through Kant and into the social imagination or imaginary as bearing on our collective being-in-the-world, with semantic and ontological significance, in Paul Ricoeur, Cornelius Castoriadis, (...) and Charles Taylor. The two Japanese philosophers, when brought into dialogue with the above contemporary Western thinkers, can contribute to this recent development of the imagination’s creativity into the collective sphere. Miki shows a connection between the imagination and a certain form-formlessness dynamic he inherits from Nishida. Nakamura in turn points to a connection between imagination and place via his development of the Aristotelian notion of common sense. Both have implications on how we understand the social imaginary. (shrink)

This chapter examines the imagination, its relationship to “common sense,” and its recent development in the notion of the social imaginary in Western philosophy and the contributions Miki Kiyoshi and Nakamura Yūjirō can make in this regard. I trace the historical evolution of the notion of the productive imagination from its seeds in Aristotle through Kant and into the social imagination or imaginary as bearing on our collective being-in-the-world, with semantic and ontological significance, in Paul Ricoeur, Cornelius Castoriadis, (...) and Charles Taylor. The two Japanese philosophers, when brought into dialogue with the above contemporary Western thinkers, can contribute to this recent development of the imagination’s creativity into the collective sphere. Miki shows a connection between the imagination and a certain form-formlessness dynamic he inherits from Nishida. Nakamura in turn points to a connection between imagination and place via his development of the Aristotelian notion of common sense. Both have implications on how we understand the social imaginary. (shrink)

Although it seems natural to consider the last fifty years the contemporary period, because this year (1995) punctuates a historical period celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, this essay will limit the term “contemporary” roughly to the last twenty‐five years. The reason for this demarcation is that at the beginning of the 1970s, we witnessed a new philosophical mood emerging in Japan. Prior to that period, the Japanese philosophical scene was dominated by the study of (...) European thinkers, such as Husserl, Heiddeger, Sartre, and Merleau Ponty. The end of the students' movement in the early 1970s also marked the end of the ideological disputes launched by Marxism since the early 1930s. Instead, it appears that the Japanese intelligentsia in the early 1970s began to acutely sense problems inherent in the Eurocentric philosophy which had served as a foundation for Western science and technology. This occurred largely through a recognition that scientific technology had yielded, as its unexpected byproduct, a “mind/heartless” society, pollution, and global ecological crises, which had permeated almost all parts of the Japanese archipelago to threaten the psyche of the Japanese people and their mode of living. In this essay, I should like to briefly introduce three representative contemporary Japanese thinkers who have addressed some aspects of these problems in their writings. They are Nakamura Yujiro, Sakabe Megumi, and Yuasa Yasuo. (Because of the limitations of space, this article will restrict itself to these three thinkers, but this should not suggest that there are no other representative thinkers in Japan. Consider particularly those belonging to the neo Kyoto school, such as Nishitani Keiji, Kosaka Masaki, Koyama Iwao, Umehara Takeshi and Ueda Shizuteru. Nishitani's works are well known in the English speaking world, along with those of Abe Masao. Out side of the Kyoto school, we can also mention other thinkers, such as Matsumoto Masao, Hiromatsu Wataru and Ichikawa Hiroshi.). (shrink)

Terminologically, the “topos of mu” and the “predicative self” originated in the Kyoto School and are traceable to the work of its founder NISHIDA Kitarō. The full phrase was coined by NAKAMURA Yūjirō. Conceptually, the topos of mu or place of nothingness is Nishida’s development of the Buddhist notion of anatta or no self and radiating out from that locus of emptiness is a self constituted by its predicates or the things to which it is connected by an (...) existential copula. Deeply ingrained in Western languages, metaphysics, and religion is the subjective self, in both the linguistic and psychological senses of “subjective.” That Buddhism, as reworked by the Kyota School, or Daoism, or any other non-Western tradition of thought, will catch on in the West was a puerile fantasy of some members of the first generation of environmental philosophers. There is a good chance, however, that the Western worldview may evolve toward a similar conception of the self—as ecological, relational, or systems thinking becomes ever more ingrained. We in the West may come to understand that we are constituted by our social and environmental relationships, in which we are deeply embedded and on which we are utterly dependent, such that world care is the essence of self-help. (shrink)

My contribution seeks to unfold an ontology of the imagination based on the history of the productive imagination in its relation to common sense and recent developments of the notion of the social imaginary, while making use of ideas found in both Western and Japanese thinkers. Kyoto School philosopher Miki Kiyoshi shows a connection between the imagination he inherits from Kant and a certain form-formlessness dynamic he inherits from Nishida Kitarō’s notion of a self-forming formlessness. The source of the imagination’s (...) creativity is in that formlessness that lies both within the interior depths of the psyche and outside in the environing nature. Post-war Japanese philosopher Nakamura Yūjirō—taking off from Miki’s attempts to concretize Nishida’s theory of place in terms of the imagination—in turn points to a connection between imagination and place and explicates this via his development of the Aristotelian notion of common sense (koinē aisthēsis, sensus communis). Common sense in itself has a long history within the West that involves a variety of meanings starting with the Aristotelian faculty for integrating the various senses (as koinē aisthēsis) that was closely associated with the imagination, and ending with two contrasting notions of a communal or social sensibility (as sensus communis)—the vulgar “commonplace” notion of common sense as habituated custom and the healthy sense of common sense as prudential, contextual, ethical judgment explicated by thinkers like Hannah Arendt. Both are found in Kant’s Critique of Judgment but the imagination’s creativity expressed in genius comes into tension with the latter communal sense of common sense that attempts to fetter that creativity of genius with the judgment of taste. The contemporary notion of the social imaginary, for example in Cornelius Castoriadis, seems to encompass both the vulgar and the healthy senses of common sense, and also recalls the close connection between the imagination and common sense in Aristotle. Contrary to what Kant sought, however, this underscores the temporal contingency or historicity and non-transcendental status of common sense, even in its healthy sense, and its communal judgments. At the same time, the form-formlessness dynamic found in Miki and the tension between unbounded creativity and communal responsibility found in Kant’s third Critique in a certain sense also reappears in Castoriadis’ ontology (of magmas) whereby chaos is the source of the imagination’s creativity not only for the individual psyche but for the social-historical or social imaginary significations as well, that is, in the social imaginary’s inner tension between the instituting and the instituted. Recalling the fact that Nishida was inspired by the Greek notion of chōra in developing his theory of place, I then suggest that the linking of the imagination with the process of the forming of the formless as well as with place may allow us in turn to understand the creative imagination ontologically in the Greek terms of chōrismos—etymologically related to chōra—as the difference that brings order to chaos by allotting beings, each to its own place. Imagination as Ein-bildung might then be viewed as the ontological formation that, through differentiation, gives shape, form, to place. This then leads to the issue of autonomy—To whom does the spontaneity of the creative imagination belong when the chaos or formlessness, indeed “freedom,” at the root of its creativity exceeds the boundaries of subjectivity or reason? Heidegger in his later works, albeit in only a few places, suggests such a sense of the imagination as no longer a faculty of the human subject, no longer a doing of man. (shrink)

The imagination—Einbildung—as its German makes clear is the faculty of formation. But this formative activity in various ways through the history of its concept has been intimately related to the concept of common sense, whether understood as the sense that gathers, orders, and makes coherent the various sense, or as the sensibility of the community. This contribution seeks to unfold that history of the concept of the creative or productive imagination while also tracing the parallel history of the concept of (...) common sense (sensus communis) and their relationship that begins with their inception in Aristotle, a connection that has been retained implicitly in one way or another, intentionally or not, at different times—but also often forgotten—in their history and that seems again to manifest with the recent conceptions of the social imaginary. I will trace this history in the Western philosophical tradition while also making use of a couple of Japanese philosophers who take part in this intellectual history. We shall follow the history of the imagination from Aristotle through Kant’s epistemology in his first Critique—when its productive function becomes positively, rather than negatively, evaluated—and on to the post-Kantians of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Post-Kantians like Schelling and Heidegger ontologize that productivity of the imagination beyond the epistemic sphere and, in a parallel fashion, broaden its significance beyond the individual and onto the collective. Common sense also has a long and parallel history within the West that involves a variety of meanings starting with the Aristotelian faculty for integrating the various senses (as koinē aisthēsis) that was closely associated with the imagination (phantasia), and ending with two contrasting notions of a communal or social sensibility (as sensus communis)—the vulgar “commonplace” notion of common sense as habituated custom and the healthy sense of common sense as prudential, contextual, ethical judgment. Both senses of common sense together with the faculty of the imagination are found in Kant’s third Critique but the imagination’s creativity expressed in genius comes into tension with the latter communal sense of common sense (Gemeinsinn) that attempts to order and fetter that creativity with the judgment of taste. The contemporary notion of the social imaginary, for example, in Castoriadis, certainly recalls the close connection between the imagination and common sense in Aristotle but also seems to encompass both the vulgar and the healthy senses of common sense along with their tension in Kant. Although Kant wanted to argue for a transcendental basis of common sense as such that would fit with his theory of the imagination from the first Critique, the imagination itself has been broadened in the third Critique, making way for post-Kantian developments, such as in its ontologization, expanding it beyond the merely epistemic as noted above. At the same time this also broadens the significance of the faculty beyond the cognizing mind of the individual and onto the social sphere to unfold what was implicit in Kant’s third Critique. In Japan Miki Kiyoshi develops that ontology of the imagination even though he still affirms its transcendental status. Nonetheless he explicates its formative creativity as involving the human collective producing not only ideal forms for thought but also institutions and technics of human culture. Likewise, Castoriadis understands the creativity of the imagination in socio-collective terms. But in addition, he underscores—in contrast to Miki—its temporal contingency or historicity and non-transcendental status. At the same time, the tension between unbounded creativity and communal responsibility found in Kant’s third Critique—together with the form-formlessness dynamic found in Miki—in a certain sense reappears in Castoriadis’ theory of the social imaginary and the creative imagination. We might say that in general the notion of Gemeinsinn in Kant in that sense provides a bridge between the idea of a creative or productive imagination and the idea of the social imaginary, while harking back to the original relationship between koinē aisthēsis and phantasia in Aristotle. This connection is implicitly assumed, perhaps unintentionally, by many of the relevant thinkers who discuss either concept. It is made explicit in contemporary Japanese philosopher Nakamura Yūjirō’s discussions of common sense, but can also be extracted out of Hannah Arendt’s discussions of the imagination, judgment, and sensus communis. Conceptually the two converge in Castoriadis’ and Ricoeur’s notions of the social imagination/imaginary. I thus plan to trace the parallel history of these two concepts (imagination and common sense). This is a chapter in the book 'Social Imaginaries: Critical Interventions' edited by Suzi Adams and Jeremy Smith. (shrink)

This paper delves into the dispute surrounding “overcoming modernity” in Japanese philosophy, which arose before and during Japan’s Pacific War (the “Greater East Asia War”) in the late 1930s and its impact on the postwar period. Nishida Kitarō’s philosophy provided the foundation for “overcoming modernity,” and the “Oriental” logic of “nothing” emerged as a counterpoint to the rationalist spirit of the West. This logic has persisted from the postwar period to the present day via postmodernism. Takeuchi Yoshimi and Hiromatsu Wataru, (...) both discussed in this paper, played a crucial role in the discussions about this issue in the postwar era. Mainly, this paper focuses on the state of philosophy in Japan during the 1970 and 1980 s, highlighting the divergence in thinking about “nothing” by examining Nakamura Yūjirō and Karatani Kōjin. Focusing on these two thinkers shows that “nothing” transformed into a diverging movement in this period. Additionally, this paper explores the intellectual continuity between the 1930 and 1960 s that paved the way for this era. Through these historical reflections, the paper sheds light on the divergence between the ideas of “nothing” relating to capitalism and those relating to life systems, which occurred in the deeper layer of the intellectual culture of this period (1970-1980 s). This divergence is generally overlooked as a resistance of the “postmodernist” or “new academism” in Japan against the modernist intellectual tides. The purpose of this paper is to offer a fresh perspective on the historical evolution of Japanese philosophy in terms of “nothing”. (shrink)

In tackling the question of what is Japanese philosophy, the paper discusses: philosophy in general, the issue of Japanese philosophy, and the relevance of both philosophy and Japanese philosophy in our present age of globalization. Examining the definitions of philosophy provided by Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger, and looking at the philosophies of Nishida and Nishitani among others, I argue the source of philosophy—its originary and universal motivation—to be the question of meaning of existence. Japanese philosophy is no exception. I then (...) discuss whether there is something unique to Japanese philosophy in particular and look into the question of the essence of Japanese philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that in order to be true to the original motivation of philosophy, the study of Japanese philosophy, if it is itself to be considered philosophy, cannot be reduced to biography, history, or philology. It must be relevant to our life. I then conclude with a discussion of the relevance of Japanese philosophy and the philosophical study of Japanese philosophy to our life today. (shrink)

1. Katachi no odissei -- 2. Rinshō no chi -- 3. Aku no tetsugaku nōto 4. Zōho 21-seiki mondaigun ; Jutsugoshū II -- 5. Shūkyō to kagaku; Jinruichi shō -- 6. Shinpen Nihon bunka ni okeru aku to tsumi ; Shōnenba -- 7. Jutsugoteki sekai to seido -- 8. Seishin no fūga -- 9. Shinpen Pasukaru to sono jidai -- 10. Shinpen kindai Nihon ni okeru seido to shisō.

This volume presents historical, contemporary, and theoretical perspectives on the role of local communities and social norms in the economic development process. Using historical evidence combined with recent developments in institutional economics involving game theory and contracts, it establishes that communities can enhance the development of a market economy under certain circumstances -- and sheds light on what those circumstances are.

This study developed an emotional vulnerability scale and examined its reliability and validity with a sample of university students. In health psychology, a measurement of emotional pain can contribute to the prevention and improvement of physical and mental health problems in daily life. We collected data from 361 Japanese university students. From preliminary interviews with 20 participants, 42 semantic units were extracted. For scale development, a questionnaire survey was conducted using the 42 extracted categories, and exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses (...) were performed. Four factors emerged, which were both reliable and valid: “vulnerability toward criticism or denial,” “vulnerability toward worsening relationships,” “vulnerability toward interpersonal discord,” and “vulnerability toward procrastination and emotional avoidance.” This scale can be useful to understand vulnerability in everyday situations and grasp the vulnerable conditions experienced by individuals. This can help prevent stress responses and mental health problems, which are valuable contributions to health psychology. (shrink)

The history of the Vedanta school is well known since the time of Sankaracarya on, and its prehistory before Sankara is quite obscure. However, from the time of compilation of major Upanisads to Sankara there is a period of thousand years, and the tradition of Upanisads was not lost; there appeared many philosophers and dogmaticians, although their thoughts are not clearly known. The author has made clear the details of the pre-Sankara Vedanta philosophy, utilizing not only Sanskrit materials, but also (...) Pali, Prakrit (Jain), as well as Tibetan and Chinese sources. In this respect this is quite a unique work. For this work the author was awarded the Imperial Prize by the Academy of Japan. Some sections of this work were already published in Indian as well as European and American journals in English. This work is a complete English translation of the entire book. The English translation was done with the financial aid by the Harvard-Yenching Institute, and the final touch was given by Mr. Trevor Leggett, the British writer, who is well-versed in Sanskrit as well as in Japanese. (shrink)

While entanglement is a phenomenon discussed in quantum theory, it can also be found in art. We propose to connect entanglement to art’s most fundamental question: what is creativity? For example, Marcel Duchamp found the essence of the creative act in the “art coefficient,” the difference and/or gap between the artist’s intention and realization which is created. This paper locates the common sense understanding of entanglement in an inseparable whole that ensures difference between the intention and realization. Seeing the artistic (...) act as actively designing entanglement within artistic production, we present examples of this from the work of the Japanese-style painter Nakamura, and present a concrete vision for an answer regarding the question of the nature of creativity. (shrink)

This is a lucid and rewarding book which sets a new standard for dealing with a history of thought across many cultures.

Although a distinction between moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]) has been widely accepted as an explanation for a difference between the trolley and footbridge dilemmas (Thomson, 1985 Thomson, J. J. 1985. “The trolley problem”. In Ethics: Problems and (...) principles, Edited by: Fischer, J. M. and Ravizza, M. Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. [Google Scholar]), its psychometric properties remain a mystery. In this study 219 participants completed 62 moral dilemma tasks used in Greene et al. (2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]), and the correlation structure among the dilemmas was analysed through factor analysis and structural equation modelling. Findings suggest that, first, moral-personal dilemmas are composed of one factor, indicating that the assumption in Greene et al. (2001 Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M. and Cohen, J. D. 2001. An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgement. Science, 293: 2105–2108. doi:10.1126/science.1062872.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]) was supported. Second, moral-impersonal dilemmas are explained by two factors that reflect procedural and consequential aspects of decision making. Third, the trolley and footbridge dilemmas fall under the same factor category; therefore the difference between the two dilemmas cannot be attributed to emotional involvement. Additionally, the results of the structural equation modelling suggest that they differ in the engagement of rational processing. (shrink)

One short passage on what is called the Receptacle in Plato’s Timaeus has been the subject of much controversy since Cherniss presented an alternative reading of it in 1954. In this paper, I criticize an influential argument presented by Zeyl for a traditional reading, and propose a new interpretation which adopts the alternative reading on important sentences of the passage, but is not accompanied by the defects of Cherniss’ interpretation.

Resumo: Este artigo procura responder à pergunta se Marx possui de fato um método dialético próprio. A argumentação está dividida em três partes. Na primeira, procura-se mostrar que as críticas de Marx ao método absoluto de Hegel poderiam ser tomadas por este como meras explicações sobre o seu próprio método. Na segunda parte, tecem-se algumas considerações sobre o que é o método dialético de Hegel, a partir das figuras da imediaticidade e da imediaticidade mediada. Na última parte, apresentam-se três exemplos (...) de como Marx pratica, em sua crítica à Economia Política, exatamente aquilo que criticou no método dialético de Hegel.: This paper attempts to answer the question whether Marx really has an own dialectic method. My argument is divided into three parts. In the first, I try to show that Marx’s criticism of Hegel’s absolute method could be taken by Hegel as mere explanations of his own method. In the second part, I offer some considerations about what Hegel’s dialectical method is based on the figures of immediacy and mediated immediacy. In the last part, I present three examples of how Marx practices in his critique of Political Economy exactly what he criticized in Hegel’s dialectic method. (shrink)

The Komori–Kashima problem, that asks whether the implicational intermediate logics axiomatizable by formulas minimal in classical logic are only intuitionistic logic and classical logic, has stood for over a decade. In this paper, we give a counter-example to this problem. Additionally, we also give some open problems derived from this result.

Die hegelsche Staatsidee wurde oft mit einer ideologischen Begründung des preußischen Staates verwechselt, als ob sich eine Philosophie unmittelbar mit einer besonderen Gestaltung der realen Welt zufriedengeben könnte. Nakamura vertritt die These, dass die hegelsche Rechtsphilosophie einen kritischen Maßstab für die Analyse der modernen Staaten entwickelt. Eine vernünftige Verfassung muss nach Hegel vor allem objektive Garantien für die Verwirklichung der Rechte der subjektiven Besonderheit bieten. Die kritische Rechtsphilosophie von Marx lässt sich vernünftig begründen, wenn sie ausgehend von diesem Maßstab (...) kritisch gegen die vormärzliche Entwicklung der sozialen und Verfassungsfrage gewendet wird. Aus dieser geschichtlichen Auseinandersetzung stellt Marx eine Idee der sozialen Freiheit dar, die sich von der hegelianischen Tradition unterscheiden lässt. Diese besagt, dass Freiheiten durch Teilnahme an sozialen Institutionen zu erlangen seien. Marx bezieht sich aber auf die sozialen Rechte, die Freiheiten gegenüber den Subsistenzrisiken in einer kapitalistischen Gesellschaft schaffen. Damit bietet er uns Anregungen zu einer Diskussion über die sozialen Rechte der modernen Sozialstaaten. (shrink)

While many historians take the view that Japanese philosophy only started with the Meiji Restoration and the entrance of Western culture into Japan, Hajime Nakamura demonstrates that there has been a long history of philosophy in Japan prior to the Meiji. Beginning in 592 AD, when Japan first became a centralized state and continuing into the early modern era, this work deals with the important problems and salient feature of Japanese philosophical thought at all stages in its development.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Artist as Professional in JapanKazuyo Nakamura and Akio OkazakiThe Artist as Professional in Japan, edited by Melinda Takeuchi. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004, 262pp., $45.00 cloth.With the increase of cross-cultural academic exchange in our time, more accurate information on art from other cultures has become more easily available, and curriculum development of art education directed toward multiculturalism has been brought to realization. There is need (...) emerging among art educators for academic resources for teaching cross-cultural subject matters, and The Artist as Professional in Japan provides historical information helpful in gaining a critical understanding of the nature of Japanese art discourse. The volume is edited from a fresh sociocultural perspective by Melinda Takeuchi, professor of Japanese art at Stanford University.Takeuchi, noticing that few scholarly books on the profession of Japanese artists are available to students of art history in the United States, set about the volume in concerted efforts with her colleagues. The volume consists of individual case studies on different Japanese artists; they are well-known sculptors, painters, potters, printmakers, and architects and are recognized in Japan as representative in different eras from the seventh to the twentieth century. Running through the individual studies, there is a concern for political forces that shaped art discourse and the identity of the Japanese artist. The following questions are asked: What degree of control did the artists exercise over their métier? What were some of the dynamics operating in the production, consummation, and evaluation of art and artist? How was the image of the artist formed during various periods? Working with these questions, seven case studies address issues of canon formation of art by looking into the terrain of the meaning of a critical word, Shoku-nin; it literally means people (nin) with an occupation (shoku) and denotes the collective artisan class.Different art historians and art theorists take a unique approach for developing each case study in the volume. Donald F. McCallum's study in chapter 2 is on the Buddhist Icons of the Shaka Triad during the Asuka Period (ca.590-ca.650), and it is asked what were the political forces working on the production of the [End Page 118] icons. In contrary to orthodox view, it is argued that the icons were produced not by an individual sculptor named Tori-busshi but by the guilds of which the supervisor was Tori. Also, it is argued that the icons were produced with the patronage of soga clan, the dominant political force of the time, not by the imperial family, including Shotoku Taishi.Karen L. Brock in chapter 3 examines the case of E'nichibo Jonin (active ca.1211-ca.1243), the painter of Saint Myoe. The case shows that the ateliers of temples, such as Kozanji in Kyoto, played a central role in producing and distributing sacred images. This study makes clear that few individual painters, such as those named ebusshi, participated in the formation of the canon of Japanese painting, but collective political forces, such as Kozanji ateliers, exercised power in bringing out sacred objects.In chapter 4 Melinda Takeuchi takes up the case of Tosa Mitsunobu (1434-ca.1523), an artisan painter active in Kyoto court circles. It shows a historical fact particular to Japanese art discourse—that later artists manipulated the names of earlier ones for professional or cultural merits. Taking notice of the fact that Mitsunobu's name late became synonymous with a production unit that shares secret techniques of products, Takeuchi concludes, "In the end, the name of an artist transcends time, space, materiality, and ultimately discourse itself" (101).The study of Louise Allison Cort in chapter 5 is on the case of Morita Kyuemon in the seventeenth century, a warrior trained as a potter and running the Odo pottery in the Tosa domain. By exploring the motivations of the Tosa domain in trying to transform local products into refined and stylish pottery worthy of formal presentation to other domain rulers (daimyo), to government officials, and to the shogun in Edo, this chapter demonstrates how both the potter and the ruler actively sought to join the aesthetic mainstream of their own day.In... (shrink)

Previous research reported that in processing structurally ambiguous sentences comprehenders often preserve an initial incorrect analysis even after adopting a correct analysis following structural disambiguation. One criticism is that the sentences tested in previous studies involved referential ambiguity and allowed comprehenders to make inferences about the initial interpretation using pragmatic information, suggesting the possibility that the initial analysis persisted due to comprehenders' pragmatic inference but not to their failure to perform complete reanalysis of the initial misanalysis. Our study investigated this (...) by testing locally ambiguous relative clause sentences in Japanese, in which the initial misinterpretation contradicts the correct interpretation. Our study using a self-paced reading technique demonstrated evidence for the persistence of the initial analysis with this structure. The results from an eye-tracking study further suggested that the phenomenon directly reflected the amount of support given to the initial incorrect analysis prior to disambiguating information: The more supported the incorrect main clause analysis was, the more likely comprehenders were to preserve the analysis even after the analysis was falsified. Our results thus demonstrated that the preservation of the initial analysis occurs not due to referential ambiguities but to comprehenders' difficulty to fully revise the highly supported initial interpretation. (shrink)

The measurement of pain depends upon subjective reports, but we know very little about how research subjects or pain patients produce self-reported judgments. Representationalist assumptions dominate the field of pain research and lead to the critical conjecture that the person in pain examines the contents of consciousness before making a report about the sensory or affective magnitude of pain experience as well as about its nature. Most studies to date have investigated what Fechner termed “outer psychophysics”: the relationship between characteristics (...) of an external stimulus and the magnitude and nature of pain experience. In contrast, Fechner originally envisioned that “inner psychophysics” should investigate the relationship between physiological states and subjective experience. Despite the lack of established research tradition, inner psychophysics has a potential utility in elucidating underlying mechanisms for the production of phenomenal self-report. We illustrate this, using causal modeling analyses of the accuracy of self-reported pain ratings from our laboratory. We submit that the results are inconsistent with representationalist assumptions. Converging trends from several domains of consciousness studies seem to suggest that we need to abandon the unquestioned doctrine of representationalism and search for a more viable framework for understanding the generation of subjective self-report. (shrink)

Résumé Les écrivaines de la génération de Beauvoir étaient confrontées à un dilemme où l’engagement politique était devenu un impératif dans le champ littéraire, alors qu’elles étaient historiquement exclues du domaine politique en raison de leur sexe. L’objectif de cet article est de réfléchir à la conjonction de la littérature et de la politique chez Beauvoir en comparant sa trajectoire avec celles d’autres écrivaines de son temps afin d’en montrer le caractère exceptionnel.

This article addresses how Asian racialization grounds contemporary social media experimentation on—and comprehensive surveillance of—users. To make this point, we focus on the relationship between the sentimentality of white benevolence as an expression of US empire and the social scientific history of sentiment analysis, which derives from early twentieth-century analyses of women workers and Japanese internment camps. The drive to “read” the inscrutable other—framed as a benevolent alternative to direct coercion—underlies methods to better capture and control individuals by understanding their (...) reactions within experimental and disruptive environments. In tracing these histories, we contribute to larger efforts to unpack the centrality of racial formations to current forms of social media and to reveal how contemporary digital campaigns to protect Asian Americans sustain the mutually constitutive logic of white love and white hate. We conclude by reading for moments of Asian affective opacity as ways to move beyond the sentimental economy of love and hate that so easily feeds the digital economy of sentiment analysis. These examples of opacity make possible contradictory meanings to any particular affective response and makes possible practices of care that coexist with, but exceed, the extractive logics of sentiment analysis. (shrink)

Tragic Beauty in Whitehead and Japanese Aesthetics evolved from a paper Steve Odin delivered at the 1984 Conference for the International Society of Process Philosophy at Nanzan University in Nagoya, Japan. This book will be intriguing and stimulating not only to those scholars who engage in Whitehead studies but also to those who are concerned with the development of an East–West dialogue on aesthetics and aesthetic education. In this volume, Odin compares Alfred North Whitehead's axiological process metaphysics, including his concept (...) of aesthetic experience and a doctrine of beauty, with the aesthetics of Zen Buddhism and offers readers a fresh cross-cultural understanding of Whitehead's process philosophy.In... (shrink)

The measurement of pain depends upon subjective reports, but we know very little about how research subjects or pain patients produce self-reported judgments. Representationalist assumptions dominate the field of pain research and lead to the critical conjecture that the person in pain examines the contents of consciousness before making a report about the sensory or affective magnitude of pain experience as well as about its nature. Most studies to date have investigated what Fechner termed “outer psychophysics”: the relationship between characteristics (...) of an external stimulus and the magnitude and nature of pain experience. In contrast, Fechner originally envisioned that “inner psychophysics” should investigate the relationship between physiological states and subjective experience. Despite the lack of established research tradition, inner psychophysics has a potential utility in elucidating underlying mechanisms for the production of phenomenal self-report. We illustrate this, using causal modeling analyses of the accuracy of self-reported pain ratings from our laboratory. We submit that the results are inconsistent with representationalist assumptions. Converging trends from several domains of consciousness studies seem to suggest that we need to abandon the unquestioned doctrine of representationalism and search for a more viable framework for understanding the generation of subjective self-report. (shrink)

Comprehenders generate expectations about upcoming lexical items in language processing using various types of contextual information. However, a number of studies have shown that argument roles do not impact neural and behavioral prediction measures. Despite these robust findings, some prior studies have suggested that lexical prediction might be sensitive to argument roles in production tasks such as the cloze task or in comprehension tasks when additional time is available for prediction. This study demonstrates that both the task and additional time (...) for prediction independently influence lexical prediction using argument roles, via evidence from closely matched electroencephalogram (EEG) and speeded cloze experiments. In order to investigate the timing effect, our EEG experiment used maximally simple Japanese stimuli such as Bee-nom/acc sting, and it manipulated the time for prediction by changing the temporal interval between the context noun and the target verb without adding any further linguistic content. In order to investigate the task effect, we conducted a speeded cloze study that was matched with our EEG study both in terms of stimuli and the time available for prediction. We found that both the EEG study with additional time for prediction and the speeded cloze study with matched timing showed clear sensitivity to argument roles, while the EEG conditions with less time for prediction replicated the standard pattern of argument role insensitivity. Based on these findings, we propose that lexical prediction is initially insensitive to argument roles but a monitoring mechanism serially inhibits role-inappropriate candidates. This monitoring process operates quickly in production tasks, where it is important to quickly select a single candidate to produce, whereas it may operate more slowly in comprehension tasks, where multiple candidates can be maintained until a continuation is perceived. Computational simulations demonstrate that this mechanism can successfully explain the task and timing effects observed in our experiments. (shrink)

We propose a triple test to evaluate the usefulness of behavioral economics models for public health policy. Test 1 is whether the model provides reasonably new insights. Test 2 is on whether these have been properly applied to policy settings. Test 3 is whether they are corroborated by evidence. We exemplify by considering the cases of social interactions models, self-control models and, in relation to health message framing, prospect theory. Out of these sets of models, only a correctly applied prospect (...) theory fully passes the tests at present. Specifically, in broad agreement with the evidence, a gain frame has positive implications for welfare encourages disease prevention activity, though this does not apply if the perceived probability of the bad health outcome is large enough. We see our tests as being useful to identify how much health policy weight policy makers should assign to specific behavioral economic models; they are also useful to verify what next steps would be most useful in further research. (shrink)