Index to the Digha-nikaya. Compiled by M. Yamazaki, Y. Ousaka, K. R. Norman and M. Cone. Pali Text Society, Oxford 1997. vii, 357 pp. £19.75. ISBN 0 86013 355 9.

The Digha Nikaya and its Commentaries. Dhammagiri-Pali-Ganthamala, Volumes 1-11. Vipassana Research Institute, Igatpuri 1993-95.

The aim of this paper is to situate the early Indian (Nikāya) Buddhist notion of karmic causation within the mental causation discourse in the Western analytic tradition, which concerns causal transactions involving mental events, such as desires, beliefs, and intentions, whether the transactions are between mental events, or between mental events and physical events. Karmic causation involves actional causes, in concert with non-actional causes, and their experiential effects on the actor, in concert with non-experiential effects. The problems generated by karmic (...) causation in Buddhism overlap with those generated by mental causation in the Western analytic tradition. They include how the mental aspects relate to the physical aspects of the self, sense perception, and action, as well as how the mental and physical aspects of an actional cause relate to the experiential and non-experiential aspects of an effect on the actor. -/- To make sense of mental causation, it is crucial to understand a cluster of associated concepts such as causation, the self, sense perception, and action. Similarly, to make sense of karmic causation, it is crucial to understand a cluster of associated concepts such as dependent arising (paṭiccasamuppāda), the fivefold laws of nature (pañca-niyāma), the five aggregates (pañca-khandha), the six sense bases (Saḷayatana), action (karma), and results (vipāka). I shall discuss these concepts under the headings of causation, the self, sense perception, and action before I move on to address karmic causation in the context of the mental causation debate. (shrink)

空은 붓다가 설한 다양한 주제 가운데 가장 핵심적인 사상이다. 초기경전에서는 空의 단어가 여러 차례 언급되는데, 그 중에서도 맛지마 니까야(Majjhima Nikāya)의『소공경』과『대공경』이 가장 중요한 의미를 지닌다. 맛지마 니까야에서는 무아를 중심으로 공성을 설명하고 있다. 자아에 집착하지 않는다는 견해에 의거해서 공을 관찰하는 것은 초기불교에서 말하는 최초의 공성이다. 공성은 맛지마 니까야에서 이미 언급된 것으로, 반야나 중관 등 여러 대승불교사상에서 다루어지는 주요한 주제이다. 이 때, 공성에 대한 초기불교와 대승불교의 견해 차이가 존재한다. 초기불교의 경우 주로 我空을 말하고 있는 반면, 대승불교의 경우는 法空을 위주로 교설이 전개된다고 할 수 (...) 있다. 대승불교에서 강조하고 있는 法空의 개념은 초기경인 『소공경』에 주로 등장한다. 이 경을 살펴보면 수행자는 자기 마음에서 나타나는 일체를 현현(viññapti)일 뿐이라고 간주한다. 이를 통해 차례대로 일체에 대한 집착을 마음에서 제거함으로써 無相三昧를 얻게 된다. 일찍이 많은 학자들은 주석에서 무상삼매가 我空을 뜻한다고 주장하였지만, 이에 대한 논란이 불거지며 我空이 아니라 法空으로 파악되어야 한다는 주장이 출현하게 되었다. 이에 대해 논자는 붓다가 我空만을 공성으로 본 것이 아니라 『소공경』, 『대공경』등의 경전에 나타나는 일체공, 즉 法空의 의미도 공성에 포함시켰다고 본다. 『니까야』에서의 공성은 오직 我空 뿐이라고 하는 것은 옳지 않다. 주석서에 法空이 언급되어 있지 않는 것은 전통에 따르기 위한 노력이었을 뿐이라고 생각하기 때문이다. 그리고 我空과 法空에 대한 해석의 차이는 부파불교가 여러 학파로 나뉘는 원인이 되었다고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

What does it mean to ‘know’ in the Nik?yas such that simply ‘knowing’ certain things ‘as they really are’ has the power to liberate one from sa?s?ra? In an effort to characterize such ‘knowing’ while minimizing the pr ojection of modern-western pr esupp ositions, the pr esent paper expl ores parallels between concepts of transformational and liberating knowledge in the Nik?yas and the early Upani?ads in an effort to identify epistemological pr esupp ositions curr ent in ancient India. The characterization (...) is contrasted with modern-western common sense notions of factual knowledge in order to highlight features that we may tend to miss or to overl ook. It is arg ued that for the authors of both sets of literature, ordinary opinion is deluded while genuine knowledge holds directly effective power, and that transformative knowledge is a reflexive mode of comportment towards the known, concerned as much with relations as with the entities related. This understanding help s to acc ount for the transformative power of ‘knowledge’ and may have impl ications for the ways we interpr et central doctrines. (shrink)

The Nikāyas contain several apophatic descriptions of a state of cessation that occurs during the life of an individual. Furthermore, some texts suggest that this cessation paradoxically coincides with liberating insight. This article attempts to draw out philosophical implications of these passages and to reconstruct the ideas serving as their basis. To make better sense of these ideas, the article compares early Buddhist views with certain developments in modern philosophy of mind. It argues that cessation of khandha-s and saḷāyatana-s may (...) be viewed as suspension of various aspects of globally available phenomenal consciousness. It hypothesizes that this suspension is necessary due to the latter's processed character, which precludes direct cognition of reality. It attempts to account for a cognitive nature of cessation by suggesting the possibility of the mind (citta) working independently of phenomenal consciousness. It also considers the issue of cognitive content of cessation and of its expressibility. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss some philosophical problems connected with the notion of regarding the aggregates (_khandha_) as self in the Nikāyas. In particular, I focus on the attitude represented by the formula “I am this” (_esohamasmi_) which may be labeled as that of identifying with the aggregates. In the first part of the paper, I point out and analyze certain similes contained in the Nikāyas which may be read as implying the existence of a distinction between the aggregates and (...) the individual who regards them as self. Then, I consider a hypothesis that the aggregates are not objective constituents of a human being but subjectively experienced representational phenomena. I argue that several Nikāya texts imply the existence of important aspects of a human being, in particular cognitive ones, which are not conceptualized in the terms of the five aggregates. I also discuss the possibility of interpreting _khandha_s as not active in character but as resultant of other cognitive processes. In the last part of the paper I offer a hypothesis that one of the key aspects of regarding the aggregates as self lies in the identification of a human individual with one’s own phenomenal self-representation which results in a mistaken projection of the notions of agency, identity and subjectivity onto something that is inherently devoid of it. I also consider certain parallels between the ideas present in the Nikāyas and the concepts of the modern philosophy of mind. (shrink)

General opinion holds that the Abhidhamma treats the Buddha’s teachings in terms of ultimate realities, i.e. dhammas, and that conventional constructs such as persons fall outside the primary concern of the Abhidhamma. The present paper re-examines this ultimate-conventional dichotomy drawn between dhammas and persons and argues that this dichotomy does not hold true for the canonical Abhidhamma in Pali. This study explores how various types of persons are interpreted and approached by the Abhidhamma material, including Abhidhamma texts such as the (...) Puggalapaññatti and a number of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that are identified in this paper as proto- Abhidhamma. (shrink)

According to Buddhist soteriology, fear is a direct cause of suffering and one of the main obstacles in the path to liberation. Pāli Suttas and Abhidhamma present a number of sophisticated strategies to deal with fear and to overcome it. Nevertheless, in the Nikāyas and in the Abhidhamma there are also consistent instructions about implementing fear in meditative practices and considering it as a valuable ally in the pursuit of nibbāna By means of a lexicographical study of selected passages and (...) especially of two compounds (bhayūparata and abhayūparata), this paper demonstrates that fear may have the crucial function of stimulating the meditator: through reiterated admonishments and reflections that evoke a feeling of dread, the meditator gets weary of unwholesome patterns and is prompted to put effort in his/her own practice. Evidence proves that this set of instructions is ultimately consistent with the several teachings that emphasize the importance of counteracting fear and fostering fearlessness, which is described as a quality of liberation as well as an attitude to be cultivated. In fact, a close analysis of the dynamics involved in bhaya (fear) and abhaya (fearlessness) as graphically depicted in the Nikāyas and in the Abhidhamma texts, reveals that stirring fear and letting go of fear are two essential steps of the same process. (shrink)

The "Khandha Passages" in the Vinayapitaka and the four main Nikayas. Tilmann Vetter. Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vienna 2000. 357 pp. ASch. 774. ISBN 3-7001-2932-7.

Abstract: This article shows how in the Pāli Nikāyas, after having defined Eternalism and Nihilism as two opposed positions, Gotama makes a dialectical use of Eternalism as means to eliminate Nihilism, upheld to be the worst point of view because of its denial of kammic maturation in terms of puñña and pāpa. Assuming, from an Eternalist perspective, that actions have effects also beyond the present life, Gotama underlines the necessity of betting on the validity of moral kammic retribution. Having thus (...) demonstrated the central ethical error of Nihilism, he subtly introduces peculiar Buddhist moral concepts (kusala/akusala) to purify the Eternalist vision from the doctrine of a real existing self (attāvāda) and from the puñña/pāpa dichotomy. We can summarize this dialectical course as follows: Nihilism is pāpa/akusala because it denies kamman, Eternalism is puñña/not-akusala because it upholds kamman from a non-Buddhist perspective, Buddhism is kusala because it admits the law of kamman not centred on a theory of a real existing self (anattāvāda). (shrink)

An Analytical Study of Four Nikayas. Dipak Kumar Barua. Rabindra Bharati University, Calcutta 1971. xviii + 626 pp.

Index to the Majjhima-nikaya, by M. Yamazaki & Y. Ousaka, pp. xi + 473, £35.50. ISBN 0 86013 421 0.

The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha - A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya. Translated by Bhikkhu Ñanamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi. Wisdom Publication, Boston, Mass., 1995. 1412 pp.. US$75.00. ISBN 0-86171-072-X.

To explain the khandhas as the Buddhist analysis of man, as has been the tendency of contemporary scholars, may not be incorrect as far as it goes, yet it is to fix upon one facet of the treatment of the khandhas at the expense of others. Thus A. B. Keith could write, “By a division which ... has certainly no merit, logical or psychological, the individual is divided into five aggregates or groups.” However, the five khandhas, as treated in the (...) nikāyas and early abhidhamma, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level rūpa, vedanā, sañña, and are presented as five aspects of an individual being's experience of the world; each khandha is seen as representing a complex class of phenomena that is continuously arising and falling away in response to processes of consciousness based on the six spheres of sense. They thus become the five upādānakkhandhas, encompassing both grasping and all that is grasped. As the upādānakkhandhas these five classes of states acquire a momentum, and continue to manifest and come together at the level of individual being from one existence to the next. For any given individual there are, then, only these five upādānakkhandhas — they define the limits of his world, they are his world. This subjective orientation of the khandhas seems to arise out of the simple fact that, for the nikāyas, this is how the world is experienced; that is to say, it is not seen primarily as having metaphysical significance.Accounts of experience and the phenomena of existence are complex in the early Buddhist texts; the subject is one that is tackled from different angles and perspectives. The treatment of rūpa, vedanā, saññā, and represents one perspective, the treatment of the six spheres of sense is another. As we have seen, in the nikāya formulae the two merge, complementing each other in the task of exposing the complex network of conditions that is, for the nikāyas, existence. In the early abhidhamma texts khandha, āyatana and dhātu equally become complementary methods of analysing, in detail, the nature of conditioned existence.The approach adopted above has been to consider the treatment of the five khandhas in the nikāyas and early abhidhamma texts as a more or less coherent whole. This has incidentally revealed something of the underlying structure and dynamic of early Buddhist teaching — an aspect of the texts that has not, it seems, either been clearly appreciated or properly understood, and one that warrants further consideration. (shrink)

본 연구는 최근 행복담론에 대한 성찰을 토대로 초기불교에 나타난 행복의 의미와 추구 방법을 탐구함으로써 오늘날 행복담론의 방향성 정립에 도움을 주기 위한 것이다. 일반적으로 인생을 고(苦)라고 전제한 불교는 행복과 거리가 먼 사상으로 인식되지만, 초기불교에서는 인생의 목적이 행복, 즉 고(苦)를 극복하여 락(樂) 에 이르는 이고득락(離苦得樂)임을 분명히 하였다. 초기불교에서는 고(苦)의 원인은 갈애(渴愛)와 무명(無明)에 의한 번뇌이며, 행복은 이 번뇌심리를 극복함으로써얻어진다고 하였다. 갈애와 무명에서 생기는 번뇌심리를 극복하기 위하여 지속적으로 수행하여 행복에 도달하고자 하는 것이 이고득락의 구조이다. 초기불교에서는 행복을 현세적 행복과 궁극적 행복으로 구분하는데, 전자는 자신의 삶에서 (...) 최선을 다하고 선업을 쌓아 봉사하면서 삼매로 몸과 마음의 평안함을 유지하는 것이목표이고, 후자는 통찰지로 열반에 이르러 윤회를 끊는 것이 목표이다. 초기불교에서는 기쁨 혹은 희열을 뜻하는 ‘삐띠(pitī)’, 즐거움을 의미하는 ‘수카(suka)’, 사무량심(四無量心)의 희(喜)인 ‘무디타(muditā)’, 그리고 선업의 결과인 ‘망갈라(maṅgala)’ 등 행복의 심리상태를 나타내는 다양한 개념들이 등장한다. 초기불교에서는 행복에 이르는 구체적 방법으로 교학과 수행의 체계를 37보리분법으로 제시하였다. 사마타[定, 몰입] 수행으로 심해탈(心解脫)을 이루어 삼매의 경지에서 느끼는 열락(悅樂)이 행복이다. 그러나 여기서 그치지 않고 위빠사나[觀, 통찰] 수행으로 통찰지에 의한 인식의 변화, 즉 혜해탈(慧解脫)을 통해 열반(涅槃)에 이르는행복을 추구한다. 정서의 평안함과 인식의 전환을 통해 나의 행복에 도달하고, 궁극적으로는 나를 넘어 자비의 세계에 이르고자 하는데 여기서 대승불교로 이어지는 가교로서의 특성이 드러난다. 오늘날 행복의 맥락은 초기불교의 그것과 달라져서 초기불교에서 제시한 행복의 경지에 이르기는 것이 결코 쉽지는 않지만 정진과수행의 노력으로 얼마든지 가능하다. 초기불교의 행복담론이 주관적 측면의 행복에 초점을 둠으로써 객관적 조건과 환경의 변화에 대한 인간의 주체적 역할을 소홀히 하였다는 점에서는 아쉬움이 남는다. (shrink)

빨리 문헌에서 말하는 성인은 사향사과를 말한다. 특히 사향사과에서 과를 성취한 사성인은 수행의 단계적인 성격을 띠고 있는 성인의 전형적인 형태이다. 사향사과와 사성인의 단초는 빠른 시기의 빨리 문헌에서부터 나타나고 있다. 그러나 일부 학자들은 다른 관점에서 이들을 연구해석하고 있다. 이들은 사향사과에서 사향과 사과를 묶어서 생각하지 않고 사향설을 사과설이 성립한 후에 파생적으로 고안된 것으로 보기도 한다. 또한 사성인에서 사후의 생천과 연관되어 있는 일래와 불환은 현세에서의 깨달음을 지향하는 불교의 본지도 붓다의 직접적인 교설도 아니며, 성립과정에서도 예류와 아라한 사이에 후대에 유입된 것이라고 하고 있다. 아울러 사성인의 정의설명에서 (...) 몇 가지 부합되지 않은 점도 논의의 대상이 되고 있다. 그러나 붓다는 현세에서의 완전한 열반을 강조하였지만, 아울러 삼계윤회와 생천 또한 부정한 것은 아니다. 최고의 경지인 아라한이 되지 못하면 누구라도 윤회에서 자유롭지 못하므로 윤회하는 과정에서 삼계윤회와 생천은 불가피한 전제이다. 그리고 사성인의 계위성립설에 있어서도 이들의 해석을 논증할만한 근거자료가 빨리 문헌에서는 쉽게 보이지 않는다. 또한 일래자에서 엷어지는 탐욕, 성냄 그리고 어리석음은 감각적 욕망의 탐욕, 악의 그리고 무명을 생기게 하는 근원적인 뿌리이므로, 열 가지 족쇄와도 무관한 것은 아니다. 따라서 사향사과와 사성인은 고층문헌에서부터 전체 빨리 문헌에서 나타나고 있으므로, 이는 붓다에 의한 바른 교설이라고 보는 것이 오히려 빨리 문헌에 가까운 입장이라고 본다. (shrink)

Als wahrscheinlich älteste vollständige Überlieferung des Buddhismus reflektiert der Pali-Kanon in literarisch-narrativer Form die Auseinandersetzung mit religiös,Anderen' aus emischer Perspektive. Die Suttas berichten nicht nur, wie der Buddha Mitglieder seines Ordens belehrt, sondern auch, wie er Vertretern anderer religiöser Gruppierungen begegnet und mit ihnen diskutiert haben soll. Caroline Widmer untersucht, inwiefern in diesen Begegnungen religiöse Abgrenzung im Sinne eines Otherings literarisch dargestellt wird, und behandelt diese religionswissenschaftliche Fragestellung im Bereich des Buddhismus erstmals durch eine literaturwissenschaftlich angelegte Analyse der narrativen Gestaltung (...) der Pali-Suttas. Die Texte spiegeln jedoch nicht wie oftmals angenommen in erster Linie Toleranz oder Offenheit gegenüber anderen religiösen Ansichten wider; vielmehr sind durch einen hohen Grad an Selbstdarstellung und einem exklusiven Anspruch auf Wahrheitsbesitz geprägt. Erzählerisch wird diese Spannung so aufgelöst, dass der,Andere' das,Eigene' annimmt und dadurch seine,Andersheit' verliert. Die Untersuchung eröffnet einen neuen Zugang zu religionsgeschichtlichen Quellen, erlaubt detaillierte Einblicke in diesen systemspezifischen Prozess des Selfings und erläutert seine Funktion innerhalb der buddhistischen Überlieferung. (shrink)

The meaning of its title, ‘Section with Verses’, may appear sufficient to explain why the Sagatha-vagga was identified as a discrete entity within the Samyuttanikaya. However, this article looks beyond that simple explanation, to discover whether some other rationale may underlie this grouping of samyuttas. It examines evidence that the compiling of the Sagatha-vagga was probably based on a familiar, although doctrinally marginal, piece of Buddhist teaching, namely the ‘eight Assemblies’.

The Long Discourses of the Buddha. Fr P. Anatriello. Anchor Publications, Bognor Regis 1986. viii, 128pp. £6.95.

Routinization is a term invented by Max Weber to describe events after the death of a charismatic religious leader. It has become widely used in the humanities in a variety of contexts. The death of the historical Buddha produced the first known instance of extreme routinization, in which the charisma of the founder is transmuted into a system of teachings that are themselves invested with authority, quite separate from the charisma of any individual within that tradition. This article examines the (...) Sāmagāmasutta and the Gopaka-Mogallānasutta, two texts from the Majjhima Nikāya. These texts, when read together, show us just how the Buddha prepared the way for the extreme routinization that would take place in the community, and how the early Buddhist monks reacted to this. In the Sāmagāmasutta, the Buddha prepares for the power vacuum after his own death by setting up procedures by which the monks will be able to govern themselves without relying on a single charismatic leader. The Gopaka-Mogallānasutta describes events after the Buddha’s death and indicates that the Buddha’s instructions had been followed faithfully. Taken together, these two obscure texts frame the far more famous Mahāparinibbānasutta and provide it with valuable context. This discussion is followed by a consideration of how Buddhism ended up reverting to more conventional patterns of routinization as it expanded. (shrink)

이 글은 초기불교의 무아설(無我說)에 근거하여 갈등 문제의 대처를 위한 소통 담론을 모색하는 데 목적을 둔다. 초기불교의 니까야(Nikāya) 문헌에는 다양한 유형의 무아설이 나타난다. 필자는 그들 중 ‘동일시의 부정(disidentification)’을 내용으로 하는 무아 유형 들이야말로 협력적 삶을 위한 소통의 지침이 될 수 있다고 본다. ‘동일시의 부정’ 방식으로 제시되는 무아란 스스로의 주장과 견해에 대한 반성적 태도를 본질로 한다. 이것은 자신의 경험을 구성하는 물질현상(色, rūpa)이나 느낌(受, vedanā) 따위에 대해 ‘나의 것 (mama)’이 아니며 ‘나의 자아(me attā)’가 아니라고 부정하는 방식으로 이루어진다. 이와 같은 부정은 스스로의 정체성을 이루는 (...) 요인들에 대한 거부로서, 자신의 신념이나 사고에 매몰되는 것을 막아줄 수 있다. 필자는 이와 같은 반성적 태도가 결여된 상태에서는 스스 로의 느낌이나 생각에 대한 과도한 확신과 함께 타인과의 소통 부재 상황이 초래될 수 있 다고 본다. 동일시 부정의 무아는 ‘나’ 혹은 자아에 대한 존재론적 부정으로 볼 수 없으며, 다만 자신을 구성하는 요인들과의 ‘거리두기’로 바꾸어 말할 수 있다. 이러한 ‘거리두기’는 자신에 대해 거리를 두는 정도만큼 타자를 위한 여유 공간의 확보를 가능하게 해줄 수 있 다. 이 점에서 무아란 ‘나’ 혹은 자아에 대한 전면적인 거부가 아니며 타자에 대한 맹목적 인 수용도 아니어야 한다. 무아의 실천에는 자신과 타자 모두에게 얽매이지 않는 유연성과 균형감이 요구된다고 할 수 있다. 이 글은 무아의 실천적 측면을 규명하기 위해 원효의 화 쟁(和諍) 사상과 현대의 체험주의(Experientialism) 담론을 활용한다. 자신의 신념이나 확 신조차도 다른 사람에 의한 검토와 비판에 개방되어야 한다는 화쟁 해석은 무아의 실천적 측면을 이해하는 데 참고가 될 수 있다. 한편 체험주의 담론은 절대주의적 사고방식의 폐해를 지적하는 동시에 몸으로 경험되는 ‘나쁜 것’에 대한 체험적 인식으로부터 공감과 소통 의 실마리를 찾아나갈 것을 제안한다. 체험주의의 시선은 무아설 및 사성제(四聖諦)가 사변 의 산물이 아니며 생생한 삶의 현실에 대처하기 위한 것임을 드러내는 데 유용하다. (shrink)

Drawn from the Anguttara Nikaya, Numerical Discourses of the Buddha brings together teachings of the Buddha ranging from basic ethical observances recommended to the busy man or woman of the world, to the more rigorous instructions on mental training prescribed for the monks and nuns. The Anguttara Nikaya is a part of the Pali Canon, the authorized recension of the Buddha's Word for followers of Theravada Buddhism, the form of Buddhism prevailing in the Buddhist countries of southern Asia. (...) These discourses are called numerical because they retain the structure of the original Anguttara Nikaya. Sayings are organized not by topic, but by numbers mentioned in the texts. This organizational scheme, common in ancient Indian literature, can give the reader a haphazard view of the Buddha's teachings. To balance this tendency, Bhikku Bodhi provides a systematic introduction to the Buddha's teachings. To balance this tendency, Bhikku Bodhi provides a systematic introduction to the Buddha's Teaching in the Anguttara Nikaya. The translators also provide notes, a glossary, and another introduction placing the Anguttara Nikaya in the context of the larger Theravada Buddhist Canon. This readable butt precise translation will be welcomed by both students of Theravada Buddhism as well as anyone wishing to learn from the Buddha's teachings. (shrink)

The Buddhist Nikāya Suttas frequently mention the concept of fear (bhaya) and related synonyms. This concept does not receive much scholarly attention by subsequent Buddhist philosophers. Recent scholars identify a ‘paradox of fear’ in several traditions of classical Indian Buddhism (Brekke 1999, Finnigan 2019, Giustarini 2012). Each scholar points out, in their respective textual contexts, that fear is evaluated in two ways; one positive and the other negative. Brekke calls this the “double role” of fear (1999: 443). Each also identify (...) fear as purposely elicited to motivate acts aimed at achieving fearlessness, where freedom from fear is characteristic of nibbāna. They all find this puzzling. Finnigan asks: “Why would one purposefully incite fear if one’s goal is its elimination?” (2019: 221). Giustarini says that fear has a “contradictory nature” (2012: 513); Brekke calls it “the paradox of fear” (1999: 442). This article introduces the ‘paradox of fear’ as it appears in the Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva and the Nikāya suttas. It then critically examines Brekke and Giustarini’s proposed solutions. It argues that they get some things right in ways that are both supported by the Nikāyas and relevant to Śāntideva but that they leave some important questions unanswered. The article contends that these questions are best answered if fear is analysed as appropriate when its objects are related to karma and rebirth. (shrink)

I argue that the Buddha did not discuss the free will and determinism problem because he only considered issues relating to overcoming suffering and his teaching about this did not raise the problem. As represented in the Nikāyas, the heart of his teaching was an empirically based account of the causes of suffering and how to modify these to end suffering. It was primarily a practical teaching about how to achieve this goal, more a craft knowledge than a philosophical theory (...) of causality. Similarly, the no-self teaching was more about living selflessly than about developing a theoretical analysis of agency. (shrink)

Recently, some contradictory statements have been made concerning whether or not the Buddha taught free will. Here, a comparative method is used to examine what exactly is meant by free will, and to determine to what extent this meaning is applicable to early Buddhist thought as recorded in the Pāli Nikāyas. The comparative method reveals parallels between contemporary criticisms of Cartesian philosophy and Buddhist criticisms of Brahmanical and Jain doctrines. Although in Cartesian terms Buddhism promotes no recognizable theory of free (...) will, it does promote a primitive theory of compatibilism which shares some keyfeatures with Daniel Dennett's position on this issue. It is argued that the implicit Buddhist stance on freedom of the will allows the existence of choice and responsibility without calling upon an ultimate controlling agency that transcends the causal nexus of mind and body. (shrink)

This article announces the discovery of a Sinhalese version of the traditional meditation ( borān yogāvacara kammaṭṭhāna ) text in which the Consciousness or Mind, personified as a Princess living in a five-branched tree (the body), must understand the nature of death and seek the four gems that are the four noble truths. To do this she must overcome the cravings of the five senses, represented as five birds in the tree. Only in this way will she permanently avoid the (...) attentions of Death, Māra, and his three female servants, Birth, Sickness and Old Age. In this version of the text, when the Princess manages not to succumb to these three, Māra comes and snatches her from her tree and rapes her. The Buddha then appears to her to explain the path to liberation. The text provides a commentary, padārtha , which explains the details of the symbolism of the fruit in terms of rebirth and being born, the tree in terms of the body, etc. The text also offers interpretations of signs of impending death and prognostications regarding the next rebirth. Previously the existence of Khmer and Lānnā versions of this text have been recorded by Francois Bizot and Francois Lagirarde, the former publishing the text as Le Figuier a cinq branches (Le figuier à cinq branches, 1976). The Sinhalese version was redacted for one of the wives of King Kīrti Śrī Rājasiṅha of Kandy by the monk Varañāṇa Mahāthera of Ayutthayā. This confirms earlier speculation that this form of borān/dhammakāya meditation was brought to Sri Lanka with the introduction of the Siyam Nikāya in the mid-eighteenth century. It also shows that in Sri Lanka, as in Ayutthayā, this form of meditation—which in the modern period was to be rejected as ‘unorthodox’—was promoted at the highest levels of court and Saṅgha. (shrink)

In this article I share some of my experiences of practising Korean Zen meditation and how, without ever mentioning the word ‘mindfulness,’ this practice helps us to become mindful. This leads me to suggest that the main ingredients of Buddhist meditation are samatha (which I will translate here as ‘concentration’) and vipassanā (which I will call ‘experiential enquiry’). No matter which Buddhist tradition one follows, the practice of samatha and vipassanā will lead to the cultivation of mindfulness. I also intend (...) to show how the traditional doctrine of the ‘four great efforts’ is very close to therapeutic methods advocated in MBCT. I will also propose that the Buddha's five methods of dealing with difficult thoughts as presented in the Vitakkhasa hāna Sutta (Majjhima Nikāya 20) are examples of an early Buddhist cognitive behavioural strategy. (shrink)

This paper considers the controversy surrounding the Buddhist doctrine of “no-self”, and especially the question of whether the Buddha himself meant by it unequivocally the ontological denial of the self. The emergence of this doctrine is connected with the Buddha’s attempt to forge a “middle way” that avoids the extreme views of “eternalism” in regards to the soul and “annihilationism” of the soul at bodily death. By looking at the earliest works of the Pāli canon, three of the five Nikāyas (...) along with later Abhidharmist developments, my discussion shows that its original intent was not explicitly ontological. The intent was more practical than theoretical, with the aim of bringing about a freedom from attachment to such theories as eternalism and annihilationism. The Buddha’s “middle” position was, hence, a praxis towards freedom rather than a theoria about the existence or non-existence of the self. (shrink)

The present article supplies an annotated translation of the sixteenfold instructions on mindfulness of breathing in the Chinese Samyukta-agama. These instructions show how mindfulness of breathing fulfi ls the four satipatthanas and leads to the development of the seven bojjhangas, thereby leading to knowledge and liberation. The translation is followed by a comparison with its Pali counterpart, the Ananda-sutta in the Samyutta-nikaya.

This paper challenges the traditional Buddhist positioning of the four jhànas under the category of `concentration meditation' and the premise regarding their secondary and superfluous role in the path of liberation. It seeks to show that the common interpretation of the jhànas as absorption-concentration, attainments that have no liberative value, is incompatible with the teachings of the Pàli Nikàyas. The paper argues few things: First, that one attains the jhànas, not by fixating the mind or being absorbed into a meditation (...) object, but by releasing and letting go of the foothold of the unwholesome mind. Second and related, that the entrance into the first jhàna is the actualization and embodiment of insight practice. Third, that jhànic joy and pleasure has significant liberative importance in the path of liberation; they allow the mind to let go of a rooted and basic tendency that causes suffering: the tendency to desire sensual pleasures. (shrink)

Dasakathāvatthu appears to be a unique, but less known course of training in the Buddhist spiritual practice of the Theravāda tradition. Though the importance of the practice is highlighted, it is discussed with very little information in the Pāli Nikāya literature. But a well-informed discussion of the practice is found in the commentarial texts. One specific feature of the practice is that the path factors are defined as kathā suggesting that the practice is dialogical. This is in connection with the (...) Buddha’s advice that monks should spend their time either in dhamma-discussion or in noble silence. The dasakathāvatthu is an illustration of the kind of practice and talks that qualify for dhamma-discussion. The commentarial literature points out that the Buddha highly appreciates the one who, after being skilled in these talks, acts as a kalyānamitta and discusses them with others. The stress seems to be that the conversation one has with fellow practitioners is vital in one’s spiritual journey. In other words, the spiritual journey should consist in not walking alone but walking together. For my study of the subject, I used primarily the Pāli Nikāya texts and their commentaries as source materials. (shrink)

The Abhidhamma uses the concept of lokuttara-jjhana to refer to the moment one attains any of the four stages of Awakening. In contrast, the Suttas use the terms jhana and samadhi to refer to aspects of the path leading to the stages of Awakening. Therefore, when the commentaries interpret jhana and samadhi in Sutta usage as lokuttara-jjhana, they are imposing an interpretation on the Suttas that is foreign to them. Directly contradicting the Suttas, this reinterpretation makes jhana dispensable as a (...) path factor leading to Awakening. More generally, this particular problem highlights the inherent danger of distortion when the commentaries use later concepts to explain the earliest teachings of the Nikayas. (shrink)

This paper examines the Vitakkasanthana Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya from a psychological perspective. This discourse deals with unwanted, intrusive cognitions that interfere with one’s meditative efforts. Five strategies for dealing with these are given, presented in an hierarchical order. The paper elucidates and comments on these, with special reference to the techniques used, in present day clinical psychology and psychiatry, to counter intrusions/obsessions.

This article first briefly examines the textual structure of the Vangisathera Samyutta of the Pali Samyutta-nikaya in conjunction with two other versions preserved in Chinese translation in Taisho vol. 2, nos. 99 and 100. Then it compares the main teachings contained in the three versions. These three versions of this collection on the subject of the venerable Vangisa represent three different early Buddhist schools within the Sthavira branch. This comparative study of these three different versions focuses on three major (...) topics: Arhants at the pravarana ceremony; sensual desire and the way to extinguish it; and the Buddha’s teachings to Vangisa. It reveals similarities and significant differences in structure and doctrinal content, thus advancing the historical/critical study of early Buddhist doctrine in this area. (shrink)

The _play of formulas_ is a new theory designed to explain the manner in which discourses (Suttas, Sūtras) were composed in the early Buddhist tradition, focusing at present mainly on the _Dīgha-_ and _Majjhima- Nikāyas_ (the collections of the Buddha’s Long and Middle-length discourses). This theory combats the commonly accepted views that texts are mainly an attempt to record and preserve the Buddha’s teachings and life events, and that the best way to understand their history is to compare parallel versions (...) of them. By identifying the creative, mainly the literary, vectors alive in the shaping of the texts, the theory explains how discourses are the products of formulas, which themselves are the primary texts of early Buddhism. Formulas combine in order to produce meaningful textual patterns, with little account of historical context and with much interest in aesthetic appeal and emotive potency. Formulas connect according to set narrative designs, in which different types of audiences are represented not only through unique formulas, but also with their specific narrative trajectories and complementing doctrinal emphases. It is not that the early authors were not at all interested in safeguarding the tradition. It is only that there was much more going on, and that thinking about the texts in this way misses their entertaining faces and ignores their beauty. These probably tell us more about what the early discourses actually were for the people that first produced and studied them than dry philosophical doctrine. (shrink)

This essay attempts to clarify the position of Nāgārjuna in the history of Buddhist philosophy by comparing the concept of emptiness in the Pāli Nikāyas and the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. It is argued that the identity of samsāra with nirvāna, the emptiness of svabhāva of all dharmas, and the equating of emptiness and dependent arising are not revolutionary innovations of Nāgārjuna or the second turning of the wheel of Dharma, but orthodox philosophical moves entailed by the teachings of early Buddhism.