AbstractŚaṅkara’s Brahma-advaita-vāda and Abhinavagupta’s Śiva-advaita-vāda are well-known non-dualistic systems in Indian philosophy.1In Advaitavedānta, Brahman-Ātman is the sole reality, and there is unanimity about the fact that all the Upaniṣads speak of an attribute-less non-dual reality that is consciousness, existence and bliss. In Trika, Paramaśiva is the only reality with the nature of sat, cit and ānanda.2 This non-dual reality is self-luminous (sva-prakaśa) in both the schools. Both the schools, in different ways, accept the world as an appearance. In (...) Advaitavedānta, the world-illusion is a superimposition on Brahman whereas according to Trika, the world is a spontaneous self-projection of Paramaśiva. Both the systems agree that there is total identity between individual self and the Absolute, ajñāna as the cause of bondage, and jñāna as the means to self-realization. Jīvanmukti as the state of complete freedom and realization of one’s unity with the ultimate reality have been accepted in both the schools. The focus of this paper is to dwell upon the concept of non-dualism (Advaita) from the Trika angle as enunciated by Abhinavagupta and Advaitavedānta as propounded by Śaṅkara. Abhinava has envisaged a non-dualistic dimension of consciousness with the inclusion of prakāśa and vimarśa, which means that within the format of non-dualism, Trika accepts a second in the form of Śakti without compromising the non-dualistic dimension of the school whereas Śaṅkara’s Advaitic non-dualism has no space for anything other than the self, i.e., Brahman-Ātman. (shrink)

Advaita, a non-dualist system of Vednta philosophy, and Yoga, a dualist system of classical Indian philosophy, make different ontological assumptions. Yet surprisingly they subscribe to similar views on many psychological issues. Together they provide the base for what is now known as Indian psychology. As an alternate system of psychology, it provides fruitful models that go well beyond the currently dominant reductionist postulates in cognitive science and suggest attractive programmes of research for those working in areas of cognitive excellence (...) and extraordinary human abilities. This paper provides an outline of a model derived from Indian psychology called the Body-Mind-Consciousness Trident model which favours a process view of reality, in place of entity metaphysics. (shrink)

This article examines Appaya Dīkṣita’s intellectual affiliation to Śivādvaita Vedānta in light of his well-known commitment to Advaita Vedānta. Attention will be given to his Śivādvaitanirṇaya, a short work expounding the nature of the Śivādvaita doctrine taught by Śrīkaṇṭha in his Śaiva-leaning commentary on the Brahmasūtra. It will be shown how Appaya strategically interprets Śrīkaṇṭha’s views on the relationship between Śiva, its power of consciousness and the individual self, along the lines of pure non-dualism. In this context, the hermeneutical (...) role of the daharavidyā doctrine will be considered with reference to Appaya’s Śivādvaita magnum opus, the Śivārkamaṇidīpikā. (shrink)

This essay is an attempt to evaluate the concept of non-duality (_advaita_) in the philosophy of Abhinavagupta (_fl. c._ 975–1025 CE), one of the leading exponents of Trika Śaivism, who argues for ‘absolute non-duality’ (_paramādvaita_) as a fundamental principle of everything. According to him, this fundamental meta-category subsumes within itself both ‘duality’ (_dvaita_ or _bheda_) and ‘non-duality’ (_advaita_ or _abheda_) in a resolution that, on the surface, appears to be nothing more than an oxymoron. How can two mutually opposing categories (...) be one? However, for Abhinavagupta, both ‘duality’ and ‘non-duality’ are the basic building blocks of an all-encompassing singular meta-category called ‘absolute non-duality’ (_paramādvaita_). This version of non-duality argues for inclusivism, i.e., for any idea of binary to manifest, someone fundamentally recognises the distinction between, for instance, a ‘pot’ (_ghaṭa_) and a ‘non-pot’ (_aghaṭa_) and it is this distinction (_dvaita_ or _bheda_) that unitarily brings a pot and a non-pot together (_advaita_ or _abheda_). By saying this, Abhinavagupta is not suggesting that a pot is a non-pot and a non-pot is a pot. But they are singular manifestations in a plural form _of_ and _in_ a singular principle, i.e., non-dual consciousness (_advaitasamvit_). Using a more contemporary terminology, this form of non-duality may be called ‘pluralistic non-dualism’ or ‘subjective pluralism’, understood in the sense that even two mutually opposing labels, such as ‘pluralistic idealism’ or ‘idealistic realism’, can be used. (shrink)

Many of us, and I am no exception, have been led to assume, almost un-consciously, that Śankara is India's greatest philosopher and that the non-dualist philosophy he consolidated, Advaita Vedānta, is the supreme spiritual philosophy of India, if not of the whole world. Dualist opponents like Madhva, on the other hand, have usually been appreciated very little, if at all. Several of my colleagues think of Madhva as a reactionary, if brilliant, theist whose philosophy best serves as a foil (...) to Śankara's. Madhva, it almost seems, is studied not for his own philosophical virtues but as a means the better to appreciate Śankara's. I believe that we must weigh more carefully the dualist position, particularly its trenchant critique of non-dualism. We may discover in the process that Śankara, whatever else he was – brilliant stylist, mystic par excellence , deft polemicist – was not the originator or consolidator of anything like an internally consistent metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper seeks to bring cosmopsychism, a contemporary metaphysical position on the nature of mind and consciousness, into contact with the philosophical tradition of Hinduism. Behind this exercise lies the motivation to examine how ideas developed within this rich tradition could aid in the effort to think constructively and creatively about issues which occupy the contemporary literature on panpsychism, and in particular cosmopsychism. I argue that, within the Hindu philosophical corpus, contemporary cosmopsychism finds its most natural allies in two world-affirming (...) views: Kashmir Śaivism, and the integral Advaita of Sri Aurobindo. After discussing these views, and their affinities to cosmopsychism, I argue that one important potential contributions of such perspectives lies in the fact that they present us with a form of priority monism little developed within contemporary philosophy. I call this neglected perspective generative monism, and I offer a preliminary exposition of the view and of its explanatory potential. (shrink)

The late 16th century Indian philosopher Vijñānabhikṣu is most well known today for his commentaries on Sāṃkhya and Yoga texts. However, the majority of his extant corpus belongs to the tradition of Bhedābheda (Difference and Non-Difference) Vedānta. This article elucidates three Vedāntic arguments from Vijñānabhikṣu’s voluminous commentary on the Brahma Sūtra, entitled Vijñānāmṛtabhāṣya (Commentary on the Nectar of Knowledge). The first section of the article explores the meaning of bhedābheda, showing that in Vijñānabhikṣu’s understanding, “difference and non-difference” does not entail (...) a denial of the principle of contradiction. The second shows how the relation between the individual soul (jīva) and Brahman can be understood as a relation of part and whole. The third section discusses Brahman as cause of the world, and Vijñānabhikṣu’s particular formulation of Brahman as “locus cause” (adhiṣṭhānakāraṇa). Understanding these arguments enables us to appreciate how Vijñānabhikṣu’s Difference and Non-Difference Vedānta is a credible alternative to the Advaita Vedānta schools prevalent in northern India in the late medieval period, and how in his later works Vijñānabhikṣu built upon this Difference and Non-Difference metaphysical framework to argue for the unity of Vedānta, Yoga, and Sāṃ-khya philosophies. (shrink)

NON-DUALISM, DUALISM AND MONISM Q.1 What do the following terms, often used by the Vedanta: dualism, monism, monotheism and non-dualism, mean? A. Every philosophical or cosmological vision which affirms two opposing and irreducible...

On Advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy of Hinduism.

The present work is a comparative and critical study of Shunyavada, Vijnanavada, Advaita Vedanta and Kashmira Shaivism, the four main systems of Advaitavada or spiritual non-dualism which has been the most celebrated tradition in Indian philosophy. It is based on the author`s study of original sources and when dealing with fundamental issues original texts are either quoted or referred to. The points of similarity and of difference among these systems are discussed in detail and with great clarity. Professor Sharma, (...) with his unique gift of expressing abstruse metaphysical thoughts in a clear language, has eminently succeeded in correcting some misconceptions and in clarifying many difficult and obscure points about these systems. This work is indeed a masterly survey of Mahayana Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta and kashmira Shaivism which brings into rominence the author`s original contributions some of which are of outstanding merit for a correct appreciation of the relation among these systems.The Advaita Tradition in Indian Philosophy will be found eminently useful by the students of philosophy in universities and colleges and also by all those who are interested in Buddhism, Vedanta and Kashmira Shaivism and who want a clear and accurate exposition of the development of the Advaita tradition in Indian philosophical thought. (shrink)

Study on the contribution of Citsukha, 13th century Indian philosopher, to the non-dualistic (advaita) school of Hindu philosophy.

On the life and work of Sureshvaracharya, disciple of Shankaracharya, founder of the school of Hindu Advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy.

This paper aims to reveal the point of contact between modern science and ancient Indian philosophy, namely quantum mechanics and Advaita Vedanta and Sunyavada in particular. Modern quantum research discloses the essential characteristics of quantum mechanics that disprove classical determinism and find out the relations between energy, entropy, and observations, wave-particle duality, and entanglement. These ideas have some similarity with Advaita Vedanta’s non-dualism (Maya) and Buddhism’s relational existence (Sunyavada) yet there lacks investigation of how either paradigms interface to (...) develop their conceptual epistemology and ontological nexus. This paper recognises the issue of the bridging of these two perspectives, suggests Energetic Relational Ontology as a solution, and presents a new concept, Quantum-Metaphysical Cohesion, through which energy, consciousness and reality can be seen as one. (shrink)

The sixteenth-century Marathi poet-saint Eknāth is better known for his devotional songs and allegorical drama-poems than his “philosophical” writings. These writings include commentaries on and distillations of Sanskrit texts that feature a highly localized form of Advaita, or non-dualist Vedānta. Rather than consider them vernacular translations of the classical traditions of Advaita, I propose to read Eknāth’s philosophical works as embedded in a local context of non-dualist thought that filtered into the elite world of Sanskrit knowledge-systems. I provide (...) examples from his Marathi commentary on the Sanskrit Hastāmalaka Stotra, a brief versified teaching on Advaita Vedānta. I also look at the para-textual material bracketing the content and some of the accompanying manuscript record, in order to understand the context for circulation and transmission of this material among Eknāth’s various readers over generations. My general attempt is to understand how ideas and practices belonging to local, vernacular networks filter into elite Sanskrit systems of knowledge—that is, not just into flexible genres like purāṇa but into disciplines, like Vedānta, that are generally viewed as impervious to the world around them. From my perspective, all knowledge is local, even that articulated in such cosmopolitan languages as Sanskrit. In Eknāth’s vernacular Advaita, we find evidence for a much wider scope for the movement of ideas, one that moves not from top-down but bottom-up. (shrink)

There are various permutations of theism: henotheism, pantheism, panentheism, a/theism, and nontheistic divinity. There is debate whether the idea of OmniGod was ever achieved in India. R. C. Zaehner argued that an evolutionary transition from pratenaturalism of the Vedas to Upaniṣad’s monism, culminated in monotheism with Purāṇas and the _Bhagavad Gītā._ I argue differently, beginning with ancient ritualistic polytheism, followed by unifying One Brahman, toward monistic panentheism and later non-dualism of _advaita_ Vedānta. Under the influence of Asaṅga, Buddhism elevated the (...) Buddha as the Great Divine Replacement. As a response or reaction, Brāhmaṇism forged Īśvara as God with the World as his Body. By 13th century, theistic dualism separated Īśvara from his _creatio._ Even Nyāya rational philosophy was persuaded by monotheism as demonstrated in their teleo-cosmological argument for the existence of Īśvara. I attribute all this to sectarian and doctrinal shifts rather than to any evolutionary teleology and/or predestined historicist movement. (shrink)

An exposition of non-dualist Vedanta. Advaita, called the summit of Indian philosophical and religious thought, is the knowing the absolute reality and ground. The component of "seeing" truth is developed through our immediate presence to the Self, as this latter is purified through separation from everything object-like. The differentiated apparent world is Maya, illusion created by erroneous perception. That creation is not a real act, however, and its product is utterly unreal; "false identification" is the only relation between appearance (...) and reality, and because even the problem is unreal, there is no proper metaphysical explanation. The work too often exhibits a superficial understanding of Western philosophical formulations.--E. W. (shrink)

On Hindu non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

The concept of the unity of existence finds resonance in both Islamic philosophy, particularly in the Transcendental philosophy of Molla Sadra, and the Advaita Vedanta school of Indian philosophy, notably championed by the mystic philosopher Sankara. Molla Sadra's philosophical framework is rooted in the intertwining principles of Multiplicity within Unity and Unity within Multiplicity, (Kathrat fil Wahdat, Wahdat fil Kathrat) elucidated through two key theories: (I) Gradational unity of existence, (Al Wujud Al Tashkiki) and (II) Individual unity of existence. (...) (Wahadat al Shkaksi) Sankara, a mystic philosopher within the Vedanta tradition, expounds upon the unity of existence through non-dualism, positing that Atman (individual soul) is identical to Brahman (universal consciousness). His philosophical stance involves dismantling the perceived realm of multiplicity by invoking the concept of cosmic illusion, referred to as the doctrine of Maya. This paper delves into an exploration of the perspectives of Molla Sadra and Sankara regarding the unity of existence. While both thinkers share the notion that a singular reality is concealed by a metaphorical veil, they each draw inspiration from their respective sacred texts-the Quran for Molla Sadra and the Vedas for Sankara. Consequently, they have formulated comprehensive systems of thought grounded in principles and assertions that invite scrutiny. However, it is essential to note that some disparities exist in their ideas. This paper aims to elucidate the commonalities and divergences between Molla Sadra's and Sankara's philosophies, shedding light on the similarities and polarities inherent in their conceptualizations of the unity of existence. (shrink)

The quest for self knowledge is pervasive in indian thought and is a central concern of advaita vedanta--The non-Dualistic system expounded primarily by samkara. The article explicates the advaitic conception of the self in its two primary dimensions: self and the empirical self. Arguments used to demonstrate the supreme self are critically appraised and the various theories which seek to explain the relation that obtains between the supreme self and the empirical self are examined. The advaitic analysis of the (...) empirical self is interpreted to be a "phenomenology of consciousness." it is argued that advaita vedanta does not so much explain the self as it describes the process by which we come to believe that it exists. The four levels of consciousness identified by advaita are then analyzed in terms of their respective ontological contexts and epistemological contents. (shrink)

Study of the non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta school in Hindu philosophy.

This book will be of great interest to all students of Hinduism, students of both Eastern and Western philosophy, and spiritual seekers who wish to better understand this ancient Indian tradition of non-dualist thought.

Study of the non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta school in Hindu philosophy.

Introduction: Experiential deconstructive inquiry -- Foundational philosophies and spiritual methods -- Non-duality in Advaita Vedanta and Zen Buddhism -- Ontological differences and non-duality -- Meditative inquiry, questioning, and dialoguing as a means to spiritual insight -- The undoing or deconstruction of dualistic conceptions -- Advaita Vedanta : philosophical foundations and deconstructive strategies -- Sources of the tradition -- Upaniads that art thou (Tat Tvam Asi) -- Gauapda (c.7th century) : no bondage, no liberation -- Aakara (c.7th-8th century) : (...) there is no apprehender different from this apprehension to apprehend it -- Modern and contemporary masters -- Ramana Maharshi (1879-1950) : who am I? -- H.W.L Poonja (1910-1997) : you have to do nothing to be who you are! -- Gangaji (b. 1942) : you are that! -- Advaita Vedanta summary : nothing ever happens -- Zen Buddhism : philosophical foundations and deconstructive strategies -- Sources of the tradition -- The Lakvatra Sutra and the Vajracchedik Prajñpramit Sutra all things ... are not independent of each other and not two -- Ngrjuna (c.113-213) : Sasra is Nirva -- Eihei Dgen (1200-1253) : if I am already enlightened, why must I practice -- Contemporary masters -- Ekai Korematsu (b. 1948) : return to the spine -- Hgen Yamahata (b. 1935) : why not now -- Zen Buddhism summary : neither being nor non-being is to be taken hold of -- Deconstructive techniques and dynamics of experiential undoing -- Deconstructive techniques common to both traditions -- The teacher-student dynamic -- Key deconstructive techniques -- Unfindability analysis -- Bringing everything back to the here and now -- Paradoxical problems -- Negation -- Dynamics of experiential undoing -- Non-dual experiential space -- Experiential mapping : practitioners in the space -- Experiential undoing in Advaita Vedanta -- Experiential undoing in Zen Buddhism -- Conclusion: Deconstruction of reified awareness. (shrink)

Study of the Hindu doctrine of non-dualism (Advaita).

Classical text on non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

On Hindu non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

This is a doctoral thesis in the Department of Philosophy of the Madras University. Central to Indian philosophical thought is Mukti or liberation from the present state of ignorance and bondage. But the positive meaning of this liberation is not conceived in the same way by all Indian schools. In the first part of the book the author examines the opinions of various Indian schools other than Vedanta, including Buddhism and Jainism. The second part explains the point of Advaita (...) Vedanta, the chief exponent of which is Sankara. For Advaita or Non-Dualism Brahman is the unique, infinite and immutable reality; Finite beings are maya or unreal beside the absolute reality of Brahman. They have only a relative and practical reality for human life until Mukti or liberation is attained in the realization that Brahman is the real self of all and the world of finite beings ceases to have any further meaning. All religious exercises are only means towards this final realization. On the whole the book is a synthesis of metaphysics from the Indian, especially non-dualistic, point of view. Twelve pages of Errata at the end of the book do little honor to the printers and publishers of the Madras University Philosophical Series.—J. K. (shrink)

Classical work, with Hindi and Sanskrit commentaries, on non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

Classical Sanskrit work, with English and Sanskrit commentaries, on non-dualistic (Advaita) Vedanta philosophy.

The question of idolatry -- Non-dualism and its presuppositions -- Ignotum per ignotius -- Descartes and Shankara: a revealing parallel -- Knowledge, reality, and tradition -- Body, soul, and advaita -- Dream and reality -- A debate concerning non-dualism.

Analytical study of the concept of creation and perception in Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, treatise on Hindu Advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy by Prakāśānanda, 16th cent.

Ignorance becomes a philosophical issue when it is first-personal, i.e., _x_’s awareness about _x_’s own ignorance. It raises exciting and apparently paradoxical questions about cognition. Keeping first-personal experience of ignorance at the centre, some Indian philosophical schools discuss extensively the nature of ignorance. Vyāsatīrtha from the Dualist school (Dvaita Vedānta), along with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school propound that ignorance belongs to a negative category (_abhāvapadārtha_) or in other words, that it must be understood as an absence of some cognition. The Non-dualist (...) school (Advaita Vedānta) thinks that ignorance is not an absence of cognition, but a positive entity (_bhāvarūpa_) that obstructs our cognition. The first group objects for considering ignorance as a positive entity arguing that it leads to the problem of profligacy of ontological entities, whereas the Non-dualists argue that considering ignorance as an absence of cognition leads to contradictions in cases of first-personal experiences of ignorance. In this paper, I present a small segment of the extensive arguments from both sides, alongside two Western philosophical theories that support the views of the Dualists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Through a critical analysis of these arguments, I demonstrate that, with respect to the specific set of arguments examined, the view of ignorance as an absence of cognition fails to sufficiently account for cases of first-personal experiences of ignorance. In contrast, the Non-dualist conceptualization proves more robust, given its successful applicability to all instances of ignorance. (shrink)

... belief that every creature is a manifestation of God pantheism – belief that everything is divine phenomena – (Kantian) reality-as-it-appears polytheism ...

The Mughal court was the main sponsor of Persian works on Vedānta, broadly conceived, from the late sixteenth until the mid-seventeenth century. Thereafter, the audience for such works shifted outside the court. Several Hindus literate in Persian composed or circulated Vedāntic writings. This article surveys three hitherto neglected Persian texts treating Vedānta that appear to have been composed independently from court sponsorship. All three are attributed to Banwālīdās Walī. They comprise the Gulzār-i ḥāl [Rose-garden of ecstatic states], which is itself (...) a translation of the Prabodhacandrodaya; a translation of the Rāma Gītā, which is a dialogue between Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa from the Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇa; and the Om-nāma [Book of Oṃ], a poem loosely based on the Yogavāsiṣṭha that incorporates Vedāntic themes. In general, Indo-Persian authors such as Walī associated Vedānta with a non-dualist doctrine, even when they did not specifically refer to Advaita Vedānta. The article discusses the approaches to translation that these texts take. It also reflects on the functions of these Persian translations in a context where conveying the meaning of the source texts was not the only motive. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism by Swami MedhanandaAnantanand Rambachan (bio)Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism. By Swami Medhananda. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. Pp. xv + 412. Hardcover $99.00, isbn 978-0-197624-46-3.As a young man, Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902), founder of the Ramakrishna Mission, addressed a direct question to the teachers he encountered in his quest for religious certainty. "Have you seen God?" asked Vivekananda. The first affirmative reply to his question (...) came in 1882 when he met Ramakrishna (1836-1886), who eventually became his teacher and mentor:"Do you believe in God, Sir?" asked Vivekananda."Yes," replied Ramakrishna."Can you prove it Sir?""Yes.""How?""Because I see him just as I see you here, only in a much intenser sense."(p. 144)Ramakrishna's unhesitating reply had a deep impact on the young Vivekananda. "For the first time," said Vivekananda, "I found a man who dared to say that he saw God, that religion was a reality to be felt, to be sensed in an infinitely more intense way than we can sense the world" (p. 144).This pivotal encounter with Ramakrishna and his claim about the perception of God found more systematic expression in Vivekananda's arguments for supersensuous perception as the only ultimately authoritative source of knowledge about the nature of God and other matters that are not accessible through our ordinary ways of knowing. Medhananda's book, Swami Vivekananda's Vedāntic Cosmopolitanism, is a wide-ranging discussion of many facets of Vivekananda's interpretations of the tradition of Advaita Vedānta and religion in general. These include the decisive influence of Ramakrishna on Vivekananda, Vivekananda's departure from Śaṅkara, and his understanding of the possibilities and limits of reason, the nature of faith and the hard problem of consciousness. The single theme, implicitly and explicitly, present throughout his discussion, is the reality and epistemic significance of mystical experience: "For Vivekananda, we can achieve 'objective certitude' of God's existence…through a self-authenticating realization of God that guarantees its own veridicality" (p. 285). [End Page 1] Medhananda ends his work calling for greater recognition of the importance of spiritual experience for our understanding of the nature of consciousness (p. 371). One comes away from his work thinking that the edifice of Vivekananda's philosophy stands or fall on his arguments for supersensuous perception as the highest authority for religious claims. Medhanananda is critical of appeals by Vivekananda to scripture unless such appeals are buttressed by affirming the supremacy of supersensuous experience (p. 341). Medhananda regards references to scripture alone as dogmatic. In those Advaita traditions, however, that regard scripture as a source of valid knowledge (pramāṇa), arguments for scripture are not asserted without appeals to reason and the evidence of other sources of valid knowledge (Rambachan 1991). In other words, appeals to scripture are not always dogmatically irrational.At the end of The Limits of Scripture: Vivekananda's Reinterpretation of the Vedas, I invited those who are the direct heirs of Vivekananda's legacy and those movements who have come under his influence "to provide a consistent and coherent account of the synthesis that he attempted" (p. 137). I regard Medhananda's work as a significant contribution to this much-needed task. His work on Vivekananda is an exercise in apologetics, understood as the effort to defend and clarify religious teachings through systematic argument, and is one of the most detailed, scholarly, and vigorous contemporary expositions of Vivekananda's thought. As a work in apologetics, however, readers will not find any significant criticism of Vivekananda's thought. The single significant one I found is his observation that there is a patronizing element in Vivekananda's situating of dualistic traditions on a lower salvific level than non-dualism (pp. 88-90).I am heartened by the fact that Medhananda acknowledges important differences between Vivekananda and Śaṅkara on several significant issues. As a scholar-monk of the Ramakrishna Order, Medhananda's position is unusual on this issue, and he must diverge from prominent members of his Order in this regard. At the heart of this difference is Śaṅkara's insistence on the... (shrink)

Description: Suddhadvaita or the system of Pure Monism of Sri Vallabhacarya claims to be the most faithful and authentic exposition of the real teachings of the Upanisads as it purifies the Non-Dual Ultimate Reality of the extraneous concept of Maya introduced by Samkara under the influence of Buddhism. In this system we have the concept of Non-Dualism or Advaita in its pristine, Upanisadic sense unblemished by Samkara's Illusionism, the concept of a Concrete, Personal and determinate Ultimate Reality. In recent (...) years many important works expounding the philosophy of Sri Vallabhacarya have been published but none of them have endeavoured a problem-wise study of this system which is essential for its proper understanding vis-a-vis the claims of other Vaisnavite schools. This book attempts to supplement this want by under-taking a problem-wise exposition of the philosophy of Sri Vallabha and his followers incorporating the views and solutions of other schools as well. Vallabhism as a philosophico-religious creed of Vaisnavism has the distinction of putting forward a novel creed and theory of Bhakti known as Pusti-bhakti which acquires a central place in the Suddhadvaita system. The author has, therefore, discussed it, at length, to distinguish it from other forms of Bhakti propagated in other schools of Vaisnavism. The author has, in this study, based himself only on Samskrta sources providing the reader with an outline of the basic philosophical and religious theories and concepts of Sri Vallabhacarya and his followers. (shrink)

Study of Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, treatise on Hindu Advaita (non-dualistic) Vedanta philosophy, by Prakāśānanda, 16th cent.

I argue that grammatical thomism helps to clarify certain problems in philosophical theology by focusing attention on the parameters of coherent God-talk. By drawing on figures like David Burrell, Brian Davies, Kathryn Tanner, and Denys Turner, I show that the first rule of theological grammar is to avoid talking about God as if God were some sort of thing existing alongside the world. In fact, Aquinas concedes that we cannot really know what God is at all. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s later emphasis (...) on meaning as use helps us to see why we can still talk intelligibly about God by focusing on the use of the word more than its referent. I connect this with the work of Stephen Mulhall and Cora Diamond on the nature of riddles, and suggest that this genre is one way of illuminating the peculiar grammar of certain Christian doctrines: in particular, the doctrine of the incarnation and of creation out of nothing. Finally, I look outside Christian contexts to the Hindu tradition of Advaita Vedānta, and argue that the language and imageries of non-dualism can provoke us into reconsidering the essence of Christian grammar and alert us to some of the therapeutic possibilities of grammatical thomism. (shrink)

Collection of articles and poems on the Ramanuja Sampradaya representing the qualified non-dualistic (Viśiṣṭadvaita) approach in Hindu Vedanta philosophy.

Meditations.--Some views on Paul Deussen's "Elements of metaphysics."--The fundamentals of Vedanta.--Uma's mirror.--The drum-beat of angels.--Heroes of ancient Ind.--The spirit of Vedic Ind.--Was Śaṅkara a crypto-Buddhist?--Vedic support for non-dualism.--The system of Ramanuja with side-lights on those of Madhava and Śaṅkara.--The system of Sankhya.--The system of thought revealed in the Bhagavad-gītā.--The philosophy of Advaita or non-dualism.--"Tiger" Varadachar.

The issue of liberation is a recurrent theme in all schools of Indian classical thought. In case of advaita-vedānta it is deeply rooted in ontology. The problem of ontological status of the world was the bone of contention for two competing non‑dualist schools of vedānta — vivaraṇa and bhāmatī. Maṇḍana’s Brahmasiddhi can be regarded as an important source of inspiration for the latter. The present paper is an analysis of Maṇḍana’s statements pertaining to the issue of mukti in contrast (...) with those of Śankara, the exponent of advaita commonly considered the creator and the most prominent representative of the school. (shrink)

Religion for a Secular Age provides a transnational history of modern Ved nta through a comparative study of two of its most important exponents, Friedrich Max Muller (1823 1900) and Swami Vivekananda (1863 1902). This book explains why Ved nta's appeal spanned the ostensibly very different contexts of colonial India and Victorian Britain and America, and how this ancient form of thought was translated by Muller and Vivekananda into a modern form of philosophy or religion. These religiously-committed men attempted to (...) reconcile religion with modernity by appealing to Advaita (literally, 'non-dualistic') Ved nta's monistic interpretation of reality. The 'scientific' study of religion allegedly demonstrated the evolutionary superiority of Ved nta and the possibility of religion's survival in 'the light of modern science'. They believed Ved nta could also provide the religious basis for moral engagement in this world, even as the hold of orthodox Christianity and traditional Hinduism appeared to be weakening. Ved nta thus served as a way of articulating a form of religion suitable for a secular age religion which has embraced modern forms of thought while breaking away from creeds, scriptures and institutions to thrive in the spheres of public debate of London, Calcutta and New York.". (shrink)

The literature of Bhartṛhari and Maṇḍana attention in contemporary times. The writings of the prominent linguistic philosopher and grammarian Bhartṛhari and of Manḍana, an encyclopedic scholar of later seventh century and most likely a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, shape Indian philosophical thinking to a great extent. On this premise, this study of the influence of Bhartṛhari on Maṇḍana’s literature, the scope of this essay, allows us to explore the significance of Bhartṛhari’s writings, not only to comprehend the philosophy of language, (...) but also to understand the contribution of linguistic philosophy in shaping Advaita philosophy in subsequent times. This comparison is not to question originality on the part of Maṇḍana, but rather to explore the interrelationship between linguistic philosophy and the monistic philosophy of the Upaniṣadic tradition. Besides excavating the role of Bhartṛhari writings on the texts of Maṇḍana, analysis this will reveal the interrelatedness of the Advaita school of Śaṅkara often addressed as ‘pure non-dualism’ (Kevalādvaita) and the Advaita of Bhartṛhari, identified as ‘non-dualism of the word-principle’ (Śabdādvaita). (shrink)

Problem: The question of the moral and social effects of non-dualism has not yet been clarified to the necessary extent. The relation of truth claims, power and violence has been simplified; critical questions of non-dualist practises have not yet been addressed. Approach: By discussing relevant philosophy and political theory, this paper draws the attention of non-realists towards the issues of power, conflict and discourse rules and asks to rethink the issue of the pragmatic justification of non-realist epistemology. Findings: (1) Constructivists, (...) as well as the non-dualist Josef Mitterer, are critical of the discursive effects of truth claims. Yet, neither constructivism nor non-dualism solve the power issues that are ascribed to realism by constructivists and dualism by Mitterer. Even if participants abstained from truth claims in discourses, many of the power issues would still be prevalent. (2) The question arises of whether a practical difference between non-dualism and dualism exists. (3) There is a tendency in constructivist and non-dualist theory to regard any form of influence on others as illegitimate. This tendency is not sound. Instead, the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate power is necessary in non-dualism as well. Implications: Constructivist and non-dualist theory need to scrutinise statements about the moral implications of the respective theories and to emphasise power issues not solely by extrapolating from epistemology, but by acknowledging the social dynamics of discourses and conflicts. Non-dualist social scientists could contribute to the discussion through empirical analyses of the effects of the use and the debunking of truth claims. (shrink)

I present Weber’s German book Radikaler Lingualismus to those who are interested in non-dualism but cannot read German. In my review, I compare Weber’s book with Mitterer’s works, address non-dualism at key points, and elaborate on Weber’s deviations.

Context: Although Josef Mitterer’s non-dualism has received increasing attention in recent years, it is still underrated by philosophers. It is an ambitious and unusual treatment of epistemological problems concerning truth and reality. Problem: Is non-dualism tenable? Is conceptual relativism tenable? Method: On the basis of a pragmatic semantics, Mitterer’s arguments against conceptual relativism are shown to be unjustified. Results: Non-dualism lacks a clear conception of semantics. Given the similarities to Robert Brandom’s account of truth, as well as Mitterer’s preoccupation with (...) Wittgenstein, pragmatic semantics suggests itself for filling this gap. But then conceptual relativism seems to be the more attractive position. Implications: This paper is a critical survey of non-dualism and a defense of conceptual relativism, but it might also be a worthwhile reading for those interested in semantic issues such as the difference between Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Robert Brandom’s approaches to “meaning as use.” Constructivist content: Non-dualism is sometimes regarded as an alternative to realistic and constructivist positions in epistemology. This paper, however, defends conceptual relativism, which is a kind of realism that can also be seen as a kind of (non-radical) constructivism. (shrink)

Although somewhat neglected in the scholarly debate, Vṛṣabhadeva’s commentary (known as Sphuṭākṣarā or Paddhati, possibly 8th c. CE) on Vākyapadīya’s first chapter, offers a remarkable analysis of Bhartṛhari’s views on metaphysics and philosophy of language. Vākyapadīya’s first four kārikās deal with ontological issues, defining the key elements of Bhartṛhari’s non-dualistic edifice such as the properties of the unitary principle, its powers, the role of time and the ontological status of worldly objects. Vṛṣabhadeva’s interpretation of the kārikās in question is intriguing (...) and seems to be guided by the urgency to find a solution to the riddle which every non-dualistic theory has to face: how is it possible to postulate a unitary principle of reality when reality is cognized as multiple? In accomplishing the task Vṛṣabhadeva proposes various solutions (some of them based on concepts which are hardly detectable in Vākyapadīya and appear close to the ones propounded in certain trends of Advaita Vedānta), finally suggesting an explanation which, focusing on the pragmatic aspect of language, is altogether consistent with Bhartṛhari’s theoretical picture. (shrink)