Neo-Nyaya treatise on the relationship between an object and the knowledge of it (viṣayatāvāda).

What was the basis for the adoption of mathematics as the primary mode of discourse for describing natural events by a large segment of the philosophical community in the seventeenth century? In answering this question, this book demonstrates that a significant group of philosophers shared the belief that there is no necessary correspondence between external reality and objects of human understanding, which they held to include the objects of mathematical and linguistic discourse. The result is a scholarly reliable, but accessible, (...) account of the role of mathematics in the works of Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, Newton, Leibniz, and Berkeley. This impressive volume will benefit scholars interested in the history of philosophy, mathematical philosophy and the history of mathematics. (shrink)

Few figures have been of such enduring importance as Ibn Sina, also known as Avicenna (980-1037 AD), the great Persian philosopher and physician of the Abassid period. This work is a study of the fourth part of Ibn Sina's late and most comprehensive book al-Isharat wat-Tanbihat, Remarks and Admonitions, a book which Ibn Sine describes as 'the cream of the truth', containing 'the best pieces of wisdom' expressed 'in sensitive words'. The present volume includes an introduction, discussing the nature of (...) the fourth part of al-Isharat and the procedures followed in analyzing and translating it; a lengthy analysis of Ibn Sina's ideas on the three main topics in this part of al-Isharat (the nature of happiness, the stations of the knowers, and the signs manifested by the knowers); and a translation of this part. The work shows that, to Ibn Sina, knowledge of the eternal aspects of the universe, primarily of God, is the highest human objective and the only thing that secures human happiness or heavenly existence. While no permanent knowledge of this kind is possible for a human being on earth, signs of its temporary acquisition are evidenced in many ways, one of which is possession of powers that a person who does not know the secrets of the universe may consider extraordinary. Although the focus of this volume is on the fourth part of al-Isharat, many references are made to some of Ibn Sina's other writings by way of clarifying certain points and placing this part of al-Isharat in the context of Ibn Sina's general philosophy. (shrink)

Editio princeps of Peter Thomae's De ente. It is generally acknowledged by historians of philosophy that medieval philosophers made key contributions to the discussion of the problem of being and the fundamental issues of metaphysics. The Quaestiones de ente of Peter Thomae, composed at Barcelona ca. 1325, is the longest medieval work devoted to the problem of being as well as the most systematic. The work is divided into three parts: the concept of being, the attributes of being, and (...) the descent of being. Many of the philosophical tools that Peter pioneered in this work, such as the distinction between objective being and subjective being, and various modes of quiddities and abstraction, were adopted by later thinkers and discussed up to the eighteenth century. Apart from defending and further extending Scotistic doctrine, one of Peter's achievements in the De ente is to fully reconcile Scotistic univocity with the traditional doctrine of the analogy of being. In addition to the critical edition, the present volume also contains a detailed introduction and study of the philosophy and the manuscripts of the De ente, with an appendix containing the Question on univocity by Francis Marbres (John the Canon), who copied extensively from the De ente. (shrink)

THE SENSE OF BEAUTY: A FIRST APPROXIMATION It is generally acknowledged that during the first half of the eighteenth century a profound change was wrought in the theory of art and natural beauty. To this period we owe the establishment of the modem system of the arts. 1 In England, the notion of a separate and autonomous disci pline devoted solely to art and to beauty came into being through the concept of "aesthetic disinterestedness. " 2 In addition, emphasis in (...) the theory of art shifted from object to subject - from the work of art to the perceiver and critic. Focal point for this change was the sense of beauty which, in concert with the moral sense of the British school, represented a dominant force in Enlightenment value theory. It is Francis Hutcheson who, more than anyone else, can be thought of as the founder and principal spokesman of this philosophical coterie. If the aesthetic sense was instrumental in the transfer of interest, in the philosophy of art, from object to perceiver, the aesthetic and moral senses together were no less important in a parallel transference of value judgment from the rational to the sensate. (shrink)

En 1713, le jeune philosophe irlandais George Berkeley entreprend, avec ses Trois Dialogues entre Hylas et Philonous, de convaincre les intellectuels londoniens et tous les hommes doués de jugement que, loin d'être extravagante et folle, la philosophie immatérialiste est conforme au sens commun, qu'elle est vraie et utile. L'ami de l'esprit, Philonous, est chargé d'abattre les objections et de chasser les scrupules que peuvent concevoir les amis de la matière, les Hylas que nous sommes devenus, pour n'avoir pas compris que (...) seuls existent les esprits et les idées. Hylas, sans le savoir, est sur le mauvais sentier, celui qui nous conduit vers les abîmes du doute le plus désespéré. En trois entretiens matinaux, Philonous le convainc et lui tend la main, le réconciliant avec les certitudes partagées des hommes, lui faisant entrevoir le génie du langage ordinaire, et même la dignité de la religion bien comprise. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will ed. by Jörg Noller and John WalshDai HeideJörg Noller and John Walsh, editors. Kant’s Early Critics on Freedom of the Will. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022. Pp. xlvii + 297. Hardback, $105.00; paperback, $32.99.This volume collects new (and in many instances the first) English translations of eighteen works—by Johann Fichte, Salomon Maimon, Karl Reinhold, August Heydenreich, and (...) Hermann Pistorius, among others—that engage with Kant’s critical theory of freedom as it is encountered in his three Critiques and other writings from the late 1780s and early 1790s. The essays were written between 1786 and 1800. Noller and Walsh open the volume with a thorough and penetrating introduction to Kant’s historical context, Kant’s theory of freedom, and the newly translated essays themselves. Given how central Kant’s theory of freedom is to every aspect of his systematic philosophy, and how intensely scholars have focused upon it in recent decades, this volume is a welcome addition to the existing literature. Not only is it important to have these essays translated into English, but it is also helpful to have them collected in a single volume. This volume will thus be an invaluable resource, and not merely for English-speaking scholars of Kant. For considerations of space, I cannot discuss every essay in the volume. Instead, I emphasize those contributions that strike me as especially noteworthy or relevant to contemporary discussion.The standout of the first group of essays, on “Freedom and Determinism,” is the contribution by Hermann Andreas Pistorius (1730–98), which reinforces his status as one of Kant’s most trenchant Leibnizian critics. Pistorius subjects Kant’s account of “the concept of freedom itself, its origin, its content, and its objective validity” to a withering critique, contending that this is “the most obscure aspect of his system” (5). Pistorius raises the now familiar worry that Kant’s relegation of transcendental freedom to things in themselves violates his own epistemic strictures. He goes on to argue that even if this worry can be evaded, we must “assume that the human being’s actually free actions (which likewise are things in themselves) appear as necessary to him, as a thing in itself ” (8). In other words, our representations of deterministic sequences are representations of things in themselves “obscured and distorted by the fog of sensibility,” which renders Kant’s philosophy ultimately a version of “the Leibnizian idealism which the author so strongly rejects” (8). Also of note here is the set of careful objections by Johann August Heinrich Ulrich (1746–1813) to the notion of timeless agency that appears to be required for Kant’s account of transcendental freedom, an issue that remains alive and well in contemporary discussions of transcendental freedom.The section on “Freedom and Imputability” begins with two contributions by Carl Christian Erhard Schmid (1762–1812), who contends that only morally good actions are imputable, a claim he takes to be grounded in the doctrine of intelligible fatalism: “the [End Page 669] assertion of the natural necessity of all actions of a rational being according to laws of the causality of things in themselves” (78). Johann Christoph Schwab (1743–1821) responds directly to Schmid’s intelligible fatalism in two essays published in the Philosophisches Archiv. The first essay criticizes Schmid’s endorsement of Kant’s appeal to “a supersensible I in addition to the empirical I” (84, emphasis in original). He contends that this requires Schmid “to attribute predicates to the rational I that elevate it to the rank of the deity” (86). In the second essay, Schwab responds directly to Schmid’s intelligible fatalism, arguing that intelligible fatalism is not superior to ordinary determinism. He concludes by speculating that Schmid’s intelligible fatalism is “at bottom identical with Leibnizian-Wolffian determinism” (91). This section of the book concludes with the attack moved by Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1757–1823) against intelligible fatalism, which Reinhold sees as incompatible with fundamental aspects of the critical philosophy.Each of the essays in the third section, on “Freedom and Consciousness,” takes up Kant’s discussion of the “fact of reason” in his... (shrink)

In this article I argue that the subject‐object distinction, operative in Continental Europe during the late‐1700s and early‐1800s, led to the religion‐secular distinction in higher education in the United States.Many scholars believe the origins of the shifting nature of the religion‐secular distinction resided with some form of influence that students from the United States encountered while they pursued advanced academic work in Germany. These scholars studied this influence at an institutional or organizational level. An intellectual approach to history (...) would assess the metaphysical currents of idealism that proved to be the primary influence that students from the United States encountered during their time in Germany. While idealism would never fully take hold in the United States, it gave shape and direction to the emerging movement of pragmatism. As a result, the separation of subject and object, under the guise of pragmatism, is reified in the religion‐secular distinction in the academy in the United States. Once religion becomes the object of a subject, the subject's sense of self‐dependence forces the religion‐secular distinction. However, the religion‐secular distinction proves to be a transitory relationship.Inevitably, the underlying issue proves to be that only the secular can serve as the sustainable object of its subject. (shrink)