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  1.  70
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Philosophical Review 85 (2):225.
  2. Certainty, a refutation of scepticism.Peter David Klein - 1981 - Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
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  3. (2 other versions)Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons.Peter D. Klein - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13:297-325.
  4. Useful false beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 25--63.
  5. A proposed definition of propositional knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (16):471-482.
  6. Skepticism and Closure.Peter Klein - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):213-236.
  7. What Price Coherence?Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129 - 132.
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  8. Reply to Ginet.Peter D. Klein - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell.
     
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  9. The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets.
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  10. Useful False Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 25-63.
  11. Knowledge, causality, and defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (20):792-812.
  12. When infinite regresses are not vicious.Peter Klein - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):718–729.
    I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this (...)
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  13. Certainty.Peter D. Klein - 1996 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. New York: Routledge.
     
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  14.  43
    Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism.John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
    This volume presents new work on infinitism, the view that there are no foundational reasons for beliefs--an ancient view in epistemology, now growing again in popularity. Leading epistemologists illuminate its strengths and weaknesses, and address questions new and old about justification, reasoning, responsibility, disagreement, and trust.
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  15.  91
    Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem.Rodrigo Borges, Claudio de Almeida & Peter David Klein (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    The 'Gettier Problem' has been central to epistemology since 1963, when Edmund Gettier presented a powerful challenge to the standard analysis of knowledge. Now twenty-six leading philosophers examine the issues that arise from Gettier's challenge, setting the agenda for future work on the central problem of epistemology.
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  16. How to be an infinitist about doxastic justification.Peter Klein - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):25 - 29.
  17. Closure matters: Academic skepticism and easy knowledge.Peter Klein - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):165–184.
  18.  50
    Epistemology.Peter D. Klein - 1996 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. New York: Routledge.
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  19. No help for the coherentist.Peter Klein & Ted A. Warfield - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):118-121.
  20. What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):166-171.
    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so‐called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non‐basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification.1 If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like) and if it is a proposition (or sufficiently proposition‐like), then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason (...)
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  21.  59
    (1 other version)Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Philosophical Issues 10 (1):108-116.
  22. Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's Trilemma.Peter Klein - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press.
    This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides a brief evaluation of foundationalism, emergent coherentism, and infinitism.
     
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  23. Misleading evidence and the restoration of justification.Peter D. Klein - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):81 - 89.
  24. How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays. Ashgate Press. pp. 75--94.
  25.  25
    What price coherence?Peter Klein & Alonso Church - 1994 - Analysis 54 (3):129.
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  26. (2 other versions)Infinitism.Peter D. Klein - 2010 - In Sven Bernecker & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 245-256.
     
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  27. (1 other version)Why Not Infinitism?Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Epistemology 5:199-208.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Further, I will argue that infinitism requires serious, but salutary, revisions in our evaluation (...)
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  28. Infinitism is the Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell.
     
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  29. Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and Defeasibility.Peter D. Klein - 1996 - In Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield.
     
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  30. Radical interpretation and global skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - In Ernest LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Cambridge: Blackwell.
  31. Immune Belief Systems.Peter Klein - 1986 - Philosophical Topics 14 (1):259-280.
  32. Misleading "misleading defeaters".Peter D. Klein - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):382-386.
  33.  65
    Epistemic Justification and the Limits of Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer.
  34. The Failures of Dogmatism and a New Pyrrhonism.Peter D. Klein - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (24):7-24.
     
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  35. Infinitism’s Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism.Peter D. Klein - 2005 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4):153-172.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecimento requer certeza e que uma tal forma (...)
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  36.  76
    How to get Certain Knowledge from Fallible Justification.Peter D. Klein - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):395-412.
    “Real knowledge,” as I use the term, is the most highly prized form of true belief sought by an epistemic agent. This paper argues that defeasible infinitism provides a good way to characterize real knowledge and it shows how real knowledge can arise from fallible justification. Then, I argue that there are two ways of interpreting Ernest Sosa's account of real knowledge as belief that is aptly formed and capable of being fully defended. On the one hand, if beliefs are (...)
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  37. Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem.Peter D. Klein - 2011 - In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge. de Gruyter. pp. 487-508.
  38. Useful Falsehoods.Peter Klein - 2008 - In Quentin Smith (ed.), Epistemology: new essays. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press.
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  39. What makes knowledge the most highly prized form of true belief?Peter D. Klein - 2012 - In Kelly Becker & Tim Black (eds.), The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This chapter provides grounds for thinking that it is the quality of the reasons for the propositional content of our belief-states with true propositional contents, rather than the etiology of those belief-states, that determines whether the belief-state qualifies as knowledge. Normative epistemology rather than naturalized epistemology holds the key to understanding knowledge. This chapter delineates some important features of epistemic luck. It explores the etiology view and presents reasons for concluding that it cannot adequately account for epistemic luck. The chapter (...)
     
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  40. Introduction to Infinitism.John Turri & Peter Klein - 2014 - In John Turri & Peter D. Klein (eds.), Ad infinitum: new essays on epistemological infinitism. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
  41. Infinitism in Epistemology.Peter D. Klein & John Turri - 2013 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Infinitism in Epistemology. This article provides an overview of infinitism in epistemology. Infinitism is a family of views in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification. It contrasts naturally with coherentism and foundationalism. All three views agree that knowledge or justification requires an appropriately structured chain of reasons. What form may such a […].
     
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  42. There is NO Good Reason to be an Academic Skeptic.Peter D. Klein - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 299.
  43. Epistemic Compatibilism and Cannonical Beliefs.Peter D. Klein - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
     
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  44. Real knowledge.Peter D. Klein - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):143 - 164.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements which guarantee that the truth, belief (...)
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  45. Truth and Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson.Peter D. Klein - 1986 - Cambridge: Blackwell.
  46.  14
    How sceptics teach us to know.Peter D. Klein - 2024 - Synthese 204 (4):1-23.
    The purpose of this paper is to show (1) that scepticism, in both its traditional forms and contemporary forms, poses no real threat to obtaining inferential empirical knowledge, even if such knowledge requires certainty and (2) that there are some significant lessons to be learned from the traditional sceptics about what constitutes a plausible argument for scepticism and how to obtain knowledge while avoiding dogmatism and (3) that contemporary scepticism is based on several serious mistakes about what is required to (...)
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  47.  9
    Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?Peter Klein - 2004 - In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 112–125.
    This chapter contains section titled: Consideration of (T1) Consideration of (T2).
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  48.  46
    Reply to Professor Odegard.Peter D. Klein - 1982 - Philosophical Books 23 (4):198-203.
  49. Ascent and Assent?Peter D. Klein - 2004 - In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
     
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  50. Certainty.Peter D. Klein - 1996 - In Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Genealogy to Iqbal. New York: Routledge.
     
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1 — 50 / 93