I argue that Nietzsche’s criticism of the Kantian theory of disinterested pleasure in beauty reflects his own commitment to claims that closely resemble certain Kantian aesthetic principles, specifically as reinterpreted by Schiller. I show that Schiller takes the experience of beauty to be disinterested both (1) insofar as it involves impassioned ‘play’ rather than desire-driven ‘work’, and (2) insofar as it involves rational-sensuous (‘aesthetic’) play rather than mere physical play. In figures like Nietzsche, Schiller’s generic notion of play—which is itself (...) influenced by Kant’s claim that aesthetic pleasure is orthogonal to desire-satisfaction—becomes decoupled from his (further) Kantian view that aesthetic play essentially involves a harmony of sensuous receptivity and rational spontaneity. The result, I suggest, is a self-standing opposition between desires and passions. This motivates a recognizably Romantic vision of aesthetic disinterestedness, as freedom from desire realized in a state of creative determination by passion. (shrink)

According to the spontaneity view of the role of the passions in moral deliberation, Aquinas holds that virtuous passions play an active role in moral deliberation, prior to the formation of moral judgement and choice. This article offers a qualified defense of this view. Qualified, because critics of this view are right to point out that Aquinas is generally suspicious of the passions, and he is careful to delimit the role that they can plan in processes of moral deliberation and (...) choice. A defense, nonetheless, because Aquinas does give a positive role to virtuous passions in the early stages of moral discernment and deliberation, prior to judgement. Furthermore, Aquinas has strong reasons to defend something like the spontaneity view, given his overall view of the virtues as perfections of the powers they inform. That in itself does not necessarily mean that he does defend the spontaneity view, but it does suggest that we can develop such a defense out of what he does say, in such a way as to extend and clarify central elements of his moral theory. (shrink)

Passion plays a crucial role in entrepreneurial activity, while its positive spillover to the family and community domains is scant. We proposed an integrated enrichment framework of “work-family-community” based on the literature in the field. Drawing upon the matching samples of entrepreneurs' individuals, families, and communities in the China Labor-force Dynamics Survey database, we identified a significant positive spillover effect into the family and community domains and explored the moderating role of the entrepreneur's perceived personal control. The empirical (...) results indicate that entrepreneurs with higher passion experience higher subjective wellbeing related to family members and have a higher likelihood of engagement in prosocial behaviors. Perceived personal control positively moderates the spillover of passion to life and economic satisfaction. The spread of an entrepreneurial role model's peer effect and the contagion of entrepreneurial passion have a significant positive impact on entrepreneurial behavior in a cluster. Synthesizing our findings, we contribute to the literature concerning work-family enrichment, entrepreneurial passion, and the spillover-crossover model and offer important implications for entrepreneurs' role transition tension. (shrink)

Based on self-determination theory, we conceptualized the effect of empowering leadership on employee’s voice via harmonious passion. This paper further explored the moderating effect of job characteristics in voice process, and proposed a moderated mediation model. Using a sample of 674 supervisor-subordinate dyads, we found that (1) empowering leadership was positively related to employees’ harmonious passion and voice behavior, (2) harmonious passion played a mediating role in the relationship between empowering leadership and employee voice, and (3) job (...) autonomy strengthened the effect of harmonious passion on employee voice, which, in turn, enhanced the mediated relationship between empowering leadership and employee voice via harmonious passion. We discuss the implications of these findings for research and practice. (shrink)

This paper addresses the ways that we can understand and transform our strong emotions and how this project contributes to moral and spiritual development. To this end, I choose to think with two Tibetan Buddhist thinkers, both of whom take up the question of how passionate emotions can fit into spiritual and moral life: the famous, playful yogin Shabkar Tsodruk Rangdrol (1781–1851) and the wandering, charismatic master Patrul Rinpoche (1808–1887). Shabkar's The Autobiography of Shabkar provides excellent examples of using one's (...) own passionate emotions to connect to others and gain insight into the world. Patrul Rinpoche's The Words of My Perfect Teacher (kun bzang bla ma'i zhal lung) focuses on passionate empathy with the emotions of others. Drawing on these texts, I present a (distinctly Buddhist) conception of a passionate life and argue that passionate emotional experience is a central part of moral and spiritual development more broadly construed. (shrink)

This case study in the history of “passion” and “emotion” is based on the writings of William James. James is famous for his (1884) theory of emotion. However, like his illustrious colleague, Théodule Ribot, he also recognized the importance of “passion” in psychology. That aspect of James’s work is underappreciated. Ribot explicitly defends the necessity of including “passion” in psychology. James does not go that far. But he does utilize a very similar concept in connection with the (...) term “passion” and there can be little doubt he considered it scientifically legitimate. Consequently, like Ribot, James must be considered an exception to historical accounts of this period which describe a transition from “passion” to “emotion” in which “passion” plays no part. (shrink)

Book synopsis: Passion and Action explores the place of the emotions in seventeenth-century understandings of the body and mind, and the role they were held to play in reasoning and action. Interest in the passions pervaded all areas of philosophical enquiry, and was central to the theories of many major figures, including Hobbes, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Pascal, and Locke. Yet little attention has been paid to this topic in studies of early modern thought. Susan James surveys the inheritance of (...) ancient and medieval doctrines about the passions, showing how these were incorporated into new philosophical theories in the course of the seventeenth century. She examines the relation of the emotions to will, knowledge, understanding, desire, and power, offering fresh analyses and interpretations of a broad range of texts by little-known writers as well as canonical figures, and establishing that a full understanding of these authors must take account of their discussions of our affective life. Passion and Action also addresses current debates, particularly those within feminist philosophy, about the embodied character of thinking and the relation between emotion and knowledge. This ground-breaking study throws new light upon the shaping of our ideas about the mind, and provides a historical context for burgeoning contemporary investigations of the emotions. (shrink)

Philosophy for Children claims to foster not only critical thinking, but also creative and caring thinking. However, its theoretical foundations draw mainly on the analytic and pragmatist philosophical tradition. Consequently, and made evident by the choice of the terms ‘caring thinking’ and ‘creative thinking’, it seem to reduce these concepts mostly to ‘thinking skills’. In this article I will first briefly explicate the difficulties of such a reduction. Secondly I will try to resolve this problem by embedding rationality, creativity and (...) caring in a more holistic anthropology. To this end I will refer to the German philosopher and poet Friedrich Schiller, who anchors reason and the emotions in aesthetics (that is, the relationship with the sensuous world). Finally, the article calls on the thought of D. W. Winnicott in order to show how Philosophy for Children can embrace an active creation of an emotionally meaningful (caring) and rationally reflected (critical thinking) reality through the sensuous play with concepts (creativity). (shrink)

Among the multiple, subliminal passions that inspire our life in innumerable ways, literature shows us one that seems to play a particularly penetrating role in human concerns. This passion, which Tymieniecka calls an `esoteric passion', finds its projection and crystallization in space: it is the esoteric passion for space. This subliminal passion, investigated through literature, allows the philosopher to reach beneath the fallacious separations of nature, humanness and the cultural world, restoring the wholeness of experience that (...) has become lost in the artificial one-sidedness of contemporary approaches, confined to language as they are. The elemental passion for place is investigated here in the literary fruits of creative imagination. Unravelled from the very depths of the primogenital, onto-poietic unfolding of life, the passion for place is revealed as projecting into the flux of life: it is a `station' of life-significance. This collection presents papers from two conferences of the International Society of Phenomenology and Literature held in Cambridge, MA in 1993/4. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reason, Passion, and Metaphysics in Bonaventure:Against Hylomorphic EnthusiasmMatthew J. DugandzicIntroductionContemporary commentators on Aquinas's understanding of the passions all agree that reason is supposed to be the ruler of the passions, but they disagree on the character of this rule. Some would ascribe a high degree of freedom to the passions, such that, even though reason is overall the ruler of the passions, sometimes the passions are right to (...) resist this rule.1 Others argue that the passions ought to obey reason slavishly, such that, if any passion is to be virtuous, it must result from "reason's immediate control,... [that is,] reason now commanding this or that passion."2 Many other thinkers would fall somewhere in between these two positions at various points, such that giving a full account of the range of these positions would be quite complicated, but these scholars could also be placed neatly into two categories according to how they would answer the following question: Are virtuous passions only those that arise in response to reason's immediate command, or can other passions be included, such as those that, for example, without [End Page 123] being explicitly commanded to do so by reason, prompt reason to do this or that, or even inform reason about some aspect of an object?3 Until recently, most scholars of Thomas Aquinas would have held the latter position, that the passions sometimes have some positive roles to play in the virtuous life even when they arise in the absence of an immediate command from reason.4 In recent years, however, the number of scholars who maintain the former position, holding that any passion that does not arise in response to reason's immediate command is not virtuous, has been growing.5 [End Page 124]My aim in this article is further to bolster the case of those who hold that, for Aquinas, the only passions that are virtuous are those that arise from reason's immediate command. I will do this by criticizing an argument that is commonly used by those who oppose this position, and which I refer to as "hylomorphic enthusiasm." Generally speaking, the logic of hylomorphic enthusiasm goes like this: Aquinas's understanding of the relationship between passion and reason is rooted in his hylomorphic view of the unity between body and soul, which unity implies that, for him, reason and passion have something of a collegial relationship, whereby reason rules the passions not despotically, but as a ruler who, though in charge, is nevertheless interested in hearing what his subjects have to say. Paul Gondreau, for example, says that, in Aquinas's view, reason rules over the passions as in a "constitutional monarchy," in which "citizens submit to the supreme authority of the monarch, yet without relinquishing all their political rights and privileges."6 For Gondreau, Aquinas's characterization of the relationship between reason and passion was unique for his time, and was due to his similarly unique "hylemorphic [sic] metaphysics of human nature."7 Bonaventure, on the other hand, did not share this hylomorphic view of the relationship between body and soul, but was rather a substance dualist, and so, consequently, he thought that reason cannot rule the passions politically, but can only "'tame' the passions by a kind of exterior imposition, or forced 'submission to reason' [obtemperat ratoini)]."8In sum, the position of the hylomorphic enthusiasts is this: Aquinas's hylomorphic view of the unity of body and soul implies a collegial view of reason's rulership over passion, while Bonaventure's more dualistic view of the relationship between body and soul implies that reason could rule the passions only despotically, rather than politically. There are a number of premises, both implicit and explicit, in this argument. For the sake of focusing this paper, I will choose to focus on two. First, I will focus on the explicit claim that Bonaventure held a dualistic view of the relationship [End Page 125] between body and soul; I maintain that Bonaventure's understanding of the relationship between body and soul is no more dualistic than Aquinas's. Second, an implicit premise of hylomorphic enthusiasm is that having a hylomorphic or... (shrink)

Grounded in long-term ethnographic fieldwork in New Delhi’s fashion industry, this article explores the pressing question on the designer’s mind, namely: how do I align the desires of others with my (master)-desire? This question points us towards an investigation of how people’s affects are mobilized and directed through commercial rituals such as fashion shows set within hyper-designed theatrical play-spheres. Translating the invisible or covert mobilization of affects into profit has been on the mind of advertisers for the last decade. However, (...) analysing such deliberately covert strategies of capture employed in two cases – JJ Valaya’s haute couture shows and Nitin Bal Chauhan’s youth brand – we realize that it is precisely their failure at being covert that makes them effective; clients know full well about them. Robert Pfaller’s theory of ‘illusions without owners’ can throw some light here on why clients passionately embrace the desire of capital precisely against their better knowledge. (shrink)

This book contains a collection of 13 essays from leading scholars on the relationship between passionate emotions and moral advancement in Greek and Roman thought. Recognising that emotions played a key role in whether individuals lived happily, ancient philosophers extensively discussed the nature of the passions.

There is vast evidence that accounts for the association between entrepreneurial orientation and the probability of starting a business. However, there are not many studies that test how psychological factors moderate this relationship. A variable that has been little studied in this relationship is Grit. Grit is considered a personality trait defined as perseverance and passion for long-term goals. Grit considers two sub-dimensions, one linked to the consistency of interests and the other linked to perseverance in the effort. The (...) objective of this article is to analyze the moderating role that both sub-dimensions of grit plays in the relationship between EO and PSB, considering its interaction with sociodemographic variables such as age, gender, and culture. This cross-sectional study has a sample of 1,761 participants, active workers. The EO scale and a Grit Scale were applied. In addition, participants were asked, based on their perception, how likely they were to start their own business within the next 5 years. A simple moderation analysis was considered to test the moderating role of grit in the relationship between EO and PSB. Subsequently, a double moderation analysis was carried out in order to identify which sociodemographic variables moderate the moderating effect of grit on the relationship in question. The results show that only the Grit-Passion component of grit moderates the relationship between EO and PSB. Regarding the sociodemographic variables, neither age, culture, nor gender showed a moderating effect on the moderation exercised by Grit-Passion in the relationship between OE and PSB. The results are discussed in terms of psychological capital, particularly with an emphasis on explaining why only the Grit-Passion shows a moderating effect on the relationship between EO and PSB, in detriment of Grit-Perseverance. In addition, the power of grit in the field of entrepreneurship is discussed, considering that its moderating effect is transversal to variations in age, gender and culture, as well as its relevance when considering interventions and pedagogical models in the field of entrepreneurship. (shrink)

Yve Lomax is a remarkable artist and writer, who has established a practice of writing that is unique within contemporary Fine Art. Her work has helped to establish a new discipline of Art Writing, which provides a particular space for a critical and analytical approach to writing within contemporary art. Passionate Being, as Anne Tallentire observes, "is both a culmination of and a departure from previous work," including her two earlier books for Tauris. Written through both the first and second (...) person singular, Passionate Being takes its author and its reader on a journey that has them thinking of their experience of and belonging to language. At its beginning, it brings to its author the question "What can you say?" The responses that ensue turn our attention toward presupposition and about how "singularity" can be said. The book also brings into play the work of other theorists, notably Giorgio Agamben. It asks us to view both language and the world taking-place without presupposition, revealing both the political implications, and those for living, that this vision holds. It is a work to be read twice with pleasure, and then again. (shrink)

Who hasn't wondered what it's like to be a dog or bird? Such questions seem unanswerable because we have no way of getting into an animal's mind. Marc Bekoff's work on animal behavior and mind draws world-wide attention for its originality and its probing into what animals might know as well as what skills are needed to live life successfully as a member of a particular species. Convinced that individuals of every species have some level of self-awareness, Bekoff embarks on (...) fascinating observations of animals playing, leaving and detecting scent-marks, solving problems, and behaving fairly toward each other.Animal Passions and Beastly Virtuesbrings together some of his path-breaking research papers, essays on science and ethics, and popular articles in order to reveal a remarkable range of animal behaviors but also to argue that the ethical treatment of animals is an especially significant issue now. (shrink)

This paper shows how turns in theology in early Modernity and in the last century framed the context of distinct philosophical understandings of the self. Focusing on the concept of “pure nature,” the foreshadowing of philosophical themes in theology is shown. It is further argued that while the modern self emerging from certain early Modern theological discourses from Suárez, through Descartes to Kant was deeply implicated in Stoic apatheia, the self which arises from a phenomenological rethinking of the place of (...) love and beauty in the worldliness of being and appearance is one which is fundamentally passionate. At play here is a shift in the notion of will from that of sovereign indifference to desire. (shrink)

This book, the last that noted moral theologian Servais Pinckaers, OP, wrote before his death, was conceived as a follow-up to his previous work Plaidoyer pour la vertu (An Appeal for Virtue) (2007) Pinckaers' aim in Passions and Virtue was to show the positive and essential role that our emotions play in the life of virtue. His purpose is part of a larger project of renewing moral theology, a theology too often experienced as an ethics of obligation rather than as (...) a practical guide to living virtuously. To this end, Pinckaers sketches a positive psychology of the passions as found in the biblical tradition, in the writings of the Fathers of the Church, in pagan authors and, especially, in the writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

The development of the new means of communication and the overwhelming presence of the media in all realms of life represent a challenge for democratic politics. In this presentation I want to argue that such a challenge can only be grasped and met by discarding the rationalist perspective dominant in liberal democratic political thought. Indeed, such a perspective impedes us from acknowledging the nature of the political struggle and the centrality of symbols in the construction of political identities.As the recent (...) growth of right-wing populist movements testifies, new political identities are currently being created and there is no doubt that the media are playing an important role in their diffusion. It would be a serious mistake however to present the media as the main culprit, and to see such movements as a consequence of `media politics'. The success of those movements would not be possible without a political rhetoric that managed to mobilize a wide range of signifiers. Had it not been able to articulate those signifiers into a chain of equivalence against the existing order, right-wing populism could not have made such important inroads in several European countries.From a theoretical point of view, what this reveals is the utter irrelevance of the rationalist approach to politics and the importance of the so-called `post-modern approach'. It shows that, despite what authors like Habermas pretend, the critique of Enlightenment rationalism does not constitute a threat to the modern democratic project. On the contrary, it is only by taking account of such a critique that it is possible to defend and deepen democratic institutions. If there is anything that endangers democracy nowadays, it is precisely the rationalist approach, because it is blind to the nature of the political and denies the central role that passions play in the field of politics. Only by drawing out all the implications of the critique of essentialism will it be possible to understand the process of construction of collective political identities and their discursive mode of articulation. (shrink)

The dominant model of democratic politics treats passions as dangerous, the opposite of reason and the enemy of virtue. In this short, timely book, Paul Ginsborg and Sergio Labate put forward a very different view, showing that today, whether in the success of neoliberalism or the rise of populism, both passions and reason play a crucial role.

Drawing on philosophy, social and psychoanalytic theory, popular culture, and her own experience, Salecl explores how the passion for ignorance plays out in many different aspects of life today, from love, illness, trauma, and the fear of failure to genetics, forensic science, big data, and the Incel movement-and she concludes that ignorance is a complex phenomenon that can, on occasion, benefit individuals and society as a whole.

'Those most capable of being moved by passion are those capable of tasting the most sweetness in this life.'Descartes is most often thought of as introducing a total separation of mind and body. But he also acknowledged the intimate union between them, and in his later writings he concentrated on understanding this aspect of human nature. The Passions of the Soul is his greatest contribution to this debate. It contains a profound discussion of the workings of the emotions and (...) of their place in human life - a subject that increasingly engages the interest of philosophers and intellectual and cultural historians. It also sets out a view of ethics that has been seen as a radical reorientation of moral philosophy.This volume also includes both sides of the correspondence with Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia, one of Descartes's keenest disciples and shrewdest critics, which played a crucial role in the genesis of The Passions, as well as the first part of The Principles of Philosophy, which sets out the key positions of Descartes's philosophical system.ABOUT THE SERIES: For over 100 years Oxford World's Classics has made available the widest range of literature from around the globe. Each affordable volume reflects Oxford's commitment to scholarship, providing the most accurate text plus a wealth of other valuable features, including expert introductions by leading authorities, helpful notes to clarify the text, up-to-date bibliographies for further study, and much more. (shrink)

Elizabeth Radcliffe's book is an important and original contribution to scholarship on Hume's ethics and moral psychology. Throughout, she deftly combines important discussions of Hume's predecessors and contemporaries that serve to contextualize his views with in-depth analysis of Hume's texts. At the same time, she shows an impressive familiarity with more recent scholarship on Hume's and Humean ethics, and deploys much of this recent scholarship to frame her own interpretation of Hume's ethics and moral psychology. That sophisticated and nuanced interpretation (...) focuses particularly on the relations between and the respective roles played by belief, the passions, and moral sentiments in motivation and agency.The... (shrink)

In this article, we discuss the importance of emotions for ethical reflection on technological developments, as well as the role that art can play in this. We review literature that argues that emotions can and should play an important role in the assessment and acceptance of technological risk and in designing morally responsible technologies. We then investigate how technologically engagedartcan contribute to critical, emotional-moral reflection on technological risks. The role of art that engages with technology is unexplored territory and gives (...) rise to many fascinating philosophical questions that have not yet been sufficiently addressed in the literature. (shrink)

The entrepreneurial institutional environment is the external factor that entrepreneurial enterprises rely on for survival. Our interest is in how entrepreneurs cultivate entrepreneurial orientation in response to the highly uncertain entrepreneurial situation. Based on the cognitive appraisal theory of emotion, we analyzed the impact of the entrepreneurial institutional environment on entrepreneurial orientation through entrepreneurial passion. This study applied stepwise regression analyses to test the hypotheses on a sample of 197 entrepreneurs from the co-creation space in China. The output of (...) the study showed that the entrepreneurial institutional environment had a positive effect on entrepreneurial orientation and that entrepreneurial passion played a mediating role between the entrepreneurial institutional environment and entrepreneurial orientation. (shrink)

Had I not read that book in the months leading up to my university finals I might never have gained that real enthusiasm and excitement for ideas which has possessed me ever since. Before that time I played with the academic world in a desultory fashion, moving the thoughts, thinkers and theories in front of me as though they were merely so many counters. After I read Collingwood everything changed, and I believe the same can be true for any of (...) its readers. (shrink)

While it is often supposed that Spinoza understood a life of virtue as one of pure activity, with as few passions as possible, this paper aims to make explicit how the passions for Spinoza contribute positively to our virtue. This requires, first, explaining how a passion can increase our power, given Spinoza’s view on the passions generally, which, in turn, requires coming to terms with the problem of passive pleasure, that is, the problem of explaining how being passive can (...) cause an increase in our power. In brief, this paper will argue that, for Spinoza, even when we are passive, we are somewhat active or, in Spinoza’s language, “adequate” to varying degrees. The passions represent activity because they exercise our understanding by providing us with intelligence about external bodies and our own bodies, in particular, the degree of our bodies’ perfection. It follows that a passion can be sufficiently adequate to bring about an increase in one’s power; in this sense, they can be virtuous. Moreover, this paper will show that the passions can also be virtuous in a moral sense. The view goes roughly as follows: according to Spinoza, the passions serve as a measure of our perfection. Consequently, they play a necessary role in moral reasoning, by indicating which activities increase or hinder our virtue. On this view, a truly virtuous person would require the passions in order to engage consistently in the sorts of activities which increase her power, in particular, following reason. Since this sort of consistency in behavior is necessary for a virtuous character, the passions can be virtuous in the sense that they are necessary aspects of the sort of character which disposes us to act according to reason. (shrink)

It is now a commonplace that emotions are not mere sensations but, rather, conceptually contentful states. In trying to expand on this insight, however, most theoretical approaches to emotions neglect central intuitions about what emotions are like. We therefore need a methodological shift in our thinking about emotions away from the standard accounts' attempts to reduce them to other mental states and toward an exploration of the distinctive work emotions do. I show that emotions' distinctive function is to engage us (...) with both objective and personal values. Attention to emotions' work reveals that it is precisely their “unruliness” that allows them to play meaningful roles in our lives. (shrink)

This paper revisits the charges of fideism and irrationalism oftentimes leveled against Kierkegaard's consideration of the relation of ratio to fides. To this avail the author engages one of the key texts in this polemic, namely the first three chapters of Philosophical Fragments. His reading centers on the rather subtle suggestion that eroticlove, as a surrendering of oneself to another, plays the role of a metaphor or image for the downfall of the understanding characteristic of religious conversion. By considering (...) the possibilities and limitations of this metaphoric relation, he suggests that thedownfall of the understanding required in religious conversion occurs, surprisingly, not without an understanding, however limited, of the downfall. Because the experience oferotic love reveals where our true passion lies, we gain access to an alternative account of religious conversion according to Kierkegaard, one where ratio is not necessarilyput on the verge of disappearing by fides. Moreover, thanks to this metaphoric relation, not only does erotic love itself acquire a novel meaning—under the religious command of loving one's neighbor — but also one grasps in advance the risk of becoming dispassionate in a religious sense. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:26. DAVID HUME ON REASON, PASSIONS AND MORALS Perhaps the most notorious passage in Hume's Treatise is the one that concerns the relative roles of reason and passions, where he says: Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions (T 415). This psychology of action is the foundation of Hume's moral theory, wherein we find his two other notorious dicta, one being!.¡oral distinctions cannot be (...) derived from reason, and the other, Ought cannot be derived from is. Many commentators have interpreted Hume as saying that reason plays no role in the making of moral judgments, and, while not taking the rationalistic line, criticized him for not giving reason its proper due. The aim of this paper is to show that Hume's primary concern is to argue against the rationalist position which takes reason to be sufficient (always or sometimes) to move one to act, and to give rise to moral judgments. I wish to show that Hume is only concerned with dismissing the claim that reason could be a sufficient condition, not that it is a necessary one. Indeed, Hume could be interpreted as saying that reason is no less important than passions in shaping human conduct, anc in the area of inorai conduct, there can be no moral judgments without the work of reason. At the same time, however, passions remain the prime mover; reason does not move us to act (generally, hence morally). 1 shall try to show that the dictum '¿¡oral distinctions cannot be derived from reason' is essentially correct, but its being correct in no way shows that reason is not a necessary element of moral distinctions. 27. Before discussing the views of some critics of Hume's moral theory, it is important to clear up one source of misunderstanding that lies in Hume's discussion of the psychology of action. When Hume says that reason is the slave of passions, he does not say thereby that reason is unimportant. He is saying merely that reason alone does not move one to act. The force that propels one to action is the passion, whether it be love, or anger, or pride, or envy, or fear, or desire. Reason alone does not provide the motive. However, it is reason that does the groundwork, analyzing facts, perceiving relations, and drawing conclusions, all of which go to determine which action to perform, but the action will not be performed unless one of the passions is also present. Just because reason is the slave does not indicate that its work is not relevant. To extend the slavery metaphor, we may observe that slave owners supported slavery for the very reason that the slave's work was found indispensable; analogously, it must be observed that Hume is most unlikely to hole that reason plays no part in human action. To complete the analogy, we should say that while much could be achieved with slaves, it was the masters who conceived the plan, and the masters must rank higher in the causal order. We may observe further that greater achievement could be had by treating slaves properly, not overworking them, and not ill-treating them. If reason is the slave, it will be in our interest to cultivate it, sharpen it, and use it always and to the full. This could be inferred from HuTr.e's discussion of the understanding in Book 1 of the Treatise. indeed, in the conclusion of Book I, Hume points out forcefully that we contradict ourselves if we hold that no refin'd or elaborate reasoning is ever to be 28. receiv'd (T 268). For it is only through reasoning that we arrive at any such conclusion. He goes on to say: Very refin'd reflections have little or no influence upon us; and yet we do not, and cannot establish it for a rule, that they ought not to have any influence; which implies a manifest contradiction (T268). There cannot be a clearer demonstration that it is not the case that Hume fails to give reason its proper due. Later, I shall cite further evidence for this in relation specifically to the role of reason in... (shrink)

The enumeration of the “principal passions” in the articles 53 to 67 of the Passions of the Soul is generally regarded as laborious and unclear. This article opposes to this view and proposes elements to make sense of Descartes’ enumerative procedure. First, it clarifies the nature and function of what is called “ordered enumeration”: it amounts to a methodical act of collecting which must not be confused with a cognitive sequence based on determinate principles. The article also suggests that the (...) paragraph 52 of the Passions provides relevant indications to account for the structure of Descartes’ discourse. Indeed, different ordering criteria can be deduced from the under­standing of what the emotional object is, and from Descartes’ emotional subject as a “mind-body union” put into motion by passion. The article finally insists on Descartes’ main novelty: his forty “principal passions” are not exclusively centered on the ego and his desire; on the contrary, the enumeration makes room for other human beings who, being emotional subjects in their own right, play an active role in the develop­ment of the subject’s sentimental experience. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a close study of Hume’s treatment of contrary passions, asking questions about his description of the psychology of emotional difference and opposition. In treating this topic, I examine two opposed, but noteworthy, psychological functions that Hume imputes to human beings: sympathy and comparison. In brief, sympathy is the mechanism by which we share others’ feelings, and comparison is the function of our minds by which we find ourselves feeling passions opposed to others’ experiences. Sympathy can (...) lead me to feel pleased at your good fortune, while comparison can lead me to feel resentment or envy at the same. I also examine another form of opposition in Hume’s theory: the distinction between calm and violent passions, a distinction which plays an important part in Hume’s account of motivation. Among the questions I ask here are: what counts as contrary passions; how conflicts are psychologically possible within the context of Hume’s theory, which declares that dominant passions “swallow” inferior ones; and what the effects of contrariety are on our psychology and motivation to action. (shrink)

Reflecting Subjects is an important and timely book, both as a piece of Hume interpretation and as a work of philosophy more generally. Let me begin with the first. It has increasingly become a commonplace in Hume interpretation that the passionate and social dimensions of human life play an unusually fundamental role in Hume's philosophy. But we are only beginning to appreciate the significance of this side of Hume in a systematic way. It is precisely here that Taylor focuses her (...) attention, providing us with a... (shrink)

Francis Bacon’s political thought cannot be understood without a close reading of his discussions about human emotions and the role they play from our private to public spheres of interaction. This paper discusses Bacon’s widespread treatment of envy as a particularly significant source of political strife within states which, when unattended, leads to civil war. Bacon rejects envy as a ‘private’ passion. As a ‘public’ passion, however, it becomes a tool for preventing the very outcome to which ‘private’ (...) envy is inclined. Envy thus serves as a useful political tool that uncovers ambitious men ‘when they grow too great’ and helps political leaders ‘in handling sedition’. Envy, moreover, is also a central concept that elucidates Bacon’s discussions of ‘moral’ and ‘civil’ philosophy as two areas of study that need to be united for proper political rule. The paper opens with an analysis of Bacon’s treatment of envy in his Essays or Counsels Civil and Moral and his writings on historiography; it then connects Bacon’s understanding of envy and civil war with the writings of Thomas Hobbes and Michel de Montaigne; finally, it concludes with a discussion of the role of envy in Bacon’s civil and moral philosophy. (shrink)

Critics have suggested that deliberative democracy reproduces inequalities of gender, race, and class by privileging calm rational discussion over passionate speech and action. Their solution is to supplement deliberation with such forms of emotional expression. Hall argues that deliberation already inherently involves passion, a point that is especially important to recognize in order to deconstruct the dichotomy between reason and passion that plays a central role in reinforcing inequalities of gender, race, and class in the first place.

Hume is famous for his criticism of substantial minds, free will, and self-consciousness—central elements in traditional philosophical accounts of persons. His empiricism dissolves self-inspecting minds into heaps of distinct perceptions and turns cognitive faculties into successions of causally related, discrete impressions and ideas. Whatever regularities the complex ideas and their bundles or heaps display are explained by laws of association of ideas, which are supposed to play the same role in the mental world as Newton’s laws of gravitation play in (...) physical nature. This paper explores some strands of the new science of man proposed in Hume’s Treatise, in particular his account of personal identity.. (shrink)

This book centres on Samuel Pufendorf’s moral and political philosophy, a subject of recently renewed interest among intellectual historians, philosophers and legal scholars in the English-speaking world. Pufendorf’s significance in conceptualizing sociability in a way that ties moral philosophy, the theory of the state, political economy, and moral psychology together has already been acknowledged, but this book is the first systematic investigation of the moral psychological underpinnings of Pufendorf’s theory of sociability in their own right. Readers will discover how Pufendorf’s (...) psychological and social explanation of sociability plays a crucial role in his natural law theory. By drawing attention to Pufendorf’s scattered remarks and observations on human psychology, a new interpretation of the importance of moral psychology is presented. The author maintains that Pufendorf’s reflection on the psychological and physical capacities of human nature also matters for his description of how people adopt sociability as their moral standard in practice. We see how, since Pufendorf’s interest in human nature is mainly political, moral psychological formulations are important for Pufendorf’s theorizing of social and political order. This work is particularly useful for scholars investigating the multifaceted role of passions and emotions in the history of moral and political philosophy. It also affords a better understanding of what later philosophers, such as Smith, Hume or Rousseau, might have find appealing in Pufendorf’s writings. As such, this book will also interest researchers of the enlightenment, natural law and early modern philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Playing the Dummy:Maugham, Smartphones, and the End of EleganceEric BronsonIOn the Russian Trans-Siberian train from Vladivostok to Petrograd (now St. Petersburg), an American businessman won't stop talking for the entire ten-day journey. In his story, "A Chance Acquaintance," W. Somerset Maugham describes this 1917 meeting between Ashenden, a British character loosely based on himself, and the chatty American, named Harrington. The two passengers are blissfully unmoved by the revolution (...) unfolding all around them. Ashenden casually suggests the two of them try and find another pair to pass the time playing bridge. Harrington refuses. "It beats me how an intelligent man can waste his time card-playing," Harrington asserts, "and of all the unintellectual pursuits I have ever seen it seems to me that solitaire is the worst. It kills conversation. Man is a social animal and he exercises the highest part of his nature when he takes part in social intercourse."1 Ashenden doesn't understand the American's distaste for playing cards, especially bridge. "'There is a certain elegance in wasting time,' said Ashenden. … 'Besides,' he added with bitterness, 'you can still talk.'" [End Page 477]Like many of his fictional characters, Maugham enjoyed eloquent, "time-wasting" games like bridge. Unlike solitaire, bridge encourages social interaction. Once, when his confounded bridge partner confronted Maugham with evidence that his high-class opponents were cheating, Maugham was nonplussed. "They gave us double Martinis to start with," he noted, "a slap-up lunch with a particularly good bottle of white Burgundy and old brandy with our coffee."2 The dishonesty was irrelevant. For Maugham, a good bridge game, like the attendant conversation, should help temper one's moral outrage and skim over the unruly passions that so often plague our public and private lives. Elegance, for Maugham, meant presenting the appearance of calm and respectability, especially when such presentations conflicted with one's more turbulent emotions.In Maugham's short story "The Three Fat Women of Antibes," the women around the bridge table desperately try to keep up appearances, both physically and emotionally. When passionate arguments inevitably threaten to undo the air of genteel conversation, Lena, the newest addition to the table, states, "I think it's such a pity to quarrel over bridge. … After all, it's only a game."3 But while it might be true that bridge is "only a game," Maugham took games seriously. Parlor games like bridge were spaces to practice and perfect the social mores on which colonial hierarchies were solidified. In Maugham's England, the game of life required an elegant performance of the many roles the genteel class was expected to play. That performance was predicated on a relentless effort to keep up ordinary appearances by regulating emotional displays. As Maugham wrote in a 1944 article for Good Housekeeping, a good bridge game rewards people who are "truthful, clearheaded, and considerate," characteristics essential "for playing the more important game of life."4More than any other card game, bridge is built on conventions. Etiquette dictates how cards are shuffled, passed, and played. While there is always some room for surprise and risk, everyone around the table needs to know the bidding and playing conventions to ensure the best possible game. In every hand a silent partner, known as the dummy, lays their cards face up, thereby taking themself out of the action.The persistence of such conventions is a holdover from the game of whist, the predecessor of bridge. In an early-nineteenth-century story, "Mrs. Battle's Opinions on Whist," essayist Charles Lamb describes an elderly whist player who enjoys the elegant waste of time that such long card games encourage. While dances and parties help build social skills around untrustworthy passions, card games like whist, and later bridge, [End Page 478] were more like "a long meal; not like quadrille, a feast of snatches. One or two rubbers might co-extend in duration with an evening. They gave time to form rooted friendships." This kind of congeniality mattered to serious people like Mrs. Battle, people who "despised superficiality, and looked deeper than the colours of things."5The game of bridge... (shrink)

As strategies of suspicion, skeptical philosophies are themselves suspicious. Despite of their routinely anti-systematic rhetoric, skeptics raise the suspicion of secretly playing into the hands of the ruling regime . In his book Skepticism and Epistemology: The Development and Application of the Skeptical Method in Philosophy, Tim Köhne argues at length that a stabilizing, affirmative trait in fact characterizes all argumentative strategies of radical skepticism, for in the final instance it is not doubt that motivates skepticism but instead the desire (...) for coherence or for a system that would rise beyond all doubt. (shrink)

In this paper, I seek to develop Aquinas’s view of the passions’ contribution to moral reasoning by discussing the role he sees the passions as playing in each of practical reason’s three acts. I begin by outlining why, on Aquinas’s account, the passions are capable of contributing to moral reasoning. I then turn to his proposal in Summa Theologica I-II, q. 44, a. 2 that certain passions can improve the act of counsel. I also address what appears to be a (...) contradiction in his account. Next, I explain why Aquinas allows the passions to contribute to the act of counsel, but claims in De malo q. 3, a. 11 that they should not be given weight in our moral judgments. I end by briefly exploring whether Aquinas allows the passions to contribute to the act of command. I suggest that he does. (shrink)

What are the passions? And what, if anything, do they have to do with our intellectual lives? I argue that, according to Aristotle, the passions are complex states that carry information about the value things have. More specifically, Aristotelian passions are constituted by fine-grained evaluative appearances—a kind of truth-apt, cognitive, yet non-rational representation that non-human animals also entertain. Given that the passions are representations of value, they can be the basis for coming to know and understand the peculiar value of (...) things. So, the passions can serve as grounds for intellectual achievements that are essential to a good life. In particular, I argue that, for Aristotle, the passions contribute substantively to three intellectual achievements that are required for a flourishing life: practical wisdom, certain instances of contemplation, and the appreciation of art. Since Aristotelian passions carry rich information and discriminate value, they are cognitive states that can shape and enrich not only our lives as agents, but also our lives as knowers. The passions can play an epistemic role by serving as warrant for intellectually discerning the normative features of the situations we inhabit, the kinds of characters that surround us, and what is good and fine in them and us. Furthermore, in virtue of their epistemic role, the passions can be the basis for the intellectual aspects of a moral education. (shrink)

Hume argues that whenever we seem to be motivated by reason, there are unnoticed calm passions that play this role instead, a move that is often criticised asad hoc(e. g. Stroud 1977 and Cohon 2008). In response, some commentators propose a conceptual rather than empirical reading of Hume’s conativist thesis, either as a departure from Hume (Stroud 1977), or as an interpretation or rational reconstruction (Bricke 1996). I argue that conceptual accounts face a dilemma: either they render the conativist thesis (...) trivial, or they violate Hume’s thesis that ‘a priori, any thing may produce any thing’ (THN1.4.5.30). I defend an empirical construal of Hume’s conativist thesis. I provide two theoretical frameworks within which Hume’s appeal to the calm passions may be justified: first, by the framework of theoretical virtues, and secondly, by lights of his own “rules by which to judge of causes and effects” (THN1.3.15). (shrink)