The article is a translator’s commentary to the Ukrainian translation of E. Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations. The task of this article is twofold: On the one hand, to reveal the historical context of the writing and publishing of Cartesian Meditations, on the other hand, to outline the strategic and terminological aspects of the Ukrainian translation of this work. The first part of the article is devoted to the history of creation of the text of Cartesian Meditations. In particular, the author answers (...) the question of why the German text of Cartesian Meditations was not published until 1950, almost twenty years after the French translation of the book was released. The historico-philosophical investigation conducted in the article shows that Husserl considered the publication of Cartesian Meditations as an opportunity to systematically present his phenomenological philosophy and, eventually, recognized the impossibility of embracing the complexity of his doctrine within this work. The difficulty of this systematic presentation led to the enhancement of the role of Husserl’s assistant, Eigen Fink, in the editing of Cartesian Meditations and, ultimately, to the creation of Fink’s Sixth Meditation. The latter, as the author of the article demonstrates, puts previous developments in the phenomenology of static and genetic types into a new theoretical perspective, mainly by introducing the method of constructive phenomenology. In the second part of the article, the author offers one of the possible strategies for translating Husserlian texts that consists in structural simplification and stylistic improvement of the text. This strategy is proposed to be implemented by using simpler grammatical structures, by supplementing the text with translator’s comments, as well as by consistent usage of the Ukrainian phenomenological terminology. During the analysis of the terminological discourse of contemporary Ukrainian phenomenology, the author revises some of the established Ukrainian translations, such as the translation of the phenomenological terms Ausschaltung and Zeitbewusstsein and introduces the translation of new terms, such as Vergemeinschaftung, Person, reell and ideell. (shrink)

Modern developments in philosophy have provided us with tools, logical and methodological, that were not available to Medieval thinkers - a development that has its dangers as well as opportunities. Modern tools allow one to penetrate old texts and analyze old problems in new ways, offering interpretations that the old thinkers could not have known. But unless one remains sensitive to the fact that language has undergone changes, bringing with it a shift in the meaning of terminology, (...) one can easily perpetrate an anachronism. Yet there is a growing need to bring modern tools and to bear on the struggle for greater understanding of the problems studied and the solutions found by the ancient scholars. If we remain sensitive to the dangers, this openness to new methods can be expected to widen our perspectives and deepen our knowledge of old material. The focus in the present volume is on problems in Medieval and contemporary philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Several fields contributing to psychiatric advances, such as psychology, biology, and the humanities, have not yet met to produce a cohesive and integrated picture of human function and dysfunction, strength and vulnerability, etc., despite advances in their own areas. The failure may have its roots in a disagreement on what we mean by the human person and his or her relationship with the world, for which the incommensurate language of these disciplines may be partly to blame. Turns taken by western (...) philosophy over the past 400 years may help to explain this. Language is such an important tool for psychiatrists, that examination of it may afford an insight into the reasons for divisions in the field. This paper aims to examine and compare psychologies (and hence psychiatries) derived from modern western philosophy, with similar concepts in other cultures, through the study of developments in terminology, in terms of the simplest facts about what it means to be human. Terminology used in mental health in western cultures is examined, with particular consideration of the term “self” as it has come to be used in a technical sense. Analogous terms from non-English speaking European languages, and some non-western cultures are studied. Western philosophy and psychology have evolved a meaning for the term “self” which is quite different from equivalent terms in non-western cultures. It is a moot point whether or not the development in western psychiatry of what are now technical terms to describe normal human experience has become needlessly obscure and ambiguous. It is not evident that this “new” language represents a genuine advance in understanding; it distances mental health professionals from those who are not familiar with it; and it makes transcultural dialogue difficult. (shrink)

1880년대를 전후로 일본은 종래의 계몽적 과학의 도입을 넘어, 과학(科學) 즉 분과(分科)의 학(學)에 대한 전면적인 수용을 시작했다. 그것은 각종 과학학회들의 설립과 더불어 동경대학을 비롯한 고등 교육기관의 창립을 통해 제도적으로 뒷받침되었다. 그런데 메이지 초기 계몽적 지식으로서의 ‘과학’과는 달리, 분과의 학으로서의 과학 각 분야의 수용은 종래보다 전문적인 과학기술 어휘들의 제정과 통일를 필요로 했다. 본고에서 다룬 물리학 역어회는 메이지 초기 난립 상태에 있던 물리학 술어들의 통일과 표준화를 목적으로 탄생한 것이다. 물리학 역어회는 1883년 동경대학 교수 야마카와 겐지로와 그 졸업생들의 발기에 의해 당시 일본의 물리학 관련자들을 (...) 대부분 망라한 단체로, 약 4년간에 걸쳐 일본에서 물리학 역어들의 통일과 표준화라는 임무를 담당했다. 그 결실로 탄생한 것이 『물리학술어･화영불독대역자서』(1888)라는 물리학 전문 술어 사전이었다. 이 같은 물리학 역어회의 활동은 메이지 초기 난립 상태에 있던 물리학 역어들의 통일을 획기적으로 진전시켰음은 물론, 물리학이라는 학문을 신속하게 일본화하는데 기여했다. 나아가 일본제 물리학 술어가 근대화시기 중국, 조선 등 동아시아의 인국으로 전파되는데 중요한 역할을 담당했다. 그러나 한편으로 그 같은 물리학 술어의 조직적인 제정과 통일 작업은 전통적 술어들과의 급격한 단절은 물론, 메이지 후기 물리학이 계몽적 지식으로서의 성격을 넘어 국가적 요구가 반영된 거대과학으로 재탄생하는 출발점이 되었다는 점도 지적하지 않으면 안 된다. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to conduct an analysis of the terminologies employed by Imam Ibn Rajab in his well-known work, "Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari," with the intention of enhancing our comprehension of his methodology in the field of Hadith studies. The study utilises a methodology that combines textual analysis and statistical techniques to examine the occurrence and usage of specific terms. The study also compares Ibn Rajab’s terminology with that of "Muqaddimah Ibn Salah" for a thorough (...) analysis. The study's main findings highlight the nuanced interpretations and variations in Ibn Rajab’s use of terminologies, specifically in synonymous terms like 'tafarrud' and 'garabah'. Furthermore, it emphasises his careful choice of the term "hasan" and the potential consequences it carries. The statistical analysis offers valuable insights into the frequency and patterns of these terminologies, which contributes to a quantitative understanding of their significance. After analysing the results, several suggestions are put forward. First, to gain a deeper understanding of Ibn Rajab's unique perspectives, it is recommended to thoroughly examine his methodologies throughout his entire body of work. Second, additional research is required to delve into the interpretations and implications of synonymous terms employed by Ibn Rajab. Third, conducting a thorough examination of his specific use of the term "hasan" would yield valuable insights into his criteria for evaluation. Fourth, it is important to conduct a thorough comparative analysis between the two texts, "Muqaddimah Ibn Salah" and the current text, to identify any similarities, differences, and potential influences. Fifth, it is recommended to broaden the statistical analysis to explore patterns, trends, and correlations within the dataset. Furthermore, gaining a broader understanding of Ibn Rajab’s contributions within the academic and scholarly landscape would greatly enhance comprehension. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to establish a relationship between philosophy, myth, and science in reference to a historical perspective. If for methodological reasons we now disregard the above mentioned terminological difficulties and refer to a common-sense view of myth, philosophy, and science, it remains unquestionable that myth existed long before philosophy and modern science began as late as the seventeenth century.Nevertheless, this historical perspective is not introduced to affirm the positivistic view, according to which the history of (...) humanity should be described in terms of three stages: theological (mythical), metaphysical (philosophical), and positive (scientific); nor is it presented to say that the positive one represents the final achievement of the human race. On the contrary, I will attempt to show that by departing from myth and original philosophy, modern men and women have concealed from themselves an intensely rich experience of life. In order to regain the love of wisdom, we need first to look backwards in order to move forward. (shrink)

This article examines the interaction of ideas of Modern Western philosophy, including Polish philosophy, and Ukrainian philosophy in Eastern Galicia in the late eighteenth century through the early twentieth century. The authors argue that during this period the methodological foundations of Ukrainian philosophy and its history, both in periodization, and the development of philosophical terminology, were intensively elaborated. This is proved by the analyzing works of such Galician thinkers and cultural figures as Klym Hankevych and Ilarion Svientsits’kyi. Both (...) were able to involve Ukrainian philosophy in Central-Eastern philosophical discourse. Such an involvement was fruitful because it contributed to the development of Ukrainian philosophy and its methodology for both historic-philosophical researches and the formation of philosophical terminology. (shrink)

The purpose of this essay is to establish a relationship between philosophy, myth, and science in reference to a historical perspective. If for methodological reasons we now disregard the above mentioned terminological difficulties and refer to a common-sense view of myth, philosophy, and science, it remains unquestionable that myth existed long before philosophy and modern science began as late as the seventeenth century.Nevertheless, this historical perspective is not introduced to affirm the positivistic view, according to which the history of (...) humanity should be described in terms of three stages: theological (mythical), metaphysical (philosophical), and positive (scientific); nor is it presented to say that the positive one represents the final achievement of the human race. On the contrary, I will attempt to show that by departing from myth and original philosophy, modern men and women have concealed from themselves an intensely rich experience of life. In order to regain the love of wisdom, we need first to look backwards in order to move forward. (shrink)

Which language should philosophers use: technical or common language? In a book as important for intellectual historians as it is for philosophers, Lodi Nauta addresses a vital question which still has resonance today: is the discipline of philosophy assisted or disadvantaged by employing a special vocabulary? By the Middle Ages philosophy had become a highly technical discipline, with its own lexicon and methods. The Renaissance humanist critique of this specialised language has been dismissed as philosophically superficial, but the author demonstrates (...) that it makes a crucial point: it is through the misuse of language that philosophical problems arise. He charts the influence of this critique on early modern philosophers, including Hobbes and Locke, and shows how it led to the downfall of medieval Aristotelianism and the gradual democratization of language and knowledge. His book will be essential reading for anyone interested in the transition from medieval to modern philosophy. (shrink)

Since ancient times comparisons between embryonic forms of humans, animals, and plants are known. In deciphering a plant embryo and its development, one applied a specific zoomorphic terminology. Until the 17th century naturalists who studied plants were inspired by the concepts of ancient natural philosophy. Since then plant embryos are visualized by drawings and diagrammatic sketches. In the 18th century the embryo became an important issue in debates concerning theories of generation and the analogy between animal egg and vegetable (...) seed was emphasized. Due to the cell theory and refined microscopic techniques around 1850 botanists described the 'plant embryo' as an aggregate of cells. The 20th century profited of further technical improvements, e.g. microphotography, SEM, and plant tissue culture. The spell of the word embryo integrated morphological and morphogenetic data in botany and served as a code to decipher botanic forms. The paper presents a short history of the concept of 'plant embryo' and focuses on its distinct meanings over centuries, supported by different images. (shrink)

In selecting the papers for this volume I have excluded all physics papers proper. I have further omitted all book rev.iews. Instead, I have included two papers not published previously; they are marked by an asterisk (*) in the table of contents. Since many of the papers were occasioned by Symposia or similar gatherings their chronological order is rather accidental. Hence I have tried to group the papers thematically into four parts. Within each part the order of sequence is from (...) the more general to the more special, or from a more popular to a more technical treatment. The same principle has been applied to the sequential order of the parts. The foundational papers on quantum mechanics have been arranged in a somewhat dif ferent manner. Chapters XVI-XIX are concerned with the logic of complementarity while in Chapters XX-XXII a more radical recon ceptualization is carried out. Two of the older papers (Chapters VI and VIII) have been revised to bring them more into line with present terminology. Other papers have been corrected by additions and omissions. Additions are marked by square brackets [ ], while double square brackets [[ II signify omis sions or parts to be omitted. Hence [[A]] [B] means that 'A' should be replaced by 'B'. The heading of one paper (Chapter XX) has been changed to make it more descriptive. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the rationality of law and legal decision making would be enhanced by a systematic attempt to recognize and respond to the implications of empirical uncertainty for policy making and decision making. Admission of uncertainty about the accuracy of facts and the validity of assumptions relied on to make inferences of fact is commonly avoided in law because it raises the spectre of paralysis of the capacity to decide issues authoritatively. The roots of this short-sighted (...) view are found in primitive mechanical models of relationships in the empirical and social world – those of objective causality and determinism. Insofar as it is believed that if we had sufficient data a clear and unequivocal answer would be available to each question, admission of uncertainty is seen as a sign of insufficiency, incompetence, impotence, and is avoided whenever a decision that must be seen to be based on valid reasons, cannot be avoided. Avoidance of some decisions, duplicity in others, is the result. -/- Decision-making must be restructured to recognize the provisional and context-bound validity and relevance of the models we use to conceptualize and order our understanding of phenomena, and to utilize this awareness as an instrument in the production of legal policies and decisions that will be authoritative precisely because they are honestly accurate and socially responsible. The paper makes a start on such a re-structuring of the legal process by exploring the implications of the observation that if law is to be “just”: 1) legal policy must be based on accurate information and rationally related to social goals; and 2) decisions applying policy to individual fact situations must be based on assumptions that are both relevant and accurate. -/- Reasons for determinations of fact must be given, otherwise the presumption that the trier of fact is “reasonable” is an unconditional licence to use private modes of logic and theories of social and natural science. What is not disclosed cannot be challenged on grounds of invalidity or irrelevance. -/- Use of “objective validity” as a standard to evaluate conclusions made by the trier of fact in contentious cases would only serve to beg all important questions by concealing: 1) fundamental normative conflict, and 2) the limited nature and applicability of many validity claims. -/- Our use of the phrases “undue risk,” “public interest,” “reasonable,” and “necessary,” reflects the weight we choose to give conflicting social values and goals when we must make decisions in relative ignorance of all the consequences. “Objective criteria” are of limited utility in legal decision-making because their social meaning is derivative. Policy generation in the absence of any coherent conceptual-normative framework, use of vague terminology in legislation stating policy, and the absence of rational means to distinguish between individual cases to which decision-makers are required by law to apply policy, make it inevitable that many legal “decisions” made in the guise of determinations of objective fact, are charades, an arbitrary, capricious, intuitive, subjective (and thus private) use of public decision-making power. -/- Law must alter its aspirations and recognize that rational decision-making is a process that can occur only within parameters set by present knowledge and societal preference structures. Only by working with the constraints imposed by these parameters is it possible to achieve “just” decisions. Where no rational basis for differentiating cases exists, “individualized justice” must be avoided and public policy articulated in law applied uniformly to all cases in a class. The terms “reasonable” and “necessary,” used to describe policy and its consequences for specific cases, must be understood to represent provisional societal assessments, attempts to implement societal preference structures in the face of limited knowledge. Heightened awareness of the limited nature of our knowledge can only result in legal policies that have a more explicit normative basis. -/- The volume is is published with an introduction by Michael D. Bayles. It is available in hardback, paperback, and as an ebook. (shrink)

From the Introduction: This inquiry is concerned with the themes of praxis and action in four philosophic movements: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, and analytic philosophy. It is rare that these four movements are considered in a single inquiry, for there are profound differences of emphasis, focus, terminology, and approach represented by these styles of thought. Many philosophers believe that similarities among these movements are superficial and that a close examination of them will reveal only hopelessly unbridgeable cleavages. While respecting the (...) genuine fundamental differences of these movements, this inquiry is undertaken in the spirit of showing that there are important common themes and motifs in what first appears to be a chaotic babble of voices. I intend to show that the concern with man as an agent has been a primary focal point of each of these movements and further that each contributes something permanent and important to our understanding of the nature and context of human activity. (shrink)

Scholastic terminology, with roots in theology and the now largely unfamiliar Latin language, is a perpetual obstacle for the uninitiated and a potential cause of misunderstanding and cross-argument in communication with non-Scholastics. Yet if any jargon is legitimate, one tried by centuries of definition and discussion of fundamental problems has classic value and is a fit object of study in the modern mood of linguistic analysis. The present welcome addition to the English language is a compact collection of (...) some 1,600 common terms and phrases current in the general stream of Thomist Aristotelian philosophy. Its ideal is the crisp definition which the author’s pedagogical experience suggests is necessary to understand a general course of such philosophy. Choice of matter is practical, not exhaustive and makes no attempt to trace the diversity of historical usage. Occasionally a precise reference is given to the classic origin of its decisive definition, mainly to the works of Aristotle and St. Thomas and occasionally to Augustine, Boethius, Scotus and Suarez. For fuller information reference is also made to current Thomist monographs in English. (shrink)

This book provides an authoritative account of Hegel's social philosophy at a level that presupposes no specialised knowledge of the subject. Hegel's social theory is designed to reconcile the individual with the modern social world. Michael Hardimon explores the concept of reconciliation in detail and discusses Hegel's views on the relationship between individuality and social membership, and on the family, civil society, and the state. The book is an important addition to the string of major studies of Hegel published (...) by Cambridge. It will interest a broad swathe of readers in philosophy, (both students and specialists), and could be used in courses on political and social theory. -/- "Michael Hardimon's carefully and clearly argued, deeply nuanced book represents an important contribution to the ongoing Hegel renaissance. A short review can never do justice to such a richly argued work so replete with detail and example. Hegel scholars will learn much from it, and those innocent of Hegelian language will find it a good place to begin." Terry Pinkard, Ethics -/- "Micahel Hardimon's new book is a valuable study of Hegel's social and political philosophy....Hardimon deliberately resists using Hegel's technical terminology and engaging in detailed scholarly disputes in a successful effort to avoid obscurity and distraction. The result is a book that should be prized by anyone seeking an accessible presentation of Hegel's social philosophy, particularly as a vehicle for teaching Hegel's political thought without having to devote an entire course to the task." The Philosophical Review. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I Aristotle and Early Modern Philosophy II Medieval Thought in Early Modern Scholasticism III The Philosophical Textbook IV Conclusions.

This paper explores the question of Leibniz’s contribution to the rise of modern ‘science’. To be sure, it is now generally agreed that the modern category of ‘science’ did not exist in the early modern period. At the same time, this period witnessed a very important stage in the process from which modern science eventually emerged. My discussion will be aimed at uncovering the new enterprise, and the new distinctions which were taking shape in the early (...) modern period under the banner of the old Aristotelian terminology. I will argue that Leibniz begins to theorize a distinction between physics and metaphysics that tracks our distinction between the autonomous enterprise of science in its modern meaning, and the enterprise of philosophy. I will try to show that, for Leibniz, physics proper is the study of natural phenomena in mathematical and mechanical terms without recourse for its explanations to metaphysical notions. This autonomy, however, does not imply for Leibniz that physics can say on its own all that there is to be said about the natural world. Quite the opposite. Leibniz inherits from the Aristotelian tradition the view that physics needs metaphysical roots or a metaphysical grounding. For Leibniz, what is ultimately real is reached by metaphysics, not by physics. This is, in my view, Leibniz’s chief insight: the new mathematical physics is an autonomous enterprise which offers its own kind of explanations but does not exhaust what can (and should) be said about the natural world. (shrink)

It is plausible to think that before the emergence of terms like “consciousness” and “Bewusstsein,” philosophers and scientists relied on intuitions about phenomena of subjective experience that we would now classify as “conscious.” In other words, pre-modern thinkers availed themselves of one or another concept of consciousness as they developed their theories of mind, perception, representation, the self, etc., although they did not attend to consciousness in its own right. In the early modern period, terminology of consciousness (...) emerges to pick out concept(s) of consciousness. This brings with it an occasion for philosophical disagreements concerning consciousness among contemporaries, on the one hand, and an occasion for us as interpreters of historical authors to better assess their views on consciousness, on the other. (shrink)

The first ever dictionary of continental philosophy to be published.With over 450 clearly written definitions and articles by an international team of specialists, this authoritative dictionary covers the thinkers, topics and technical terms associated with the many fields known as 'continental' philosophy'. Special care has been taken to explain the complex terminology of many continental thinkers. Researchers, students and professional philosophers alike will find the dictionary an invaluable reference tool.Key features include:*in-depth entries on major figures and topics*over 190 shorter (...) articles on other figures and topics*over 250 items on technical terms used by continental thinkers, from abjection [Kristeva] to worldhood [Heidegger]*coverage of related subjects that use continental terms and methods*extensive cross-referencing, allowing readers to relate and pursue ideas in depth.Entries include: Major Figures and Topics: Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl, Irigaray, Kant, NietzscheEpistemology, Feminism, German Idealism, Marxism, Phenomenology, Poststructuralism, Time, etc.Other figures and topics covered include: Adorno, Althusser, Arendt, Badiou, Barthes, Bergson, Butler, Haraway, Habermas, Kristeva, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Schelling, Schiller, Weber, Weil, Wittgenstein, Zizek, etc;African Philosophy, Cognitive Science, Death, Ecocriticism, Embodiment, Environmental Philosophy, Modernity, Philosophy of Nature, NeoThomism, Postcolonial Theory, Psychology, Race Theory, Sex / sexuality, Space, Speech Act Theory, Structuralism, Subject, 'Young Hegelians', etc. (shrink)

In this article, I would like to present a brief overview of Aquinas’s philosophy of mind. I try to express the cognitive processes that this model of the mind describes in more modern terminology (e.g., I interpret ‘an image’ [phantasm] as the binding effect of monomodal representations of a perceived object). Characteristic of this model is the postulation, in the case of the human mind, of intellectual abstraction leading to concepts, which requires assuming the existence of the intellect (...) in its active and passive aspects. In this context, a metaphysical conclusion can be drawn about the immortal nature of this intellect, according to Thomas. On the other hand, this model of the mind is not, to all appearances, a variant of Platonic-Cartesian dualism – Aquinas makes several arguments against dualism understood in this way, at least one of which was still raised by (non-Thomistic) critics of Descartes. In addition, Thomas points to the developmental aspect of the human mind and also attempts to describe the possible functioning of the intellect after death. (shrink)

Michael Hardimon’s new book is a valuable study of Hegel’s social and political philosophy. Hardimon takes seriously Hegel’s intention to offer a social philosophy that can reconcile people to the modern social world. Since Hegel’s own presentation of his philosophy is motivated by a number of competing concerns, Hardimon’s admirable success at reconstructing Hegel’s view in accordance with this fundamental intention offers an important and insightful perspective on Hegel’s project. The focal points of Hardimon’s reconstruction—the aim of reconciliation and (...) the problem of alienation it is meant to overcome—are explained and interpreted with considerable clarity in a way that shows their significance to the tradition of modern political philosophy. Hardimon deliberately resists using Hegel’s technical terminology and engaging in detailed scholarly disputes in a successful effort to avoid obscurity and distraction. The result is a book that should be prized by anyone seeking an accessible presentation of Hegel’s social philosophy, particularly as a vehicle for teaching Hegel’s political thought without having to devote an entire course to the task. (shrink)

In this dissertation I uncover a logic of the development of atomism in early Greek philosophy that has not been previously recognized in the philosophical literature. This logic results from the nature of subjectivity and the attempt by reflective subjects to understand the world in which they live. Thus because of the nature of illusions built in to perception and reflection, reflective subjects who attempt to understand their world will develop more or less accurate accounts according to their ability to (...) see through these illusions. ;Physicalism, as it is understood by Professor Phillip Scribner of The American University and explained in currently unpublished manuscripts, provides the interpretative key that reveals the underlying logic in the development of early Greek philosophy. It is therefore necessary to explain this particular form of physicalism in some detail in order to understand the terminology and categories to be used in the historical analysis. To this end I explain the physicalist ontology and philosophy of science, the genesis of the problem of mind in Modern and Contemporary philosophy, the physicalist solution to the problem of mind, and the nature of the physicalist critique of the history of philosophy. ;In the historical sections the themes of materialism, reductionism, and realism are used to compare the views of Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Parmenides, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Leucippus, and Democritus and to show how their various positions on the themes follow from their assumptions about the nature of subjectivity. I argue that the predecessors of atomism were all naive realists and that this assumption about the nature of mind generates the problems of early Greek philosophy. The resolution of these problems follows from the development of critical realism by Leucippus and a form of proto-physicalism by Democritus. ;The main sources used are English translations of Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker by H. Diels, edited by W. Kranz, and a variety of secondary sources which provide the consensus of modern authorities. (shrink)

Scientists’ language use in communication to or with the public has often been criticised as merely strategic. This article explores three terms employed in stem cell and genomic research, to support the hypothesis that biomedical terminology is heavily influenced by different legal, cultural, and ethical backgrounds in different societies. The word ‘pre-embryo’ has never been part of any acceptable official rhetoric in Germany but was important in Britain. The ‘toti-’, ‘pluri-’, or ‘multipotency’ of specific stem cells became a topical (...) issue of scientific expertise in countries with strict regulations on embryo research. The distinction between ‘reproductive’ and ‘therapeutic’ cloning has become very common but problematic due to its obvious strategic purpose, and is intensely debated in the scientific community. The examination of these examples and the cultural framework in which they gain importance will demonstrate the mutual interconnectedness of biomedical science and social and cultural conditions. Separation of a purely descriptive terminology that belongs to science itself, adequately describing its discoveries, and a rhetoric that addresses external, non-scientific attitudes is impossible. Regulations, social discourses, and cultural traditions influence biomedical sciences, their scientific research projects and the terminology employed therein. Biomedical practices are considered ethically problematic not only by those external to the scientific realms, but also by some professionals participating in the research. Biomedical science is not a discrete field with clear boundaries and has to be re-conceptualized as an integral and important part of modern culture. (shrink)

Pierre Hadot, whose inaugural lecture to the chair of the History of Hellenistic and Roman Through at the Collège de France we are publishing here, is one of the most significant and wide-ranging historians of ancient philosophy writing today. His work, hardly known in the English-reading world except among specialists, exhibits that rare combination of prodigious historical scholarship and rigorous philosophical argumentation that upsets any preconceived distinction between the history of philosophy and philosophy proper. In addition to being the translator (...) and author of monographs on Plotinus, Vitorinus, Porphyry, and many others, Hadot’s most important general philosophical work is entitled Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique.1 Combined with detailed studies of Socrates and Marcus Aurelius, this work presents a history of spiritual exercises from Socrates to early Christianity, an account of their decline in modern philosophy, and a discussion of the different conceptions of philosophy that have companied the trajectory and fate of the theory and practice of spiritual exercises. Hadot’s “Forms of Life and Forms of Discourse in Ancient Philosophy” provides an overview of his major themes and preoccupations, and gives some indication of the historical scope of his work. This lecture also illuminates the methodological problems one faces in studying the history of thought, especially problems concerning the evolution, reinterpretation, and even misunderstanding of the meaning and significance of philosophical terminology. In this brief introduction, I can do no more than attempt to provide a context for Hadot’s inaugural lecture, by way of summary of his major work, and, more specifically for reader’s of Critical Inquiry, to sketch the profound importance that Hadot’s writings had for the last works of Michel Foucault. Arnold I. Davidson, executive editor of Critical Inquiry, is associate professor of philosophy and a member of the Committees on the Conceptual Foundations of Science and General Studies in the Humanities at the University of Chicago. He introduced and edited the “Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism” . He is currently working on the history of horror as it relates to the epistemology of norms and deviations. (shrink)

Whitehead's philosophy of civilization is discussed in this book. noting that this aspect of whitehead's philosophy is less well known and appreciated than his work in mathematics and metaphysics, the author presents it as "an impressive treatment of the meaning and values of civilization." actually the book presents whitehead's views on western christian civilization rather than on civilization "per se", as discerned in "a series of insights," rather than by "detailed systematic presentation." since whitehead wrote no treatise exclusively on this (...) topic, this book draws from "science and the modern world", "process and reality", "adventures in ideas", and articles written by him after 1925. the final chapter relates whitehead's philosophy of civilization to his "highly technical terminology" and "demonstrates that whitehead's main ideas in his philosophy of civilization are in accordance with his metaphysics--, i.e., his theory of reality." one chapter discusses various criticisms of whitehead. (bp). (shrink)

This is a new attempt at an analysis of classical Chinese (Confucian) ethics which is still inappropriately explained by Western philosophy as a traditional normative ethical system. Special conditions of ancient Chinese anthropogeny and social and economic development gave rise in this cultural region to an original theory of being, which in modern terminology can be referred to as an ontological model of a fundamental Yin‐Yang dialectic of a bipolar and non‐homogeneous synergy of being. This theory of being (...) became a cornerstone for the whole complex of ancient Chinese philosophy, socio‐anthropology and ethics. Its most leading representatives—several ancient Taoist philosophers as well as the whole ancient Confucian ethical philosophy—proposed an original approach to issues which could be, for the modem world of philosophical research, a very suggestive source of inspiration. (shrink)

G. W. F. Hegel is an immensely important yet difficult philosopher. Philosophy of Mind is the third part of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, in which he summarizes his philosophical system. It is one of the main pillars of his thought. Michael Inwood presents this central work to the modern reader in an intelligible and accurate new translation---the first into English since 1894---that loses nothing of the style of Hegel's thought. In his editorial introduction Inwood offers a philosophically (...) sophisticated evaluation of Hegel's ideas which includes a survey of the whole of Hegel's thought and detailed analysis of the terminology he used. (shrink)

Many years the academic community has been discussing issues of a universal metalanguage as the general conceptual framework of modern social and humanitarian research, especially of philosophy. The article questions the claim that the language of Western philosophy was already accepted as a unified tool in the 20th century. The peculiarities of perception and further application of Western philosophical terminology in Japan in late 19th – first half of the 20th centuries are investigated here as a factual evidence (...) base of argumentation. Special attention is given to examples of translation and interpretation of some concepts of Western origin, such as metaphysics, ethics, logic, substance, subject, etc., as observed in the works of eminent thinkers Nishi Amane, Inoue Tetsujiro, Nishida Kitaro, and Watsuji Tetsuro. The paper provides examples of new original concepts developed by modern Japanese philosophers, such as Kimura Bin, Hiromatsu Wataru et al. The author concludes that the general conceptual framework that modern philosophy operates with is a very dynamic and open system, capable of transforming in different cultural contexts and in keeping with newly emerging issues that require analysis. The article identifies factors that provide philosophical communication between different cultures at the conceptual level, that is, the presence of a common circle of problems and presence of partial overlap between the key concepts. The author poses the problem of the emergence of new approaches and ideas in a situation of “conflicting interpretations,” or incomplete equivalence of similar notions when used by the parties in a dialogue, casting doubt on possibility, necessity and reasonability of exact reproduction of meanings and “complete domestication” in other cultures. (shrink)

Since the role of the Asian countries is increasing in the modern world, their philosophical traditions attract more and more attention. Due to this trend, a more complete panoramic view of the development of world philosophy as a whole is accessible, and it has become possible to understand that any constructions of the human mind that have arisen in a particular cultural field of experience cannot be regarded as exemplary and absolute. The researchers of Asian philosophies concentrate mostly on (...) studying the texts of individual thinkers. As a rule, they do not set themselves the task of examining these texts from the point of view of intercultural interactions and transformations of significant ideas and concepts in various cultural and historical contexts, defining the direction and mechanisms of cultural borrowing, as well as revealing new approaches and growth points. To achieve these goals, the research should focus at the problem of the self-determination and development of philosophy as a separate science in non-Western cultures, which are based on intellectual traditions with different origin than Greek and Judeo-Christian traditions. This article deals with the consideration of some topics that elucidate the features of the development of philosophical science in Japan, including the emergence of the concept of “philosophy” in this country, the definition of its subject, the formation of philosophical terminology, and various interpretations of what the term “Japanese philosophy” means. The author pays special attention to the characteristic of the main periods of progress of Japanese philosophical thought. In the conclusion, the author argues that the most important characteristic feature of the Japanese philosophy is its involvement in intercultural dialogue throughout its history. (shrink)

Works by authors of the Romantic period have often been viewed primarily as expressions of escapism, disillusionment, or apostasy on the part of the writer. In contrast, Hoagwood shows that political repression had important effects on the production of Romantic texts. Far from disengaging from the political world, works by Wordsworth, Coleridge, Blake, Shelley, Hays, and Smith, written at a time when overt expression was dangerous, express their author's contentions with political repression through duplicitous meaning and figural terminology. By (...) emphasizing the material textuality of Romantic writing, Hoagwood provides a new model for interpretation in the tradition of countering "Romantic ideology." Hoagwood demonstrates how political pressures and the institutions of publishing helped to shape the meanings of Romantic texts. He argues for the importance of a book's historically specific and material form in influencing the way critics and scholars view a given work. Literary theory and textual criticism come together in this book to show the new ranges of significance that can emerge when a poetic work is studied as a material artifact. The study concludes with a comparative analysis of critical theory in the Romantic period and in our own, addressing ways in which the differences between modernity and romanticism have affected interpretations of Romantic works. Hoagwood suggests that the political forces shaped the formulations of philosophic questions concerning interpretation and fictionality in much the same way they influenced the writing of Romantic literature. (shrink)

The rhetoric studies art of well-reasoned and convincing speech since antique times. In the article, a rhetoric phenomenon is viewed as certain method in Cicero’s philosophy of education. He considered a semantic component as a basis of the speaker speech. From the point of view of a rhetoric demand in teaching mathematics of various levels, modern interpretation of rhetorical skill does not come down to eloquence only. The rhetoric is still methodological means for strengthening the convincing influence of mathematical (...) arguments at a statement of difficult mathematical terminology or at proving theorem. Article underlines a role of the good speaker’s rhetoric of the live speech. Rhetoric gives the required words and ‘colors‘ that are essential for the live speech. From the point of teaching mathematics, the convincing speech art is especially demanded for understanding of mathematics at various justification levels. The rhetoric studies art of the convincing and reasoned eloquence. Sometimes, addressing to non-mathematician audience, mathematicians allow themselves to substitute arguments by unreasoned rhetorical means, but it is necessary to amplify the pragmatical aspect of rhetoric at lectures on mathematics. It provides the means for communication with the student audience of any level of mathematical knowledge. (shrink)

Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz stand out among their seventeenth-century contemporaries as the great rationalist philosophers. Each sought to construct a philosophical system in which theological and philosophical foundations serve to explain the physical, mental and moral universe. Through a careful analysis of their work, Pauline Phemister explores the rationalists seminal contribution to the development of modern philosophy. Broad terminological agreement and a shared appreciation of the role of reason in ethics do not mask the very significant disagreements that led (...) to three distinctive philosophical systems: Cartesian dualism, Spinozan monism and Leibnizian pluralism. The book explores the nature of, and offers reasons for, these differences. Phemister contends that Spinoza and Leibniz developed their systems in part through engagements with and amendment of Cartesian philosophy, and critically analyses the arguments and contributions of all three philosophers. The clarity of the authors discussion of their key ideas including their views on knowledge, universal languages, the nature of substance and substances, bodies, the relation of mind and body, freedom, and the role of distinct perception and reason in morals will make this book the ideal introduction to rationalist philosophy. (shrink)

In order to consider the question of whether empire is a subject for philosophy, I do three things. I sketch an original typology of three types of state, which I call polis, imperium and cosmopolis, in order to show that the second is an important philosophical conception which lies behind the terminology of empire and imperialism. I also consider modern theories of empire and imperialism in order to indicate some of their limitations as theories. And finally I indicate (...) that it is important even for philosophers to recognise that all imperial terminology emerges out of a very complicated history in which the concept of imperium has been extended and distorted in meaning, so that, at best, any good theory of empire or imperialism can only be some sort of recapitulation of that history. Neither the second nor the third of these claims undermines the claim of imperium to be a concept of the state which is of great political and philosophical significance. (shrink)

Here we are witness to the great cultural event of the West, the emergence of a Latin philosophical language translated from the Greek. Once again, it would be necessary to make a systematic study of the formation of this technical vocabulary that, thanks to Cicero, Seneca, Tertullian, Victorinus, Calcidius, Augustine, and Boethius, would leave its mark, by way of the Middle Ages, on the birth of modern thought. Can it be hoped that one day, with current technical means, it (...) will be possible to compile a complete lexicon of the correspondences of philosophical terminology in Greek and Latin? Furthermore, lengthy commentaries would be needed, for the most interesting task would be to analyze the shifts in meaning that take place in the movement from one language to another. In the case of the ontological vocabulary the translation of ousia by substantia, for example, is justly famous and has again recently inspired some remarkable studies. This brings us once more to a phenomenon we discretely alluded to earlier with the word philosophia, and which we will encounter throughout the present discussion: the misunderstandings, shifts or losses in meaning, the reinterpretations, sometimes even to the point of misreading, that arise once tradition, translation, and exegesis coexist. So our history of the Hellenistic and Roman thought will consist above all of recognizing and analyzing the evolution of meanings and significance. Pierre Hadot holds the chair of the History of Hellenistic and Roman Thought at the Collège de France. He is the author of many books and articles on the history of ancient philosophy and theology. Among his works are Plotin et la simplicité du regard, Porphyre et Vitctorinus, Marius Victorinus: Recherches sur sa vie et ses oeuvres, and Exercises spirituels et philosophie antique. Arnold I. Davidson, executive editor of Critical Inquiry, is associate professor of philosophy and a member of the Committees on the Conceptual Foundations of Science and General Studies in the Humanities at the University of Chicago. He introduced and edited the “Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism” . He is currently working on the history of horror as it relates to the epistemology of norms and deviations. Paula Wissing, a free-lance translator and editor, has recently translated Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant’s The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks . She also contributed translations of articles by Maurice Blanchot, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Emmanuel Levinas for the “Symposium on Heidegger and Nazism.”. (shrink)

Translation of: Kritik der reinen Vernunft.

This book offers a selection of 13 case studies on how the notion of grounding helps illuminate philosophical discussions of our past with a special focus on debates of the Middle Ages. It thereby makes not only the case that the notion of grounding, which has become so widely debated in analytic metaphysics, has a long and venerable tradition, but also shows that this tradition has a lot to teach to contemporary philosophers of grounding. This is because the historical authors (...) discussed in this volume – that is, Aristotle, Fazang, Boethius, Avicenna, Abelard, Aquinas, Scotus, Ockham, Buridan, Suárez, Leibniz, and others – suggested different types of non-efficient-causal explanations which are to be carefully distinguished. This volume illustrates how philosophy and history of philosophy can be mutually illuminating by showing that the terminology developed in the contemporary debate about grounding can help reconstruct philosophical discussions from Antiquity up to the Early Modern Period, and that these very discussions enrich, and in part challenge the contemporary debate about grounding. In this vein, it is an important reading for everyone interested in the history of grounding and the philosophical insights that this history might have left to us. (shrink)

The approach adopted by Early Modern authors to the notions of ‘whole’ and ‘part’ (what is called, in contemporary metaphysics, “mereology”, from the Ancient Greek word μερος: ‘part’) constitutes a central feature of their respective systems. The issue of what constituted a whole became all the more crucial as the new, revolutionary approaches to matter and extension – which mark the unavoidably fuzzy beginning of what we define as “modernity” – demanded a novel (and in some cases, radical) approach (...) to the questions of what constitutes a whole and how parts are arranged and bound together. It is important to mention that diverse attitudes towards mereology characterised Early Modern philosophers orthogonally to their belonging to different camps, such as the traditional categories of ‘Rationalists’ and ‘Empiricists’. Some of these philosophers considered wholes to be ontologically and/or logically prior to their parts (an approach that we may call “organicist” or “holist”, applying an anachronistic but nonetheless appropriate label). Others considered wholes to be derivative, resulting from the union of their parts (an approach that could be named “mereological mechanism”). Therefore, a word about terminology is in order: in what follows, I will apply the label “holist/organicist” to refer to a philosopher who would favour the priority of wholes over parts. Vice versa, I shall label as a “mereological mechanist” any philosopher favouring the priority of parts over the wholes formed by those parts, regardless of such parts being exclusively material, or including spiritual/mental parts as well as material ones. (shrink)

A unique collection of studies, the present volume sheds new light on central themes of Ibn Taymiyya's (661/1263-728/1328) and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya's (691/1292-751/1350) thought and the relevance of their ideas to diverse Muslim societies. Investigating their positions in Islamic theology, philosophy and law, the contributions discuss a wide range of subjects, e.g. law and order; the divine compulsion of human beings; the eternity of eschatological punishment; the treatment of Sufi terminology; and the proper Islamic attitude towards Christianity. Notably, a (...) section of the book is dedicated to analyzing Ibn Taymiyya's struggle for and against reason as well as his image as a philosopher in contemporary Islamic thought. Several articles present the influential legacy of both thinkers in shaping an Islamic discourse facing the challenges of modernity. This volume will be especially useful for students and scholars of Islamic studies, philosophy, sociology, theology, and history of ideas. (shrink)

The brief response by Rui Zhu provides an interesting take on the perennial problem of what comparative philosophy is or should be. While Zhu makes some interesting observations about and suggestions for comparative philosophy, he chooses contributions to the thinking about the possibilities and methodologies of comparative philosophy that are rather old, though, and my first wonder is: why these two papers, and not more recent contributions to the development of the methodology of comparative philosophy, as can be found in (...) numerous recently published works? Such more recent publications tend to take a more nuanced approach to the idea of commensurability than the two essays from 1991, given the developments in comparative philosophy in the last twenty-five years. Zhu first discusses Rorty, and claims that Rorty's ideas amount to "a dismissal of comparative philosophy." This is where my first disagreement arises. The fact that Rorty challenges the dominant style of doing philosophy in the West seems not so much to suggest that he wants to rid us of philosophy, but to me at least can be understood as a positive development for comparative philosophy. The term 'philosophy' has been, especially in the last twenty-five years, a hot topic for thinkers who see themselves as comparative, for multiple reasons. First of all, if one defines philosophers as Rorty does, then it is indeed clear that certain thinkers from non-Western traditions would not fit that bill. This is the reason why many thinkers have a problem with the term, as it is reflective and representative of a tradition of thinking that is indeed essentialist and dualist. Thinkers from other traditions may have put less emphasis on essentialism and dualism, and for some this is a reason to exclude those thinkers from the discourse of philosophy. So I think that Rorty does not want "comparison sans philosophy," as Zhu suggests; rather he wants comparative philosophy to not be dominated by the specifically Western understanding of the term, which is a very strict and narrow understanding, and by extension Rorty thinks the specifically Western problems and terminology that have been the concern of Western philosophers throughout the history of Western philosophy, examples being 'truth' and 'rationality', may not be the best candidates when attempting to do comparative philosophy. Many comparative thinkers have argued in the last twenty-five years that such concepts or notions may be absent from other cultures, or may not have had any prominence in the thought of those cultures as they did in Western philosophy. In my view, it is a definite advancement that recent comparative philosophy is trying to step away from essentialism, the concept of 'essence' not even being prominent in other traditions such as the Chinese in the first place. This means that post-modern thinkers who have actively challenged the dominant Western tradition provide a more fruitful platform for comparison, since they display the kind of openness often lacking in the 'stricter' philosophers. Second and following up on this, using the term 'philosophy' is problematic for comparative philosophers since by the very nature of our profession we would then have to widen the scope of philosophy, which would inevitably result in disagreements about the limits and boundaries of what philosophy is in general. Yet this does not necessarily mean we need to let go of the term. There is a different understanding of 'philosopher' that may be a bit more humble than Rorty's "ascetic priest." Culture and philosophy will never be considered the same, so we should not argue that any serious contributor to a culture would automatically count as a philosopher. But instead we could easily argue for some minimum criteria that an author or thinker would need to display to count as a philosopher. One such criterion would be that the thinkers are able at least to distance themselves from their own culture. They are not purely cultural products or participants or even producers of culture, but analyze and criticize aspects of life that others take for granted. Such distancing need not be done... (shrink)

This chapter describes the logic of inductive inference as seen through the eyes of the modern theory of personal probability, including a number of its recent refinements and extensions. The structure of the chapter is as follows. After a brief discussion of mathematical probability, to establish notation and terminology, it recounts the gradual evolution of the probabilistic explication of induction from Bayes to the present. The focus is not in this history per se, but in its use to (...) highlight the key assumptions, criticisms, refinements, and achievements of that theory. Along the way, the structure of the modern theory is presented, and its relation to the problem of induction discussed. (shrink)

This admirable volume inagurates a manual series which precisely implements, neither more nor less, what its experienced Dominican writer claims: a clear introduction to Thomist philosophy. Within the classic simplicity of the manual tradition it expounds the vital first principles of metaphysical psychology without overloading the beginner with unnecessary technical difficulties, and refreshingly illustrates the lucid concentration of Thomas upon the relevant questions. Sometimes its simplicity is deceptive, since it is inspired by the traditional commentary upon the classic intellectualism, which (...) is the basis of epistemology as Thomas conceived it historically, in his developing Aristotelianism. It expounds this doctrine sensibly in its own historical right, apart from the findings of modern empirical psychology. To his own text, Père Gardeil adds a valuable selection of passages from the relevant works of St. Thomas, notably the Quaestiones Disputatae, De Anima et De Veritate, with pedagogical cross-references. Dr. Otto’s translation is unpretentiously faithful and easy for a twentieth century student unaccustomed to Scholastic terminology and method. (shrink)

This article offers an account of the philosophy of language expounded in the Cogitata de interpretatione (1692) of the Dutch philosopher Johannes De Raey (1620-1702). In this work, De Raey provided a theory of the formation and meaning language based on the metaphysics of René Descartes. De Raey distinguished between words signifying passions and sensations, ideas of the intellect, or external things. The aim of this article is to shift away the discussion of De Raey’s critique on the application of (...) the language of practical matters by Lodewijk Meijer and Spinoza, and to redirect modern interpretations to the originality of De Raey’s own reflections on the uses of language. In his linguistic thought, De Raey criticized philosophers such as Hobbes, who supposedly deprived Aristotelian terminology of any reference and meaningful use. The analysis of De Raey testifies to the emergence of the philosophy of language out of the double traditions of logic and metaphysics. It is to be interpreted as an effect of the emergence of an alternative worldview to Aristotelianism. This called for an update of the semantic catalogue of philosophy and practical disciplines. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humaneness and Justice in the Analects:On Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early ChinaHagop Sarkissian (bio)IntroductionOne of the central themes of Tao Jiang's Origins of Moral-Political Philosophy in Early China is the contestation of the values of partialist humaneness and impartialist justice across diverse thinkers and texts throughout the classical period. His departure point is the Analects, which displays a keen awareness of the difficulties in balancing these (...) opposing values. Jiang's analysis of this dynamic is skillful, filled with Sinological detail and philosophical analysis.Here, I hope to add to Jiang's discussion, focusing on two broad points. First, I suggest two different interpretations of Jiang's analysis of ren 仁 as preference for kin in the Analects, and argue that one of these interpretations is more successful than the other. Second, I argue that aligning humaneness with partiality on the one hand, and justice with impartiality on the other, may obscure some of the Analect's views on these topics, even while illuminating others. In particular, I try to argue that justice cannot be understood as consisting of impartiality alone.Humaneness and JusticeJiang provides "thin or baseline definitions" of the key values of humaneness and justice so as to "schematize … competing normative values operative in the moral-political project during the classical period while … leaving room for variations on these broad underlying values among different inherited texts and the thinkers they are attributed to" (p. 35). They are as follows:[H]umaneness is understood in this book as the … natural inclination to be partial toward those who are close to us, especially our family/kin members; justice is defined here as … our exercise of impartial judgment on the merits of persons and states of affairs, especially in lieu of articulated and publicized standards and codes, irrespective of their relations to us. In other words, humaneness is partialist in nature, whereas justice is impartialist. Humaneness is understood in relational terms, whereas justice is non-relational by contrast. More importantly, precisely because of the relational nature of humaneness, [End Page 429] agent and recipient cannot be switched or substituted, whereas in justice agent and recipient are switchable and substitutable.This framework is fruitful, allowing Jiang to draw connections across texts and thinkers, highlighting aspects of the debates that too often remain hidden from view. His detailed analyses of concepts such as xiao (filial piety), jianai (impartial care), fa (objective standards), tian (Heaven), and shu (conscientious perspective taking) show how they relate to these overarching values. The schematization works, and the book repays careful reading.There are also points, however, where the alignment of humaneness with partiality on the one hand, and justice with impartiality on the other, can lead those familiar with these texts to wonder whether the presentation has, as a result, oversimplified some complex issues. I discuss two of these in what follows.Ren and PartialityJiang claims that the concept of ren in the Analects has two components or elements to it. As he puts it,[T]he way ren is articulated by Confucius, it contains both a partialist element favoring one's family and an impartialist element when dealing with others. … To put it in terms of the central terminologies employed in this book, ren in the Analects is a comprehensive category that contains the elements of both humaneness and justice.Jiang 2021, p. 53)Jiang's analysis of ren in terms of impartiality is compelling, so I will focus on the other half of the analysis—specifically, the claim that the concept of ren itself is partialistic (or, more accurately, has a notable partialist element). This claim may surprise some readers. For example, ren has often been contrasted with the partialistic xiao (filial piety) as the more impartial, public-facing virtue in Confucianism. Indeed, this contrast has been the focus of a strenuous and strident debate in Confucian ethics in modern times (see, e.g., Guo 2007; Guo 2004; Liu 2003), and has a pedigree going at least as far back as the Hou Hanshu (Chan 2004). However, such debates span multiple texts and thinkers in the Confucian tradition. We can still ask the more pointed... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Some Suggestions about the Moral Philosophy of George Berkeley* PAUL J. OLSCAMP WHILE TRAVELLINGIN ITALYin 1716, Berkeley lost the second part of his Principles of Human Knowledge. Much later he wrote to Dr. Johnson in America, saying that he did not have the energy to do something so disagreeable as writing the same thing twice? This manuscript contained Berkeley's ethics and metaphysics, but in spite of its loss, there (...) is much to be learned about Berkeley's moral philosophy from his extant writings. Surprisingly, very little has been written about Berkeley's ethics, and what has been written usually concentrates on Passive Obedience and virtually ignores the rest of his worksY Most of the terminology now used to classify and criticize ethical theories was, of course, unknown to Berkeley. In spite of this, much of what he says may be fruitfully compared with some of the claims of modern ethicists. I shall try to show that many of his claims might have been strikingly modern, a In this paper however, I can only deal with what would now be called the normative part of Berkeley's theory, so, perhaps, it would be of some use to give a general *All references to Berkeley's writings are to the Jessop and Luee edition, The Works o] George Berkeley, Bishop o] Cloyne (9 vols.; London: Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1948). I shall abbreviate the titles of the works in this collection as follows: A/c. for A/~phron, or the Minute Ptdlosopher; DraJt for The First Dra]~ o] the Introduction to the Priuciple8 o] Human Knowledge; Principles for The Principles o] Human Knowledge; P.O. for Passive Obedience; Disc. for A Discourse to the Macistrates; T.V. for An Essay Towards a New Theory o] Vision; T.V~E. for The Theory o] Vision Vindicated and Explained; P.C. for philosophical Commentaries; Corr ]or Philosophical Correspondence; DHP for Three Dialooucs Between Hylas and Philonous. I am deeply indebted to Professor Richard T. Garner for his help in the preparation of thispaper. 1Corr., II, 282. 'The other references are: C. D. Broad, "Berkeley's Theory of Morals," Revue Internationale de Philosophie (1953); Graham P. Conroy, "Berkeley on Moral Demonstration, Journal o] the HisLory o] Ideas, XXII (1961), and Conroy's doctoral dissertation, Language and Morals in Berkeley's Philosophy (Berkeley, 1957); H. D. Aiken, "The Fate of Philosophy in the Twentieth Century," The Kenyon Review (Spring, 1962); kvrum Stroll, The Emotive Theory o] Ethics (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1954); Ernest Albee, A History o] English Utilitarianism (London: Alien & Unwin, 1901), chap. xv; I. A. Richards and C. K. Ogden, The Meaning o] Meaning (New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1923), p. 42; P. J. Olscamp, A Berlceleyan Analysis o] the Uses o] Language in Ethics, (doctoral dissertation, University of Rochester, 1962); W. V. Denard, "Berkeley's Theological Utilitarianism," Acres de XI" eongr~s internationale de philosophic, XIII (1953), 87-93; G. A. Johnston, "The Development of Berkeley's Ethical Theory," Philosophical Review, XXIV, 419-430; H. W. Orange, "Berkeley as a Moral Philosopher," Mind, XV (old series), 514-523. =The definitions of any technical terms I may use will be found in William K. Frankena, Ethies, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Foundations of Philosophy Series, 1963). [147] 148 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY outline of the main features of what I think his entire system would have been, before examining part of it in more detail. Berkeley was first and last a Christian clergyman, and he therefore believed in the existence of a personal, wise, and benevolent God whose being was relevant to our daily lives. He was convinced that the natural world provides evidence for this belief, evidence as sound as that which we have for the existence of other minds. Given that the esse of objects consists in their being perceived, that only minds are active, and that no human perceiver perceives all things at all times, it follows that a cosmic mind maintains the universe it created. Moreover, the system of nature is not random, but regular; it is, in fact, a divine language in which God makes his intentions known to us, and demonstrates his wisdom... (shrink)

Bacon is not an empiricist. His critique concerns equally sense-experience and conceptformation. He uses the term „experience” in a wider sense, closely related to „wisdom”. Bacon is not an inductionist. The falsification-principle is explicit in his philosophy. The new meaning of „induction” in Bacon implies that judgements are not mainly guided by the presence of phenomena but by their absence. Bacon is not het precursor of modern science as regards their contents. He has been, on this point, too much (...) influenced by Renaissance natural magic. Bacon anticipates, however, modern sciences with regard to their method. The central issue of his philosophy is, according to his own words, the „ars inveniendi”. In modern terminology: the context of discovery is the main objective of his new methodology. (shrink)

This book collects sixteen theses written by Professor Tang Yijie, one of the most prominent scholars of traditional Chinese philosophy. He argues that a general understanding of traditional Chinese philosophy can be achieved by a concise elaboration of its truth, goodness and beauty. He also asserts that goodness and beauty in Chinese philosophy, combined with the integration of man and heaven, knowledge and practice, scenery and feeling, reflect a pursuit of an ideal goal in traditional Chinese philosophy characterized by the (...) thought mode uniting man and nature. He also discusses the anti-traditionalism of the May Fourth Movement, explaining that the true value of "sagacity theory" in traditional Chinese philosophy, especially in Neo-Confucianism in the Song and Ming dynasties, lies in its insights into universal life. In addition, he stresses that existing ideas, issues, terminologies, concepts, and logic of Chinese philosophical thought were shaped by Western philosophy. It is necessary to be alienated from traditional status for the creation of a viable "Chinese philosophy." "Modern Chinese philosophy" in the 1930s and 1940s was comprised of scholarly work that characteristically continued rather than followed the traditional discourse of Chinese philosophy. That is to say, in the process of studying and adapting Western philosophy, Chinese philosophers transformed Chinese philosophy from traditional to modern. In Chapter 13, he puts forward the idea of a "New Axial Age." He emphasizes that the rejuvenation of Chinese culture we endeavor to pursue has to be deeply rooted in our mainstream culture with universal values incorporating cultures of other nations, especially the cultural essence of the West. (shrink)

Modern and Postmodern Cutting Edge Films closely examines a wide variety of major filmic texts that have established permanent, iconic shifts in modern and postmodern US culture and filmic practices. These films and their often visionary, trend-setting auteurs each introduced new manners of seeing that were imitated by later directors and ultimately, absorbed by popular culture itself. The primary rationale for writing this collection was quite simple: it is new and different. No anthology exists that examines the concept (...) of the cutting edge film across such a remarkably wide variety of genres and with such a diversity of theoretical approaches and subject matter. Equally important, all the contributors bring a unique voice and multi-disciplinary perspective to their respective chapters. This anthology will be of great interest to scholars from a variety of disciplines, including film studies, historical studies, and gender and genre studies. As far as possible, contributors have minimized a great deal of typical theoretical terminology so that lay readers who possess some familiarity with basic film analysis and theory can understand the text. It can be used as a classroom text in both graduate and upper-level undergraduate film classes. Modern and Postmodern Cutting Edge Films is an anthology that instructors of film theory and history can use for many years to come. Indeed, we feel that this remarkable collection of essays will itself become an indispensable, cutting edge text of film scholarship. (shrink)