Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established that the (...) cosmos is physically comprehensible. But this argument presupposes a widely accepted but untenable conception of science which I shall call standard empiricism. According to standard empiricism, in science theories are accepted solely on the basis of evidence. Choice of theory may be influenced for a time by considerations of simplicity, unity, or explanatory capacity, but not in such a way that the universe itself is permanently assumed to be simple, unified or physically comprehensible. In science, no thesis about the universe can be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Granted this view, it is clear that science cannot have established that the universe is physically comprehensible. Standard empiricism is, however, as I have indicated, untenable. Any fundamental physical theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy two criteria. It must be sufficiently empirically successful, and sufficiently unified. Given any accepted theory of physics, endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted – disunified because they assert that different dynamical laws govern the diverse phenomena to which the theory applies. These disunified rivals are not considered for a moment in physics, despite their greater empirical success. This persistent rejection of empirically more successful but disunified rival theories means, I argue, that a big, highly problematic, implicit assumption is made by science about the cosmos, to the effect, at least, that the cosmos is such that all seriously disunified theories are false. Once this point is recognized, it becomes clear, I argue, that we need a new conception of science which makes explicit, and so criticizable and improvable the big, influential, and problematic assumption that is at present implicit in physics in the persistent preference for unified theories. This conception of science, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, represents the assumption of physics in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions. As one goes up the hierarchy, the assumptions become less and less substantial, and more and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all. At each level, that assumption is accepted which best accords with the next one up, and has, associated with it the most empirically progressive research programme in physics, or holds out the greatest hope of leading to such an empirically progressive research programme. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods, low down in the hierarchy, can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. One assumption in this hierarchy of assumptions, I argue, is that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – that is, such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified theory of everything is true. Hence the conclusion: improve our ideas about the nature of science and it becomes apparent that science has already established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – in so far as science can ever establish anything theoretical. (shrink)

What are the laws of physics? -- The stuff that kicks back -- Point-of-view invariance -- Gauging the laws of physics -- Forces and broken symmetries -- Playing dice -- After the bang -- Out of the void -- The comprehensible cosmos -- Models of reality.

Most scientists would hold that science has not established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – i.e. such that there is some as-yet undiscovered true physical theory of everything that is unified. This is an empirically untestable, or metaphysical thesis. It thus lies beyond the scope of science. Only when physics has formulated a testable unified theory of everything which has been amply corroborated empirically will science be in a position to declare that it has established that the (...) cosmos is physically comprehensible. But this argument presupposes a widely accepted but untenable conception of science which I shall call standard empiricism. According to standard empiricism, in science theories are accepted solely on the basis of evidence. Choice of theory may be influenced for a time by considerations of simplicity, unity, or explanatory capacity, but not in such a way that the universe itself is permanently assumed to be simple, unified or physically comprehensible. In science, no thesis about the universe can be accepted permanently as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Granted this view, it is clear that science cannot have established that the universe is physically comprehensible. Standard empiricism is, however, as I have indicated, untenable. Any fundamental physical theory, in order to be accepted as a part of theoretical scientific knowledge, must satisfy two criteria. It must be (1) sufficiently empirically successful, and (2) sufficiently unified. Given any accepted theory of physics, endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals can always be concocted – disunified because they assert that different dynamical laws govern the diverse phenomena to which the theory applies. These disunified rivals are not considered for a moment in physics, despite their greater empirical success. This persistent rejection of empirically more successful but disunified rival theories means, I argue, that a big, highly problematic, implicit assumption is made by science about the cosmos, to the effect, at least, that the cosmos is such that all seriously disunified theories are false. Once this point is recognized, it becomes clear, I argue, that we need a new conception of science which makes explicit, and so criticizable and improvable the big, influential, and problematic assumption that is at present implicit in physics in the persistent preference for unified theories. This conception of science, which I call aim-oriented empiricism, represents the assumption of physics in the form of a hierarchy of assumptions. As one goes up the hierarchy, the assumptions become less and less substantial, and more and more nearly such that their truth is required for science, or the pursuit of knowledge, to be possible at all. At each level, that assumption is accepted which (a) best accords with the next one up, and (b) has, associated with it the most empirically progressive research programme in physics, or holds out the greatest hope of leading to such an empirically progressive research programme. In this way a framework of relatively insubstantial, unproblematic, fixed assumptions and associated methods is created, high up in the hierarchy, within which much more substantial and problematic assumptions and associated methods, low down in the hierarchy, can be changed, and indeed improved, as scientific knowledge improves. One assumption in this hierarchy of assumptions, I argue, is that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – that is, such that some yet-to-be-discovered unified theory of everything is true. Hence the conclusion: improve our ideas about the nature of science and it becomes apparent that science has already established that the cosmos is physically comprehensible – in so far as science can ever establish anything theoretical. (shrink)

The contribution is a follow-up to my textual note in Aristotelica 3 (2023) on Physics VIII 1.250b1. What is at issue is a previously neglected lectio difficilior concerning cosmic motion, i.e., εἰ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, “if it was [always] there, it will also always be”, vs. ἀεὶ ἦν καὶ ἀεὶ ἔσται, “it was there always and it will always be”. The theoretical relevance of the reading emerged more clearly in the subsequent debate: it may imply a hypothetical foundation of (...) Aristotle’s theory of the eternity of cosmic motion, hence, of the cosmos itself, and hence, of its first unmoved principle. The question is: how can this case study contribute to the evolving research field of Aristotelian textual criticism? I will provide a more comprehensive answer in ‘Aristotle’s Earliest Extant Manuscripts. New Doubts and Perspectives’ forthcoming in Aristotelica 6. (shrink)

The proposed synthesis is set within general object-theory. The underlying idea of the synthesis is that the alternative worlds semantics — arrived at in pursuit of a universal semantics (a general semantics for all languages, including relevant ones) and, connectedly, as part of a comprehensive object-theory — be applied also in fundamental physics, most importantly to the matter of the origin, history, and physical features of the cosmos, but as well, again connectedly, elsewhere, in particular in the interpretation (...) of quantum theory. The universal semantics is a many worlds — a many nonexistent worlds — theory. The point of applying such an interpretation in cosmology also is explained by way of examples, concerning the understanding of the contingency of existence and the improbability of present arrangements. A resolution of the basic question, 'Why does anything at all exist?' is sketched, leading to the further question why the fundamental constants of physics have the particular surprisingly sensitive values they appear to have. Chauvinistic answers through anthropic principles are critically rejected, in favour of resolution by way of world selection. (shrink)

The proposed synthesis is set within general object-theory. The underlying idea of the synthesis is that the alternative worlds semantics — arrived at in pursuit of a universal semantics (a general semantics for all languages, including relevant ones) and, connectedly, as part of a comprehensive object-theory — be applied also in fundamental physics, most importantly to the matter of the origin, history, and physical features of the cosmos, but as well, again connectedly, elsewhere, in particular in the interpretation (...) of quantum theory. The universal semantics is a many worlds — a many nonexistent worlds — theory. The point of applying such an interpretation in cosmology also is explained by way of examples, concerning the understanding of the contingency of existence and the improbability of present arrangements. A resolution of the basic question, 'Why does anything at all exist?' is sketched, leading to the further question why the fundamental constants of physics have the particular surprisingly sensitive values they appear to have. Chauvinistic answers through anthropic principles are critically rejected, in favour of resolution by way of world selection. (shrink)

The proposed synthesis is set within general object-theory. The underlying idea of the synthesis is that the alternative worlds semantics — arrived at in pursuit of a universal semantics (a general semantics for all languages, including relevant ones) and, connectedly, as part of a comprehensive object-theory — be applied also in fundamental physics, most importantly to the matter of the origin, history, and physical features of the cosmos, but as well, again connectedly, elsewhere, in particular in the interpretation (...) of quantum theory. The universal semantics is a many worlds — a many nonexistent worlds — theory. The point of applying such an interpretation in cosmology also is explained by way of examples, concerning the understanding of the contingency of existence and the improbability of present arrangements. A resolution of the basic question, 'Why does anything at all exist?' is sketched, leading to the further question why the fundamental constants of physics have the particular surprisingly sensitive values they appear to have. Chauvinistic answers through anthropic principles are critically rejected, in favour of resolution by way of world selection. (shrink)

The proposed synthesis is set within general object-theory. The underlying idea of the synthesis is that the alternative worlds semantics — arrived at in pursuit of a universal semantics (a general semantics for all languages, including relevant ones) and, connectedly, as part of a comprehensive object-theory — be applied also in fundamental physics, most importantly to the matter of the origin, history, and physical features of the cosmos, but as well, again connectedly, elsewhere, in particular in the interpretation (...) of quantum theory. The universal semantics is a many worlds — a many nonexistent worlds — theory. The point of applying such an interpretation in cosmology also is explained by way of examples, concerning the understanding of the contingency of existence and the improbability of present arrangements. A resolution of the basic question, 'Why does anything at all exist?' is sketched, leading to the further question why the fundamental constants of physics have the particular surprisingly sensitive values they appear to have. Chauvinistic answers through anthropic principles are critically rejected, in favour of resolution by way of world selection. (shrink)

The proposed synthesis is set within general object-theory. The underlying idea of the synthesis is that the alternative worlds semantics — arrived at in pursuit of a universal semantics (a general semantics for all languages, including relevant ones) and, connectedly, as part of a comprehensive object-theory — be applied also in fundamental physics, most importantly to the matter of the origin, history, and physical features of the cosmos, but as well, again connectedly, elsewhere, in particular in the interpretation (...) of quantum theory. The universal semantics is a many worlds — a many nonexistent worlds — theory. The point of applying such an interpretation in cosmology also is explained by way of examples, concerning the understanding of the contingency of existence and the improbability of present arrangements. A resolution of the basic question, 'Why does anything at all exist?' is sketched, leading to the further question why the fundamental constants of physics have the particular surprisingly sensitive values they appear to have. Chauvinistic answers through anthropic principles are critically rejected, in favour of resolution by way of world selection. (shrink)

How all philosophical explanations of human consciousness and the fundamental structure of the cosmos are bizarre—and why that’s a good thing Do we live inside a simulated reality or a pocket universe embedded in a larger structure about which we know virtually nothing? Is consciousness a purely physical matter, or might it require something extra, something nonphysical? According to the philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel, it’s hard to say. In The Weirdness of the World, Schwitzgebel argues that the answers to (...) these fundamental questions lie beyond our powers of comprehension. We can be certain only that the truth—whatever it is—is weird. Philosophy, he proposes, can aim to open—to reveal possibilities we had not previously appreciated—or to close, to narrow down to the one correct theory of the phenomenon in question. Schwitzgebel argues for a philosophy that opens. According to Schwitzgebel’s “Universal Bizarreness” thesis, every possible theory of the relation of mind and cosmos defies common sense. According to his complementary “Universal Dubiety” thesis, no general theory of the relationship between mind and cosmos compels rational belief. Might the United States be a conscious organism—a conscious group mind with approximately the intelligence of a rabbit? Might virtually every action we perform cause virtually every possible type of future event, echoing down through the infinite future of an infinite universe? What, if anything, is it like to be a garden snail? Schwitzgebel makes a persuasive case for the thrill of considering the most bizarre philosophical possibilities. (shrink)

The Comprehensibility of the Universe puts forward a radically new conception of science. According to the orthodox conception, scientific theories are accepted and rejected impartially with respect to evidence, no permanent assumption being made about the world independently of the evidence. Nicholas Maxwell argues that this orthodox view is untenable. He urges that in its place a new orthodoxy is needed, which sees science as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, (...) these assumptions asserting less and less as one ascends the hierarchy. This view has significant implications: that it is part of scientific knowledge that the universe is physically comprehensible; that metaphysics and philosophy are central to scientific knowledge; that science possesses a rational, if fallible, method of discovery; that a new understanding of scientific method and rationality is required. Maxwell argues that this new conception makes possible a natural resolution of long-standing philosophical problems about science, regarding simplicity, induction, and progress. His goal is the reform not just of the philosophy of science but of science itself, and the healing of the rift between the two. (shrink)

Relatively few philosophers of science today could do all of what Nicholas Maxwell does without hesitating: treat theoretical physics as indicative of all science because it is deemed fundamental, observe and expect science to exhibit a cumulative history of more and more unified knowledge, claim to solve the problem of induction, and insist that philosophy, particularly metaphysics, is crucially relevant to ongoing progress in science. Maxwell is distinctly out of fashion—this is no dappled world—but in hewing to a line he (...) has been developing for decades he presents several intriguing and intertwined proposals for understanding and continuing the progress of physics over the last three and a half centuries toward a single, true, theory of everything. (shrink)

Mathematics may seem unreasonably effective in the natural sciences, in particular in physics. In this essay, I argue that this judgment can be attributed, at least in part, to selection effects. In support of this central claim, I offer four elements. The first element is that we are creatures that evolved within this Universe, and that our pattern finding abilities are selected by this very environment. The second element is that our mathematics—although not fully constrained by the natural world—is strongly (...) inspired by our perception of it. Related to this, the third element finds fault with the usual assessment of the efficiency of mathematics: our focus on the rare successes leaves us blind to the ubiquitous failures. The fourth element is that the act of applying mathematics provides many more degrees of freedom than those internal to mathematics. This final element will be illustrated by the usage of ‘infinitesimals’ in the context of mathematics and that of physics. In 1960, Wigner wrote an article on this topic [4] and many later authors have echoed his assessment that the success of mathematics in physics is a mystery. At the end of this essay, I will revisit Wigner and three earlier replies that harmonize with my own view. I will also explore some of Einstein’s ideas that are connected to this. But first, I briefly expose my views of science and mathematics, since these form the canvass of my central claim. (shrink)

Acknowledgements -- List of illustrations -- Table of transliteration -- Introduction: Shams al-Din Samarqandi: his life and training -- Works and thought -- Science of the cosmos and the soul ('Ilm al-afaq wa al-anfus) -- Manuscripts used in preparing this edition -- Sources -- Persian and Arabic texts [1-287].

continent. 2.1 (2012): 6–21. The French philosopher and novelist Tristan Garcia was born in Toulouse in 1981. This makes him rather young to have written such an imaginative work of systematic philosophy as Forme et objet , 1 the latest entry in the MétaphysiqueS series at Presses universitaires de France. But this reference to Garcia’s youthfulness is not a form of condescension: by publishing a complete system of philosophy in the grand style, he has already done what none of us (...) in the older generation of speculative realists has done so far. His book is sophisticated, erudite, rigorous, imaginatively rich, and abundant in worldly wisdom– despite the author’s conclusion that wisdom does not exist. The quality and scope of Forme et objet took few observers by surprise, since Garcia has been treated as an emerging philosopher to watch across half a decade of Parisian oral tradition. But Garcia was not just the subject of rumor, being already well known to the French public as a writer of fiction. His debut novel, La meilleure part des hommes , 2 was awarded the 2008 Prix de Flore 3 and has already appeared in English as Hate: A Romance . 4 His follow-up novel, Mémoires de la jungle , 5 made clever use of a chimpanzee narrator. Nor was Garcia only published as a novelist before last November: his philosophical study L’Image 6 had already appeared when the author was just twenty-six, a year before he was crowned by the muses at the historic Café de Flore. And then in 2011, just months before the appearance of Forme et objet , Garcia published a widely distributed work entitled Nous, animaux et humains , 7 with its focus on Jeremy Bentham’s ideas about animals. Given this prolific and versatile track record, an optimistic scenario might envisage the young Garcia as one of those combined literary/philosophical talents who appear intermittently in France across the centuries: Jean-Paul Sartre is merely the most famous recent case. While more time is needed to see how Garcia will channel his impressive mental energies, Forme et objet displays such breadth of insight that its author has a good chance to emerge as one of the leading philosophers of his generation. If we accept Aristotle’s dictum that the peak mental age is fifty-one, then to read Garcia’s massive book is to gain some idea of what European philosophy might look like in the futuristic-sounding 2030’s. The present article is confined to Forme et objet . At 486 pages, the work is obviously daunting in size. Indeed, it is even longer than it sounds, given that many of its early sections are printed in a smaller typeface to designate them as supplemental commentary to the main flow of the argument. But while the length of the book reportedly led to delays in French publication, and will probably slow the inevitable appearance of an English translation, the length of the book should not deter interested readers– much of it results from Garcia’s teacherly writing style. Whereas Quentin Meillassoux’s prose displays an arctic economy of means, Garcia’s style is reminiscent of the repeated lessons of oral classroom proceedings. Rarely is the reader given fewer than three or four chances to master an idea before the author moves on to the next. In practice, the style feels welcoming rather than long-winded. Otherwise, the structure of Forme et objet is surprisingly simple. There is a useful Introduction of less than twenty pages. Then comes Book I: Formally , running to approximately 135 pages. Here Garcia outlines the most basic features of a thing “no matter what it is,” or n’importe quoi , an everyday phrase that Garcia shapes into a technical term. This part of the book feels at times like a more amiable version of Hegel’s Science of Logic , a parallel emphasized further by the threefold articulation of its theme: 1. Thing; 2. Thing and World; 3. Being and Understanding. This is followed by the much longer Book II: Objectively , totaling more than 300 pages. It contains sixteen essay-like meditations on specific kinds of objects—including time, animals, humans, history, gender, and death. Here each chapter rolls smoothly into the next, making this second part of the book feel more like a different work of Hegel: The Phenomenology of Spirit . But these are merely analogies. Garcia is no Hegelian, even if the book contains a few dialectical flourishes that seem to reflect his early enthusiasm for the Frankfurt School. Forme et objet ends with a six-page Coda, followed by the usual page of acknowledgments. In what follows, I will briefly summarize each of these four parts of the book before ending with some more general remarks. Before doing so, it will be useful to situate Garcia biographically (as much as I am able) and philosophically. Though Toulouse is his native city, his formative years were spent largely in Algeria, where his family has deep roots. During our sole private conversation, Garcia mentioned that his parents are professors of literature. 8 As a student of philosopher Garcia flourished so early that many of his current ideas date to his teenaged years: “There are sentences in Forme et objet that I wrote when I was seventeen,” he said in response to a question on that cold night on the Canal St.-Martin. I recalled that remark when reading his brilliant account, late in the book, of the central role of adolescence in contemporary culture. While many prodigies blow through their formal academic training without serious obstruction, Garcia’s student memories are rich in tales of isolation and struggle, though equally rich in gratitude for a half-dozen or so exceptional teachers who provided the intellectual space he needed: Meillassoux and Alain Badiou are simply two of the most prominent figures on that list. Though there are many points of agreement between Garcia’s philosophical position and my own, he not only reached his position years before reading my work, 9 he arrived along a rather different path: not through phenomenology, but via the Frankfurt School, which may be one of the reasons for his profound fascination with aesthetics. Garcia’s cultural background is as broad as one could wish: he is no less informed about punk rock and European football leagues than about the spiritualist roots of Bergson’s philosophy. Curious about everything and contemptuous towards nothing, Garcia can be expected to write insightfully on dozens of topics in the years to come. Given that his philosophy is so personally tantalizing in its agreements and disagreements with my own, and given the great internal richness of Forme et objet itself, the present review is no better than a first effort at coming to terms with the challenges posed by this minstrel from the rising generation. This is especially intriguing for older Generation X’ers like me, since confrontation with the younger generation is one of the many themes treated insightfully in Garcia’s book. 1. Introduction Garcia begins in defense of a so-called “flat ontology,” in which all things are equally things. While Roy Bhaskar 10 used this term pejoratively to refer to anti-realist philosophies that flatten everything onto an epistemic plane of human access, Manuel DeLanda 11 (an admirer of Bhaskar) reversed it into the positive principle that all realities are equally realities. Similar notions can be found in the “absistence” of Alexius Meinong, 12 the “irreduction” of Bruno Latour, 13 and my own critique 14 of the undermining/overmining pair. Also noteworthy is Levi Bryant’s use of the term “flat ontology” throughout The Democracy of Objects 15 and his earlier essay “The Ontic Principle.” 16 But for Garcia, flatness is only one face of the cosmos, and one that he ultimately declares to be rather impoverished. Even so, he always remains an advocate of a flat ontology. Insofar as everything is equally something, no matter what it is ( n’importe qui ), everything is equally a thing, equally solitary in its relation with world. This is why his book abounds in those long lists of random, ontologically equivalent entities that Ian Bogost has playfully termed “Latour Litanies.” 17 The first litany in Garcia’s book runs as follows: “We live in this world of things, where a cutting of acacia, a gene, a computer-generated image, a transplantable hand, a musical sample, a trademarked name, or a sexual service are comparable things.” (7) Yet Garcia is frankly dualistic; his flat ontology only lasts until page 159 and the end of Book I (entitled “Formally”), which deals entirely with things that are equally things. Thereafter Garcia turns his attention from things to objects, which are not flat in the least, but engage in hierarchical relations with one another. In agreement with both DeLanda and the speculative realists, Garcia proclaims that his book “proposes to put to the test a thought about things rather than a thought about our thought about things .” (8) Just as ducklings are “imprinted” (9) after hatching and treat the first creature they see as their mother, philosophers are imprinted by the idea with which they begin. Hence, philosophies that begin with human access will never truly find their way back to things. This makes Garcia rather suspicious of twentieth century philosophy, since “the twentieth century—to which in some way this work proposes to bid adieu—has been a period of theorizing modes of access to things rather than things...” (9) Among other possible benefits of the philosophy of things that Garcia proposes, it is fully able to account for thought as a special variant of things, while the reverse is not possible.(10) In Book I of Forme et objet , Garcia’s “things” are so flat, so de-determined, that he is forced to renounce some of the most basic features ascribed to things by most realists. As he tells us in his foreboding third footnote: “We will maintain that the solitude [of things] is less than unity, less than identity, and that it does not imply acceptance (any more than refusal) of the principle of non-contradiction.” (11) In a contemporary world cluttered with too many things, Garcia’s flat and formal plane provides us with some breathing room: “The formal plan of thought enables or re-enables us to cut short all accumulation—whether of knowing, experience, or action—by a simplicity, an impoverished surface...” (13) As Garcia says elsewhere in responding to a Deleuzian critic of the book, his starting point in flat ontology is designed to obstruct the claims of both analytic philosophy and Hegelianism: “Hence, this work seeks to protect each thing—real, imaginary, inconsistent, contradictory—both against Ockham’s Razor and against the Aufhebung or dialectical process.” 18 Yet contrary to the equalizing spirit of many flat ontologies, “we will add to our formal ontology of the equal, an objective ontology of the unequal.” (13) But initially, Garcia joins all flat ontologists in holding that everything is irreducible: “this irreducibility, which we will term the ‘chance’ of each thing... also marks the refusal of a positive thought that reduces things exclusively to natural things, or social things, or historical things, etc.” (15) This irreducible “chance” of a thing emerges as an important technical term in the book, always paired with its inverted brother, the “price to pay” ( prix à payer ). On pages 17-19, we find the only diagrams in the book. What they illustrate is that Garcia wishes to avoid two equally dangerous extremes. The first is the philosophy of substance, featuring the thing-in-itself as a mighty river fed by attributes as if by subordinate tributary streams. This model can be found in many of the classic thinkers of West and East alike. In it, “there is obviously a hierarchization between that which is dragged towards something other than itself, and this other which serves it as an ontological support while supporting its proper being.” (16) For Garcia, the second extreme worth avoiding is the philosophy of events: “One thus conceives trajectories of being, identified as events, facts, powers, intensities, or intentionality. These vectors of being come first, bearing and supporting being, displacing it, but without ever finding a stopping point, a buffer, an objective consistency.” (17) The first model gives us a thing too wrapped up in itself, too compact . This word “compact” (the French and the English are the same) is another technical term for Garcia. But if the “compact” model of things leads us to something more than things, the philosophy of events gives us less than things, by dissolving them into a play of vectors. Garcia’s alternative lies midway between these two extremes: Being enters the thing, being comes out of it. And a thing is nothing other than the difference between the enters and the being that comes out. Thus, the circuit of being is never halted. In the thing, there is never the thing-in-itself. And the thing is never in-itself, but outside of itself. Nonetheless, being is not eventally “pollinated” by vectors: it possesses an objecting halting-point... (19) This single idea is the key to Garcia’s book: the thing is neither a self-contained durable lump nor some sort of evental flux. Instead, the thing is the difference between its various components and its relations with its environment. Or stated differently: “the price to pay for this disposition is a circulation of being that systematically distinguishes two senses of things: that which is in the thing , and that in which the thing is , or that which encompasses it and that which it encompasses,” (19) translating comprendre here as “encompass.” 19 In a beautiful description of a piece of black slate, Garcia sums up the various minerals, qualities, and shapes that compose [ comprend ] it, and calls them “that which is in the thing,” (20) noting that this tells us nothing about “that in which [the slate] is”—namely, all the various situations in which the black slate can be found. Instead, the slate is the difference between these two: the most characteristic principle of Garcia’s philosophy. 2. Formally Book One of Forme et objet , “Formally,” is concerned with the formal equality of all things in a flat world. “Two questions mark the boundaries of reflection: of what is everything composed [ composé ], and: what do all things compose?” (27) Looking downward, we wish to know what everything is made of; looking upward, we want to know the ultimate result of the combination of all things. Here we must turn our attention to the thing n’importe quoi— no matter what it is. (30) Anything with finite qualities is obviously too specific to be relevant to global ontological questions. To an equal degree, something possessing all qualities (think of Whitehead’s God) 20 would not be n’importe quoi either, since it would still be too definite, even if incredibly vast. The same holds for contradictions, since these all differ from each other. The square circle, the non-white black white, and the non-city city are all too distinct to count as the thing no matter what it is. The n’importe quoi must be devoid of all specific qualities, including contradictory ones. In one of the more intriguing points in his book, so reminiscent of Meinong, Garcia proclaims that “the ‘no matter what it is’ is neither a reality nor an abstract construction, nor both of these at once; the ‘no matter what it is’ is simply the plane of equality of that which is real, that which is possible, that which is inexistent, that which is past, that which is impossible, that which is true, that which is false, that which is bad.”(39-40) Since everything has two faces, it would be a grievous mistake to focus on just one of them at the expense of the other, as physicalism or materialism do when reducing the world to minuscule physical underpinnings. For scientistic materialism, “it is either atoms, particles, or fields of force... which are the things.” (47-48) Moreover, “these more-than-things are accompanied by less-than-things: for example, ideas or facts of consciousness are determined by the state of matter and are not autonomous things, but manifestations reduced to secondary effects of material processes...” (48) On this point, Garcia’s position is in complete accord with my own critique of undermining and overmining. 21 Where we disagree is that Garcia is more deeply suspicious of the notion of substance, which I view as salvageable with a few needed changes, while Garcia sees this operation as hopeless: “A substance, in the history of philosophy, is the more-than-thing par excellence.” (51) Another agreement between our positions is visible when Garcia claims (correctly, in my opinion) “that it is vain to distinguish between things which are material and those which are not.” (52) Yet we also find an even more important disagreement, since for Garcia withdrawal cannot be the quality of a thing. Instead, the absence of a thing is simultaneous with it, embodied in all that is not it– the absence of the sculpture of a woman is to be found in the mold that appears at the same time as it, and thus withdrawal must be viewed as an “event” rather than as something pertaining to an object. For Garcia, nothing withdraws beyond access. Since we must distinguish between “that which is something” and “that which something is,” and since the former is identified with “no matter what it is is” and the latter with “ not no matter what it is,” we can say that “everything is thus a milieu, a fragile link between ‘no matter what it is’ and ‘ not no matter what it is.’” (62) And here we find Garcia’s critique of the thing-in-itself: “A thing is never defined en bloc . We can affirm that a thing is this or that, but that does not suffice. It is still necessary to state precisely that which is this thing .” (62) Stated differently, “something is not in itself : for that which is in the thing is not the thing, and that in which the thing is is not the thing.” (62) And here Garcia and I, facing the same evidence, draw opposite conclusions. For me, the fact that nothing can be identified with either its components or its concrete location means that the thing must be something in-itself distinct from both of these. Yet for Garcia, to be in-itself would mean to be identified with just one of these two extreme terms, and hence the thing can only be the difference between them. Garcia is equally suspicious of the classical tendency to view “unity” as a property of the thing, since in his eyes unity is too relational a property to belong to things. (65) While specific things are situated determinately with respect to other things, we are still speaking here about the thing no matter what it is, and this can be viewed only in terms of solitude, which all things share: a human being, a hand, or a chair or all equally things insofar as they are on their own , not insofar as they are one . (64) A thing is alone, and relates only to the one thing that is not another thing: world. In a striking parallel to my own argument for a partial revival of occasionalism, Garcia tells us that “the things communicate only by their solitude: it is because everything is equally on its own in the world that things can be together, enmeshed in one another.” (67) Alone in their solitude, things all relate to world, which serves as a mediator allowing them to become mixed up in one another. As we have seen, one reason that nothing can be in itself is because everything is in something else. For Garcia, “to be in something and to be something are equivalent.” (69) Stated more broadly, “being is thus the difference between the two aspects of each thing: that which is it, and that which it is.” (70) And even more vividly: “a thing is almost like a sack: there is that which one puts in the sack and that which remains outside the sack.” (70) But not quite like a sack, “since a thing is not a thin skin or film. Instead, a thing is comparable to a sack that is immaterial and without thickness: it is nothing other than the difference between that which is this thing and that which thing is, between content and container.” (71) Nothing can be in-itself because everything is two selves at once. For example, we cannot say that our self is defined by our consciousness: “Everything has a self because nothing is in itself. The self is not the quality of that which is related to itself (which is conscious, for example) or which thinks itself related to itself. Nonetheless, for an entity called ‘conscious’ to be related to itself, it is necessary that this very relation should be another thing than the self to which it is related.” (71) Consciousness cannot be the self, precisely because it is other than that of which it is conscious. Nothing is able to grasp itself. The self is “the function by which being and composition [ compréhension ] are mutually excluded...” (72) The self is “the point of shadow of everything that projects some light...” (72) The in-itself faces two opposite dangers: “For something to be in-itself is to be a self. Something which is a self flies out through one of its two sides... Stated differently, being in-itself is simply the possibility of a double failure.” (73) The in-itself can be termed compact : “There remains to us a means of thinking that which does not fully enter into the world, though without exiting from it. This means is what we call the compact.” (76) In a sense, the compact is the opposite of the world. For in the case of the world, everything enters it and it enters nothing; as for the compact, it enters the world (since it is something, after all) while nothing enters it. (77) The compact marks the presence of the impossible in the world. (78) It is not impossible, but possible only on the condition that it fails. (78) The time has come to speak of where a thing is located. “The sole condition of a thing is that of being in another thing than itself, and thus in another thing than something.” (78) A condition is “that which determines something, that which forms something, that in which something is.” (78) As for humans, “the condition of someone is his situation; my social condition is that which socially determines me, my place and my function...” (79) More generally, “to be conditioned is to find oneself reduced to that in which one is.” (79) Everything is conditioned, but nothing is reducible to this condition. To determine the condition of something is to determine in what it is. A thing is located in that which contradicts it, just as a statue exists in its mold, which is precisely that which it is not. Since the thing is finite and definite, its condition or form must be infinite and indefinite. That in which all things are is the world, which Garcia also terms “the whole.” (81) “To try to be in-itself is to attempt to remain outside the world. And indeed, to try to be in-itself is only a path of entry into the world.” (83) For Garcia, “the world is not the pre-existent container of the things it contains, a priori , nor the construction by the mind of a fictional ensemble of all things, a posteriori .” (85) Instead, the world is simultaneous with all things; the two always go together. The world cannot be a determinate world, such as the physical universe or mathematical space, since these are already too specific and limited. “Every determinate world, which is in fact a universe , is a ‘big thing’ [ grosse chose ]: it is a set, however vast, of composite things which itself embodies a thing.” (85) Every determinate world is really just a “big thing.” Stated differently, “it is nothing other than a balanced milieu between the things that compose it and the thing that it composes.” (85) We generally picture the world as a physical univer. (shrink)

Intuitively, the totality of physical reality—the Cosmos—has a beginning only if (i) all parts of the Cosmos agree on the direction of time (the Direction Condition) and (ii) there is a boundary to the past of all non-initial spacetime points such that there are no spacetime points to the past of the boundary (the Boundary Condition). Following a distinction previously introduced by J. Brian Pitts, the Boundary Condition can be conceived of in two distinct ways: either topologically, (...) i.e., in terms of a closed boundary, or metrically, i.e., in terms of the Cosmos having a finite past. This article proposes that the Boundary Condition should be posed disjunctively, modifies and improves upon the metrical conception of the Cosmos’s beginning in light of a series of surprising yet simple thought experiments, and suggests that the Direction and Boundary Conditions should be thought of as more fundamental to the concept of the Cosmos’s beginning than classical Big Bang cosmology. (shrink)

Paradigm-shifts, termed scientific revolutions, occur periodically in the course of science's development The twentieth century witnessed a number of revolutions, first by Albert Einstein and then by Niels Bohr in physics, and subsequently in biology, cosmology and, through the pioneering work of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, in the transdisciplinary area that includes human mind and consciousness. But scientific development did not come to a standstill: while the spirit of Einstein and Teilhard is as present as ever, their specific theories are (...) subject to the dynamics of theory development through periods of "normal" and "revolutionary" science. Today another revolution is about to occur, bringing science to the threshold of a more comprehensive and integrated account of the observed phenomena. The currently emerging transdisciplinary unified theory is consistent with the goals and vision of both Albert Einstein and Teilhard de Chardin. It penetrates deeper into the domains of reality than the 20th century's mainstream physical, biological and psychological theories did -below the level of the quanta that populate space-time, to the quantum vacuum, better termed cosmic plenum, that generates the quanta and interconnects them throughout space and time. In the twentieth century Einstein's general relativity gave us the relativistically interlinked universe, where all things are connected by signals propagating across the geometric structure of space-time, and Teilhard de Chardin laid the foundations of a unified theory where life and mind emerge consistently out of the physical world. In the twenty-first century transdisciplinary unified theory will extend these conceptions and give us the coherent universe, where all things are intrinsically connected by a fundamental information and virtual-energy field at a fundamental level of physical reality. /// A mudança de paradigmas, a que frequentemente damos o nome de revoluções científicas, ocorrem periodicamente no decurso da evolução científica. O século XX testemunhou uma importante série de revoluções científicas, primeiro por Albert Einstein e depois por Niels Bohr no âmbito da física, e subsequentemente em biologia, cosmo-logia e, graças ao trabalho pioneiro de Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, na área transdisci-plinar que inclui os fenómenos da mente humana e da consciência. Mas o desenvolvimento científico não estagnou: enquanto que o espírito de Albert Einstein e de Teilhard de Chardin continua certamente presente, a verdade é que as suas teorias têm-se necessariamente submetido à dinâmica própria do desenvolvimento das teorias, o que acontece ao longo de períodos de ciência ditos "normais" quer "revolucionários". Segundo o autor do artigo, a humanidade está hoje a ponto de assistir a uma nova revolução, a qual colocará a ciência no limiar de produzir uma narrativa mais compreensiva e integrada dos fenómenos observados. Nesse sentido, a teoria transdisciplinar unificada é perfeitamente consistente com os objectivos e a visão tanto de Albert Einstein como de Teilhard de Chardin. Com efeito, esta teoria penetra mais fundo nos domínios da realidade do que as teorias mais comuns que o século XX produziu seja no domínio da física, da biologia ou da psicologia — passando do domínio dos quanta que povoam o espaço-tempo, para o quantum vacuum, mais precisamente designado plenum cósmico que gera os quanta e os interconecta através do espaço-tempo. No século XX, a teoria da relatividade generalizada de Einstein deu-nos um universo relativisticamente interconectado, no qual todas as coisas estão conectadas por sinais que se propagam através da estrutura geométrica do espaço-tempo. Por seu lado, Teilhard de Chardin lançou os fundamentos de uma teoria unificada em que os fenómenos da vida e da consciência emergem consistentemente do mundo físico. Agora, no século XXI, diz o autor do artigo, a teoria transdisciplinar unificada destina-se a alargar o âmbito destas concepções geniais de modo a dar-nos um universo coerente em que todas as coisas estão intrinsecamente conectadas por uma informação fundamental e um campo energético virtual ao nível mais profundo da realidade física. (shrink)

This book provides an introduction to Newtonian and relativistic mechanics. Unlike other books on the topic, which generally take a 'top-down' approach, it follows a novel system to show how the concepts of the 'science of motion' evolved through a veritable jungle of intermediate ideas and concepts. Starting with Aristotelian philosophy, the text gradually unravels how the human mind slowly progressed towards the fundamental ideas of inertia physics. The concepts that now appear so obvious to even a high school student (...) took great intellectuals more than a millennium to clarify. The book explores the evolution of these concepts through the history of science. After a comprehensive overview of the discovery of dynamics, it explores fundamental issues of the properties of space and time and their relation with the laws of motion. It also explores the concepts of spatio-temporal locality and fields, and offers a philosophical discussion of relative motion versus absolute motion, as well as the concept of an absolute space. Furthermore, it presents Galilean transformation and the principle of relativity, inadequacy of Galilean relativity and emergence of the spatial theory of relativity with an emphasis on physical understanding, as well as the debate over relative motion versus absolute motion and Mach's principle followed by the principle of equivalence. The natural follow-on to this section is the physical foundations of general theory of relativity. Lastly, the book ends with some new issues and possibilities regarding further modifications of the laws of motion leading to the solution of a number of fundamental issues closely connected with the characteristics of the cosmos. It is a valuable resource for undergraduate students of physics, engineering, mathematics, and related disciplines. It is also suitable for interdisciplinary coursework and introductory reading outside the classroom. (shrink)

This volume of Proclus' commentary on Plato's Timaeus records Proclus' exegesis of Timaeus 27a–31b, in which Plato first discusses preliminary matters that precede his account of the creation of the universe, and then moves to the account of the creation of the universe as a totality. For Proclus this text is a grand opportunity to reflect on the nature of causation as it relates to the physical reality of our cosmos. The commentary deals with many subjects that have (...) been of central interest to philosophers from Plato's time onwards, such as the question whether the cosmos was created in time, and the nature of evil as it relates to physical reality and its ontological imperfection. (shrink)

From the cutting edge of science and living spirituality: a guide to understanding our identity and purpose in the world • Outlines the new understanding of matter and mind coming to light at the cutting edge of physics and consciousness research • Explains how we can evolve consciously, become connected with each other, and flourish on this planet • Includes contributions from Maria Sagi, Kingsley L. Dennis, Emanuel Kuntzelman, Dawna Jones, Shamik Desai, Garry Jacobs, and John R. Audette For the (...) outdated mainstream paradigm the world is a giant mechanism functioning in accordance with known and knowable laws and regularities. The new paradigm emerging in science offers a different concept: The world is an interconnected, coherent whole, and it is informed by a cosmic intelligence. This is not a finite, mechanistic-material world. It is a consciousness-infused whole-system world. We are conscious beings who emerge and co-evolve as complex, cosmic-intelligence in-formed vibrations in the Akashic Field of the universe. Ervin Laszlo and his collaborators from the forefront of science, cosmology, and spirituality show how the re-discovery of who we are and why we are here integrates seamlessly with the wisdom traditions as well as with the new emerging worldview in the sciences, revealing a way forward for humanity on this planet. They explain how we have reached a point of critical incoherence and tell us that to save ourselves, our environment, and society, we need a critical mass of people to consciously evolve a new thinking. Offering a guidepost to orient this evolution, Laszlo examines the nature of consciousness in the universe, showing how our bodies and minds act as transmitters of consciousness from the intelligence of the cosmos and how understanding science’s new concept of the world enables us to re-discover our identity and our purpose in our world. With bold vision and forward thinking, Laszlo and his contributors Maria Sagi, Kingsley L. Dennis, Emanuel Kuntzelman, Dawna Jones, Shamik Desai, Garry Jacobs, and John R. Audette outline the new idea of the world and of ourselves in the world. They help us discover how we can overcome these divisive times and blossom into a new era of peace, coherence, connection, and global wellbeing. (shrink)

The review introduces readers to a new monograph by the Norwegian historian of philosophy T.T. Tollefsen. In the new book, the author summarizes his many years of research into the legacy of St. Maximus the Confessor, one of the most important and sophisticated Byzantine thinkers. The metaphysics of St. Maximus is described as a large philosophical system, as coherent and rational as other systems of late Antiquity. Its distinctive feature is its emphasized dynamism, which consists in the movement of the (...) entire sensual and intelligible cosmos towards the goal of comprehensive actualization and deification. Tollefsen describes the philosophical system of Maximus the Confessor in the following topics: epistemology, the doctrine of creation, the doctrine of logoi, divine activity (energy), the problem of universals, and the question of Incarnation and deification. In addition, the scholar makes an attempt to apply the metaphysics of St. Maximus to the philosophical problems of our time. (shrink)

A thorough interpretation of the ideological structure of the recently unearthed Daoist text Hengxian 恒先 has not yet been achieved, and a few doubtful and difficult points still remain to be discussed. Based on the concepts of “ hengxian ”, “ Qi ”, “the Field”, “beginning”, “movement”, “spontaneity”, and “name”, this paper comprehensively discusses the text of Hengxian with respect to the primordial state of the cosmos, the evolution of the cosmos, the production and existence of Heaven, Earth, (...) and the myriad things, and the measure of human behaviors in a society. It further addresses why the word “Dao” does not appear in Hengxian , why it contains a theory of production instead of an ontology, and what is meant by a series of special concepts including “the Field” and “ wuxian 物先 (the state before the myriad things)”. (shrink)

A sweeping history of humanity's evolving vision of the universe, as viewed through the writings of the most exceptional thinkers in history.

This dissertation shows that Proclus provides a consistent reading of Plato's late dialogues, and develops a three level ontology which stands on its own. By augmenting the reserve of Platonist philosophy with Post Platonic developments of Greek mathematics and astronomy and physics, at points where Platonism ceased to provide operating principles, Proclus, reached for formulations which went beyond Plato. His own metaphysics, though sometimes obscured by theurgic allusions, grounds Being in an infinite One. ;One of the problems that Proclus attempts (...) to solve through the posit of three infinities, is that an iterative potential infinity, seen in the interval structure of the physical world, could divide to oblivion if uncolonized by Principle. The 'One Being', which brings Limit and noetic sameness, is itself entrapped in Self Reflexivity. An infinity of a third kind, one beyond all Limit and Unlimit is posed to solve this problem. This is Proclus' NeoPlatonic solution to the fact that Being alone, albeit under the rule of intellect, cannot guarantee itself. ;Platonism assumes a "universe" i.e. One grounding Many, which predetermines the place of all structure. $\rm A\nu\lambda o\gamma\iota\alpha$ is a principle of substitution which governs the visible cosmos and makes it comprehensible by mathematical formulations. Plato's emphasis on the self same as the epitome of Being, with circularity as the highest form for thought, helps Proclus provide a consistent account of: Creation ; Infinity as a Simultaneous Whole ; Soul and Nous, Dialectic is valorized over other forms of thought as most like $$ the eternal truth and a means to assimilation. Procession and reversion forms a circle which demonstrates a metaphysical successor of cosmic revolutions found to exist as the heavenly bodies carry out their noetic patterns. ;Finally Eternity encapsulates Time; but again its infinite circularity is only recouped by a One beyond all Limit which can carry out the Providence of a final cause. (shrink)

In this paper I argue for a priori conjectural scientific knowledge about the world. Physics persistently only accepts unified theories, even though endlessly many empirically more successful disunified rivals are always available. This persistent preference for unified theories, against empirical considerations, means that physics makes a substantial, persistent metaphysical assumption, to the effect that the universe has a (more or less) unified dynamic structure. In order to clarify what this assumption amounts to, I solve the problem of what it means (...) to say of a theory that it is unified. There are, I argue, eight different kinds of unity important in theoretical physics, all varieties of one basic idea. This provides us with a precise way of partially ordering physical theories with respect to their degree of unity. It also leads to a hierarchical view of physics, according to which physics makes a number of increasingly insubstantial metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe. Two of these are identified as constituting a priori conjectures. I conclude by arguing that the view developed in the paper resolves the traditional clash between empiricism and rationalism in the philosophy of science, and has important implications for science, and for academic inquiry more generally. (shrink)

Contemporary physics and cosmology have accumulated a great deal of empirical evidence for the claim that in order for our universe to contain life, an array of incredibly precise laws, constants, and specific initial conditions had to be in place. The minuscule odds of this happening purely by chance have prompted some Christian thinkers to suggest that this can be seen as novel evidence that the universe was fine-tuned specifically to give rise to biological life. And yet some Christian thinkers (...) also wish to make the case that molecular biology provides new evidence to the effect that life could not have arisen naturally in our universe, but rather that the origin of life required additional special divine intervention. There is at least a prima facie tension between these two ideas. Relatedly, some have raised the question of why, if the universe were fine-tuned for life, it was also set up in such a way that the origin of life was preceded by more than 10 billion years of lifelessness. If life was the whole point, why the seeming delay? In this paper I suggest a way Christian thinkers might address both issues: namely, the cosmos was not fine-tuned for life, but merely for the possibility of life. Perhaps God wanted a universe in which biological organisms were possible but in which their non-existence was also a live possibility. I develop this solution in dialogue with related ideas arising from the demonologies of St. Augustine, Boethius, and St. Anselm. (shrink)

Everything is Something is a book about Stoic metaphysics. It argues that the Stoics are best understood as forging a bold new path between materialism and idealism, a path best characterized as non-reductive physicalism. To be sure, only individual bodies exist for the Stoics, but not everything there is exists — some things are said to subsist. However, this is no Meinongian move beyond existence, to the philosophy of intentionality (as the language of subsistence might suggest), but a one-world metaphysics (...) that both counts its entities by logical criteria, and grounds them in body by physical principles, yielding a tightly ordered ontology in which everything is Something and nothing is not. -/- This last phrase is not innocent. It invokes the Stoic innovation of Something (ti) as the highest genus of reality, and takes the stand that it is not only principled and coherent, but comprehensive — anything that is not Something is nothing at all (for the initiated: there is no class of Not-Somethings between Something and nothing). Further, everything that is Something is either itself a body, or ontologically dependent on body. Herein lies the Stoics’ non-reductive physicalism, and the beating heart of their response to the Battle of Gods and Giants in Plato’s Sophist: a one-world metaphysics. -/- The foundation of Stoic metaphysics is their ground-breaking corporealism, which introduces an alternative to both atomism and hylomorphism. The Stoics are continuum physicists for whom body as such, i.e. solid, three-dimensional extension, is homogeneous, partless, uniform, and infinitely divisible without reaching minima (atoms). And because body is not conceived along hylomorphic lines, i.e. as a composite of matter and form, the Stoics are free to make body fundamental. Out of two basic bodies, then (the archai), and by the tantalizing mechanism of through and through blending (krasis di’ holou), Stoic physics constructs the cosmos (and every body it contains) in completely corporealist terms, composing one thing out of many. And once those bodies are built, Stoic logic gives an account of their identity conditions, kinds, and qualities according to the vexed schema of the Categories, making now many out of one by the constitution relation, as a statue is constituted by its clay. With these distinct mereological relations of composition and constitution, Stoic corporealism artfully divides the labor of Plato’s Forms between physics and logic. -/- Next in the ontological order, with bodies as their foundation, are the incorporeals (asōmata): space (place, room, and surface), time, void, and the (awkwardly named) sayables, or lekta (roughly, though controversially, the meanings of our words). These entities do not exist; they do, however, subsist, inheriting their physical properties and, hence, their subsistence, from the bodies on which they depend. For example, place depends for its three-dimensional (non-solid) extension on the bodies that occupy or delimit it. The ontological dependence of space, time, and their novel semantic entities (the lekta) on body, is what takes Stoic metaphysics beyond corporealism to non-reductive physicalism, beyond a merely sorted ontology to an ordered, one-world metaphysics. Each incorporeal counts as Something according to the Stoic criterion for subsistence (hence, the theory is non-reductive), and what they have in common as incorporeals (and what makes the account physicalist), is their dependence on underlying body. -/- In addition to the incorporeals, the Stoics also recognize the subsistence of things like creatures of fiction and geometrical limits, which they classify as neither corporeal nor incorporeal. What these entities have in common is that they are products of thought; and since thoughts are themselves bodies according to Stoic corporealism, this remains a physicalist account. As before, the account is not Meinongian; neither all objects of thought, nor all products of thought count as Something. Indeed, the Stoics’ eliminative treatment of universals (and Forms) turns on their denying concepts (ennoēmata) a place on the ontological map altogether — concepts are simply not Somethings (and, again, not some further category of Not-Somethings, intermediate between Something and nothing at all). If all this is right, then the Stoics are not flat-footed materialists or ersatz Platonists, as so often assumed, but our first non-reductive physicalists. (shrink)

As humanity continues to consume planetary resources at an unsustainable rate, we require not only new and renewable forms of energy but also new ways of understanding energy itself. Clayton Crockett offers an innovative philosophy of energy that cuts across a number of leading-edge disciplines. Drawing from contemporary philosophies of New Materialism, non-Western traditions, and the sciences, he develops a comprehensive vision of energy as a material process spanning physics, biology, politics, ecology, and religion. Crockett argues that change is foundational (...) to material reality, which is ceaselessly self-organizing. We can observe energy’s effects in the operations of natural selection as well as those at work in human societies. Matter and energy are not an oppositional binary; rather, they are expressions of how change functions in the universe. Ultimately, Crockett argues, we can conceive of God neither as a deity nor as a being but as the principle of change. Informed by cutting-edge theoretical discourses in thermodynamics, science studies, energy humanities, systems theory, continental philosophy, and radical theology, Energy and Change draws on theorists such as Gilles Deleuze, Catherine Malabou, Slavoj Žižek, Karen Barad, Bruno Latour, and Kojin Karatani as well as ideas about spirituality, society, and nature from Amerindian, Vodou, and Neo-Confucian traditions. A foundational work in New Materialist philosophy of religion, this book offers compelling new insights into the structure of the cosmos and our place in it. (shrink)

As one of the earliest Western physics teachers, Richard Rufus of Cornwall helped transform Western natural philosophy in the 13th century. But despite the importance of Rufus's works, they were effectively lost for 500 years, and the Physics commentary is the first complete work of his ever to be printed. Rufus taught at the Universities of Paris and Oxford from 1231 to 1256, at the very time when exposure to Aristotle's ibri naturales was revolutionizing the academic curriculum; indeed Rufus gave (...) the earliest surviving lectures on physics and metaphysics. Rufus not only expounded the views of Aristotle and the commentator Averroes, but he also challenged them, and this lively discussion proved to be enormously influential. Rufus rejected Aristotle's theory of projectile motion, and this rival view was later adopted by Franciscus de Marchia. His revised account of the place of the heavens was taken up by Roger Bacon and Thomas Aquinas; and his defence of creation, still considered a cogent reply to Aristotle's claims for a beginningless universe, was to be embraced by both Bacon and Bonaventure. Professor Wood's meticulous edition sheds light on that Crucial period when the medieval West for the first time acquired a comprehensive scientific account of the cosmos. (shrink)

Does the fact that everything has a cause imply that all events are causally determined? Drawing on discussions from the history of philosophy, John Burbidge's Cause for Thought captures the diverse dynamics found in physics, chemistry, biology, animal psychology, and rational action. At each level, forms of activity emerge that cannot be reduced to the functioning of simpler, more elementary components. By exploring the logic of what happens when two causal conditions reciprocally interact, Burbidge develops a concept of complex cause (...) in which an agent generates effects not simply because of the action of its constituent components, but also because of the way those components mutually supplement and reinforce one another. By extending this to the interaction of agents with their environment, Burbidge throws light on the structure of organisms, on the distinctive contributions of consciousness and rationality, and on the quest for a comprehensive explanation of the cosmos. Recovering the force and legitimacy of metaphysical inquiry by focusing on the concept of cause and causality, Cause for Thought offers a new way of understanding natural processes, the role of consciousness and free will, and the significance of rational explanation. (shrink)

Examining in detail Aristotle's treatment of physical, cosmological, chemical, and meteorological questions, this learned study compares his arguments and conclusions with those of his precursors in order to assess his debt to them and at the same time to show clearly the nature of his own new contributions to the body of scientific thought. It also examines the interrelations of the major topics included in Aristotle's scientific work and the relations between his theology and his science. Describing his work (...) as "a study in continuity and transformation," Friedrich Solmsen writes, "The scientific endeavors of the Presocratics have a sequel.... Aristotle did not discover the subjects with which he deals in his physical treatises. In the questions which he takes up he is neither as free nor as arbitrary as some students of his thought appear to believe, and in the answers which he provides he is not as invariably original as he himself in the course of his arguments may lead us to think." With constant reference to its historical antecedents, Aristotle's system of movement is analyzed and studied, as are his doctrines regarding time, place, matter, and the infinite. In connection with his concept of cosmic order, special consideration is given to the relation between the lower (sublunary) and the upper (celestial) Cosmos in his scheme. Solmsen's mastery of the relevant texts (not only Aristotelian, but also Platonic, Presocratic, and Epicurean) is evident on every page. (shrink)

All parts of Heraclitus’ cosmos are simultaneously living and dying. Its constituent stuffs (“biomasses”) cycle endlessly through physical changes in sweeping patterns (“biorhythms”) that are reflected in the dynamic rhythms of Heraclitus’ own thought and language. These natural processes are best examined at a more-than-human level that exceeds individuation, stable identity, rational comprehension, and linguistic capture. B62 (“mortals immortals”), one of Heraclitus’ most perplexing fragments, models these processes in a spectacular fashion: it describes the imbrication not only of (...) humans and gods but of cosmic masses more generally, and its language mimics the natural relations that it names, or rather intimates through its grammatical and syntactical indeterminacy. The remaining fragments amplify the uncertainties and the exhilarations of Heraclitus’ worldview along the same lines. His approach to nature raises urgent questions about how human beings fit into the cosmos, not least by challenging our intuitive conceptions of life and death, our material makeup, and our entanglements with our natural surroundings. In doing so, he provides vital lessons for contemporary ecological awareness, and proves to be an unexpected ally. (shrink)

A realistic study of man’s primary di­mensions and roles that breaches custo­mary bounds to the consideration of man to draw closer to the quintessence of man than ever before. Paul Weiss moves beyond the point where psychologists, psychiatrists, ethi­cists, and physiologists usually stop to make evident how man is at once pri­vate and public, with an I, a me, native rights, and responsibility, able to be and to function together with others in so­ciety and in the cosmos. He examines (...) the you we come to know as we confront other men, show­ing this to be both accountable and re­sponsible, with distinctive values and powers, maintained from within and ap­proached from without. You is con­trasted and compared with the me, what is publicly available to each alone, known and sustained by a radically private I. In opposition to contemporary thought, Weiss shows that I has a being, nature, and power of its own, able to make use of the self and mind, and to sustain the you and the me. These explorations pre­pare the way for a novel examination of different types of we—those that govern men, those with which they interplay, and those that, together with them, con­stitute the groups, societies, and states in which men live together. His final section deals with the dif­ference and relations between the they and the others in which he provides a fresh examination of the way men and their lived-in bodies both stand apart from and fit in the cosmos. In discussing these pivotal notions he extends our comprehension of such central topics as the difference between freedom and lib­erty, the nature of self-consciousness, the rights of the subhuman, the nature of the physical world, abortion, behav­iorism, mental health, biography, fic­tion, and the differences between men, animals, and things. (shrink)

This paper presents a unified theory of reality, which integrates two interdependent frameworks: Cellular Primary Consciousness Theory (CPCT) and Open and Closed Systems Theory (OCST). Although CPCT and OCST can each stand as individual theories, they are, in this work, combined to form a cohesive explanation of both the mechanics and purpose of the universe. CPCT posits that consciousness is a fundamental aspect of all life, extending to even the simplest cells, rather than being an emergent property exclusive to complex (...) neural systems. Drawing upon evidence from quantum mechanics, cell biology, and systems theory, CPCT challenges traditional views on the origins of consciousness by suggesting that awareness is a universal property present from the cellular level. OCST, which forms the second component of this unified theory, examines the nature of the universe as a closed system subject to the laws of entropy. This theory explores how the universe is moving toward maximum entropy, where meaning and contrasts dissolve. However, beyond this closed system lies the realm of an open system—a domain of infinite potential that transcends the dualities and limitations of the physical universe. This open system offers a philosophical explanation for existence and the possibility of eternal meaning. Together, these two theories provide a novel and cohesive framework that addresses both the mechanics of consciousness and the ultimate purpose of the universe. The integration of CPCT and OCST bridges scientific evidence from quantum biology and systems theory with philosophical explorations of existence, presenting a comprehensive vision of reality as both a closed physical system and an open metaphysical one. This unified theory encourages a reexamination of our place in the cosmos, suggesting that beyond the observable universe lies an infinite realm of potential where consciousness and meaning endure. (shrink)

Roger Crisp presents a comprehensive study of Henry Sidgwick's The Methods of Ethics, a landmark work first published in 1874. Crisp argues that Sidgwick is largely right about many central issues in moral philosophy: the metaphysics and epistemology of ethics, consequentialism, hedonism about well-being, and the weight to be given to self-interest. He holds that Sidgwick's long discussion of 'common-sense' morality is probably the best discussion of deontology we have. And yet The Methods of Ethics can be hard to understand, (...) and this is perhaps one reason why, though it is a philosophical goldmine, few have ventured deeply into it. What does Sidgwick mean by a 'method'? Why does he discuss only three methods? What are his arguments for hedonism and for utilitarianism? How can we make sense of the idea of moral intuition? What is the role of virtue in Sidgwick's ethics? Crisp addresses these and many other questions, offering a fresh view of Sidgwick's text which will assist any moral philosopher to gain more from it. (shrink)

Presents a comprehensive history of multiverse theory, reviewing the discoveries that shaped astrophysicists' current consensus view while showing that the multiverse is able to be explained entirely in naturalistic terms.

This volume contains the Arabic translations of a lost treatise by Alexander of Aphrodisias "On the Principles of the Universe" with English translation, introduction and commentary. It also includes an Arabic and Syriac glossary. The introduction and commentary deal in detail with the manuscripts, the translators and the exegetical tendencies of the text, as well as with its reception in Arabic philosophy. The main theme of the work is the motion of the heavenly bodies and their influence on the (...) class='Hi'>physical world. (shrink)

A distinguishing characteristic of the biomedical model is its compartmentalized view of man. This way of seeing human beings has its origin in Greek thought; it was stated by Descartes and to this day it still considers humans as beings composed of distinct entities combined into a certain form. Because of this observation, one began to believe that the focus of a health treatment could be exclusively on the affected area of the body, without the need to pay attention to (...) patient’s subjectivity. By seeing pain as a merely sensory response, this model was not capable of encompassing chronic pain, since the latter is a complex process that can occur independently of tissue damage. As of the second half of the twentieth century, when it became impossible to deny the relationship between psyche and soma, the current understanding of chronic pain emerges: that of chronic pain as an individual experience, the result of a sum of physical, psychological, and social factors that, for this reason, cannot be approached separately from the individual who expresses pain. This understanding has allowed a significant improvement in perspective, emphasizing the characteristic of pain as an individual experience. However, the understanding of chronic pain as a sum of factors corresponds to the current way of seeing the process of falling ill, for its conception holds a Cartesian duality and the positivist premise of a single reality. For phenomenology, on the other hand, the individual in his/her unity is more than a simple sum of parts. Phenomenology sees a human being as an intending entity, in which body, mind, and the world are intertwined and constitute each other mutually, thus establishing the human being’s integral functioning. Therefore, a real understanding of the chronic pain process would only be possible from a phenomenological point of view at the experience lived by the individual who expresses and communicates pain. (shrink)

This is an interview with the philosopher Iain Hamilton Grant, author of Idealism: The history of a philosophy and Philosophies of Nature After Schelling.

"This is the book that I have been waiting for for twenty years. With exceptional clarity, Draine introduces the underlying physics and brings the basic pieces together to describe the multiphase structure of the interstellar and intergalactic medium. Combined with many useful tables and figures, this book will rapidly become a hit with students and researchers alike. It continues the fine tradition of Princeton professors writing seminal books on this topic."--Ewine van Dishoeck, Leiden University "A true tour de force, providing (...) a definitive account of the physics of interstellar matter. Written with authority and insight by a master of the subject, Bruce Draine's book will be a treasured guide for new graduate students as well as a comprehensive and rigorous reference for galactic and extragalactic researchers."--Eve Ostriker, University of Maryland "Draine has written an interstellar-medium textbook worthy of Lyman Spitzer, updated thirty years later. His coverage of atomic, molecular, radiative, thermal, and dynamical processes is excellent. Most valuable to students and professionals are the combinations of physical processes with multiwavelength observations appropriate for the modern astronomer."--J. Michael Shull, University of Colorado at Boulder "This book is a comprehensive account of the physical processes that take place in the interstellar medium and that determine its behavior. It is likely to become the bible on the subject."--Alexander Dalgarno, Harvard University "This is an outstanding text on an important topic in astrophysics. Draine carefully goes into the physical processes, providing a unifying discussion that is often missing in other treatments."--Christopher F. McKee, University of California, Berkeley. (shrink)

The paper provides an innovative interpretation of the treatise De Victu, showing that, though Heraclitean, Anaxagorean and Empedoclean borrowings in the work are certainly pervasive, the author also develops a sophisticated and multi-purpose explanatory framework, which, being based on an original conception of the nature of man, the cosmos and the relationship between the two, provides an effective foundation for the medical enterprise, allowing him to propose his dietetics as a ‘way of life’. At the core of this enterprise (...) is the relationship between microcosm and macrocosm: in virtue of this relationship, I submit, the cosmos becomes both an active factor to be taken into account for the maintenance of individual physical well-being and the normative standard to which a dietician and whoever cares about health must refer in order to live the healthiest possible life. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Ever-Moving Soul in Plato's PhaedrusDougal BlythThe proof of the immortality of the soul at Phdr. 245c5-246a2 is unique in the dialogue for its apparent philosophical rigour and technical style, and it is peculiar in its rhetorical and mythical context.1 It is introduced as the first stage of Socrates' palinode, exhorting Phaedrus to give himself to a true lover rather than a non-lover. On this basis the philosopher will (...) then describe the course of true love (erōs) as the attempt of an older man to lead the soul of a younger whom he loves, along with his own soul, up and back to the original immortal condition of the "winged" soul which contemplates true being (246a-257b).As the groundwork upon which this vision is built the proof of the immortality of the soul deserves close study, not only of its argument, but also its rhetorical achievement and relation to the subsequent myth. It might be a parody or imitation of a Pythagorean proof, but the definition of soul and the role that plays in the implied theory appear original to Plato.2 Nevertheless, the importation of a fragment of some more extensive physical theory into a speech on love is surprising, and demands explanation.3 My procedure here involves the recovery of significant features [End Page 185] of the theory, firstly by reference to the myth, secondly by comparison with other dialogues containing related concepts and positions, and finally and most importantly by extended analysis of the physical and cosmological postulates of the argument itself.4 It should then emerge from my attention to the stages of its presentation that, as might be expected in its epideictic context, the statement of the proof involves significant rhetorical finesse. It both establishes the credibility of the subsequent myth, and, with its cosmic sweep, prepares the listener for the profundity of the latter. Moreover the proof is written so as itself to provoke that philosophical erōs for understanding which the myth then describes.I. To begin, we need some idea of what soul the proof is concerned with. The three possible meanings of the ambiguous phrase (245a5) are (i) every individual soul, (ii) one comprehensive world soul, or (iii) some common aspect of all living things, which, despite the mortality of psychophysical individuals, would be immortal in itself.5 The plurality of separate individual souls [i.e., sense (i)] is excluded by the requirements of the proof (see below), that "all soul" be one unique source of cosmic motion. No specific doctrine of a world soul [i.e., sense (ii)] is expressly stated in the Phaedrus; I shall in fact argue that the world soul is signified by the gods' chariots in the following myth, but in that case this cannot be equivalent to "all soul," since immortal souls (or fragments of soul as such) are described as entering into human and animal bodies, whereas the gods do not (248c-249d). This seems sufficient grounds to understand "all soul" as (iii)-one common soul in which we all participate insofar as we are alive; thus Plato writes "all soul cares for what is soulless (i.e., body), and travels round the whole world ('all [End Page 186] heaven', ) coming to be in different forms at different times" (246b6-7).Since the identity of the subject concerned in the proof of the immortality of "all soul" receives its only clarification subsequently in the course of the following myth, before turning to a detailed consideration of the argument I shall first survey the implications of the myth for the cosmological status of immortal soul. It is represented here as a chariot rising up to the sphere of the fixed stars, where each lesser soul follows in the train of its appointed god; and by passing beyond the outermost edge of the visible universe, insofar as it is capable, the soul studies the forms beyond, the truly divine, by proximity to which even gods are divine (249c6). Gods are thus, in this dialogue, paradigms of that divine soul which is said to circumnavigate the cosmos in governing it (246b7-c2, e5-6) and soul has its... (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo aborda críticamente la propuesta de Herbert Feigl al problema mente-cuerpo dentro del marco general de su filosofía. Para esto, se describe de forma sucinta (a) el contexto de las teorías fisicalistas dentro del cual emerge su propuesta, remarcando sus diferencias con las posturas de Carnap (1932), Place (1956) y Smart (1959), y (b) algunos elementos relevantes de la evolución de su propio pensamiento, con especial énfasis en la herencia de la filosofía anterior que le permitió al (...) filósofo austriaco construir un marco teórico propio, caracterizado principalmente por la defensa de un realismo científico de carácter “semántico”. Respecto de estos antecedentes, se exponen las diferencias entre las ideas centrales de su texto de 1934, centrado en la idea de doble-lenguaje, y su propuesta definitiva expuesta en su texto más influyente de 1958, centrado en su teoría del doble conocimiento. Adicionalmente, a lo largo del texto, se sustenta la idea de que la filosofía de la mente de Feigl es una propuesta de valor e interés contemporáneo, aunque no especialmente original, cuya comprensión depende notoriamente del marco más general de su filosofía y las tradiciones que la cruzan. Abstract: This work critically addresses Herbert Feigl's proposal to the mind-body problem within the general framework of his philosophy. For this, we describe succinctly (a) the context of the physicalist theories within which his proposal emerges, highlighting its differences with the positions of Carnap (1932), Place (1956) and Smart (1959), and (b) some relevant elements of the evolution of his own thought, with special emphasis on those elements inherited from previous philosophy that allowed the Austrian philosopher to build his own theoretical framework, characterized mainly by the defense of a “semantic realism” in science. Against this background, we will expose the differences between the central ideas of his 1934 text, centered on the idea o double-language, and his definitive proposal presented in his most influential text of 1958, centered on his theory of double knowledge. Additionally, throughout the article, we support the general view that Feigl's philosophy of mind is a proposal of contemporary value and interest, although not especially original, whose understanding depends notoriously on the more general framework of his philosophy and the traditions that crossed it. (shrink)

This fully revised and updated edition of God, Humanity and the Cosmos is an essential companion to the field, with exercises for the student, a comprehensive bibliography, and suggestions for further reading.

Here is a comprehensive and practical guide to using the Five Element model in your daily life in ways that can improve your physical health, foster mental ease and clarity, create more emotional balance, and bring you closer to spirit. Having introduced the philosophical and practical principles of the Five Elements, the author invites you to 'live the book', immersing yourself in the many aspects of each Element during its corresponding season. He offers a range of methods of doing (...) this, including activities such as movement, cooking, gardening, journaling, visualisation, meditation, dialogue and self-acupressure. In working with each Element, he explores the three levels or expressions of human life - the physical (structures, organs, tissues and systems), the psycho-emotional (thoughts, beliefs, self-images, emotions and reactions), and the spirit. Detailed information is provided on each Element's specific attributes, associations, resonances and gifts, and anatomical illustrations are included for further guidance. An invaluable reference book for practitioners and students of Chinese Medicine who hope to become better practitioners to others, the book also provides the means to become a practitioner to yourself. (shrink)