This book intends to establish, against his numerous modern critics, that the ancient philosopher Parmenides was a mystic. Instead of arriving at his conclusions by cold reason, Parmenides found the unity of Being, which he called “the Truth,” by turning to a life of meditation.

A well-established tradition has argued that it is not legitimate to attribute to Parmenides a Fregean semantics, i.e. the distinction between ‘naming’ and ‘meaning’. Nonetheless, Parmenides claims more than once (B 8.53, B 9.1) that mortalsdo namereality, although incorrectly. As many scholars have emphasised, because it is fair neither to conclude that mortals’ names are ‘empty names’ nor dismiss Opinion's account (i.e., broadly speaking, the mortals’ account of reality) itself as meaningless, it seems that Parmenides is suggesting that some kind (...) of distinction between what names refer to and what names mean must be drawn. In view of this, what is Parmenides’ account of names?My suggestion is that in order to explain the Eleatic philosophy of language (and the Eleatic account of names) a step back is required. More specifically, Parmenides’ epistemology has to be taken into account. Indeed, if we assume that Parmenides is arguing for an ‘epistemological disjunctivism’ – such that the veridical and truthful state and the erroneous and deceptive state are essentially different – it will be clear that he is further arguing for what could be defined as a ‘semantic disjunctivism’, so that true speech and false speech are essentially different as well. (shrink)

Resumen: El objetivo del presente trabajo es acercarnos no ya en clave epistemológica a la pregunta específica que se realiza respecto de la teoría literaria, sino por el contrario, a la pregunta mediada por la idea de verdad que la filosofía le ha hecho a la literatura. Creemos que en los textos de Platón existe una intuición fundamental que de manera implícita ha puesto en marcha múltiples aparatos teóricos que intentaron dar cuenta de la literatura. La intuición, sin dilaciones, es (...) la siguiente: la poesía no es matemática. Nuestro interés entonces es reconocer las periferias del diálogo inaugurado por Platón entre el concepto de verdad y la idea de literatura, como así también sus recíprocas determinaciones, y su pregnancia en los discursos que han abordado a la literatura en clave teórica.: In the present work the objective is not only to approach in an epistemological key to the specific question asked by literary theory but rather the question, mediated by the idea of truth, that philosophy has done to literature. We believe that in Plato's texts there is a fundamental intuition that implicitly has set in motion multiple theoretical devices that tried to account for literature. The intuition, without delay, is the following: poetry is not mathematical. Our interest then is to recognize the peripheries of the dialogue inaugurated by Plato between the concept of truth and the idea of literature, as well as their reciprocal determinations, and their pregnancy in the discourses that have addressed literature in a theoretical key. (shrink)