We express here the statement » The probability of a given b equals r « symbolically by » p = r «. A formal axiomatic calculus can be constructed comprising all the well‐known laws of probability theory. This calculus can be interpreted in various ways. The present paper is a criticism of the subjective interpretation; that is to say, of any interpretation which assumes that probability expresses degrees of incomplete knowledge: a is the statement incompletely known, b is our total (...) knowledge, and p is the degree to which a is entailed by b. The subjective interpretation has often been proposed as an explanation and even a sharpening of the various objective theories . It is shown in the paper that this proposal cannot be realised because the subjective theory cannot lead to results which are compatible with the objective theory. This is due to various reasons, the most important of which is that the objective theory interprets » b « in » p « as a statement of the objective conditions of an experiment and » a « as one of its possible results. The subjective theory on the other hand interprets » b « as our total relevant knowledge which will in general include some knowledge of previous results of the experiment. It is shown that this must lead to incompatibility owing to the fact that this knowledge of previous results must influence the value of the probability.It is shown, in this way, that any probabilistic theory of the process of learning from experience—that is to say, any probabilistic theory of induction—must lead to contradictions.RésuméL'énoncé: » La probabilité de a, si b est donné, est égale à r « est ici exprimé symboliquement par » p = r «. On peut construire un système axiomatique formel qui contient toutes les règles bien connues du calcul des probabilités. Ce calcul formel peut ětre interprété de manières très différentes. L'article contient une critique des interprétations subjectives, c'est‐à‐dire des interprétations qui admettent que la probabilité exprime des degrés de connaissance incomplète: a est un énoncé qu'on ne connaǐt que partiellement, b est notre connaissance totale, et p exprime le degré auquel a est implicitement contenu dans b. L'interprétation subjective a souvent été proposée comme une explication et un renforcement des différentes théories objectives . Dans cet article, l'auteur montre que ce projet n'est pas réalisable, car la théorie subjective mène à des résultats qui contredisent la théorie objective. Plusieurs circonstances sont responsables de cette situation; la plus importante, c'est que la théorie interprète le » b « dans » p « comme une description des conditions objectives d'une expérience . D'autre part, la théorie subjective interprète » b « comme notre savoir total , et ce savoir inclura en général des informations sur les résultats obtenus antérieurement pour cette expérience. L'auteur montre que ce fait conduit à une contradiction entre les deux interprétations, car cette connaissance doit avoir une influence sur la valeur subjective de la probabilité.A l'aide de ce raisonnement, on peut montrer que la théorie des probabilités appliquée au processus inductif tirant une expérience du domaine expérimental conduit à des contradictions.ZusammenfassungDie Aussage » Die Wahrscheinlichkeit von a, wenn b gegeben ist, ist gleich r « wird hier symbolisch durch » p = r « ausgedrückt. Ein formales Axiomensystem kann konstruiert werden, das alle die wohlbekannten Regeln der Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung enthält. Dieser formale Kalkül kann in sehr verschiedener Weise interpretiert werden. Der Artikel enthält eine Kritik der subjektiven Interpretationen; das heisst, jener Interpretationen die annehmen, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit Grade von unvollständigem Wissen ausdrückt: a ist ein Satz der unvollständig gewusst wird, b ist unser Gesamtwissen, und p drückt den Grad aus zu dem a in b implizit enthalten ist. Die subjektive Interpretation wurde oft als eine Erklärung und Verschärfung der verschiedenen objektiven Theorien vorgeschlagen. In dem Artikel wird gezeigt, dass der Vorschlag undurchführbar ist, da die subjektive Theorie zu Resultaten führt, die der objektiven Theorie widersprechen. Verschiedene Umstände tragen zu dieser Situation bei. Der wichtigste dieser Umstände ist, dass die objektive Theorie das » b « in » p « als eine Beschreibung der objektiven Bedingungen eines Experimentes interpretiert . Andererseits interpretiert die subjektive Theorie » b « als unser Gesamtwissen , und dieses wird im allgemeinen Informationen bezüglich früherer Resultate dieses Experiments einschliessen. Es wird gezeigt, dass das zu einem Widerspruch zwischen den Interpretationen führt, da dieses Wissen Einfluss auf den subjektiven Wahrscheinlichkeitswert haben muss.Mit Hilfe dieses Gedankenganges wird gezeigt, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie des induktiven Lernens aus der Erfahrung zu Widersprüchen führt. (shrink)

It is often claimed that the conclusion of a deductively valid argument is contained in its premises. Popper refuted this claim when he showed that an empirical theory can be expected always to have logical consequences that transcend the current understanding of the theory. This implies that no formalisation of an empirical theory will enable the derivation of all its logical consequences. I call this result ‘Popper-incompleteness.’ This result appears to be consistent with the view of deductive (...) reasoning as a process of unfurling the content of the premises; but I suggest that the result about validity impugns this theory of reasoning. (shrink)

The philosophy of Karl Popper (1902–94) has gained a range of interest and reaction far wider than that normally received by professional philosophers; in recent times only Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) obtained comparable (probably still greater) attention. Convinced that philosophical problems and issues came from outside philosophy itself, especially science, Popper addressed a broad audience. However, he also entered the professionals’ field, and indeed attacked some major epistemological tenets held there, such as the assumption that knowledge was accreted by (...) the inductive accumulation and classification of facts. The response to Popper’s work has created interest in his life, which was known as falling in three periods: birth and early career in Vienna, followed by nearly a decade in New Zealand, and finally a rather reclusive lifestyle in Britain after the Second World War. This book, devoted to the first two periods, is the outcome of a long research effort by the author started well before Popper’s death and incorporating a doctorate received in 1993. His book shows the incompleteness of Popper’s autobiography of 1974, which hitherto has been our main source. (shrink)

“Situational Analysis” (SA) constitutes Popper’s methodological proposal for the social sciences. We argue that notwithstanding Popper’s claim that SA is an attempt to extend the methodology of neoclassical economics to the rest of the social sciences, the former is better interpreted as an extension of his view of the “method” of history to the “theoretical” social sciences. The reason is that, unlike neoclassical economics, Popper’s formulation of SA presupposes that social scientists exhibit a “more complete” view of (...) the “logic of the situation” than individual actors do, on average, which implies that the latter’s knowledge is “partially wrong” or “incomplete.”. (shrink)

Recent work on Imre Lakatos’s missing Hungarian dissertation on the historical sociology of science sheds new light on his mature philosophy of science. Remembered primarily as an “internalist” defender of the autonomy of science, and a Cold Warrior in poli­tics, commentators have mistaken his contribution as primarily a rearguard action against the followers of Thomas Kuhn and the “externalists” influenced by Boris Hessen. It comes as a surprise, then, to find that he developed and retained a fully general soci­ology of (...) scientific knowledge, with Marxist roots that articulated Lenin’s “inexhaustible atom.” He carried forward this emphasis on the fallible, changing, and incomplete nature of our engagement with the natural world by a dialectical account of how research programs advance and recede historically. In his effort to develop a synthesis of Popper and Kuhn, and via his engagement with Paul Feyerabend, he continued to develop a distinctly dialectical ap­proach to science. (shrink)

Accounts of big data practices often assume that they target individuals. Personalization, with all the risks of discrimination and bias it entails, has been the critical focus in accounts of consumption, government, social media, and health. This paper argues that personalization through models using large-scale data is part of a more expansive change in probabilization that, in principle, is not reducible to individual or ‘personal’ attributes and actions. It describes the ‘personalization’ of an online grocery shopping recommender system to list (...) a small number of grocery items of personal relevance for each of the millions of online grocery shoppers at a major UK supermarket chain. Drawing on a theory of probability proposed by the philosopher of science Karl Popper and anthropological work on shopping, it suggests that the attempt to generate personalized predictions necessarily incorporates impersonal relations to others and things. Using a mixture of discourse analysis and code-based reconstruction of key elements of the recommender system, it suggests that personalization is one facet of an open-ended weave of propensities associated with people and things in contemporary big data configurations. The paper explores how, in the context of recommender systems, the constitutive incompleteness of shopping lists, their propensity to expand or change, might be more important than their capacity to be personalized. (shrink)

We present an exegesis of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument for the incompleteness of quantum mechanics, and defend it against the critique in Fine. (1) We contend,contra Fine, that it compares favorably with an argument reconstructed by him from a letter by Einstein to Schrödinger; and also with one given by Einstein in a letter to Popper. All three arguments turn on a dubious assumption of “separability,” which accords separate elements of reality to space-like separated systems. We discuss how this (...) assumption figures in the literature spawned by the Bell inequalities. (shrink)

The general notion of relative freedom is introduced. It is a kind of freedom that is observed everywhere in nature. In biology, incomplete knowledge is defined for all organisms. They cope with the problem by Popper’s trial-and-error processes. One source of their success is the relative freedom of choice from the basic option ranges: mutations, motions and neuron connections. After the conjecture is adopted that communicability can be used as a criterion of consciousness, free will is defined as a (...) conscious version of relative freedom. The resulting notion is logically self-consistent and it describes an observable phenomenon that agrees with our experience. (shrink)

The energy of methodologists and historians of science in our age is absorbed by the problem of the relationship between the cognitive and the social in the scientific activity. Popper's "epistemology without a knowing subject" and Lakatos's "programology without a creative subject" are being overcome. After Kuhn the concept of paradigm linked the cognitive with the social, thereby stimulating the study of scientific communities. The research interests of philosophers and historians has centered on elucidating the relations between two "coordinates": (...) one representing the knowledge of objects that conforms to the norms of truth, and the other representing the social production of this knowledge. The author of these lines has always viewed this "double-aspect" image of science as incomplete. As soon as one reflects upon it one ineluctably encounters a third aspect, the personal-psychological aspect, which cannot be reduced to, merged with, or separated from the others. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the XunziKurtis HagenVirtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi. Edited, with introduction, by T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2000. Pp. xvii + 268.Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, edited by T. C. Kline III and Philip J. Ivanhoe, is an anthology that has much to recommend it. It brings together several seminal (...) papers on Xunzi by established and distinguished scholars of Chinese philosophy, such as Antonio S. Cua, D. C. Lau, David S. Nivison, and Henry Rosemont, Jr. It also includes contributions from relative newcomers, who focused their dissertations on Xunzi's philosophy, namely T. C. Kline III and Eric Hutton. While most of these essays have been previously published, some appear in print for the first time in this volume. There is also a succinct introduction, name and subject indexes, and a targeted bibliography, which may serve as a reading list for those interested in supplementing their study of Xunzi. Another nicety is that references to passages in the Xunzi in older articles have been updated to include John Knoblock's translation1 as well as A Concordance to the Xunzi,2 and romanizations have been standardized to pinyin. [End Page 434]For the most part, the title Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi accurately represents the most prominent subject matter of the book. However, by "nature" what is meant is apparently "human nature," if that is an adequate translation for the concept Xunzi designates with the character xing. Xunzi's view of tian (the propensities of nature, the heavens) is not prominently discussed.3 Most of the essays, chapters 4 through 11 (the final chapter), deal extensively if not primarily with understanding Xunzi's conception of human nature. Chapters 5 through 7 are tied even closer together under the theme of moral agency (more on their connection below). Virtue is the topic of chapter 3 and plays a role in chapters 4 and 7.Although the first two chapters seem not to fall neatly within these categories, Henry Rosemont, Jr.'s contribution, "State and Society in the Xunzi: A Philosophical Commentary," seems an appropriate choice for the lead chapter of this collection. A sweeping polemic in defense of Xunzi's political philosophy, this seminal essay demonstrates the philosophical strength and potential relevance of Xunzi's thought. Specifically, Rosemont argues that Xunzi's political system is no less "reasonable" than democracy, and that while Xunzi advocates what Karl Popper would call a "closed society," Xunzi's system is defensible against Popper's critique of such societies.4The second chapter, "Ethical Uses of the Past in Early Confucianism: The Case of Xunzi," is authored by Antonio S. Cua, who has been a consistent contributor to the understanding of Xunzi's philosophy for more than twenty years. A collection of essays on Xunzi would be incomplete without Cua's work being represented. However, given the themes of the book, it is not entirely clear why this particular piece was selected. While Cua has written on both human nature and virtue in the Xunzi, this essay only tangentially addresses the theme of virtue. Nevertheless, it exemplifies the kind of careful scholarship characteristic of Cua's work, and there is something to be said for an anthology like this to exhibit breadth as well as focus. In his contribution, Cua analyzes Xunzi's appeal to history in terms of its "pedagogical function," "rhetorical function," "elucidative function," and "evaluative function."In chapter 3, "Virtues in Xunzi's Thought," Jonathan W. Schofer offers a lucid depiction of Xunzi's moral theory as a kind of virtue theory, despite the lack of any systematic analysis on Xunzi's part of a specific set of virtues. He then suggests that, given Xunzi's theory and goals, the omission of any analysis of specific virtues may have been deliberate.The last eight chapters deal extensively with the issue of human nature. Chapter 4, "Xunzi: Morality as Psychological Constraint," by Joel J. Kupperman, compares Xunzi's and Mencius' conceptions of human nature. Kupperman argues that, unlike Mencius, Xunzi does not really have a "view of human... (shrink)

A sampling of the philosophical writings of Karl Popper includes discussions of rationalism, knowledge, human freedom, and the scientific method.

Hailed on publication in 1957 as "probably the only book published this year that will outlive the century," this is a brilliant of the idea that there are ...

At the age of eight, Karl Popper was puzzling over the idea of infinity and by fifteen was beginning to take a keen interest in his father's well-stocked library of books. Unended Quest recounts these moments and many others in the life of one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century, providing an indispensable account of the ideas that influenced him most. As an introduction to Popper's philosophy, Unended Quest also shines. Popper lucidly explains the (...) central ideas in his work, making this book ideal for anyone coming to Popper's life and work for the first time. (shrink)

First published in 2011. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

The basic theme of Popper's philosophy--that something can come from nothing--is related to the present situation in physical theory. Popper carries his investigation right to the center of current debate in quantum physics. He proposes an interpretation of physics--and indeed an entire cosmology--which is realist, conjectural, deductivist and objectivist, anti-positivist, and anti-instrumentalist. He stresses understanding, reminding us that our ignorance grows faster than our conjectural knowledge.

Described by the philosopher A.J. Ayer as a work of 'great originality and power', this book revolutionized contemporary thinking on science and knowledge. Ideas such as the now legendary doctrine of 'falsificationism' electrified the scientific community, influencing even working scientists, as well as post-war philosophy. This astonishing work ranks alongside The Open Society and Its Enemies as one of Popper's most enduring books and contains insights and arguments that demand to be read to this day.

The World of Parmenides is a unique collection of essays that not only explores the complexity of ancient Greek thought, but also reveals Popper's engagement with Presocratic philosophy and the enlightenment he experienced in reading Parmenides. It includes writings on Greek science, philosophy and history and demonstrates Popper's life-long fascination with the presocratic philosophers, in particular Parmenides, Xenophanes and Heraclitus.

The essays in this volume represent an approach to human knowledge that has had a profound influence on many recent thinkers. Popper breaks with a traditional commonsense theory of knowledge that can be traced back to Aristotle. A realist and fallibilist, he argues closely and in simple language that scientific knowledge, once stated in human language, is no longer part of ourselves but a separate entity that grows through critical selection.

This classic remains one of Karl Popper's most wide-ranging and popular works, notable not only for its acute insight into the way scientific knowledge grows, but also for applying those insights to politics and to history.

The Open Universe is the centerpiece of the argument of the Postscript.

Realism and the Aim of Science is one of the three volumes of Karl Popper’s Postscript to the Logic of scientific Discovery. The Postscript is the culmination of Popper’s work in the philosophy of physics and a new famous attack on subjectivist approaches to philosophy of science. Realism and the Aim of Science is the first volume of the Postcript . Popper here formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge: science aims at true explanatory theories, yet (...) it can never prove, or justify, any theory to be true, not even if is a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticise all its theories, even those that happen to be true. Realism and the Aim of Science presents Popper’s mature statement on scientific knowledge and offers important insights into his thinking on problems of method within science. (shrink)

The way in which knowledge progresses, and especially our scientific knowledge, is by unjustified (and unjustifiable) anticipations, by guesses, by tentative solutions to our problems, by conjectures. These conjectures are controlled by criticism: that is, by attempted refutations, which include severely critical tests. They may survive these tests; but they can never be positively justified: they can neither be established as certainly true nor even as 'probable' (in the sense of the probability calculus). Criticism of our conjectures is of decisive (...) importance: by bringing out our mistakes it makes us understand the difficulties of the problems which we try to solve. This is how we become better acquainted with our problem, and able to propose more mature solutions: the very refutation of a theory - that is, of a tentative solution to our problem - is always a step forward that takes us nearer the truth. And this is how we can learn from our mistakes. As we learn from our mistakes our knowledge grows, even though we may never know - that is, know for certain. Since our knowledge can grow, there can be no reason here for despair of reason. And since we can never know for certain, the can be no authority here for any claim to authority, for conceit over our knowledge, or for smugness. The essays and lectures of which this book is composed apply this thesis to many topics, ranging from problems of the philosophy and history of the physical and social sciences to historical and political problems. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell described this study, with its companion volume on Hegel and Marx, as 'a work of first-class importance which ought to be widely read for its masterly criticism of the enemies of democracy, ancient and modern. His (Popper's) attack on Plato, while unorthodox, is in my opinion thoroughly justified. His analysis of Hegel is deadly. Marx is dissected with equal acumen, and given his due share of responsibility for modern misfortunes. The book is a vigorous and profound defence (...) of democracy, timely, very interesting, and very well written'. 'A powerful and important book. It is a criticism of a set of dogmas which underlie the most influential political theories, and in consequence powerfully affect the actual conduct of human affairs. Dr Popper writes with extreme clarity and vigour. His studies in Greek history and Greek thought have obviously been profound and original. Platonic exegesis will never be the same again. Nor, I think, will Marxist exegesis. Readers should not miss studying the notes collected at the end of the two volumes.' - Gilbert Ryle, Mind. (shrink)

Popper formulates and explains his non-justificationist theory of knowledge. Science--empirical science--aims at true explanatory theories, yet it can never prove, finally establish, or justify any of its theories as true, not even if it is in fact a true theory. Science must continue to question and criticize all its theories, even those which happen to be true.

The cynical conception of history says that—in history, just as everywhere else—greed is always the only thing that governs: greed for material objects, greed for money, for gold, for oil, for power. "It has been so," says the cynic, "and so will it most likely always be. It has been so in despotic regimes, and it is not much different in a democracy, except for the fact that in a democracy, the hypocrisy is possibly even worse." I consider this doctrine (...) to be not only wrong but also irresponsible, especially because a certain plausibility seems to support it. An d I consider it a compelling duty to fight against it, for how we think about ourselves and our history is important; it is important for our decisions and for our actions. That is the reason why I have picked this theme for my lecture. (shrink)

Príspevok pozostáva z troch častí. Prvá časť sa zaoberá taxonómiou a kritériami klasifikácie rôznych druhov noriem. Poukazuje na to, že rozdiel medzi dvoma najdôležitejšími druhmi kooperačných noriem – sociálnymi a morálnymi – je skôr kvantitatívneho než kvalitatívneho charakteru a navrhuje trojdimenzionálny model ich diferenciácie. Druhá časť je venovaná morálnym normám a zdôvodňuje dominantnú rolu emócií pre vznik a fungovanie morálky, ktorá zohráva kľúčovú rolu pri ochrane spoločnosti pred najnebezpečnejšími sociálnymi konfliktami. V tretej časti sa argumentuje, že vzájomná sociálna dôvera, nevyhnutná (...) pre medziľudskú kooperáciu, sa postupne vytvára zdola nahor, najskôr na úrovni najbližšej rodiny a postupne sa rozširuje na ďalšie okolie. Pre jej zvýšenie a udržanie sú nevyhnutné sociálne a morálne normy, ktoré tiež historicky vznikali najskôr v lokálnych spoločenstvách a až postupne sa šírili do širších sociálnych celkov. Príspevok upozorňuje na možné negatívne konzekvencie plynúce z podceňovania roly sociálnych a morálnych noriem a snahy riadiť sa namiesto nich len legislatívnymi normami, spočívajúce v oslabení sociálnych väzieb. (shrink)

With a new foreword by_ Scott Austin_ _'I hope that these essays may illustrate the thesis that all history is or should be the history of problem situations, and that in following this principle we may further our understanding of the Presocratics and other thinkers of the past. The essays also try to show the greatness of the early Greek philosophers, who gave Europe its philosophy, its science, and its humanism.'_ _- Karl Popper, from the preface _ _The World (...) of Parmenides_ is a brilliant exploration of the complexity of ancient Greek thought and science by one of the twentieth century’s leading philosophers. It reveals the great importance of Presocratic philosophy to Popper’s thought as a whole and shows the profound enlightenment he experienced reading not only Parmenides but the wider world of Greek science and philosophy including Xenophanes and Heraclitus. Edited by Arne F. Petersen, Associate Professor in the Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen. (shrink)

In this long-awaited volume, Jeremy Shearmur and Piers Norris Turner bring to light Popper's most important unpublished and uncollected writings from the time of The Open Society until his death in 1994. After The Open Society: Selected Social and Political Writings reveals the development of Popper's political and philosophical thought during and after the Second World War, from his early socialism through to the radical humanitarianism of The Open Society. The papers in this collection, many of which are (...) available here for the first time, demonstrate the clarity and pertinence of Popper's thinking on such topics as religion, history, Plato and Aristotle, while revealing a lifetime of unwavering political commitment. After The Open Society illuminates the thought of one of the twentieth century's greatest philosophers and is essential reading for anyone interested in the recent course of philosophy, politics, history and society. (shrink)

Written in political exile during the Second World War and first published in 1945, Karl Popper's The Open Society and Its Enemies is one of the most influential books of the twentieth century. Hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy', its now legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx exposed the dangers inherent in centrally planned political systems. Popper's highly accessible style, his erudite and lucid explanations of the thought of (...) great philosophers and the recent resurgence of totalitarian regimes around the world are just three of the reasons for the enduring popularity of The Open Society and Its Enemies , and for why it demands to be read both today and in years to come. This is the first of two volumes of The Open Society and Its Enemies. (shrink)