This article examines the main approaches to public understanding of science in light of recent developments in social and cultural theory. While traditional and critical perspectives on PUS differ in terms of their models of the public, science, and understanding, they nevertheless share a number of commonalities, which are humanism, incorporeality, and discrete sites. These are contrasted, respectively, to versions of the person as hybridic, to treatments of embodiment drawing especially on Whitehead’s notion of prehension, and to a rhizomic (...) view of science and public as interwoven. Throughout, it is stressed that the alternatives posed do not constitute an accusation of deficit on the part of traditional and critical PUS. Some research and political implications of interweaving these three perspectives are presented. (shrink)

Context: In recent years, the debates surrounding radical constructivism have increasingly paid attention to the problematic dualist logic of radical constructivism as well as that of realism. Mitterer’s non-dualism is an attempt to overcome such approaches. Problem: Although Mitterer succeeds in identifying the flaws of dualism, he takes a reductionist position that does not account for materiality and is therefore not convincing when it comes to describing epistemic processes appropriately. Method: Having identified the conceptual problematic to be found in Mitterer, (...) I introduce Whithead’s basic framework as an alternative non-dualistic approach. I argue that starting from Whitehead’s notion of “prehension” allows for more appropriate accounts of epistemic processes. Results: By following this train of thought, it is possible to develop a position that is non-dualist, realist, and constructivist at the same time. Implications: The article demonstrates the need to develop process theoretical approaches to epistemology and contributes to developing an epistemologically relaxed way of arguing, as was recently called for. This implies the requirement of developing a radical process constructivism that integrates concepts such as performativity and enactment. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that A. N. Whitehead's novel concept of prehension only makes sense as a form of panpsychistic idealism. After making the case for this view, I critical evaluate Lewis Ford's interpretation of prehension from his compositional analysis of Whitehead's metaphysical works.

Through our hands we construct our world and through our construction of our world we construct ourselves. We reach with our hands and touch with our hands, and with this reaching and touching we come to understand how things feel and are. It is not an utterable knowledge, yet it is knowing the world in a dynamically-engaged affective, effective way. Through affective feedback our reaching and touching becomes a prehensive grasping which leads, through the enkinaesthetic givenness of the agent with (...) its world, to a situated and embodied knowing, and the rudiments of apprehension. With each fresh comprehension a new enkinaesthetic enquiry is engendered; with each enquiry we have afresh the anticipatory dynamics of reaching, touching and feeling, with the hand-to-object of world-investigation, the hand-to-body of auto-investigation and investigating the Other. (shrink)

HEGEL and Whitehead are both prominently associated with speculative philosophy, Hegel with respect to his entire mature work, and Whitehead during the latter phase of his career. An outstanding difference between the two versions of speculative philosophy will be seen to consist in the fact that Whitehead, moving from a position that all knowledge is hypothetical, busied himself with the construction of a forthrightly abstract system. Hegel, for whom "Science can become an organic system only by the inherent life of (...) the Begriff", with certain minimally necessary qualifications, is attempting to arrive at the one system that is concrete actuality. This system is conceived as an organism that undergoes growth and development. Its conception must, nonetheless, in the end be graspable in abstraction as well, on which account it is the universal individual and what for this individual is actual that Hegel intends to set forth. Indeed a principal value, if not the value, of such abstraction, however, consists in that the various stages of the growth of the system may thereby the more readily be retraversed and recapitulated by particular individuals assimilating their cutural heritage and thereby constituting themselves as individuals. (shrink)

It is an honor and a surprise to find myself speaking with you this evening. I have not yet taken direct part in this community of discourse that is gathered in the name of AJTP; but I have operated for decades in the same intellectual neighborhood—or at least universe—and have always been entangled in some margin or other of your intellectual projects. Which projects I understand are not one. You are after all a plurality of pluralists; and you perhaps all (...) inhabit some version of the Jamesian pluriverse, which makes a universe only by getting strung along in an impossible excess of entanglements. “Without too much you cannot have enough, of anything. Lots of inferior books, lots of bad statues, lots of dull.. (shrink)

본 논문은 형이상학의 구축이라는 관점에서 들뢰즈와 화이트헤드의 관계를 다룬다. 이들 두 철학자들 사이의 관계는 역사적이고 사실적인 관점에서 볼 때 들뢰즈가 『차이와 반복』이래로 화이트헤드를 참조하고 있으며 특히 『주름』에서 화이트헤드가 매우 중요한 위치를 차지하고 있다는 사실에서 확인된다. 무엇보다 두 형이상학자들 사이의 관계를 해명하는 것은 들뢰즈의 존재론 체계가 완성된 『차이와 반복』과 원숙한 시기의 화이트헤드의 형이상학적 체계가 잘 나타나 있는『과정과 실재』의 비교작업이 될 것이다. 이러한 비교연구를 위하여 우리는 특히 사건의 철학과 관련하여 들뢰즈의 화이트헤드 독해가 갖는 적합성과 한계를 살펴본 후, 화이트헤드의 파악 개념과 들뢰즈의 수동적 (...) 종합개념(첫 번째 수동적 종합: 응시, 수축, 만족)사이의 유사점과 차이점을 고찰하고 평가할 것이다. 만일 이 두 철학자들의 형이상학(존재론)에 어떤 심층의 연대가 존재한다고 한다면, 그들 모두 칸트의 초월론적 관념론을 넘어서고자 하는 그들의 방식에 있어서 공통적으로 지니는 유사한 철학적 지향점이 있다는 점일 것이며, 이는 경험론과 분리되지 않는 형이상학을 창조함으로써 수행된다고 할 수 있다. 그것들은 각각 초월론적 경험론과 사변적 경험론이다. (shrink)

In this paper I wish to reformulate in my own way some parts of Whitehead's theory of prehensions. This reformulation will deviate in various respects from Whitehead's own detailed views and terminology, but the main inspiration is from Whitehead.

Prehensity -- Intensity -- Potentiality -- Sensibility.

Although attempts to explain religious experience in terms of brain processes usually presuppose the identification of scientific naturalism with the sensationist, atheistic, materialist version of naturalism (naturalismsam), this version is inadequate for science, and human experience more generally, for numerous reasons. An alternative version, based on panexperientialism, panentheism, and a prehensive doctrine of perception (naturalismppp), not only avoids those problems but also allows for religious experience understood as the soul's direct experience of a Holy Reality.

In June 1975, the distinguished Harvard entomologist Edward O. Wilson published a truly huge book entitled, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. In this book, drawing on both fact and theory, Wilson tried to present a com prehensive overview of the rapidly growing subject of 'sociobiology', the study of the biological nature and foundations of animal behaviour, more precisely animal social behaviour. Although, as the title rather implies, Wilson was more surveying and synthesising than developing new material, he com pensated by giving (...) the most thorough and inclusive treatment possible, beginning in the animal world with the most simple of forms, and progressing via insects, lower invertebrates, mammals and primates, right up to and in cluding our own species, Homo sapiens. Initial reaction to the book was very favourable, but before the year was out it came under withering attack from a group of radical scientists in the Boston area, who styled themselves 'The Science for the People Sociobiology Study Group'. Criticism, of course, is what every academic gets (and needs!); but, for two reasons, this attack was particularly unpleasant. First, not only were Wilson's ideas attacked, but he himself was smeared by being linked with the most reactionary of political thinkers, including the Nazis. (shrink)

The cortical visual mechanisms involved in processing spatial relationships remain subject to debate. According to one current view, the ''dorsal stream'' of visual areas, emanating from primary visual cortex and culminating in the posterior parietal cortex, mediates this aspect of visual processing. More recently, others have argued that while the dorsal stream provides egocentric coding of visual location for motor control, the separate ''ventral'' stream is needed for allocentric spatial coding. We have assessed the visual form agnosic patient DF, whose (...) lesion mainly affects the ventral stream, on a prehension task requiring allocentric spatial coding. She was presented with transparent circular disks. Each disk had circular holes cut in it. DF was asked to reach out and grasp the disk by placing her fingers through the holes. The disks either had three holes (for forefinger, middle finger, and thumb) or two holes (for forefinger and thumb). The distance between the forefinger and thumb holes, and the orientation of the line formed by them, were independently varied. DF was quite unable to adjust her grip aperture or her hand orientation in the three-hole task. Although she was able to orient her hand appropriately for the two-hole disks, she still remained unable to adjust her grip aperture to the distance between the holes. These findings are consistent with the idea that allocentric processing of spatial information requires a functioning ventral stream, even when the information is being used to guide a motor response. (shrink)

According to the order ethics approach to business ethics, moral rules must be im-plemented by institutions that provide incentives for following the rules. As a minimal (normative) condition, these institutions must be able to motivate the homo eco-nomicus. But even if an institution passes this test, it will only motivate actual people (i.e. the homo psychologicus) to follow moral rules, if they have the relevant compe-tences and self-efficacy beliefs. Consequently, good institutional design includes com-prehensive change management. At this point applied (...) order ethics can draw on find-ings of psychology and experimental economics. It turns out, that role models can support self-efficacy beliefs and are thus more important for order ethics than has traditionally been assumed. (shrink)

What I call ambiguities of system due to the sheer complexity of Whitehead’s metaphysics and his analysis of process in terms of concrescence and transition threaten its coherence in terms of what we know empirically of the quantum and classical dimensions of nature. Ambiguities of equivocation pertaining to Whitehead’s use of the terms “contemporary” and “objectification,” as the latter is employed in relation to prehension and satisfaction, also threaten its coherence. The article proposes ways to reduce these threats and (...) uncertainty about coherence by clarifying ambiguities and by attending to the way Whitehead’s terms are predicated on the quantum and classical dimensions. (shrink)

Abstract. Twenty years have now passed since Jürgen Habermas published his only work on bioethics. This article has three main aims. First, to offer a comprehensive re-evaluation of The Future of Human Nature in light of the many critiques made of it. Second, to undertake a reconstruction of certain elements of the work. Third, to forge a ‘Habermasian perspective’ that draws not only from The Future of Human Nature but also from his influential theories, including those of modernity, social evolution, (...) and his discourse theory of ethics. In The Future of Human Nature, Habermas opposes the selection and enhancement of genetic traits for non-therapeutic purposes, arguing that such practices undermine autonomy and, in turn, ‘humanity’s ethical self-understanding.’ Although subject to vociferous critique, I argue that the argument from autonomy holds promise. However, for it to serve the role Habermas envisions, the impact of new genetic technologies on norms of socialization – specifically those related to individuation – must be brought to the fore. I reframe the argument by focusing on how processes of self-formation in future societies could differ radically from those in contemporary society. I also propose a further important shift: limiting objections to genetic technologies on the grounds of autonomy narrows the scope of what a Habermasian approach to normatively evaluating these technologies might offer. Departing from his original stance, the Habermasian perspective outlined here advocates a precautionary societal approach informed by key insights from his social and normative theories. (shrink)

What would a Jewish process theology look like if it also adopted the a priori principles of rabbinic Judaism - among them, the authority of Torah given on Sinai, an historically particular revelation of divine instruction for a particular people, and the authority of the Oral Torah, an historically evolving hermeneutic, according to which that revelation becomes normative practice for communities of observant Jews? I trust this would not be a naturalism, since it would be a theology that found its (...) grammar or regulative logic in a textual hermeneutic rather than in an account of the orders of perception and imagination. It would not, for the same token, be an anti-naturalism, but rather a theology for which the distinction between natural and super- or non-natural was not definitional. For such a theology, for example, the world out there would belong to the order of creation (maaseh bereshit), rather than to "nature." This would mean that, since God creates through words, language (at least some sort of language) and world would be intimately connected rather than extrinsic phenomena, It would mean, furthermore, that for language to "know" the world would not be surprising and that something like a form of realism would not be out of the question, While it would presuppose the authority of divine speech and even of some human interpretations of it, this other-than natural theology would not, as naturalists might suppose, present a heteronomous conception of divine law, If the distinction nature/not nature would not be definitive for this theology, neither would those of autonomy/heteronomy, body/spirit, this world/other world, This theology would present its own variety of neutral monism; in this case, however, the undifferentiated plenum would be termed a plenum of undifferentiated signification (or pure semiosis), of which undifferentiated feeling (or pure experience) was an instance; "prehension" would be another term for interpretation, Max Kadushin was the first and, as far as I know, the only Jewish thinker to articulate a process theology in the service of what he considered the behavioral or halakhic authority of classical rabbinic literature. In this paper, I examine Kadushin's work as the foundation of a rabbinic text process theology, I assume, from the outset, that such a theology may complement a Jewish natural process theology and that a Jewish process theology, in general, would appear as a process of dialogue between textual- andnatural-process theologies. (shrink)

1. L'aspect le plus important du toucher est sa relation au temps et à l'étendue, relation constituée par le mouvement même du toucher. En référence aux conceptions de E. Straus, on expose la distinction entre le toucher et l'être-touché à la lumière d'expériences faites par nous avec des animaux. 2. Le toucher est un être-dans-les-limites-propres et en même temps un franchissement de ces limites, être par lequel l'objet touché est éprouvé à la fois comme „Gegenstand” et comme „Mitseiend”. „Pour le (...) tactile, c'est l'être à deux qui se place au premier rang.” L'affirmation de l'être par le sens du toucher est saisissante dans le cas du se-touchersoi-même, qui est une union exceptionnelle d'activité et de passivité. 3. La reconnaissance tactile de la forme présente elle aussi une dialectique d'activité et de passivité, dialectique qui procède sous la forme d'un développement surmontant le temps, et cela à partir d'un schéma produit dans l'acte même de préhension. On renvoie aux études de V. von Weizsäcker sur le „Gestaltkreis”. Il faut se rappeler aussi l'inquiétude primaire de la main, qui dans le jeu de la main avec un objet devient perdurante. 4. La main peut enserrer un objet. En ce faisant une image schématique tactile est donnée, image qui fonctionne comme hypothèse ou comme principe organisateur du développement prolèptique de l'exploration tactile ultérieure. L'analyse phénoménologique du toucher avec la main se révèle comme une préfiguration de la pensée par jugements synthétiques. Il est donc vrai, comme le remarquait Herder et comme le confirmaient Goldstein et Merleau-Ponty, que la perception telle que l'homme l'effectue et l'existence spirituelle sont identiques. 5. En se référant aux recherches de Révèsz et de Palagyi, on analyse le caractère propre du monde tactil. L'exploration tactile procède selon un véritable développement, donnant lieu à des déterminations anticipatives et rétrospectives qui assurent la continuité de l'événement et de son sens. La perception tactile permet de décrire l'unité continue des phases discontinues objectivement constatables, „comme si” attente et souvenir, jugements provisoires et vérification, fixations conceptuelles et corrections étaient mises en œuvre. 6. Important est l'aspect affectif et émotif des impressions tactiles et leur rapport aux relations interhumaines. 7. Par le toucher l'homme se trouve d'une manière „sensible” en relation personnelle avec cette matérialité des choses qui demeure cachée aux sens-à-distance. Cette participation a un double aspect. Elle est comme le surgissement d'un „état d'âme”, une '‚Befindlichkeit”, mais en même temps elle est le point de départ actif d'un sentir, d'un „comprendre”, d'un „saisir par le dedans”, d'un être-ému, d'un être-frappé par l'objet touché qui se rend présent comme un „quale” propre, comme une matière, comme un être-en-soi. On rappelle le caractère propre du caresser, par lequel l'„être à deux” de l'objet caressé devient complémentaire avec celui du caressant actif. Les concepts usuels par le moyen desquels, dans la vie pratiquement et gnostiquement vécue, sont indiquées les qualités tactiles les plus importantes, ont comme but de nous référer aux propriétés des choses qui prennent place dans le monde géométrique et dans l'espace objectivement mesurable et qui fondent notre orientation naturelle. On rappelle les recherches de von Homborstel au sujet des propriétés internodales des impressions tactiles. Celles-ci nous montrent comment un „savoir” qui accompagne ta perception peut changer une impression sensible. La relation affective, déterminée par un „savoir” nuancé et par un système de valeurs, change la réalité tangible, la substantialité du corps, de la „chair”. Ce changement affectif de la matière, cette „transsubstantiation phénoménale” peut se réaliser facilement par rapport à des objets dont nous savons qu'ils appartiennent ou ont appartenu à quelqu'un. La signification qu'a une chose change la matière de l'objet, objet qui, précisément par le toucher, se rend présent „en chair et en os”. On illustre ceci avec plus de précision grâce aux phénomènes du fétichisme et grâce à de simples expériences de la vie courante. Si nous cherchons un point de vue anthropologique à partir duquel le toucher, dont la main réalise les possibilités, peut prendre un sens, une approche d'un tel point de vue devra s'effectuer à partir de la certitude non-représentable que l'unité ontique de la nature et de l'esprit est dans l'homme la réalité d'une participation possible, participation qui, dans notre existence, n'est qu'indiquée. L'„inquiétude” de la main jamais remplie et toujours chercheuse que nous avons remarquée, est le signe humain de notre existence concrète. Ainsi le toucher nous montre ce que Valéry remarquait à propos de l'esprit : „L'esprit est à la merci du corps, comme les aveugles sont à la merci des voyants.”. (shrink)

This paper contends that soft computing can help us investigate the aesthetics of digital computation. Employing broader conceptions of aesthetics and perception, and whilst drawing upon the ontology of Alfred N. Whitehead, it uses soft computing to address the 'prehensive' dimension of the quantitative procedures of computation, and explores the interrelationship between the factuality and formality of computational structures.