A controversy over the pudgala or “person” raged among Indian Buddhists for more than a millennium. Their polemics were at least as much a matter of canonical exegesis as of reasoning and argument, for the “mainstream” Buddhist doctors had to account for—and explain away—the numerous places in scripture where the Buddha speaks of the “person.” The Bhārahārasūtra or “sūtra on the bearer of the burden” was one of the scriptures most frequently quoted and discussed in this connection. The present (...) paper is aimed at presenting a reconstructed Sanskrit version of this sūtra and providing an overview of the doctrinal and argumentative uses that were made of it in the context of the debates about the status of the “person.”. (shrink)

This article examines the Buddhist idea of anātman, ‘no- self ’ and pudgala, ‘the person’ in relation to the notion of ‘self ’ emerging from contemporary cognitive science. The Buddhist no-self doctrine is enriched by the cognitive scientist’s understanding of the multiple facets of selfhood, or structures of experience, and the causative action of a functional self in the world. A proper understanding of the Buddhist concepts of anātman and pudgala proves critical to mindfulness-based therapeutic interventions: this is (...) as the ‘person’, as constituted by various structures of selfhood, including—the ecological, interpersonal, extended, private, narrative, relational and conceptual selves—which may be disrupted by traumatic events which disorder one’s experience of time, defence, relationality, memory, resource and agency. In the absence of this understanding, the no-self doctrine might encourage a sort of bypass, in which traumatic facets of selfhood are overlooked in the quest for spiritual liberation. With a proper understanding of the function served by the Buddhist concepts of no-self and ‘person’, psychotherapeutic work may be situated as a necessary ‘preliminary practice’ for meditative exploration of deeper transpersonal domains and soteriological goals. (shrink)

The theme of our conference is “The Concept of a Person”. One of the most original attitudes of the Buddha towards this problem was to have dissuaded his followers from clinging to the concept of “person”. The word “person” in P li is puggala, which represents in early middle Indian dialect puthakala, a derivation of Sanskrit: prithak. [2] Puggala means person or man, an individual as opposed to a group. Its equivalent in Sanskrit is pudgala., which means a personal (...) entity or an individual. If there were any unique and permanent substance unifying this personal entity, it would be the self or the soul, attan in Pali and tman in Sanskrit. The self and the person are closely related to each other. I will trace the evolution of these two notions as treated in some Buddhist texts, firstly in the primitive basic Buddhist texts in verse or in short sentences, secondly in the prose part of some s tras and finally in later developed Mah y na Buddhist texts. Then I will confront these notions with the experience of their followers, by taking the example of Zen master Dōgen. (shrink)

This article focuses on the under-researched Buddhist textKathāvatthu(“Points of Controversy”) and aims to better determine its place within Indian philosophy. We consider how the text was compiled, its contents, and main characteristics (such as its genre, its classification lists –mātika). To understand some of those characteristics, we suggest viewing them as shared with the whole Pali Canon (a large body of heterogeneous texts, of which theKathāvatthuis part). This article also illustrates the issues of translating religious and philosophical texts from the (...) Pāli language. Particularly, we highlight that theKathāvatthubelongs to the part of Pāli Canon known as theAbhidhamma Piṭaka, and consider how this influences the philosophical discourse presented in this text. We analyze the historical and philosophical content of theKathāvatthu. We argue that such content of this work is consistently revealed in the discussion of issues controversial for the schools of Early Buddhism. At the beginning of the text, there are the most significant questions for Early Buddhism (about the subject (pudgala), about the one who has reached perfection –arhat). As we get closer to the end of the text, the importance of the issues discussed diminishes. Its final part contains the latest questions. The discussion in each question depends on the logical method of the eight refutations, the use of lists (mātika), and the position of the Theravada school to which the final version of the text belongs. In the article, special attention is paid to the determination of theKathāvatthugenre. We conclude that the genre of this work can be considered as a unique example of religious and philosophical dialogue in Early Buddhist literature. (shrink)

The article examines the controversy between the “orthodox” Indian philosophical school Vaiśeṣika and one of the greatest Buddhist philosophers - Vasubandhu on the existence of subject as a reality. The discussion is investigated on the example of the text “Pudgalaviniścaya”. PV of Vasubandhu - literally “Study on the Self”, or “pudgala” - is traditionally considered the 9th chapter of “Abhidharmakośabhaṣya” of the same author and is one of the most important polemical treatises on the self, or ātman, in Buddhist (...) philosophy. Among the issues discussed are the famous “epistemological argument”, the ability of recall and perception, how a difference between moments of consciousness is possible, whether the substrate for consciousness is necessary. One of the strategies of Vasubandhu is that he tries to find internal contradictions in the arguments of opponents. We can say that the main argument of Vasubandhu is aimed at justifying the mechanism of the cause-and-effect occurrence of all phenomena. If the Vaiśeṣikas proceed from their logic about the need for a substance for qualities, then Vasubandhu tries to persuade them to his side and offer a fundamentally new explanatory model, according to which there are only sequence-like moments-phenomena that flow from each other according to the law of cause and effect. (shrink)

The proposed paper wishes to reflect on the conception of non-self and Shunyta and how these ideas are discerned in the process of remaking of Man as it is understood in the classical Indian philosophy. The concept of non-self is very carefully elaborated in such a way that it could define the unique relationship that thehuman being have with the world of existence where remaking of man is an absolute necessity to transact with the uncertain and indescribable phenomenal world. The (...) paper would prefer to review this aspect based on the method employed by the Madhyamika Buddhist philosophy, using the idea of shnyata where allphenomenal experiences are delineated based on selflessness of the phenomenal world and of the subjective self (dharmanairatmya and pudgalanairatmya). It is argued here that the conception of self is understandable only contextually where a notional subjective self is in contact with phenomenal happenings of the world, but a proper understanding of either of the entities would reveal the conception of selflessness and the notional self. The procedure of “remaking ofman” is explained as the proper discernment of essencelessness of subjective self. The notion of a real self (pudgala) is clearly understood by reconstructing the psychophysical personality of man that the notion of selflessness is revealed by explaining the function of his dispositions and feelings. A proper conception of sunyata and the procedure remaking of man are intrinsically connected. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Philosophical Meditations on Zen BuddhismWhalen LaiPhilosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism. By Dale S. Wright. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. xv + 227.As "philosophical meditations" on the Zen of Huang Po, Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism by Dale S. Wright is an impressive work. Philosophers will appreciate it, for it well shows how far Zen studies in America have moved ahead since the days of D. T. Suzuki (...) and Alan Watts. Just as Bernard Faure has deconstructed "Suzuki Zen," Dale S. Wright has here de-romanticized John Blofeld's 1959 book on Huang Po, the third "house" in the Hung-chou lineage of Ma-tsu Tao-I, being the successor to Pai-chang and master to Lin-chi.Wright's "post-romantic" reading strives for relevance in contemporary discourse. Each of the chapters takes up a key topic that dovetails into the next and escalates from Textuality, Reading, Understanding, Language, Rhetoric, and History to Freedom, Transcendence, Mind, and Enlightenment. Concerning the first, Textuality, it is shown how Blofeld has taken the records of Huang Po as true and holistic—a view that has been disputed by modern scholarship, which details a complex history of accretion instead. Renouncing the former romance with its single portraiture, Wright accepts the critical approach. Huang Po exists, then, as a series of images projected by the respondent Zen community. Wright then recalls the Buddhist doctrine of "no-self" (in the context of there being no unchanging Huang Po) and notes how a number of masters in that mountain-based lineage were also named Huang Po. In short, whereas Bernard Faure has dissolved the early images of Bodhidharma into a number of literary skandhas (heaps), fragments that do not even add up to a pudgala (fictive whole), Wright finds these socially constructed images to be born out of (Buddhist) "dependent origination" vis-à-vis the Zen community.This leads to the next topic, on how one should read a text. Wary of Blofeld's strong belief, a hermeneutics of faith that is possibly masking modern, subjective bias and projections, Wright sees a need for critical distance while granting the text its own horizon or an "otherness" that engages the reader anew. All ten chapters follow this format of pitting point against counterpoint before ruminating on some lead gleamed from the repertoire of Buddhist doctrines. Some chapters are more subtle than others, but all work to jog the reader into a sudden recognition of some past prejudice while offering a fresh take on the material. The book, though not always easy, nonetheless deserves a close reading by any and all Zen enthusiasts.Wright's choice of target—Blofeld and Huang Po—is somewhat of an unexpected delight. As with Buberism in Hasidic studies, D. T. Suzuki has perpetuated a certain "Suzuki-ism" in the Zen field, but compared with Suzuki or even Watts, Blofeld is never known to be that independent a thinker as to deserve similar attention. An eclectic collector of Eastern esoterica, Blofeld's "romance" with the Orient is not always that reflective; sometimes he just reports what he was told, unvarnished. His "romanticism" is thus often second- or thirdhand. The introduction to his 1959 work is anything but aggressive; he sounds at times all too apologetic. But [End Page 631] precisely because of this, Wright is able to cite Blofeld and use him to get at a more general but pervasive set of European "romantic" assumptions about the Buddhist East and submit that to a coherent and intriguing critique. He also whets our appetite for a good, intellectual biography of Blofeld, which we do not have. We do not really get a good picture of Huang Po either—but then, asking for that might be chalked up to a yearning for "romance" or just wishful thinking. One longs for some middle ground.That is because, unlike Descartes' Meditations, which set forth a singular, modern rationality, Wright's postmodern Meditation cannot help but suggest just one way of dealing with the polysemy of the text. Perhaps some histoire de mentalité in the future can restore some sense of the significance of Huang Po the person and his historic hour. Maybe a different... (shrink)

General opinion holds that the Abhidhamma treats the Buddha’s teachings in terms of ultimate realities, i.e. dhammas, and that conventional constructs such as persons fall outside the primary concern of the Abhidhamma. The present paper re-examines this ultimate-conventional dichotomy drawn between dhammas and persons and argues that this dichotomy does not hold true for the canonical Abhidhamma in Pali. This study explores how various types of persons are interpreted and approached by the Abhidhamma material, including Abhidhamma texts such as the (...) Puggalapaññatti and a number of suttas in the Aṅguttara Nikāya that are identified in this paper as proto- Abhidhamma. (shrink)