Neutral monism is the view that both ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are grounded in a more fundamental form of reality that is intrinsically neither mental nor material. It has often been treated as an odd fringe theory deserving of at most a footnote in the broader philosophical debates. Yet such attitudes do a grave disservice to its sophistications and significance for late nineteenth and early twentieth-century philosophy of mind and psychology. This paper sheds light on this neglected view by situating (...) it within broader historical monist debates about the mind and bringing attention to one of its central internal disputes regarding ‘mental chemistry’. By taking a closer look at how Ernst Mach, William James, and Bertrand Russell address the question of whether and how our mental episodes are composed of more basic elements, it highlights deep differences among their conceptions of the fundamental ‘neutral stuff’ and its relations to ‘mind’ and ‘matter’. (shrink)

Starting from Flusser’s most explicit statements about irony, self-irony, and the Devil, I try to make some sense of the relations, in Flusser’s thought, between language, reality and scepticism. And, perhaps most importantly, I try to clarify Flusser’s notion of the role of philosophy proper. This analysis will bring us to a puzzling spectrum I see hovering over Flusser’s ideas: the eradication of boundaries between the ontological and the ethical. That is what I call Flusser’s radical immanent monism.

Scott Hershovitz’s Law is a Moral Practice develops a bold, novel, and comprehensive account of law: the moral practice picture. Its central thesis is that legal relations (rights, duties, powers, etc.) are moral. They are real, full-fledged normative relations, connected to genuine reasons for action, and endowed with robust normativity. Nothing less than ordinary moral relations. The account is compounded with a deflationary view of theories in general jurisprudence and of the debates about them. In this vein, Hershovitz recommends that (...) we move away from theorising about law (understood as a set of legal norms), and focus on the nature of legal relations instead. In this paper, I pursue two interrelated objectives. First, I address Hershovitz’s main arguments for the view that legal relations are moral. Second, I take issue with the asymmetry between the deflationary and inflationary stances he advocates for legal norms and relations, respectively, arguing that this different treatment is unwarranted, because the deflationary stance is, and because this very combination of attitudes is unstable. Properly understood, questions about the nature and determination of legal norms and relations can’t but be seen as complementary aspects of a unified legal metaphysics. (shrink)

This essay discusses monism and pluralism about two related evaluative notions: welfare, or what makes people better off, and value simpliciter, or what makes the world better. These are stipulatively referred to as 'axiological value'. Axiological value property monists hold that one of these notions is reducible to the other (or else eliminable), while axiological value property pluralists deny this. Substantive monists about axiological value hold that there is just one basic kind of thing that makes our lives or (...) the world better, while substantive pluralists hold that there is more than one such thing. A more radical kind of pluralism holds that each of the plurality of good things is good in its own way, thus raising questions concerning value comparability and compensability. The essay elucidates these theories and discusses important arguments for and against them. (shrink)

Moderate Monism is the position that permanent, but not temporary, coincidence entails identity. Harold Noonan writes: " According to the moderate monist if God creates ex nihilo a bronze statue and later annihilates it, destroying both the statue and the bronze of which it is composed , the statue and the bronze are identical. If, however, God simply radically reshapes the bronze at t10 the statue ceases to exist and the piece of bronze survives, so despite their coincidence up (...) to t10 the statue and the piece of bronze are two things. ". (shrink)

Radical phenomenology is nonintentional phenomenology, and it opposes what Michel Henry has designated since The Essence of Manifestation "onto-phenomenological monism,"1 according to which appearing is always ecstatic, that is, transcendent. Contrary to monism, radical phenomenology maintains a dualism of appearing: underlying the intentionally given, life reveals itself in pure immanence. Nonetheless, this living self-affection can never appear to intentionality, although the second is grounded in the first: they are two modes of appearing that are essentially different. (...) While the very essence of appearing or manifestation lies in immanent self-affection, intentional appearing is derived from and second to .. (shrink)

Heraclitus accepts as a principle that any particular insight into things is necessarily partial and perspectival. Edward Halper has discussed how, for this reason, it is in principle impossible for a particular thinker to attain the perspective of the Logos by which the whole can be made intelligible. So, metaphysics itself tells us that metaphysics is impossible. According to Halper, Heraclitus was wrong to take the Logos as applying to itself, as the Logos should properly be understood as applying only (...) to what is not a product of human agency. I argue that Halper’s move cannot serve as a corrective patch to Heraclitus’ metaphysical thought, since it posits a distinction between the human and the rest of reality which Heraclitus could never accept. Although not a radical monist who denies the reality of all multiplicity, a fundamental principle of his thought is that all distinctions and oppositions are grounded in a more fundamental unity. I instead approach the Heraclitean paradox by appealing to the strategy, familiar from a number of ancient Greek philosophers, of making a distinction between different levels of knowledge inherent within the same knower. (shrink)

Summary This article re-examines the political thought of the neglected Fabian essayist and radical journalist William Clarke. Historians have differed over the relative importance of socialism and liberalism in Clarke's political thought. The argument is made here that the key to Clarke's thought lies in his moralised conception of democracy, rooted in his monist ontology. The further deepening of democracy was threatened for Clarke by developments in monopolistic capitalism and the related emergence of a new imperialism. Clarke's understanding of (...) democracy, rather than more overtly economic considerations, lies at the heart of his political religion, and links his views on domestic and foreign affairs. As befits a philosophical monist, his political thought reveals the limitations of established dichotomies for grasping the character of progressivism in late nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain. (shrink)

Between 1653 and 1655 Margaret Cavendish makes a radical transition in her theory of matter, rejecting her earlier atomism in favour of an infinitely-extended and infinitely-divisible material plenum, with matter being ubiquitously self-moving, sensing, and rational. It is unclear, however, if Cavendish can actually dispense of atomism. One of her arguments against atomism, for example, depends upon the created world being harmonious and orderly, a premise Cavendish herself repeatedly undermines by noting nature’s many disorders. I argue that her supposed (...) difficulties with atomism expose a deeper tension in her work between two fundamental metaphysical commitments each of which has substantial philosophical support: her monist theory of the material world (which maintains that there exists just one natural substance which is the single principal cause) and her occasional theory of causation (which requires multiple finite principal causes in nature -- causes that might be considered individual substances). Her monism undermines atomism while her theory of occasional cause seems to rest on a conception of nature that would be especially friendly to atomism. I argue further that we can solve this tension within a Cavendishian framework in such a way as to preserve her theory of causation and her monism, but that this solution depends upon our taking her monism in a particular (and weak) form. I finally note that we can best make sense of her unique and interesting form of monism by acknowledging her social-political motivations in addition to her motivations in natural philosophy. (shrink)

According to “existence monism,” there is only one concrete particular, the cosmos as a whole (Horgan and Potrč 2000, 2008). According to “priority monism,” there are many concrete particulars, but all are ontologically dependent upon the cosmos as a whole, which accordingly is the only fundamental concrete particular (Schaffer 2010a, 2010b). In essence, the difference between them is that existence monism does not recognize any parts of the cosmos, whereas priority monism does – it just insists (...) that the parts are ontologically dependent upon the whole in this case. Brentano never maintained either of these views. But in the last two years of his life, he seems to have held the following approximation: there is only one physical substance, namely, the material universe as a whole. This is twice removed from existence or priority monism: first, it allows for a plurality of mental substances (souls); secondly, it allows for a plurality of physical accidents, which in Brentano’s reistic ontology are also concrete particulars. Still, the view that the only physical substance is the universe as a whole is quite radical and finds little precedent in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

Judith Shklar’s liberalism of fear, a political and philosophical standpoint that emerges in her mature work, has ostensibly two defining characteristics. It is a sceptical approach that puts cruelty first among the vices. For that reason, it is considered to be both set apart from mainstream liberalism, in particular the liberalism of J. S. Mill and John Rawls, but also an important source of influence for political realists and nonideal theorists. However, I argue here that, in putting cruelty first among (...) the vices, Shklar also offers a value monist approach to political thought, one that she shares with Mill and Rawls as well. Each claims to have identified the general rule for the resolution of moral conflicts, although they disagree about what that rule is. Therefore, Shklar’s mature work combines scepticism with value monism. As such, it represents a radical departure from the value pluralist approach to moral conflict evident in her early work. Her commentators have not noticed either her mature monism or the move away from her earlier value pluralism, and this is explained by a tendency to see her mature work as offering simply a sceptical alternative to mainstream liberalism. (shrink)

In Spinoza’s substance monism, radically different attributes constitute the essence of one and the same substance qua a strongly unified whole. Showing how this is possible poses a formidable Cartesian challenge to Spinoza’s metaphysics. In this paper I suggest a reconstruction of Spinoza’s notion of substance that meets this challenge and explains a major feature of this notion. I then show how this reconstruction can be used to resolve two fundamental problems of the Cartesian framework that pertain to Spinoza’s (...) metaphysics. On this basis, I then explain two further major features of Spinoza’s notion of substance. While my suggested reconstruction has all these advantages and accords well with Spinoza’s conceptual framework, it goes beyond what he explicitly says concerning substance monism. It is in the spirit of his metaphysical framework rather than in its letter. Thus, all I intend to show is that Spinoza has the conceptual resources for coming to terms with some of the deep problems that beset his metaphysics. (shrink)

This chapter considers the possibility of Nihilism, that nothing exists, and its alternative, Aliquidism, that something exists. This will lead us into an investigation of the point of positing existing things. The chapter looks at the debate between Monists, who believe in only one thing, and Pluralists, who believe in many. It also considers both radical and more moderate forms of both Nihilism and Monism, including, for example, Priority Monism. The chapter examines four arguments for Monism: (...) those of Parmenides, Spinoza, Bradley, and Jonathan Schaffer. Parmenides of Elea authored a single work, a poem traditionally titled On Nature. In the first part of this poem, Parmenides seems to be arguing for Monism. Baruch Spinoza offered a set of metaphysical arguments that could be interpreted as attempting to show that only one thing exists. The chapter considers the import of Bradley's Regress for Constituent Realism, UPRealism combined with Constituent Ontology. (shrink)

Existence monism (EM) is a metaphysical view asserting the existence of only one concrete object. EM is well known for its radicalness, and encounters difficulty in terms of its prima facie inconsistency with truisms. This paper aims to propose an alternative (and somewhat easy) way to overcome this difficulty and indicate another means by which the possibility of EM can be defended. I will present a package of theses that are intended to be combined with EM, which I call (...) Linguistic Ontology with the One as Semantic Glue (LOOSG). I will show that this package (in combination with EM) provides a systematic explanation as to why truisms hold while only one concrete object actually exists. In other words, I will argue that if an existence monist embraces LOOSG, the desired explanation for truisms is then available to her. In addition, it will also be noted that LOOSG has a theoretical virtue, in that it only presupposes the framework of standard semantics. Based on these discussions, I offer LOOSG as a viable option for existence monism. (shrink)

In both his life and poetry, The Ruined Cottage marked a decisive breakthrough for Wordsworth, which resulted from his daring adoption and sustained use of a monistic idea. Though hitherto mostly dismissed or construed as a derivative of Platonism, Stoicism, Christian mysticism, and/or other conventional English and European concepts and usually seen as part of his supposedly quietist retreat from radical politics, the philosophy of One Life which Wordsworth promoted was in reality a recognizably unconventional conceptual innovation, which indeed (...) made possible his poetic and political innovations in The Ruined Cottage and beyond. In the larger context of ideas that extends well beyond England and Europe and involves in particular the Chinese cosmological belief in tianren heyi or humanity’s unity with heaven, this essay explores Wordsworth’s innovative use of monism in The Ruined Cottage and argues for a significantly different understanding of Wordsworth and the related rise of English Romanticism. (shrink)

As British and American idealism waned, new realisms displaced them. The common background of these new realisms emphasized the problem of the external world and the mind-body problem, as bequeathed by Reid, Hamilton, and Mill. During this same period, academics on both sides of the Atlantic recognized that the natural sciences were making great strides. Responses varied. In the United States, philosophical response focused particularly on functional psychology and Darwinian adaptedness. This article examines differing versions of that response in William (...) James and Roy Wood Sellars. James viewed the mind as a “fighter for ends.” His neutral monism, by taming the mind-body problem and the problem of the external world, provided a secure metaphysics of mind as functional activity. In contrast, Sellars ’s scientific realism endorsed physical reality but was not mechanistic or reductionist. His critical realism and evolutionary naturalism offered novel metaphysical and epistemological positions in comparison with other American and British realisms. James and Sellars are distinguished from British philosophy in 1890–1918 in the types of realism they endorsed and in their success at introducing Darwinian evolutionary considerations and functional psychology into mainstream philosophy. (shrink)

Essays in radical empiricism: Does "consciousness" exist? A world of pure experience. The thing and its relations. How two minds can know one thing. The place of affectional facts in a world of pure experience. The experience of activity. The essence of humanism. La notion de conscience.--A pluralistic universe: The types of philosophic thinking. Monistic idealism. Hegel and his method. Concerning Fechner. The compounding of consciousness. Bergson and the critique of intellectualism. The continuity of experience. Conclusions. Notes. Appendix: On (...) the notion of reality as changing. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that the anti-reductionist thesis supports a case for the uselessness of intentional idioms in the interpretation of highly flexible, self-modifying agents that I refer to as “hyperplastic” agents. An agent is hyperplastic if it can make arbitrarily fine changes to any part of its functional or physical structure without compromising its agency or its capacity for hyperplasticity. Using Davidson’s anomalous monism (AM) as an exemplar of anti-reductionism, I argue that AM implies that no hyperplastic (...) could use intentional psychology to predict its future intentional states or the psychological consequences of self-alterations. This is because AM implies there would be no laws allowing the hyperplastic to infer the psychological consequences of its self-alterations. This implies that no generalisations linking current to future psychological states would hold either - these could always be defeated by a self-intervention carried out by the hyperplastic. By the same token, neither hyperplastics nor human interpreters could use intentional psychology to understand the behaviour of other hyperplastics. Radical interpretation of hyperplastic agents - if such there were - would be impossible. It follows that were humans to become hyperplastic posthumans, intentional psychology would have to be instrumentally eliminated because neither the capacity nor the linguistic idiom for attributing propositional attitudes would retain predictive or hermeneutic utility. (shrink)

El argumento cosmológico en su variante racionalista está compuesto por al menos dos premisas fundamentales: la premisa según la cual hay seres explicados por otros seres y el principio de razón suficiente. Ambas premisas son plausibles si se las toma individualmente. El problema es que tomadas conjuntamente conducen a un resultado irracional. Aquí propongo sacrificar uno de los aspectos del principio de razón suficiente, precisamente aquel aspecto que nos conduce a tal resultado irracional. Sin embargo, este sacrificio implica aceptar que (...) el argumento cosmológico fracasa en su propósito fundamental. (shrink)

The paper gives a reconstruction of Donald Davidson’s theory of primary reasons in the context of the unified theory of meaning and action and its ontology of individual events. This is a necessary task to understand this philosophy of language and action because since his article “Actions, Reasons, and Causes” he has developed and modified his proposal on describing and explaining actions. He has expanded the “unified theory” to a composite theory of beliefs and desires as a total theory of (...) behavior. At first, the anomalous monism was a byproduct. Yet, the step to this philosophy of the mental is not contingent. It will be shown that the anomalous monism as the primary feature of the mental does not lead us to a materialic monism in our ontology. If the evidence of radical interpretation has no echo in natural science, we have to give up materialism.Following this, I will argue for a pure anomalism. Or, in other words, for the ascription of propositional attitudes given by the semantical analysis of sentences of such attitudes does not commit us to a materialistc framework in our ontological thinking. Yet, to understand Davidson’s unified theory, we have to grasp the role of individual events in this framework since the ontological reduction of individual events explains par example the relation between the mind and the body, and the possibility of autonomous action in the world of causality. I do not argue for a dualism of properties between the physical of the mental in the manner of other philosophers, since from the radical interpreters point the empirical restrictions of the speaker’s attitudes and behavior cannot be fixed for all cases. (shrink)

Feyerabend had many interlocutors in his controversial career, and one of them was Kuhn. One key point of contention in their interaction was the divergence between the monism inherent in Kuhnian normal science and Feyerabend’s pluralism about the content and methodology of science and other systems of knowledge. In this paper I offer my perspective on this disagreement. After presenting Feyerabend’s critique of Kuhn, I argue that the disagreement between Kuhn and Feyerabend on this point was not as (...) class='Hi'>radical as it may appear. Feyerabend respected the autonomy of diverse cultural and epistemological traditions, and such traditions are often monistic within themselves, in the manner of Kuhnian normal science. On the other hand, Kuhnian revolutions require the presence of competing paradigms at least during periods of extraordinary science. I propose a pluralist position that can accommodate local monism, but ultimately recommends going beyond monism for the purpose of productive interactions between different systems of practice. Such a pluralism can incorporate the advantages of both Feyerabend’s liberal epistemology and Kuhn’s advocacy of disciplined normal science. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article probes Jonathan Israel’s theory about ‘Radical Enlightenment’ inaugurating political modernity by way of explicating the thought of Joseph Priestley. In Israel’s view, despite the inconsistencies plaguing Socinian thought, Priestley, a monist, emerged as an ardent supporter of religious toleration and democratic republicanism. This article seeks to restore the fundamental coherence of Priestley’s theological and metaphysical views, arguing that they were produced as parts of a system founded on the simultaneous adherence to providentialism and necessitarianism. Prized as a (...) prerequisite of the unfolding of the divine plan, the unobstructed expression of religious opinions was the centre of the conception of civil society and civil liberty that Priestley articulated based on these premises and his forays into politics aimed to secure its permanence. A comparison of Priestley’s stance on the issue of manhood suffrage with that of Richard Price reveals not the materialist Priestley, but Price, a dualist, as an advocate of democratization and casts into doubt the applicability of Israel’s scheme in the case of England. The article closes with some suggestions towards reappraising the relationship between Enlightenment and modernity. (shrink)

Review of Erik C. Banks, The Realistic Empiricism of Mach, James, and Russell: Neutral Monism Reconceived.

Plotinus maintains that there is a single first principle, the One (or the Good), from which all other things derive. He is usually thought to hold this view on the grounds that any other thing’s existence depends on its participation in a paradigm of unity. This paper argues that Plotinus has a further, independent argument for adopting a single first principle, according to which principle pluralism is committed (unacceptably) to attributing good cosmic states of affairs to chance. This argument exhibits (...) similarities to ancient design arguments, but is used to draw the more radical conclusion that there is only one non-derivative existent. (shrink)

I conceive of Spinoza’s substance monism as a response to Aristotle’s prohibition against actual infinity for one key reason: nature, being all things, is necessarily infi nite. Spinoza encapsulates his substance monism with the phrase, “Deus sive Natura,” implying that there is only one infinite substance, which also possesses an infi nity of attributes, of which we are but modes. These logical delineations of substance never actually break up God’s reality. Aristotle’s well-known argument against the reality of an (...) actual infinity in his Physics prohibits the existence of an actually infinite bodily substance because it would necessarily “destroy” (Physics 204b26-27) all other elements or bodies. On Aristotle’s view, there is a fundamental and concrete distinction between things: each substance is primarily a this (Categories 3b10). I maintain that Spinoza’s rationalism and radicalization of the principle of sufficient reason lends him greater explanatory potential than Aristotle to justify the (non) existence of actual infinity. (shrink)

Today, happily, we have much less confidence than a Montesquieu or a Hegel in depicting the “spirits” of nations, times, and generations. The more intelligible such depictions are, and the more suitable for their role in world–historical drama, the less plausible they seem to those whose spirits they are supposed to be. For no matter how subtly drawn and with no matter how many reservations, they remain in the end categories. The application of categories to any living subject matter itself (...) generates a categorial malaise: the category is clear, but life while it illustrates that category, also illustrates its opposite, as well as an indefinite number of other categories not encompassed in either the one or the other. (shrink)

The paper examines Kant’s idea of autonomy as well as his conception of radical evil against the background of the theological tradition relevant to him. It is shown that both of them can be understood as ethical secularizations of theological concepts—the freedom of God and the concept of original sin—and that in both cases the problems of the theological tradition reoccur.

In this paper, I develop a comparison between the philosophies of Husserl and James in relation to their concepts of experience. Whereas various authors have acknowledged the affinity between James’ early psychology and Husserl’s phenomenology, the late development of James’ philosophy is often considered in opposition to Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. This is because James’ radical empiricism achieves a non-dual dimension of experience that precedes the functional division into subject and object, thus contrasting with the phenomenological analysis of the dual (...) structure of intentionality. However, I argue that the later “genetic” development of phenomenology converges with some central aspects of James’ radical empiricism. This is because genetic phenomenology leads us to conceive of the flow of primal impressions as a fundamental dimension of experience that precedes the subject-object duality and is at the base of the process of co-constitution of the subject and the object in reciprocal dependence. At the same time, Husserl conceives of the impressional core of experience as structured by formal conditions that depend on the concrete constitution of an embodied subject. For this reason, I argue that Husserl’s genetic phenomenology can complement James’ radical empiricism, thus leading to the development of the doctrine of pure experience as a form of empirical and not metaphysical realism. (shrink)

“Why did God create the World?” is one of the traditional questions of theology. In the twentieth century this question was rephrased in a secularized manner as “Why is there something rather than nothing?” While creation - at least in its traditional, temporal, sense - has little place in Spinoza’s system, a variant of the same questions puts Spinoza’s system under significant pressure. According to Spinoza, God, or the substance, has infinitely many modes. This infinity of modes follow from the (...) essence of God. If we ask: “Why must God have modes?,” we seem to be trapped in a real catch. On the one hand, Spinoza’s commitment to thoroughgoing rationalism demands that there must be a reason for the existence of the radical plurality of modes. On the other hand, the asymmetric dependence of modes on the substance seems to imply that the substance does not need the modes, and that it can exist without the modes. But if the substance does not need the modes, then why are there modes at all? Furthermore, Spinoza cannot explain the existence of modes as an arbitrary act of grace on God’s side since Spinoza’s God does not act arbitrarily. Surprisingly, this problem has hardly been addressed in the existing literature on Spinoza’s metaphysics, and it is my primary aim here to draw attention to this problem. In the first part of the paper I will present and explain the problem of justifying the existence of infinite plurality modes in Spinoza’s system. In the second part of the paper I consider the radical solution to the problem according to which modes do not really exist, and show that this solution must be rejected upon consideration. In the third and final part of the paper I will suggest my own solution according to which the essence of God is active and it is this feature of God’s essence which requires the flow of modes from God’s essence. I also suggest that Spinoza considered radical infinity and radical unity to be roughly the same, and that the absolute infinity of what follow from God’s essence is grounded in the absolute infinity of God’s essence itself. (shrink)

A natural question to raise about words—or about their mental analogue, concepts—is: in virtue of what facts do they refer to whatever it is that they refer to? In virtue of what does the word ‘insanity’ refer to insanity, the word ‘entropy’ refer to entropy, and so forth? There is a view called “disquotationalism” according to which this question is misconceived. I’ll have something to say about that later. But putting disquotationalism aside for now, it would seem that this question (...) about words or concepts needs an answer. And the only kind of answer we can take seriously is a naturalistic answer: the Brentanian answer that words or concepts refer by virtue of irreducibly mental connections between the mind and the world is not a serious contender. What if no naturalistic answer is possible? If we put disquotationalism aside, the only conclusion to be drawn is that the assumption that ‘insanity’ and ‘entropy’ determinately refer to insanity and to entropy is an illusion. (shrink)

Emergentism is often misleadingly described as a monolithic “third way” between radical monism and pluralism. In the particular case of biology, for example, emergentism is perceived as a middle course between mechanicism and vitalism. In the present paper I propose to show that the conceptual landscape between monism and pluralism is more complex than this classical picture suggests. On the basis of two successive analyses—distinguishing three forms of tension between monism and pluralism and a distinction between (...) derivational and functional reduction—I define three different versions of emergentism that can be considered as consistent middle courses between monism and pluralism . I then emphasise the advantage of this taxonomy of the concepts of emergence by applying the results of my analysis to the historical controversy that pertains to the relationship between life and matter. (shrink)

The late Daniel Albright was one of the preeminent scholars of musical and literary modernism, leaving behind a rich body of work before his untimely passing. In the essays contained in Music's Monisms, he shows how musical phenomena, like literary ones, can be fruitfully investigated through the lens of monism, the philosophical belief that things that appear to be two are actually one. Albright shows how, in music, despite its many binaries-diatonic vs. chromatic, staccato vs. legato, major vs. minor, (...) tonal vs. atonal-there is always a larger system at work that aims to reconcile all tension and resolve all conflict. Albright identifies a "radical monism" in the work of modernist poets such as T. S. Eliot and musical works by Wagner, Debussy, Britten, Schoenberg, and Stravinsky, and also delves into figures such as Maeterlinck, Rimbaud, and Yeats along the way. Through a series of close readings of musical and literary works, Albright advances powerful philosophical arguments that not only shed light on these specific figures but also aesthetic experience in general. (shrink)

In an affectionate aside on Vico’s conception of history, which in our own time might have led Vico himself to a fresh reading of technology, Hannah Arendt observes.

Shamik Dasgupta (2016) proposes to tame the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) to apply to only non-autonomous facts, which are facts that are apt for explanation. Call this strategy to tame the PSR the taming strategy. In a recent paper, Della Rocca (2020a) argues that proponents of the taming strategy, in attempting to formulate a restricted version of the PSR, nevertheless find themselves committed to endorsing a form of radical monism, which, in turn, leads right back to an (...) untamed-PSR. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that Della Rocca is right. My question is this: Is there reason to believe the principle of sufficient reason (in its untamed version)? In this paper, I argue that it is impossible for there to be a reason to believe the untamed-PSR. (shrink)

THE OPTION proposed by Weiss's Modes of Being is between a radical monism which denies a plurality of beings and a radical pluralism which demands the imperfection of God. The dilemma is stated thus: Either there is a perfect God, as the Hebraic-Christian tradition holds, and no other actual beings; or there are other actual beings and, at best, an imperfect God. Weiss resolves the dilemma in favour of a radical pluralism and a supreme but imperfect (...) God. Multiple proofs secure a God who is one of four interrelated modes of Being. To propose an absolutely perfect God would be to make it "impossible to acknowledge the independent reality and excellence of anything else." Quite simply, if God were all that is, there could be no more; but there is more, and so God is not all that is. (shrink)

THIS IS A REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF THE TWO-VOLUME COLLECTION ON DONALD DAVIDSON'S PHILOSOPHY: "ACTIONS AND EVENTS" AND "TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION", LEPORE AND MCLAUGHLIN (EDS), BLACKWELL, 1985 AND 1986. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED MORE AT LENGTH ARE THE EXPLANATION OF ACTION, ANOMALOUS MONISM, AND RADICAL INTERPRETATION.

I show how the Cosmological Argument (CA) is undermined by one of its own premises: the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). First, I explain the type of CA that I am thinking about. Second, I explain a traditional modal objection against the PSR, which is ultimately based upon our intuitions in favor of contingency. Third, I show how this modal objection begs the question against the necessitarian, and then I reformulate the CA in more neutral terms. Fourth, using this more (...) neutral version of the CA, I argue that the main problem with the PSR goes way beyond its apparent necessitarian consequences. As an argument used by Bradley shows, embracing the rationalist path that underlies the PSR seems to commit us to a form of Radical Monism. I conclude by showing how this result ultimately undermines the CA. (shrink)

Irad Kimhi considers the conundrum, first addressed by Parmenides, of how negative facts can be the case and be thought, to be the puzzle that philosophy has been working to solve since Plato and Aristotle and wants to do his part by criticizing Frege's dissociation of sense and force and developing a more Aristotelian account of judgment. Michael Della Rocca considers the conundrum a hopeless aporia that we must avoid by embracing Parmenides' radical monism of being and in (...) a recent article (“Parmenides' insight and the possibility of logic”) aims to show that Kimhi is confronted with exactly the kind of insoluble difficulties that he that finds in Frege. The present article agrees with Kimhi that we can think about what is not the case, although thinking reaches all the way to what IS the case. But Della Rocca is right that Kimhi cannot explain by virtue of what we are able to do this. The counter‐proposal says: (1) Thinking reaches to being in that we have learned to read things in the intersubjective spatial field of consciousness as model tokens of singular propositions about them. (2) Negation can be thought of because thinking has its very origin in absolute, non‐well‐founded negation. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to explore the limits of a conception of metaphysical explanation based on the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR). For this purpose, I will focus on one of the alleged counter-intuitive consequences of an unrestricted application of the PSR, namely: Radical Monism. First, I will articulate such a conception of metaphysical explanation. Then, I will explain how is it that from a famous argument that rests on the PSR (i.e., Bradley’s regress) Radical (...) Monism indeed seems to follow. Right away, I will argue against the natural reaction that such argument triggers, namely: that we shall accept pluralism and relations as brute facts. Finally, I will sketch a qualified version of the PSR that allows us to avoid Radical Monism without compromising the essential content of the PSR. (shrink)

This chapter argues that Richard Bentley’s notorious emendations to Milton’s Paradise Lost in his 1732 edition of the poem support critical conjectures about Milton’s affinity with Spinoza, an affinity insinuated by John Toland. Bentley’s editorial commentary in his Paradise Lost seeks to sever the ties between Milton’s and Toland’s radical monist cosmologies. For Bentley, Milton’s vitalist figurations of an animate natural world sounded dangerously close to Toland’s rendering of active matter in his Letters to Serena. Yet Toland’s echoes of (...) Milton’s materialism would have been far less troubling to Bentley were it not for Toland’s fusion of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century hermetic philosophy with Spinoza’s radical metaphysics. Battling Toland over Milton’s legacy, Bentley’s Paradise Lost suggests that Milton was a furtive Spinozist, supporting the view that Spinozism encompassed a vitalist fringe that held matter to be self-active. (shrink)

The first half of this book argues that physicalism cannot account for consciousness, and hence cannot be true. The second half explores and defends Russellian monism, a radical alternative to both physicalism and dualism. The view that emerges combines panpsychism with the view that the universe as a whole is fundamental.

On the one hand, I show that the later Wittgenstein's practice-based approach to meaning, including the idea that the meaningfulness of mathematics ultimately is rooted in the everyday ‘applications’ it emerged from, as well as his insistence on the variability in and contingency of mathematical and mathematics-like practices, foreshadows more recent work in Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (PMP), although Wittgenstein's approach was more radically practice-based than what is prevalent in present-day PMP. On the other hand, I also show that Wittgenstein's (...) work on mathematics is driven by a pervasive critical attitude towards some key characteristics (monism, foundationalism and exceptionalism) of mainstream philosophical discourse about mathematics (then and now), which is mostly absent from present-day PMP, and I argue that this aspect of Wittgenstein's work on mathematics could inspire present-day practitioners of PMP to rethink the identity of their discipline. (shrink)

In this book Timothy Clarke examines Aristotle's response to Eleatic monism, the theory of Parmenides of Elea and his followers that reality is 'one'. Clarke argues that Aristotle interprets the Eleatics as thoroughgoing monists, for whom the pluralistic, changing world of the senses is a mere illusion. Understood in this way, the Eleatic theory constitutes a radical challenge to the possibility of natural philosophy. Aristotle discusses the Eleatics in several works, including De Caelo, De Generatione et Corruptione, and (...) the Metaphysics. But his most extensive treatment of their monism comes at the beginning of the Physics, where he criticizes them for overlooking the fact that 'being is said in many ways' – in other words, that there are many ways of being. Through a careful analysis of this and other criticisms, Clarke explains how Aristotle's engagement with the Eleatics prepares the ground for his own theory of the principles of nature. Aristotle is commonly thought to be an unreliable interpreter of his Presocratic predecessors; in contrast, this book argues that his critique can shed valuable light on the motivation of the Eleatic theory and its influence on the later philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Like many of his contemporaries, Hegel considered Spinoza a modern reviver of ancient Eleatic monism, in whose system “all determinate content is swallowed up as radically null and void”. This characterization of Spinoza as denying the reality of the world of finite things had a lasting influence on the perception of Spinoza in the two centuries that followed. In this article, I take these claims of Hegel to task and evaluate their validity. Although Hegel’s official argument for the unreality (...) of modes in Spinoza’s system will turn out to be unsound, I do believe there is one crucial line in Spinoza’s system – Spinoza’s rather weak and functional conception of individuality – which provides some support for Hegel’s reading of Spinoza. (shrink)

What is the relationship between objects and properties? According to a standard view, there are primitive individuals that ‘instantiate’ or ‘have’ various properties. According to a rival view, objects are mere ‘bundles’ of properties. While there are a number of reasons to be skeptical of primitive individuals, there are also a number of challenges that the bundle theorist faces. The goal of this paper is to formulate a view about the relationship between objects and properties that avoids many of the (...) problems inherent in both of these views. The view I will end up defending implies a particularly radical version of Monism, and it collapses the object-property distinction altogether. (shrink)

Panqualityism, recently defended by Sam Coleman, is a variety of Russellian monism on which the categorical properties of fundamental physical entities are qualities, or, in Coleman’s exposition, unconscious qualia. Coleman defends a quotationalist, higher-order thought version of panqualityism. The aim of this paper is, first, to demonstrate that a first-order representationalist panqualityism is also available, and to argue positively in its favor. For it shall become apparent that quotationalist and first-order representationalist panqualityism are, in spite of their close similarities, (...) radically different theories: quotationalist panqualityism locates qualities in the subject of an experience, while first-order panqualityism locates qualities in the world. I argue that this makes quotationalist panqualityism implausible and first-order, representationalist panqualityism a highly natural, elegant, and intuitive theory. (shrink)

Donald Davidson is unquestionably one of America's greatest living philosophers. His influence on Anglo-American philosophy over the last twenty years has been enormous, and his work is an unavoidable reference point in current debates in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind. This book offers a systematic and accessible introduction to Davidson's work. Evnine begins by discussing Davidson's contribution to the philosophy of mind, including his views on action, events and causation. He then examines Davidson's work in the (...) philosophy of language. The link between meaning and truth, radical interpretation, and semantic holism are considered in detail. The final chapters deal with the metaphysical aspects of Davidson's work and seek to assess his philosophical project as a whole. (shrink)

This entry concerns dualism in the philosophy of mind. The term ‘dualism’ has a variety of uses in the history of thought. In general, the idea is that, for some particular domain, there are two fundamental kinds or categories of things or principles. In theology, for example a ‘dualist’ is someone who believes that Good and Evil — or God and the Devil — are independent and more or less equal forces in the world. Dualism contrasts with monism, which (...) is the theory that there is only one fundamental kind, category of thing or principle; and, rather less commonly, with pluralism, which is the view that there are many kinds or categories. In the philosophy of mind, dualism is the theory that the mental and the physical — or mind and body or mind and brain — are, in some sense, radically different kinds of thing. Because common sense tells us that there are physical bodies, and because there is intellectual pressure towards producing a unified view of the world, one could say that materialist monism is the ‘default option’. Discussion about dualism, therefore, tends to start from the assumption of the reality of the physical world, and then to consider arguments for why the mind cannot be treated as simply part of that world. (shrink)