Electronic text edition of Giambattista Vico, De rebus gestis Antonj Caraphaei, in Latin. It includes the page numbers of and the links to the original edition of 1716, published as image version in same issue of the "Laboratorio dell'ISPF" with DOI: 10.12862/ispfL102. Edited by A. Sansone.

Primary and secondary processes are the foundational axes of the Freudian mental apparatus: one horizontally as a tendency to associate, the primary process, and one vertically as the ability for perspective taking, the secondary process. Primary process mentation is not only supposed to be dominant in the unconscious but also, for example, in dreams. The present study tests the hypothesis that the mental activity during REM-sleep has more characteristics of the primary process, while during non-REM-sleep more secondary process operations take (...) place. Because the solving of a rebus requires the ability to non-contexually condensate the literal reading of single stimuli into a new one, rebus solving is a primary process operation by excellence. In a replication of the dream-rebus study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967), a rebus, which consisted of an image of a comb (German: “Kamm”) and an image of a raft (German: “Floß”), resulting in the German rebus word “kampflos” (Engl.: without a struggle), was flashed subliminally (at 1 ms) to 20 participants before going to sleep. Upon consecutive awakenings participants were asked for a dream report, free associations and an image description. Based on objective association norms, there were significantly more conceptual associations referring to Kamm and Floß indexing secondary process mentation when subjects were awakened from non-REM sleep as compared to REM-awakenings. There were not significantly more rebus associations referring to kampflos indexing primary process mentation when awakened from REM-sleep as compared to non-REM awakenings. However, when the associations were scored on the basis of each subject’s individual norms, there was a rebus effect with more idiosyncratic rebus associations in awakenings after REM than after non-REM-sleep. Our results support the general idea that REM-sleep is characterized by primary process thinking, while non-REM-sleep mentation follows the rules of the secondary process. (shrink)

How should philosophy be pursued? I want to defend a conception of philosophy in mediis rebus—philosophy in the middle of things. The more familiar Latin phrase is ‘in medias res,’ but Latin distinguishes two readings of ‘in the middle of things.’ There’s the middle of things from which one starts, and there’s the middle of things into which one jumps. ‘In medias res’ is the middle of things into which one jumps; I, however, mean to invoke the middle of (...) things from which one starts. Thus, risking an accusation of pedantry, I use ‘in mediis rebus.’. (shrink)

For Quine all talk is in mediis rebus, is itself a physical phenomenon. To grasp what a sentence is, its relation to a language, and what it is for a sentence to be true is to be invited to see that notions of shared meaning across languages, of truth, even of knowledge, are far from what they are ordinarily taken to be. To read Quine reflectively is to plunge with him into the midst of things, shunning the vain support (...) of purported transcendental certainties or Archimedean points, and spurning claims of the intuitive clarity of meaning, thought, and belief, for in the midst of things they themselves are what are most lacking in clarity. (shrink)

El presente artículo expone brevemente las circunstancias del "redescubrimiento" de la obra de Luciano en la Italia renacentista y el movimiento renovador en las letras que esto trajo consigo en el caso específico del Momus de Leon Battista Alberti. Para tal objetivo, me concentraré en el rol de Manuel Crisoloras; en los aspectos de género literario que Luciano plantea, sobre todo, en el Prometheus es in verbis, y finalmente, en cómo estos son retomados en el Momus, donde Alberti se presenta (...) como innovador de las letras latinas, pero al mismo tiempo como indirecto continuador del quehacer luciánico. (shrink)

Psychedelics are experiencing a renaissance in mental healthcare. In recent years, more and more early phase trials on psychedelic-assisted therapy have been conducted, with promising results overall. However, ethical analyses of this rediscovered form of treatment remain rare. The present paper contributes to the ethical inquiry of psychedelic-assisted therapy by analysing the ethical implications of its therapeutic mechanisms proposed by the relaxed beliefs under psychedelics (REBUS) hypothesis. In short, the REBUS hypothesis states that psychedelics make rigid beliefs revisable (...) by increasing the influence of bottom-up input. Put differently, patients become highly suggestible and sensitive to context during a psychedelic session, amplifying therapeutic influence and effects. Due to that, patients are more vulnerable in psychedelic-assisted therapy than in other therapeutic interventions; they lose control during a psychedelic session and become dependent on the therapeutic setting (including the therapist). This enhanced vulnerability is ethically relevant and has been exploited by some therapists in the past. Therefore, patients in current research settings and starting mainstream medical settings need to be well informed about psychedelics’ mechanisms and their implications to give valid informed consent to treatment. Furthermore, other security measures are warranted to protect patients from the vulnerability coming with psychedelic-assisted therapy. (shrink)

George Boolos (1984, 1985) has extensively investigated plural quantifi- cation, as found in such locutions as the Geach-Kaplan sentence There are critics who admire only one another, and he found that their logic cannot be adequately formalized within the first-order predicate calculus. If we try to formalize the sentence by a paraphrase using individual variables that range over critics, or over sets or collections or fusions of critics, we misrepresent its logical structure. To represent plural quantification adequately requires the logical (...) resources of the full second-order predicate calculus. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer an analysis of a passage from Eckhart’s commentary on the verse of the Genesis In principio creavit caelum et terram that has not received, in my opinion, sufficient attention so far. In this passage, Eckhart points out that the principium through which God created the world is the ideal model, i.e. the ratio essendi of a thing as well as its ratio cognoscendi. It is also the cause of the essence of the thing and, as (...) Aristotle says, of its definition and its scientific proof. Eckhart also quotes Averroes, according to whom philosophers have always searched for the quiddity of a sensible thing because it could lead to knowledge of the first cause of being. By this, Eckhart warns, Averroes does not mean God, as some erroneously think, but the ratio idealis of sensible things, which is expressed by their definition. Joseph Koch’s critical edition does not identify who the plerique erra... (shrink)

Jean Gagnier’s De vita, et rebus gestis Mohammedis was the first substantial biography of the Prophet Muhammad translated by a European author directly from an authentic Muslim source. Familiar to Edward Gibbon and Voltaire, Gagnier’s work significantly shaped European understandings of the origins of Islam well into the nineteenth century. Yet Gagnier’s scholarship has not been examined in any depth since it was closely read by his contemporaries. This article provides an analysis of Gagnier’s strategies and competencies as a (...) translator and reconstructs his attempt to exploit the Arabic manuscripts then available to an Oxford scholar. It argues that the case of Gagnier is a cautionary reminder that philological approaches to the study of the Muslim past did not necessarily occasion sympathy for Islam. Old prejudices continued to influence Gagnier’s decisions as a translator and were passed on in new forms to later readers. Moreover, aspects of the Muslim historiographical tradition discovered by Gagnier did not necessarily incline his readers to a more positive view of Islam. The increased accessibility of Islamic historical texts could just as easily serve the Christian polemicist as the Enlightened historian. (shrink)

Nos séculos XIII e XIV há um grande aprofundamento da lógica, salientando-se, entre outros autores, Guilherme de Ockam e Walter Burleigh. Entre estes dois autores há um debate a respeito da composição das proposições, perguntando-se qual a relação entre as proposições verbais e escritas e seus contrapontos mentais.

The rebus game - especially in the modern Italian examples featuring sometimes highly aesthetical drawings - offers stimuli about the relationship of the writing process with seeing; about the connections among thing, word, sound, representation and about the link between the reading of images and education.

Denken we in beelden of in woorden? En welke rol speelt taal daarbij? In 'Rebussen, van duivels tot Bosch' worden deze vragen aan de orde gesteld vanuit een kunsthistorische benadering. Beeldtaal speelt een grote rol in ons denken. Het belang van het?lezen? - dus begrijpen - van afbeeldingen kan niet worden overschat. Al in de oudheid was men zich bewust van de zeggingskracht van beelden en van de rol die visuele voorstellingen spelen voor kennis, geheugen en herinnering. In de late (...) middeleeuwen en renaissance wordt de rebus, het spelen met woord en beeld, sterk gecultiveerd. Het vervangen van een geschreven woord door een afbeelding als synoniem is een eenvoudige stap. Complexer wordt het spel als klankovereenkomsten en betekenisassociaties worden ingezet, en al helemaal als ook meertaligheid een rol gaat spelen.0In dit boek spreekt onder meer een dertiende-eeuwse duivel rebustaal en wijst de Brugse schilder Jan Provoost in een geleerde rebus op de vergankelijkheid van het leven. Ook wordt duidelijk dat we betekenisvolle afbeeldingen, zoals het werk van Jheronimus Bosch, pas verantwoord uitleggen als we goed naar de historische context kijken. (shrink)

Neste trabalho abordo a hipótese apresentada por Fernando Gil no Tratado da Evidência, da hegemonia de mecanismos alucinatórios nos processos evidenciários. Para avançar no seu estudo, mobilizo condutas elementares e fenómenos complexos, da sucção à vinculação e ao membro-fantasma. Estes fenómenos justificam uma leitura da alucinação a partir de um momentum ou “fase” que designo por evidência perimórfica; com maior brevidade, a propósito do processo de crença e do sistema percepção-linguagem, abordo a alucinação colectiva e o estado perifrástico da evidência. (...) Tentativa e incipientemente, submeto estas ideias ao crivo de realia e rebus da história da medicina e da ciência e de modelos da imaginação. Faço minha uma interrogação do grande filósofo português acerca da mutação da evidência em lei, para terminar evocando o campo moral e a repugnância natural pelo sentimento do falso. (shrink)

Necessitists about set theory think that the pure sets exists, and are the way they are, as a matter of necessity. They cannot explain why the sets (de rebus) are all the sets. This constitutes the Ur-Objection against necessitism; it is the primary motivation cited by potentialists about set theory. -/- At least three families of potentialism draw motivation from the Ur-Objection. Contingentists think that any things could form a set even if they actually did not. Prioritists think that (...) sets hyperintensionally depend upon their members. Structural-potentialists think that any possible set-hierarchy could be extended. However, once we have disentangled these three versions of potentialism, we see that the Ur-Objection should not motivate anyone. (shrink)

Increasing evidence suggests that psychedelic experiences, undergone in controlled conditions, can have various durable psychological benefits. One such benefit is reductions in fear of death, which have been attested in both psychiatric patients and healthy people. This paper addresses the question: how, exactly, do psychedelic experiences reduce fear of death? It argues, against some prominent proposals, that they do so mainly by promoting non-physicalist metaphysical beliefs. This conclusion has implications for two broader debates: one about the mechanisms of psychedelic therapy, (...) and one about the potential non-medical uses of psychedelics for the alleviation of existential angst in psychiatrically healthy people. On the first count, the paper argues that the role of metaphysical belief change in fear of death supports the “Relaxed Beliefs Under Psychedelics” (REBUS) model of psychedelic therapy over alternative accounts. On the second count, the paper argues that the role of metaphysical belief change undermines the proposed use of psychedelics in the “neuroexistentialist” project of naturalizing spirituality. The best available evidence suggests that when psychedelic experiences reduce existential angst and restore a sense of meaning in life, they do so primarily by persuading people of the falsity of a broadly naturalistic worldview, and thus do not help reconcile people to the truth of such a worldview. (shrink)

In Philosophy of Psychedelics, Letheby provides a convincing basis for the idea that psychedelics primarily derive their therapeutic potential through mediating favourable changes to self-related belief systems. In this commentary, we take a closer look at the role that contextual factors play in Letheby’s two-factor account of psychedelic therapy. While Letheby acknowledges that psychedelic effects are highly context-dependent, the exact role that context plays in self-modelling during the acute experience is not entirely clear. We argue that context plays an essential (...) role in shaping the ‘discovery’ of alternate self-conceptions during the acute experience. Specifically, users are more likely to experience alterations in self-conception that are consistent with context-dependent features, such as one’s prior mindset and aspects of the external environment. This is consistent with a REBUS model of psychedelic effects, where a corollary effect of relaxing high-level prior beliefs is that the system becomes increasingly sensitised to bottom-up information from lower-level intrinsic sources and the sensory periphery. Furthermore, it may explain why a positive well-intentioned state of mind and a supportive therapeutic environment are more likely to result in positive acute experiences and long-term improvements in mental wellbeing. We see this position as being largely compatible with Letheby’s proposal, but may shift some aspects of its emphasis and framing. In particular, it may conflict with Letheby’s notion that psychedelics lead to a ‘level cognitive playing field’, where self-related hypotheses are thought to be assigned more or less equal probability. (shrink)

John Cook Wilson (1849–1915) was Wykeham Professor of Logic at New College, Oxford and the founder of ‘Oxford Realism’, a philosophical movement that flourished at Oxford during the first decades of the 20th century. Although trained as a classicist and a mathematician, his most important contribution was to the theory of knowledge, where he argued that knowledge is factive and not definable in terms of belief, and he criticized ‘hybrid’ and ‘externalist’ accounts. He also argued for direct realism in perception, (...) criticizing both empiricism and idealism, and argued for a moderate nominalist view of universals as being in rebus and only ‘apprehended’ by their particulars. His influence helped swaying Oxford away from idealism and, through figures such as H. A. Prichard, Gilbert Ryle, or J. L. Austin, his ideas were also to some extent at the origin of ‘moral intuitionism’ and ‘ordinary language philosophy’ which defined much of Oxford philosophy until the second half of the twentieth-century. Nevertheless, his name and legacy were all but forgotten for generations after World War II. Still, his views on knowledge are with us today, being in part at work in the writings of philosophers as diverse as John McDowell, Charles Travis, and Timothy Williamson. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to show, by the example of Hugo Grotius's Annales et Historiae de rebus Belgicis (AH), that the nature and content of the concept of Tacitism (Tacitist, Tacitean) in the period around 1600 was markedly different from modern perceptions of the style and political purport of Tacitus's works. This gap between current and early-modern conceptions of Tacitus is important to bear in mind for intellectual historians dealing with early-modern intellectual currents such as Reason of (...) State, Neo-Stoicism, Tacitism, and others. This article first describes how the Tacitean style is characterised in literary criticism around 1600; then it explores the qualities of Hugo Grotius's imitation of Tacitus from the 17th-century perspective and from that of some main aspects of the present-day view of Tacitus. It concludes that Grotius's imitation shows Tacitus's style in a characteristically 17th-century mirror, in that it puts emphasis on Tacitean syntax, brevity and choice of words (the stylistic micro-level), as well as on political iudicium and Reason of State, but omits imitation of the narrative and structural qualities of Tacitus's composition, and their implications, which are central to modern interpretations. ☆ This article is part of the outcome of a research project on Grotius's Annales et Historiae conducted at the Radboud University Nijmegen in 2004–2008 with a VENI-grant from the Dutch research organisation NWO. I thank Corinna Vermeulen, Marc van der Poel, Hans Blom and HEI's anonymous referees for their comments on this piece. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to offer a Hegelian critique of Quine’s predicate nominalism. I argue that at the core of Hegel’s idealism is not a supernaturalist spirit monism, but a realism about universals, and that while this may contrast to the nominalist naturalism of Quine, Hegel’s position can still be defended over that nominalism in naturalistic terms. I focus on the contrast between Hegel’s and Quine’s respective views on universals, which Quine takes to be definitive of philosophical naturalism. (...) I argue that there is no good reason to think Quine is right to make this nominalism definitive of naturalism in this way – where in fact Hegel offers a reasonably compelling case that science itself requires some commitment to realism about universals, kinds, etc. Furthermore, even if Hegel is wrong about that, at least his case for realism is still a naturalistic one, as it is based on his views on concrete universality, which is an innovative form of in rebus realism about unive.. (shrink)