How have the theories of aesthetics which were worked out in europe evolved in america? are there widely differing standpoints between european and american aestheticians? what herrmann tried to do, to shed light on these questions, was to look over the issues of "the journal of aesthetics and art criticism" since 1941. thomas munro, a pupil of john dewey and founder of the journal tried to provide in the united states a broader and more open-ended and undogmatic platform for aesthetics (...) including such separate disciplines as philosophy, psychology, and cultural history. this interdisciplinary approach was an important part of his campaign against an a priori aesthetics. once this encyclopedic view concerning art and its theoretical understanding is adopted, one is in a position to go beyond the one-sided, partial, and dogmatic attitude in aesthetics that often dominates in european journals. the author concludes by considering an example that is closely related to contemporary aesthetics as well as to the present american scene. what is the reason that there have been so few articles on these contemporary art movements? (shrink)

The thinking of Pierre Bourdieu, even in its most subtle aspects, is characterized by a distrust of the “high” theory. He does not totally reject it, but it is questioned by his critical reflection upon it. By a resort to the functions of the social and the French epistemology, which examines and analyzes the scientific terms in connection to their constitution, Bourdieu’s theory aims to develop a “sociological thinking” in relations which integrates motives of the “social” into the theoretical reflection (...) and works out their interaction in the form of significant chains. The range and the precision of this methodical reflection is illustrated and specified in this article also on the basis of examples. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 487 Although this reviewer would have appreciated a fuller expression of the dialectical interdependency and synthetic elements holding between Fichte and Schelling than Schurr actually developed, his study is nevertheless an orderly and well-documented presentation of their fundamental views. The study can serve as a solid and professional introduction to the postKantian phase of German Idealism, and it most certainly deserves translation into English. LAWRENCES. STEPELEVICH Villanova (...) University Die Konstitution der Jl'sthetik in Wilhelm Diltheys Philosophie. By Michael Heinen. Abhandlungen zur Philosophie, Psychologie und P~dagogik, no. 100. (Bonn: Bouvier, 1974. Pp. 220) Michael Heinen's book draws attention to Dilthey's interest in the original dimension of art experience. That interest has been the traditional stock in the trade of philosophers since the ancient Greeks, and most crucially since the subjectivization of the aesthetic sphere in the speculative thought of Kant and German idealism. But the point is that there is a gap between those philosophers who speculated about perception, aesthetic pleasure, and the enjoyment of the senses, and who tried to justify those speculations through wide-ranging inquiries into the order of the world and its understanding through our ego and its potentialities--betweenthem and Dilthey, who knows that this age-old enthusiasm for metaphysical and epistemological inquiries has become obsolete. The earlier display of erudition may be vast and awe inspiring. But in Dilthey's mind an interest in those inquiries is no longer foremost. Commendable as all of them may be, they approach the world of the work of art and its experience from the outside, in an independent, self-sufficient, and almost autonomous manner, without facing up to the horizon of the world in which an artistic work is rooted. This horizon of the world emerges as the leitmotif of Heinen's book. Heinen reminds the reader that those who create are immersed in this horizon. The conditions under which they work, the tools they have, the methods they use, the materials that are available to them, the ideas they have in mind--all this can be traced back to the world which surrounds them. Moreover, they belong to an historical world. They are oriented toward a past they remember, a future they anticipate; and all they think, or feel, or will, stands in an historical context, long before they are conscious of themselves in this respect. Heinen rightly points out that this creates a problem not only for the analysis of the artistic expression but for the field of hermeneutics, for the method of understanding this expression. It is not so much something that is understood in its meaning by referring to an ego, or a system of cognitive faculties. It emerges from the socio-historical world; and we must place it back in the same horizon from which it emerges. Heinen agrees with Dilthey that we always find ourselves within the whole of life; and when understanding something--a work of art or any other historical object--we have to do it within the full context of life to which we belong. It is an objectification of life that we have to understand from life itself. This may help to explain why a work of art is more than an object created by an artist through his inspiration and the unconscious production of his genius. From his Hegelian perspective Heinen tells us that whenever an artist is involved in the creation of something he is dependent upon the world in which he lives and upon a dialectic between himself and the horizon of life. Heinen expressly defends the probability of this dialectic in a chapter on the presuppositions of Dilthey's aesthetics (pp. 134-162). He studies Dilthey's attempt to discover a methodological basis for the human sciences. He calls attention to the remarkable sequence of sketches in which Dilthey distinguishes between Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, between human sciences that, in one way or another, deal with historical and other manifestations of 488 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY life and inner experience, and natural sciences that deal with phenomena, with objects of nature. Dilthey is profoundly conscious and frank in announcing that the human sciences also treat phenomena or objects. But... (shrink)

Im Fokus dieser ersten Ausgabe des Jahrbuchs HealthCapital Berlin-Brandenburg stehen die Qualifikation sowie die Aus-, Fort- und Weiterbildung einschließlich der akademischen Studiengänge in der Gesundheit. Renommierte Fachleute aus Wirtschaft, Wissenschaft und Praxis berichten über die Entwicklungen, Trends, Praxiserfahrungen und Perspektiven von Qualifizierung sowie über neue Berufs- und Geschäftsfelder. Schwerpunktmäßig werden drei Themenkomplexe behandelt: I. Stand und Perspektive von Fachkräften in Berlin-Brandenburg II. Neue Berufsbilder und Ausbildungsgänge III. Entwicklung und Einführung neuer Gesundheitsstudiengänge Das Jahrbuch HealthCapital Berlin-Brandenburg stellt somit einen aktuellen Überblick (...) über wesentliche Fragen im Zusammenhang mit Qualifikationen, Berufsperspektiven und Arbeitsfeldern in der sich weiter entwickelnden Gesundheitswirtschaft in der Region Berlin-Brandenburg zur Verfügung. (shrink)

In this volume, Dieter Henrich provides an invaluable guide to the better understanding of the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. That well-known book was published in 1821, but the manuscript was finished on June 25, 1820, in other words, in immediate proximity to the Berlin lectures on the same topic, published here with Henrich’s extensive editorial introduction and comment. Furthermore, the Grundlinien of 1821 were intended to be an aid to the listeners of his lectures: in these published lectures (...) on the same topic of 1819/20 such a printed aid was not available to students. Hence the lectures have a directness, freshness, and attention to systematic detail that is missing both in the later lecture notes by Hotho and by D. F. Strauss, as also in the Grundlinien. This difficult publication of 1821 was to be interpreted by the later lectures, whereas in those of 1819/20 Hegel had to develop the theoretical foundation in the lectures themselves. They show an admirable cohesiveness in the flow of argumentation, and have some similarity to the popular editions of the lectures on the philosophy of history, aesthetics, and religion. (shrink)

The starting point of this article is an old question asked by Feferman in his paper on Hancock's conjecture [6] about the strength of ${\rm ID}_{1}^{\ast}$. This theory is obtained from the well-known theory ID₁ by restricting fixed point induction to formulas that contain fixed point constants only positively. The techniques used to perform the proof-theoretic analysis of ${\rm ID}_{1}^{\ast}$ also permit to analyze its transfinitely iterated variants ${\rm ID}_{\alpha}^{\ast}$. Thus, we eventually know that $|\widehat{{\rm ID}}_{\alpha}|=|{\rm ID}_{\alpha}^{\ast}|$.

In this paper I make some critical comments on John McDowell’s Mind and World and offer suggestions as to how it might be possible to solve John McDowell’s problem of finding a safe passage between the Scylla of the “Myth of the Given” (Sellars) and the Charybdis of a Davidsonian linguistic coherentism. McDowell’s defense of a minimal empiricism depends on the largely unargued and ultimately untenable assumption that epistemic justification can only operate at the level of conceptual or propositional entities. (...) Drawing on contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and continental philosophy of subjectivity, I try to show that epistemic normativity already comes into play at two levels of experience—sensory observation and self-knowledge—that are more basic than the conceptual. What McDowell needs is a philosophy of subjectivity that would allow him to identify primary sources of epistemic normativity that are both subjectcentered and pre-conceptual. (shrink)

I argue that Derrida's critique of speech act theory is largely unsustainable because of its reliance on a questionable and insufficiently explicatedconception of philosophy as negative metaphysics8 and its attendant misconception of scientific theory construction in general and speech act theory in particular.

Die Wissenschaft vom Seienden im Allgemeinen und seinen kategorienübergreifenden Bestimmungen wie Einheit, Wahrheit, Gutheit beginnt in ihrer historischen Entwicklung nicht als Ontologie, sondern als Lehre vom Guten. Seit der Summa de bono Philipps des Kanzlers bewegt sich der transzendentaltheoretische Diskurs von der Analyse des Gutseins zu einem neuen, von der herkömmlichen christlich-neuplatonischen Sicht fundamental verschiedenen Seinsverständnis. Diesem zufolge ist das geschaffene Seiende nicht nur in einem abgeleiteten, uneigentlichen Sinne mit Blick auf das Kausalverhältnis zum ungeschaffenen Guten, sondern im Hinblick auf (...) das ihm eigene innere Sein einfachhin und im eigentlichen Sinne „seiend" und „gut" zu nennen. Der Wechsel zum transzendentalen Denkmodell erfolgt angesichts der Herausforderung durch die offensiv vordringende Religion der Katharer. Er ermöglicht eine philosophische Antwort auf die katharische Weltverachtung, die in der Sicht der zeitgenössischen Autoren dem christlichen Schöpfungsverständnis besser entspricht als die frühere christlich-neuplatonische Antwort auf den Manichäismus. Seen in its historical development the doctrine of being and its general attributes such as unity, truth, goodness originally starts as a theory of the good. Beginning with Philipps Summa de bono transcendental reflection proceeds from an analysis of goodness to a new understanding of being, which breaks with the christian-neoplatonic tradition. According to this new understanding created being is called „being" and „good" not further improperly in a derived sense with regard to its causal relation to the uncreated Good, but directly and in the proper sense in respect of its own inner being and goodness. The change to a transcendental mode of thinking is due to the challenge of the propagating religion of the Cathars. It enables a philosophical answer to the Cathar contempt for the world which in the eyes of the contemporary authors more closely corresponds to the christian perspective on creation than the former christian-neoplatonic answer to Manichaeism. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a philosophical analysis of interdisciplinary scientific activities. I suggest that it is a fruitful approach to view interdisciplinarity in light of the recent literature on scientific representations. For this purpose I develop a meta-representational model in which interdisciplinarity is viewed in part as a process of integrating distinct scientific representational approaches. The analysis suggests that present methods for the evaluation of interdisciplinary projects places too much emphasis non-epistemic aspects of disciplinary integrations while more or less (...) ignoring whether specific interdisciplinary collaborations puts us in a better, or worse, epistemic position. This leads to the conclusion that there are very good reasons for recommending a more cautious, systematic, and stringent approach to the development, evaluation, and execution of interdisciplinary science. (shrink)

Die Studie befaßt sich mit Kritik und Rezeption des scholastischen Aristoteles beim jungen Luther. Der Autor behandelt Fragen der Aristoteles-Rezeption des jungen Luther: Welchen Aristoteles meinte der junge Luther jeweils in seinen zahlreichen Stellungnahmen zu "Aristoteles"? Was ist deren genauer Inhalt? Wie argumentiert Luther in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Aristoteles, und welche Probleme ergeben sich dabei? Welches sind die unterschiedlichen Formen dieses Rezeptionsverhältnisses? Die systematischen Probleme, die sich dabei zeigen, analysiert der Autor an ihrem historischen Ort.