The present chapter is a bibliographic introduction to the study of the Sarvastivada school of Buddhism, discussing available studies on the history and literature of the school, and the relation of the Sarvastivada school with the Sautrantika school.

This article discusses a peculiar Sā$$\dot {\text{n}}$$n˙khya-Yoga theory of transformation (pariṇāma) that the author of the Pātañjalayogaśāstra created by drawing upon Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories of temporality. In developing his theory, Patañjali adaptively reused the wording in which the Sarvāstivāda theories were formulated, the specific objections against these theories, and their refutations to win the philosophical debate about temporality against Sarvāstivāda Buddhism. Patañjali’s approach towards the Sarvāstivāda Buddhist theories was possible, even though his system of Yoga is (...) based on an ontology that differs considerably from that of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism because both systems share the philosophical view that time is not a separate ontological entity in itself. Time is a concept deduced from change in the empirical world. This agreement results from the common philosophical orientation of Sarvāstivāda Buddhism and Yoga, which takes the phenomenon of experience as the basis of philosophical enquiry into the structure of the world. The intention that guided Patañjali’s adaptive reuse was twofold. On the one hand, he aimed at winning the debate with Sarvāstivāda Buddhism about how the problem of temporality can be solved. He thus integrated four mutually exclusive theories on temporality into a single theory of transformation of properties (dharma) involving a second-level and a third-level theory on the transformation of the temporal characteristic mark (lakṣaṇa) and on the transformation of states (avasthā), respectively. On the other hand, Patañjali intended to achieve philosophical clarification regarding the question of how exactly properties relate to their underlying substrate in the process of transformation of the three constituents or forces (guṇa) sattva, rajas and tamas of matter (pradhāna) that account for all phenomena of the world except pure consciousness (puruṣa). Patañjali’s theory of transformation is thus of central importance for his Sā$$\dot {\text{n}}$$n˙khya ontology, according to which the world consists of 25 categories or constituents (tattva), i.e., of primal matter (prakṛti) and its transformations and pure consciousness. (shrink)

The article analyses and interprets the critique of the special dharmic theory of the early Buddhist school of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. Special attention is paid to the critique of the theory of the existence of dharmas, elementary psycho-physical data, in all three time periods. At the beginning, a general Buddhist theory of two truths is presented, which tries to legitimize the so-called philosophy of abhidharma as a “higher teaching” regarding reality (dharma theory) which is only (...) rudimentarily present in the Buddha’s discourses. Then we turn to a concise presentation and analysis of the key ontological concepts of sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika, and then to the critique of the same undertaken by the school of sautrāntika. It is concluded that sautrāntika, with its critique, “returned” Buddhist philosophy on the path of pure phenomenology after the sarvāstivada-vaibhāṣika’s attempt to interpret the Buddha’s teaching in line with a realistic reductive ontology. (shrink)

This article argues that tahe Sarvāstivāda School’s foundational doctrine of ‘all-existence’ is posited as an axiom rather than a proposition requiring illation. The Āgamas exclusively possess the capacity to expound upon this doctrine. This article examines two scriptural proofs presented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that substantiate the doctrine of ‘the existence of the three times’. It argues for an inherent relationship between these proofs and highlights the Vijñānakāya exposition on ‘the existence of the three times’. By scrutinizing the process of (...) establishing ‘the existence of the three times’ in the Vijñānakāya, it becomes evident that its characterization of the right observation aligns closely with that of the Saṃyukta Āgama. As a result, the sūtras related to the right observation, including the inaugural sūtra of the Saṃyukta Āgama, serve as scriptural proofs for the Sarvāstivāda school’s ‘all-existing’ theory. (shrink)

This article argues that tahe Sarvāstivāda School’s foundational doctrine of ‘all-existence’ is posited as an axiom rather than a proposition requiring illation. The Āgamas exclusively possess the capacity to expound upon this doctrine. This article examines two scriptural proofs presented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that substantiate the doctrine of ‘the existence of the three times’. It argues for an inherent relationship between these proofs and highlights the Vijñānakāya exposition on ‘the existence of the three times’. By scrutinizing the process of (...) establishing ‘the existence of the three times’ in the Vijñānakāya, it becomes evident that its characterization of the right observation aligns closely with that of the Saṃyukta Āgama. As a result, the sūtras related to the right observation, including the inaugural sūtra of the Saṃyukta Āgama, serve as scriptural proofs for the Sarvāstivāda school’s ‘all-existing’ theory. (shrink)

This article argues that tahe Sarvāstivāda School’s foundational doctrine of ‘all-existence’ is posited as an axiom rather than a proposition requiring illation. The Āgamas exclusively possess the capacity to expound upon this doctrine. This article examines two scriptural proofs presented in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that substantiate the doctrine of ‘the existence of the three times’. It argues for an inherent relationship between these proofs and highlights the Vijñānakāya exposition on ‘the existence of the three times’. By scrutinizing the process of (...) establishing ‘the existence of the three times’ in the Vijñānakāya, it becomes evident that its characterization of the right observation aligns closely with that of the Saṃyukta Āgama. As a result, the sūtras related to the right observation, including the inaugural sūtra of the Saṃyukta Āgama, serve as scriptural proofs for the Sarvāstivāda school’s ‘all-existing’ theory. (shrink)

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “_X_ takes _Y_ as _svabhāva_” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “_X_ takes _Y_ as _svabhāva_” can be understood as “_X_ is reduced to _Y_.” Here, _svabhāva_ functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the third layer of the reduction (...) system, the article suggests that _svabhāva_ has only played a limited role in defining dharma types. (shrink)

According to the Buddhist concept of ‘dependent origination’ (pratītyasamutpāda), discrete factors come into existence because of a combination of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya). Such discrete factors, further, are combinations of five aggregates (pañ caskandha) that, themselves, are subject to constant change. Discrete factors, therefore, lack a self-nature (ātman). The passing through time of discrete factors is characterized by the ‘characteristic marks of the conditioned’: birth (utpāda), change in continuance (sthityanyathātva), and passing away (vyaya); or, alternatively: birth (jāti), duration (sthiti), (...) decay (jarā), and impermanence (anityatā). In the interpretation of the precise nature of these characteristic marks of the conditioned, and their relation to the discrete factor they characterize, different opinions were prevalent within the Sarvāstivāda School of Buddhist philosophy, with, judging from later scholastic literature, the views of the Dārṣṭāntika/sautrāntika and the Vaibhāṣika sub-schools as most prominent ones. The Indian and Chinese Madhyamaka philosophers pointed to the fallacies in the Sarvāstivāda interpretations of the nature of the characteristic marks of the conditioned and their relation to the discrete factors they characterize, and, hence, to the fallacies in the Sarvāstivāda interpretations of the concepts ‘time’ and ‘temporality’. (shrink)

U članku se istražuje osnovna linija argumentacije buddhističke škole sarvāstivādavaibhāṣika u prilog obrani njihove osnovne ontološke teze o egzistentnosti dharmi kroz sva tri vremenska razdoblja onako kako ju je izložio Vasubandhu u svome djelu Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . U uvodnome dijelu daje se kratki prikaz nekih prijepora u pogledu podrijetla te buddhističke škole kao i njihovog tekstovnoga korpusa. Nakon toga slijedi istraživanje Vasubandhuova izvješća o specifičnostima dharmičke ontologije te škole kao što su problemi dharmičke »funkcionalnosti« , njihove kauzalne djelotvornosti i problema »prijelaza« (...) atemporalnih dharmi u područje realnog oblikovanja iskustva . U završnom osvrtu se pokušava pokazati da se opća promjena filozofijske perspektive u razdoblju postkanonske abhidharme najradikalnije ostvarila u buddhističkoj školi sarvāstivāda-vaibhāṣika koja je bila prisiljena raznovrsnim teorijskim konstruktima pomiriti svoje shvaćanje dharmi kao »atemporalnih« konstituensa iskustva s općom buddhističkom postavkom o netrajnosti i nesupstancijalnosti svih fenomena .The article deals with the main line of argumentation of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Buddhist school of thought in defence of their basic ontological thesis of the existence of dharmas through all three-time period as it is exposed in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya . Introductorily some observations are given with regard to major controversies connected with the origin and textual corpus of that Buddhist school. Then follows investigation of Vasubandhu’s exposition of the particularity of the Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika Dharmic ontology – e.g. functionality of dharmas, their causal efficiency and the problem of "transition" of temporal dharmas into the domain of a real experience . In the concluding philosophical assessment an attempt is made to show that the general shift of the philosophical perspective in the period of the so-called postcanonical Abhidharma was the most radical reflected in the Sarvāstivāda- Vaibhāṣika school which was forced to harmonize through various theoretical constructs their basic notion of dharmas as »atemporal« constituens of experience with the general Buddhist understanding of all phenomena as impermanent and devoid of substance of any kind. (shrink)

Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischen Literatur der Sarvastivada-Schule, Sanskrit Dictionary of the Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds and of the Canonical Literature of the Sarvastivada School. Begonnen von Ernst Waldschmidt. Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen herausgegeben von Heinz Bechert. 10 Lieferung: kukkura/gandu-praticchadana - bearbeitet von Michael Schmidt und Siglinde Dietz. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1998. I-III, 81, 160 pp. DM 54.

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” can be understood as “ X is reduced to Y.” Here, svabhāva functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the (...) third layer of the reduction system, the article suggests that svabhāva has only played a limited role in defining dharma types. (shrink)

Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischer Literatur der Sarvastivada-Schule. Sanskrit Dictionary of the Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds and of the Canonical Literature of the Sarvastivada School. Begonnen von Ernst Waldschmidt. Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen herausgegeben vin Heinz Bechert. 9. Lieferung: ka / kukkutyandavat - bearbeitet von Michael Schmidt und Siglinde Dietz. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1996. I-IV, 1-80 pp. DM 54.

This paper mainly addresses the following issues: how Buddhists deal with future existence, the difference between yogic perception and the cognition of ordinary people with regard to future entities, and how Buddhists resolve the contradiction between the theory of momentariness and that of action and its fruit. According to the Sarvāstivādins, a future entity exists in reality as long as there is cognition that has this entity as its object. According to the Sautrāntikas, however, that theory does not hold true. (...) A future entity is just what will occur hereafter, and it is never the case that such an entity exists at present. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla do not directly negate an opponent’s argument that the distinction between past and future entities is made by yogic perception, but implicitly accept it. They state that because a future entity is situated in a causal stream, yogis can cognize it through purified worldly cognition. As for an effect that will occur in the future, Buddhists do not seem to follow the model that one and the same agent of action will necessarily receive the fruit of past action, which is often seen in other schools such as the Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas. Rather, Buddhists adopt the theory of the uninterrupted succession of cause and effect. (shrink)

본고는 수행도 가운데 가행도에 해당하는 순결택분인 사선근과, 이 가운데 난선근과 정선근이 전제하고 있는 信(śraddhā)의 의미에 주목하여 단선근과의 관계를 고찰하였다. 먼저 아비달마문헌에 근거해 사선근에 관해 고찰한 후, 『심론』계열의 논서와 『구사론』, 그리고 정통유부계열의 논서에서 입장의 차이를 보이고 있는 난선근과 정선근의 해석에 초점을 맞추어 논의를 전개하였다. 전자는 四諦十六行相의 관찰을 중점적으로 설명하고 있으나 후자는 信의 의미 또한 부각시키고 있다. 여기서 사예류지, 삼보, 오온무상, 사성제에 대한 信은 정(頂)과 정타(頂墮)를 구분하게 되는 중요한 역할을 하며 不信은 정타로 이어진다. 한편 단선근의 자성으로 제시되고 있는 不信은 인과법칙의 부정을 의미하는 (...) 사견과 같은 맥락에서 설명되며 무명으로 귀속된다. 반대로 인과법칙을 인정하는 정견은 信과 같은 의미이고 속선근으로 연결되는 것에서 信이 선근의 단절과 속기의 직접적인 원인이 된다는 것을 확인할 수 있었다. 이러한 관점에서 信은 인과법칙에 대한 바른 이해에 근거하고 있는 것이 명확히 드러난다. 이러한 견해는 초기불교에서 이론적 원형이 확인되며, 이를 계승하고 있는 유부는 信을 인과법칙에 대한 확신으로 이해하여 慧의 의미와 궤를 같이하는 것을 알 수 있었다. (shrink)

The notions of selflessness ( an tmaka ) and karman are two key concepts in Buddhist philosophy. The question how karman functions with respect to the rebirth of a worldling who is, actually, devoid of a self, was a major philosophical issue in early Buddhist doctrine. Within the Sarv stiv da school, the Vaibh ⋅ ikas became the representative of an interpretation of this problem that hinges on the notion of 'possession' ( pr pti ). Their theory was contradicted by (...) the Sautr ntikas, whose interpretation is based on the notion of 'seed' ( bīja ). The Sarv stiv da H daya treatises, compiled in a time period spanning from the beginning of the common era to the fourth century AD, i.e. the period of the rise of the Sautr ntika school, are a particularly interesting set of works, as they reflect the gradual development of these two major theories. (shrink)

Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden und der kanonischen Literatur der Sarvastivada-Schule. Sanskrit Dictionary of the Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds and of the Canonical Literature of the Sarvastivada School. Begonnen von Ernst Waldschmidt. Im Auftrage der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen herausgegeben von Heinz Bechert. 11. Lieferung: gata/caturmahabhautika-editor: Michael Schmidt; contributors to the 11th fasc.: S. Dietz, P. Kieffer-Pülz, M. Schmidt. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1999. 161-240 pp. 12. Lieferung: caturmaharajakayika/jvrcih-sikhopama - contributors to the 12th fasc.: J. (...) Chung, S. Dietz, P. Kieffer-Pülz, M. Schmidt. V & R, Göttingen 2000. I-III, 241-320 pp. 13. Lieferung: jvalana/trayo-dasa - contributors to teh 13 fasc.: J. Chung, S. Dietz, M. Schmidt. V & R, Göttingen 2001, I-II, 321-400 pp. Each fasc. DM 56. (shrink)

The Sa gītipary ya is the earliest Sarv stiv da philosophical text that enumerates a series of contaminants (anuśaya) , i.e. innate proclivities, inherited from former births, to do something of usually evil nature. This early list comprises seven such contaminants. As it is the contaminants that lead a worldling (p thagjana) to doing volitional actions and thus to forming a karmic result (karmavip ka) , these contaminants naturally also bear on the path to salvation. The gradual development of the (...) peculiar Sarv stiv din path to salvation necessitated a gradual refinement and reinterpretation of the original list of seven contaminants. Apart from a mere technical aspect, this reinterpretation also reflects the viewpoint of the Sautr ntika school of Buddhist philosophy on the nature of contaminants, i.e. their acceptance of a latent and an active state of the defilements, vis- -vis the Vaibh ika viewpoint according to whom no such difference exists. Within Sarv stiv da literature, the H daya treatises illustrate this philosophical development. (shrink)

The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Treasury of Metaphysics with Self-Commentary) is a pivotal treatise on early Buddhist thought composed around the fourth or fifth century by the Indian Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu. This work elucidates the Buddha’s teachings as synthesized and interpreted by the early Buddhist Sarvāstivāda school (“the theory that all [factors] exist”), while recording the major doctrinal polemics that developed around them, primarily those points of contention with the Sautrāntika system of thought (“followers of the scriptures”). Employing the methodology and terminology (...) of the Buddhist Abhidharma system, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya offers a detailed analysis of fundamental doctrines, such as early Buddhist theories of mind, cosmology, the workings of karman, meditative states and practices, and the metaphysics of the self. One of its unique features is the way it presents the opinions of a variety of Buddhist and Brahminical schools that were active in classical India in Vasubandhu’s time. The work contains nine chapters (the last of which is considered to have been appended to the first eight), which proceed from a description of the unawakened world via the path and practices that are conducive to awakening and ultimately to the final spiritual attainments which constitute the state of awakening. In its analysis of the unawakened situation, it thus covers the elements which make up the material and mental world of sentient beings, the wholesome and unwholesome mental states that arise in their minds, the structure of the cosmos, the metaphysics of action (karman) and the way it comes into being, and the nature of dispositional attitudes and dormant mental afflictions. In its treatment of the path and practices that lead to awakening, the treatise outlines the Sarvāstivāda understanding of the methods of removing defilements through the realization of the four noble truths and the stages of spiritual cultivation. With respect to the awakened state, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya gives a detailed description of the different types of knowledge and meditational states attained by practitioners who reach the highest stages of the path. (shrink)

This paper brings together the Sarvāstivāda (a major school of Abhidharma Buddhism) and Miller's (2019) moving spotlight theory to see how presentness is explained in terms of causation. The paper argues that a causal theory of presentness like Miller's encounters a dilemma: causation is either synchronic or diachronic, but neither is safe in the presence of the challenges. On the one hand, if causation is synchronic, how does a causal chain extend over time so that the wave of causation (...) (and hence the spotlight) can move at all? On the other, if causation is diachronic, then a present moment has a temporal extension enough to accommodate a cause and its proximate effect. The paper proposes a synchronic notion of causation that counters the first challenge. This can be done by bringing together the Sarvāstivādin grasp‐production model of causation, some Stoic ideas about causation, and some Armstrong's metaphysics. (shrink)

Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita contains two sharply argumented critiques of the non-Buddhists’ self: one against Arāḍa Kālāma’s (proto-)Sāṅkhya version of the ātman in Canto 12, and one of a more general import in Canto 16. Close scrutiny of the latter?s narrative environment reveals Aśvaghoṣa’s indebtedness, in both contents and wording, to either a Mahāsāṅghika(/Lokottaravādin) or—much more plausibly—a (Mūla)sarvāstivāda account of the events that saw the Buddha preach selflessness to King Bimbasāra and his Magadhan subjects. Besides hinting at this genetic relationship, the (...) present essay aims at exhibiting the structure and contents of Aśvaghoṣa’s arguments against the self, some of which can pride themselves of a long posterity in the controversy over the self. (shrink)

아비달마의 설일체유부는 작용을 기준으로 하여 존재를 파악한다. 물질과 심의 위상을 비등하게 실유로 보고 인식 외부의 실체가 항유한다고 보았다. 사유의 대상인 비량도 실유하지만, 무소연심처럼 타당하지 않다고 판단한 개념은 거북의 털 등에 비유하여 실유를 부정하였다. 설일체유부의 유명한 어구인 삼세실유 법체항유는 삼세에 법체가 항상 실유한다는 의미로도 볼 수 있는데, 유부 교학 논리전개의 특이점은 법체자성과 혼용되는 사극미는 지각불가능하지만, 지각가능한 취극미나 적집상의 인식을 이루는 단계에서의 구성요소로 인정하여 그 체가 항유하는 법이 현행할 때 구생하는 심과 동시인과관계로 보는 것이다. 따라서 유식처럼 마음의 형상을 생성한다는 개념이 없기 때문에 (...) 무소연심을 인정하지 않으며, 경량부와 세친의 대상형상의 인식, 나아가서 승의심이나 일류심 등의 종자설, 심체설과는 달리 체의 작용을 인정한다. 그러나 설일체유부와 유식은 각각 법체자성과 종자식에 대해서 공통적으로 물리적 영향력인 공능으로 설정하였다는 점에서 환원주의적 성격을 보인다. 설일체유부의 철학체계는 물적 환원주의, 경량부의 비판적 태도의 영향을 받은 세친의 유식체계는 심적 환원주의라고 할 수 있다. (shrink)

Aim of the lectures -- Early Brahmanical literature -- Panini's grammar -- A passage from the Chandogya Upanisad -- The structures of languages -- The Buddhist contribution -- Vaisesika and language -- Verbal knowledge -- The contradictions of Nagarjuna -- The reactions of other thinkers -- Sarvastivada Samkhya -- The Agamasastra of Gaudapada -- Sankara -- Kashmiri Saivism -- Jainism -- Early Vaisesika -- Critiques of the existence of a thing before its arising -- Nyaya -- Mimamsa -- The Abhidharmakosa (...) bhasya of Vasubandhu -- The Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga and its bhasya -- Bhartrhari -- The problem of negation -- Dignaga and verbal knowledge -- The Bodhisattvabhumi -- Prajnakaragupta -- Indian thinkers and the correspondence principle -- Appendix. The Mahaprajnaparamitasastra and the Samkhya tanmatras. (shrink)

Abstract:There is debate about the ontological status of conventional entities in Abhidharma thought. Buddhist texts often draw a distinction between two different kinds of entities, ultimately real entities (paramārtha-sat) and conventionally real entities (saṃvṛti-sat), but are often unclear about what the distinction entails. The debate about whether past and future dharmas are ultimately real reveals that Sam.ghabhadra and Vasubandhu—two prominent Abhidharma philosophers—fundamentally disagree about whether reality consists in one or many modes of being. Saṃghabhadra's Sarvāstivāda position is best understood (...) as the ontologically pluralist view that a dharma can enjoy three distinct but equally fundamental temporal modes of being. Vasubandhu's position is that reality is univocal, that everything is real in the same sense. Because Saṃghabhadra is a pluralist and Vasubandhu is not, Saṃghabhadra affirms the reality of conventional entities whereas Vasubandhu does not. (shrink)

Buddhist philosophers draw a distinction between two kinds of entities: ultimately real entities and conventionally real entities. Among Abhidharma Buddhist philosophers, who accept the fundamental existence of ultimately real entities, there is a debate over the existential status of conventionally real entities. The most prevalent interpretation of the general Abhidharma position is an anti-realist one: conventionally real entities do not exist. Here, however, I will argue that there is at least one Abhidharma philosopher who is not an anti-realist about conventionally (...) real entities. Saṅghabhadra, a fifth-century CE Indian Buddhist philosopher belonging to the Vaibhāṣika-Sarvāstivāda tradition of Abhidharma Buddhism, offers an account of conventionally real entities that takes them to be real. According to him, conventional entities exist, although in a derivative and degenerate way—a way that is supervenient on and grounded in what is ultimately real. Saṅghabhadra’s view substantiates, in his specific case, Kris McDaniel’s argument that Abhidharma accounts of conventional reality are profitably interpreted as the view that conventional entities exist but enjoy a mode of being that is distinct from the fundamental mode of being enjoyed by ultimately real entities. In what follows, I will argue that the pluralist framework that McDaniel lays out for understanding the mode of being that non-fundamental entities enjoy fits well with and makes the most sense of, the account of conventional entities offered by Saṅghabhadra. (shrink)

History of Buddhist philosophy, with special reference to canonical and early philosophical literature, presenting Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda school.

This article proposes an interpretation of the ‘Thesis that Things do not Shift’ (Wu bu qian lun, 物不遷論) of the early Chinese Buddhist philosopher Sengzhao. We understand Sengzhao to be proposing a version of the philosophy of time found in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, and then interpreting statements about time from Mahāyāna texts in light of that account. But whatever his limitations as a cross-cultural interpreter, we find Sengzhao surprisingly impressive philosophically, as he proposes a view that is noticeably more advanced (...) towards a modern conception of time than the accounts found in South Asian Buddhist sources. Ironically, his earnest efforts to present his view as falling within the Mahāyāna may have functioned to conceal Sengzhao’s true philosophical achievement. (shrink)

Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadyamakakārikā argues against the Abhidharma view that their putatively fundamental entities—the dharmas —can enter into causal relationships. The Ābhidharmikas maintain that the mark of fundamentality is having a particular kind of nature called svabhāva —a Sanskrit term that roughly translates to "own-nature." Nāgārjuna's arguments target svabhāva, attempting to show that any entity that has a svabhāva could not enter into causal relations. Nāgārjuna's arguments, however, fail against the foundationalism of the Vaibhāṣika Sarvāstivāda Ābhidharmikas because he targets a notion (...) of svabhāva that they do not hold. This essay defends Abhidharma foundationalism against four of Nāgārjuna's causal arguments by clarifying the Vaibhāṣika understanding of svabhāva and demonstrating how their view avoids Nāgārjuna's objections. I argue that the Vaibhāṣika characterize svabhāva only as a nature that does not reductively supervene on other entities. This characterization allows for various other dependence relations among dharmas, including causal dependence. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivāda view that entities exist in the past, present, and future, if interpreted as a form of ontological pluralism, avoids Nāgārjuna's criticism that causation's temporal process must involve change, inconsistent with svabhāva 's immutability. (shrink)

This Book Is An In-Depth Study Of Buddhist Philosophy In India And Tibet. The Concentration Is On Ontology/Epistemology And, To A Somewhat Lesser Extent, Soteriology. It Is Based On The Writings Of The Buddhist Philosophers Themselves, From The Unknown Authors Of The Pali `Abhidhamma' Books Down To The Present Dalai Lama Of Tibet. It Takes Into Consideration The Work Of Many Twentieth Century Scholars Of Buddhism In Order To Bring Our Knowledge Of Buddhist Philosophy Up-To-Date. An Exhaustive Index (And Glossary) (...) Has Been Prepared In Order To Help The Reader With The Technical Terms Of Buddhist Philosophy.;;The Two Parts And Fourteen Chapters Of The Book Are As Follows: Part I (India): Ch.I: The Theravada. Ch.Ii: The Sarvastivada. Ch.Iii: The Madhyamaka (1) The Prasangikas Nagarjuna And Candrakirti. Ch.Iv: The Madhyamaka (2) The Prasangikas Aryadeva And Santideva. Ch.V: The Madhyamaka (3) The Svatantrikas. Ch.Vi: The Yogacara (1) Two Yogacara Sutras And Asanga And Vasubandhu. Ch.Vii: The Yogacara (2) Dignaga And Dharmakirti. Ch.Viii: The Yogacara (3) Santarakshita And Kamalasila. Ch.Ix: The `Tathagata-Garbha'. Part Ii (Tibet): Ch.X: The Vajrayana, General Features. Ch.Xi: The Nyingmapa. Ch.Xii: The Sakyapa. Ch.Xiii: The Kagyupa. Ch.Xiv: The Gelugpa. (shrink)

This study provides an overview of what is known about the shorter Chinese Samyukta Agama and also an annotated translation of its first 22 suttas, which corresponds to the Pali Bhikkhu Samyutta. Recent research suggests that T.100 belongs to the corpus of Sarvastivada Literature. The annotations resolve some unique expressions, correct some mistakes found in the textus receptus, and point out significant differences between the versions of the suttas. The text base for Chinese is the CBETA/Taisho edition, for Pali the (...) Chatta Sangayana edition published by the Vipassana Research Institute, if not indicated otherwise. The paper is a first result of the Bieyi za ahan jing-Project 1 at the Chung-hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies, Taiwan, which aims at a digital edition and translation of the complete work. (shrink)

Besides Giving An Account Of The Origin And Development Of Buddhism As Well As The Works Of Vasubandhu And Reviewing The Abhidarwa Literature Of Buddhism, Written In Sanskrit And Pali This Book Thoroughly Analyses The Doctrine Of Sarvastivada And The Buddhist Conceptions Of Feeling, Perception, Consciousness And Impression.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Asian PhilosophiesJames McRaeAsian Philosophies. By John M. Koller. Fourth edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2001. Pp. xxi+ 361.John M. Koller's Asian Philosophiesprovides an excellent overview of many of the major traditions of Eastern thought. It is divided into three parts, each representing a broad field of Asian philosophy: Indian Philosophy, Buddhism, and Chinese Philosophy (Japanese thought is briefly examined in a chapter on Zen Buddhism in the (...) second section). Each part begins with a historical overview that provides important contextual information for the philosophical systems it examines (a feature added since the third edition).Part 1, concerning India, gives detailed summaries of the Vedas and Upanishads, Jainism, the Bhagavad Gita, Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-Vaisheshika, Mimamsa and Vedanta (a section expanded since the last edition), and Theism. This section also includes chapters on Islamic thought and modern Indian philosophy. Koller does not simply give a bare-bones overview of these traditions; rather, he takes great care to quote from and analyze the primary sources of the traditions examined.Part 2, on India, contains chapters that focus on Siddhartha Gautama's life and thought, the doctrine of pratitya samutpada, Sarvastivada (with new material added since the third edition), Mahayana (a new chapter), Madhyamaka and Nagarjuna (also with new material), and Yogacara. A final chapter on Zen Buddhism is included in this section, although no other schools of Japanese Buddhism are discussed.Part 3, on Chinese thought, contains chapters on Confucianism, Taoism, and Neo-Confucianism, with a final chapter that examines modern Chinese philosophy (Koller uses Wade-Giles romanization for Chinese terms throughout the text).Asian Philosophiesalso contains many helpful appendixes: maps; pronunciation guides for Sanskrit, Chinese, and Japanese terms; a brief glossary; a detailed bibliography and suggestions for further reading; and timelines for each tradition (added since the third edition).Koller's book offers a clearly written and well-organized summary of the thought of most of the major Asian traditions. It is accessible to undergraduates, but rich enough to serve as a reference for graduate students studying Asian or comparative philosophy. It would provide a clear, concise introduction to Eastern thought for upper-level undergraduate philosophy courses. However, professors interested in teaching Japanese philosophy would need to supplement the text with information on non-Zen philosophy (such as Shin and Kegon Buddhism) and on modern Japanese philosophy (such as the Kyoto School).Copyright © 2005 University of Hawai'i Press. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Buddhist Abhidharma ontologies and their engagement. A close reading of two hitherto uncompared passages from _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_ 2.13 and Vasubandhu’s _Abhidharmakośabhāṣya_ 4.94 suggests that they are intertextual or interdiscursive. A mirrored argument form in the texts explains ethical causality (karma) in relation to rebirth (_punarjanman_). The arguments in both texts are similar in form, sequence, and even conclusion, although not in terms of the doctrinal basis of reasoning. On first examination, both arguments analyse how action (...) (karma) sustains patterns of moral repercussion across life and beyond death in terms of singular and plural causes and effects. But a close reading shows that the level of conceptual engagement on this issue is more nuanced – centred on ‘projecting’ and ‘completing’ mechanisms of karmic retribution (_ākṣepaka karman_ and _paripūraka karman_) as well as determinate or indeterminate (_niyata_ and _aniyata_) maturation of karmic effects. The paper suggests that the function of Patañjali’s passage was to serve as a structured engagement with Buddhist Sarvāstivāda karma theory. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna of the Ratnamālāvadāna presents six key aspects of the development of Buddhist thought from the Pāli canon to the Sarvāstivāda tradition: childlessness, the arrival of a fetus through the propitiation of gods, presence of heretics, the impact of Buddha’s intervention and a child bodhisattva, soteriological elements of the story’s didactics, and the Buddha’s peculiar smile. These six key aspects were chosen to reflect and explore the content of Sarvāstivādin society and teachings (...) concerning its source narratives of the Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka and the Pāli canon. This helps us to understand the composition of Sarvāstivāda doctrine as recounted in the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna, which varies from its source the Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka. It also aids in the identification of the avadāna and avadānamālā forms of Sarvāstivāda, as well as the impact of the Pāli canon and Brahmanical thought on them. The Kusīdāvadāna of Avadānaśataka, which is the source of the Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna and the Pāli canon, will be utilized to examine the six aspects of the societal and doctrinal development of the Buddhist thought of Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna. The final portion is the very first annotated translation of Kauśīdyavīryotsāhanāvadāna based on Takahata’s 1954 original version. (shrink)

The present paper is the third in a series dedicated to uncovering the canonical sources of Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita and, to the extent possible, the monk-poet’s sectarian affiliation. Whereas parts I and II focused on Chapter 16’s indebtedness to (Mūla)sarvāstivāda Vinaya and/or Sūtra literature, this third part inquires into the sources of Aśvaghoṣa’s account of the Buddha’s enlightenment in Chapter 14 (whose first 31 verses have been preserved in their Sanskrit original). Detailed analysis reveals this chapter’s intimate relationship with T. (...) 189, a (Mūla)sarvāstivāda (?) biographical sūtra extant in Chinese translation only, but also with textual materials that have come to belong to Mūlasarvāstivāda literature and, as already demonstrated by Kajiyama Yūichi, with the Nagar(opam)asūtra of the Saṃyuktāgama. Among these likely sources, some provide a lively description of the five destinies, others relate to the iconographic prescriptions laid down for drawing the so-called Wheel of saṃsāra/existence, while yet others spell out the doctrine of dependent origination. The detailed comparison of these materials is followed by an admittedly speculative attempt to assess the relationship between these sources. (shrink)

The Mahāsamghika is known as a sect which includes several Mahāyānic elements. Several scholars have pointed out that people belonging to it insist that the physical body of a Buddha is anāsrava (undefiled) and his existence in this world is lokottara (transcendental). In the Mahāvastu, a representative text inMahāsamghika literature, we find the word lokānuvartanā (conforming to the world), which is related closely to the anāsrava and lokottara theory on the physical body of a Buddha. However, though the Theravāda and (...) Sarvāstivāda, both of which are generally believed as having a more “realistic” understanding regarding the image of a Buddha, basically criticize the Mahāsamghika’s view, we can find descriptions similar to the concept of lokānuvartanā in their own literature. This implies that the problem of understanding a Buddha’s physical body in sectarian Buddhism is not as simple as was previously thought. For example, Buddhaghosa stated that all (past and future) Buddhas originally have asankheyya (immensely long period) lifespans. However, in reality, the duration of each lifebecomes longer or shorter, depending on the lifespan of human beings which cyclically increases and decreases due to cosmological conditions and hence, each Buddha is also subject to this principle when appearing in this world. This explanation is indeed analogous to the concept of lokānuvartanā in the Mahāvastu, and we can find several other descriptions by Buddhaghosa, which bear close resemblance to this idea. In the first place, the image of a Buddha,which is depicted in Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda literature, is also full of mythical and miraculous characteristics. Moreover, with respect to using the “two‐bodies theory” (dharmakāya and rūpakāya) to explain the essence and the appearance of a Buddha, it is the Sarvāstivāda rather than the Mahāsamghika that is closer toearly Mahāyāna. In the dispute between these two sects as to whether the physical body of a Buddha is āsrava or anāsrava, we can see that according to the Ta p’i-p’o-sha lun 大毘婆沙論, both of them acknowledge their legitimacy based on one sentence in a sutra, namely “The Tathāgata is living in this world but he is not stained by any worldly elements.” Thus, their dispute merely arose from a discrepancy in the interpretation of this sentence. In conclusion, two things should be stated. First, though it is true that we can find several Mahāyānic elements in Mahāsamghika literature, at least in terms of regarding a Buddha’s physical body as part of this world, both the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda rather than the Mahāsamghika are closer to early Mahāyāna. Second, the dispute between theSarvāstivāda, which regards the physical body of a Buddha as āsrava, and the Mahāsamghika, which explains his appearance by the concept of lokānuvartanā, certainly reflects an important difference of opinion. We should not, however, accept that this difference means a total disagreement between the two concerning the understanding of a Buddha’s appearance in this world. At least, their differing view does not imply that “while the former basically had a ‘realistic’ image of a Buddha, the latter had a ‘deified’ one which was closer to that of the Mahāyāna.”. (shrink)

This paper examines the topic of Yogācāra idealism through a little studied Buddhist meditation manual, the so-called ‘Yogalehrbuch’ or ‘Qizil Yoga Manual’, a primarily Buddhist Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma text with Mahāyāna Yogācāra strands. What does this unique Central Asian text say about Buddhist meditation practices called yogācāra or yoga? It centres on methods of vivid visualization that are somewhat specific to the Central Asian region of Kucha on the Silk Road. To understand the Manual’s practice and definition of yogic meditation, (...) this paper considers how some of the hyper-real visualizations in the dhātuprayoga section relate the mind to reality and whether Yogācāra meditation can be said to propose idealism as a metaphysical theory about the nature of reality. The paper also asks whether neurocognitive research insights can be useful in understanding what some regard as a ‘hallucination-like’ quality of some visualizations, which destabilise distinctions between appearances and reality. Furthermore, it argues that analyzing the materiality of meditation, particularly the environment of the cave, helps us to better understand the text’s techniques of yogic visualization. The paper concludes that the ‘Qizil Yoga Manual’ facilitates soteriological idealism and suggests that factoring in the material contexts of meditation is useful, both in deciphering the text’s meditation methods and in discussing the metaphysical theory of idealism. (shrink)

Comparative study of discipline in Theravada and Sarvastivada Buddhism.

Shame is by and large dichotomized into hrī and apatrāpya in the Buddhist context. In the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra scholasticism, both hrī and apatrāpya are subsumed under the wholesome states. In this paper, firstly, previous studies and the etymologies of the two terms above will be closely reviewed; secondly, the exposition and contrast of hrī and apatrāpya between the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra will be minutely contextualized; thirdly, the merit of possessing dichotomized states of shame will be thoroughly investigated. (...) Central to my research is a glimpse of the scholastic Indian Buddhist sophistication, exemplified by two kinds of shame, as well as the initial consideration of hrī and apatrāpya in the context of shame, guilt, and conscience in the Anglophone philosophy, while also taking their association with Buddhist morality and concentration into account. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative SemioticsYouru WangBuddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative Semiotics. By Youxuan Wang. London: Curzon Press, 2001. Pp. xiv + 242. Hardcover $65.00.Youxuan Wang's Buddhism and Deconstruction: Toward a Comparative Semiotics is a full-length study comparing Derridean and Buddhist discourse, especially their deconstruction of the notion of sign. Since Robert Magliola's 1984 publication Derrida on the Mend, which involved his pioneering comparison of Derrida (...) and Nāgārjuna, many articles or book chapters have contributed to the growing body of comparative studies on Derridean and various (Indian, Chinese, or Japanese) Buddhist thought. However, a more systematic study of Buddhist deconstruction had not been achieved until the publication of Wang's book. In my view, as long as the investigation of deconstructive strategies in important Buddhist texts has not been completed, the comparison of Derridean and Buddhist deconstruction will never be sufficient. Wang's book provides substantial development of this topic. The understanding of sign and the conception of the Same are the major threads running [End Page 486] through his detailed investigation of Derridean texts and the Chinese texts of Mādhyamika and Yogācāra Buddhism.Wang denies that the objects of his study are "representatives of Buddhist philosophy" but rather believes they are "specimens of Buddhist literary production" (p. 11). This attitude enables him to be open to different Buddhist texts, to discover different strategies and styles, without being fettered by the problem of the self-identity of each text and its authorship. Consequently, the author's selection of a particular set of Buddhist texts has proven distinctive and philosophically significant. The texts he investigates are written neither by famous Indian Mādhyamika philosophers such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti nor by great indigenous Chinese thinkers such as Sengzhao, Jizang, and the Chan Buddhists. Such texts, with their greater names, are popular among contemporary scholars for their study of Buddhist deconstruction. What Wang examines, however, is a set of peripheral texts, including the Dazhidu Iun (translated and edited by Kumārajīva but attributed to Nāgārjuna) and the Treatise on the Eighteen Points about Emptiness (translated and edited by Paramārtha but also attributed to Nāgārjuna). Because of their problems of alleged authorship, these have largely been neglected by modern scholarship. Wang's study in fact subverts this kind of judgment of central/marginal texts by revealing their significance to the historical development of the understanding of Mahāyāna teaching in Chinese Buddhism and their critical usefulness in the postmodern discourse of sign.The subversiveness of Wang's study lies not only in his use of marginal Mādhyamika texts, but also in his bold approach to a couple of Yogācāra texts. To my limited knowledge, no serious discussion of Buddhist deconstruction has specifically referred to any Yogācāra text. Most discussions have hitherto referred to Nāgārjuna, Prāsangika, or Chan/Zen texts. It has been a common impression that Yogācāra Buddhism somehow smuggles a form of substantialization into Mahāyāna teaching through the back door. But this is not the case with the texts Wang studies. Although these texts may also be considered marginal compared to some others, Wang convincingly demonstrates in them a Yogācāra deconstruction of substantialization through the three categories of absence-of-being (san wu xing) and other strategies, with regard to a Yogācāra understanding of the Same or True Suchness.The first two chapters concentrate on a survey of the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika metaphysical-semiotic themes in the list of seventy-five existential factors and how they are undone by Kumārajīva and Paramārtha's commentaries on the Mahāyāna list of eighteen points about emptiness. Wang's analysis reveals the deconstructive power of these commentaries while doing justice to the Sarvāstivāda-Sautrāntika refutation of naive realism. The central semiotic theme as involved in the soteriology of Mahāyāna Buddhism, according to these commentaries and Wang's interpretation, is the "true character of all dharmas"—the emptiness of all existential factors (pp. 76... (shrink)

In the study of Buddhism it is commonly accepted that a monk or nun who commits a pārājika offence is permanently and irrevocably expelled from the Buddhist monastic order. This view is based primarily on readings of the Pāli Vinaya. With the exception of the Pāli Vinaya, however, all other extant Buddhist monastic law codes (Dharmaguptaka, Mahāsāṅghika, Mahīśāsaka, Sarvāstivāda and Mūlasarvāstivāda) contain detailed provisions for monks and nuns who commit pārājikas but nevertheless wish to remain within the saṅgha. These (...) monastics are not expelled. Rather, they are granted a special status known as the śikṣādattaka. In this paper I explore the rules. concerning pārājika penance and the śikṣādattaka with specific regard to monastic celibacy. Given that five out of six extant law codes recognise this remarkable accommodation to the rule of celibacy, I argue that we must look to Vinayas other than the Pāli Vinaya if we are to arrive at a nuanced and representative view of Indian Buddhist monasticism. Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet.Augustine of Hippo (354–430 C.E.). (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and TimeDouglas W. ShraderAbhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time. By Venerable Nyanaponika Thera. Fourth edition. Edited with an introduction by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1998. Pp. 160. Paper $16.95.The delightful, thought-provoking Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Timeby the Venerable Nyanaponika Thera is the fourth incarnation of a text originally composed shortly after World War II, published in (...) 1949 (Frewin and Co., Ltd.). The Buddhist Publication Society issued a second, revised and enlarged edition in 1965 as well as a third edition, with relatively minor corrections, in 1976. The present edition, edited by Bhikkhu Bodhi, incorporates a variety of welcome changes, reflecting considerable effort and devotion to the task. In addition to authoring a superb introductory essay, Bodhi has "reformulated a few awkward sentences..., reorganized the notes, provided additional references, and supplied a bibliography" (p. viii). Perhaps the most intriguing and potentially significant change is evident in the title itself. Originally subtitled Researches in Buddhist Psychology, an apt but relatively uninformative description of its contents, the title now announces, even to the uninitiated, the book's unique, captivating subject matter: Buddhist Explorations of Consciousness and Time.This book is essential reading for any serious student of Buddhism. Additionally, it will appeal to those interested in a wide variety of both phenomenological and ontological issues: the manifold of experience, the nature of consciousness, the analysis of time, concepts of anattā(ego selflessness) and paticca-samuppāda(dependent origination), and so forth. An intermediate to advanced level of familiarity and understanding of basic Buddhist doctrines is recommended. It will prove particularly useful to scholars and students who have been intimidated by the vast, often cryptic, Abhidhamma literature.Apparently, the Buddha and his teachings were as enticing and yet profoundly puzzling and enigmatic to his contemporaries and followers as they remain to millions today. They challenge everything we commonly take to be real. That which appears substantial, we are told, is not. Contrary to our own (unexamined) inner/ subjective experience, as well as the teachings of most major world religions, we neither arenor havea self, for there is no self either to be or to have. The attempt to reconcile the teachings of the Buddha with existing beliefs and assumptions concerning the nature of reality led to a proliferation of competing philosophical schools. Each school developed its own distinctive Abhidhamma literature, ostensibly representing a deeper understanding of the teachings of the Buddha. In practice, the literature served to distinguish one school from another, guarding against and/or [End Page 637]correcting the "erroneous" teachings of the other schools. Over a period of approximately three centuries, the Abhidhamma Pitaka grew rapidly…in terms of the sheer volume of literature as well as complexity of doctrine. Paralleling that increase, it came to play a position of ever greater prominence, rivaling even the canonical collections of the Buddha's word (the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas). Together the three became known as the Tipitaka: "Three Baskets of the Doctrine."Unfortunately for scholars, the only Abhidhammas to survive the widespread persecution of Buddhism in India during the twelfth century A.D.were those that had been transported to, and transplanted in, other lands. Specifically, the Theravāda Abhidhamma (seven books in Pāli) found an enduring home in Sri Lanka. The Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma (also seven books) along with the Śāriputra-abhidharmaśāstra(probably the Dharmaguptaka School) were carried to China, where they were translated from Sanskrit into Chinese. Of these, it is the Theravaāda collection— particularly its first book (the Dharmasanganī) as well as the seventh book (the Patthana)—that forms the subject matter of Ven. Nyanaponika's study. The other two schools have long since vanished, except, as Bhikkhu Bodhi points out, that "a late exposition of the Sarvāstivāda Abhidhamma system, Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa, continues to be studied among Tibetan Buddhists and in the Far East" (p. x).Abhidhamma Studiesis divided into five chapters and two appendixes. Chapter 1, which was added in the second edition, provides a brief historical overview of "The Abhidhamma Philosophy." Those who approach the Abhidhamma... (shrink)

An advantage of a typical growing block theory (GBT) or moving spotlight theory (MST) is that it can easily account for tenseless or tensed truths involving past entities. The paper indicates what is required for such an advantage is that a particular like a rock doesn’t change its status of being a rock when turning past from being present. But a typical GBT or MST, which implies that a particular’s turning past from being present doesn’t make a physical difference, faces (...) a series of problems. The paper then regards the exclusion of the implication of making no physical difference by a typical GBT or MST as the second requirement for being a tenable GBT or MST. It’s difficult to satisfy both requirements – even Miller’s (2019) MWT fails to do so. The paper shall reveal how a GBT can satisfy both requirements. (shrink)

It has been claimed that Indian Buddhism, as opposed to East Asian Chan/Zen traditions, was somehow against humour. In this paper I contend that humour is discernible in canonical Indian Buddhist texts, particularly in Indian Buddhist monastic law codes (Vinaya). I will attempt to establish that what we find in these texts sometimes is not only humourous but that it is intentionally so. I approach this topic by comparing different versions of the same narratives preserved in Indian Buddhist monastic law (...) codes. (shrink)