The difference between a scientific system and the non scientific system is only a matter of forms of rationality: so also the difference between empirical system and non empirical system explainable in terms of the kinds of rationality systems in their structures. Similarly, the classification of civilized cultures and primitive cultures or the black civilization and western civilization is all about forms of rationalizations. That is because the form of explanation of European Society is different from the form (...) of explanation of the Black African animistic society. However, structural functionalism is an attempt on a large scale to combine the methods of both functionalism and structuralism which is not only extant in African philosophy but also embedded in the practice of tradition. Indeed Theistic Panpsychic rationality is culturally structural and functional thereby qualifying to be described as structural functional Panpsychic communicative animism. (shrink)

[ I ] Introduction: Paradigms, Theism, and the Parity Thesis Few claims are more controversial than that beliefs about God are rational. ...

After a discussion of several concepts of explanation, in which the criterion of simplicity is emphasized and some interesting historical examples are used as illustration, this paper presents the cosmological and teleological arguments. The central claim is that the hypothesis of theism is more simple and elegant and so more rational than any of its alternatives.

I contend that Kant’s moral argument that postulates God and an afterlife in order to justify moral rationality counts strongly in favor of theistic ethics even though it cannot on its own justify that God exists. In moving toward this conclusion, I assess Kant’s moral argument and note how both Kant and the utilitarian Henry Sidgwick, in their own ways, recognize that morality cannot reasonably be seen as completely overriding if God and an afterlife are rejected. I then (...) critique a theistic moral rationality argument offered by C. Stephen Layman, as a flaw in this argument helps to reveal why arguments centering upon moral rationality likely cannot reach an ontological conclusion concerning theism; nevertheless, I contend that moral rationality arguments like Kant’s have apologetic significance for theism. They reveal a dilemma for secular ethics: either appeal to the possibility of theism in order to justify moral rationality or else accept that morality is not fully rational. (shrink)

In this article, I present a defense of conceptual plausibility, understood as an epistemic way to qualify concepts that situates them between the merely possible and the actual. To show that there is such a thing as conceptual plausibility, I rely on what seems to lie at the heart of many uses of the phrase “plausible concept”: explanatory fruitfulness. To make an effective case for the claim that conceptual plausibility is of philosophical interest, I present an argument based on the (...) debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. To show that conceptual plausibility is philosophically feasible, I first show that it cannot be reduced to propositional plausibility. Next, I offer a minimally precise characterization of conceptual plausibility; I approach this from a qualitative and comparative perspective as well. Finally, I show how these qualitative and comparative criteria of conceptual plausibility might be applied to the debate over the rationality of theistic belief and the concept of God. (shrink)

This is a review of Mark McLeod's book, Rationality and Theistic Belief.

This book is a thorough study of an issue that is particularly associated with the work of William P. Alston and Alvin Plantinga, namely, the claim that belief in the existence of God is in important ways on a par with belief in the existence of ordinary parts of the world, such as trees and other people. The inference is that since the latter is recognized as epistemologically acceptable, that is, "rational," so should the former be. McLeod develops his own (...) version of this view after giving a careful, sympathetic, and detailed analysis and critique of the work of Alston and Plantinga, in addition to others. The thoroughness and clarity of this critique is striking and will be very helpful to those interested in the development of the discussion of this issue. The analysis of Alston has been particularly enriched by McLeod's being able to take advantage of Alston's own responses to it. McLeod considers the issue of the epistemological nature of perceptual beliefs of the ordinary sort as well as the peculiar problems of theistic beliefs. Hence, the book contains a substantial analysis of the nature of the justification of perceptual beliefs. He also deals with the problem of broadly religious versus specifically Christian beliefs. The latter, he argues, clearly include background beliefs that cannot be justified in a way that is independent of Christian practice. That is, in order to confirm Christian beliefs one must appeal to other Christian beliefs. This circularity must be faced, he asserts, but does not undermine the possibility of a parity with certain types of nontheistic beliefs that are similarly circular. (shrink)

Introduction i This work is a sustained argument for the rationality of belief in God based on the evidence that across various religions down through history people seem to have experienced God.1 If we conf1ne ourselves to rationality ...

In this book, Maduabuchi Dukor presents a comprehensive interpretation of African Philosophy that is informed by the idea that everything in the universe includes a 'spiritual' dimension, what he calls theistic humanism. Imperceptible agents such as God, lesser divinities, and ancestors, as well as forces such as witchcraft and magic, play prominent roles in Dukor's accounts of not just metaphysics, but also ethics, aesthetic, and epistemics. By highlighting the diversity in intellectual world currents philosophy stimulates intercultural dialogue, African Philosophy (...) in the Global Village. Theistic Panpsychic Rationality, Axiology and Science is a response to major contemporary socio-cultural challenges in the global village. (shrink)

A popular objection to theistic commitment involves the idea that faith is irrational. Specifically, some seem to put forth something like the following argument: (P1) Everyone (or almost everyone) who has faith is epistemically irrational, (P2) All theistic believers have faith, thus (C) All (or most) theistic believers are epistemically irrational. In this paper, I argue that this line of reasoning fails. I do so by considering a number of candidates for what faith might be. I argue (...) that, for each candidate, either (P1) is false or (P2) is false. Then, I make two positive suggestions for how faith can be epistemically rational but nonetheless have a unique relationship to evidence: one, that Jamesian self-justifying attitudes describe a distinctive kind of faith in oneself and others, and two, that faith is not solely based on empirical evidence. (shrink)

_The Rationality of Theism_ is a controversial collection of brand new papers by thirteen outstanding philosophers and scholars. Its aim is to offer comprehensive theistic replies to the traditional arguments against the existence of God, offering a positive case for theism as well as rebuttals of recent influential criticisms of theism.

Throughout the ages one of the central topics in philosophy of religion has been the rationality of theistic belief. This book proposes that parties on both sides of this debate might shift their attention in a different direction, by focusing on the question of whether it is rational to be a religious theist. Explaining that having theistic beliefs is primarily a cognitive affair but being a religious theist involves a whole way of life that includes one's beliefs, (...) Golding argues that it can be pragmatically rational to be a religious theist even if the evidence for God's existence is minimal. The argument is applied to the case of Judaism, articulating what is involved in religious Judaism and arguing that it is rationally defensible to be a religious Jew. The book concludes with a discussion of whether a similar argument might be constructed for other versions of religious theism such as Christianity or Islam, and for non-theistic religions such as Taoism or Buddhism. Joshua Golding offers a carefully wrought explanation of how it can be rational for someone to live a religious life, in particular, a traditional Jewish life. (shrink)

Jerome Gellman argues in Experience of God that there is “some” reasonable application of the canons of rationality to the facts concerning apparent experiences of God “on which it is reasonable to believe that God exists and not reasonable to believe that God does not exist”. The book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter sets the conceptual groundwork, discussing the meaning and reference of “God,” what is meant by “experience of God,” and the like. Gellman’s treatment of (...) “God” as a proper name in terms of reference is especially interesting, and resurfaces at crucial turns later in the book. The main argument, appealing to a modified and extended version of Richard Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity, is given in the second chapter. The remaining chapters attempt, with varying success, to answer the major objections facing this sort of argument from religious experience, including the claim that the experiential evidence for theism is outweighed or vitiated by others’ failures to experience God; the problems posed by the diversity of religious experience in different religions; the claim that the best explanations of religious experience are nonreligious; the claim that the alleged object of theistic experience is conceptually incoherent; and the relevance of the problem of evil. (shrink)

In May 1998, a distinguished group of philosophers met in Munich to discuss the rationality of theism. This volume is a collection of the papers read at that conference. While in recent years the rationality of theistic belief has been widely discussed, the Munich conference was an event of some moment in the history of philosophical dialogue: for the first time German- and English-speaking philosophers of religion, representatives of both the Continental and the Anglo-Saxon traditions, joined together (...) to grapple with a common philosophical theme. This multiplicity of perspectives brought a unique richness to the analysis of rationality that no one tradition by itself could provide. Readers will find that richness displayed in the pages of this book. Professional philosophers will find here a great deal to stimulate and challenge them; but graduate students, capable undergraduates, and all others with a serious interest in the philosophy of religion will be well rewarded for their efforts to come to grips with these thought-provoking papers. (shrink)

Applying critical sociological theory, this book explores the shortcomings of popular tactics in animal liberation efforts. Building a case for a scientifically-grounded grassroots approach, it is argued that professionalized advocacy that works in the service of theistic, capitalist, patriarchal institutions will find difficulty achieving success.

In August of 1989, as an eighteen-year-old atheist spending his last night at home before setting off cross-country for college, I had the one and only mystical experience of my life to date. Rather than grapple with expressing the content of that experience, let me quote from part of the record Blaise Pascal made of his own mystical experience, one that seems to have been similar in many respects to my own.

This paper defends the view that, in certain actual circumstances that aren’t uncommon for educated westerners, an awareness of the facts of religious disagreement doesn’t make theistic belief irrational. The first section makes some general remarks about when discovering disagreement (on any topic) makes it rational to give up your beliefs: it discusses the two main possible outcomes of disagreement (i.e., defeat of one’s disputed belief and demotion of one’s disputant), the main kinds of evidence that are relevant to (...) demoting one’s disputant, and the kinds of epistemic assessment involved in demoting a disputant. The second section argues that in cases of disagreement about theism, the theist’s evidence for theism and for the reliability of her theistic belief is often strong enough to support steadfastness in the face of disagreement. The third section argues that the theist’s evidence for the reliability of her disputant’s atheistic beliefs is often weak enough to allow her to rationally demote her atheist interlocutor and it explains how this demotion can occur in a sensible and appropriate way. The final section focuses on theists whose disagreement-based doubts about theism persist, despite the defenses offered on behalf of theism against such doubts. It concludes that these persistent doubts could in some cases result in defeaters for theistic belief, even if the doubts are irrational, but that the gift of faith can compensate for this. (shrink)

Wood aims at correcting an undue emphasis upon the negative or critical aspect of Kant’s theological thought. He seeks to achieve this object through two distinct inquiries: into the positive component of Kant’s rational theology, chiefly the account of the ens realissimium [[sic]] as the necessary ideal assumed by reason in its attempt to arrive at a complete determination of the properties of things, presented in the "Ideal of Reason" in the "Dialectic" of the first Critique, ; into the strengths (...) and weaknesses of the criticisms of the ontological and natural proofs of the existence of a supreme being, found chiefly in sections 3-7 of the "Ideal of Reason". The author here is centrally concerned with salvaging the ontological argument from Kant’s famous and still highly regarded attack. These two inquiries correspond to the two main parts of the text. The second part also contains a discussion and criticism of the role which theistic concepts play in the regulative idea of the unity of the laws of nature, as discussed in the "Appendix" to the "Dialectic". (shrink)

It is often claimed that belief in God is based on faith, while non-belief is grounded in rationality. This claim is inaccurate. Moral philosopher Carlo Alvaro takes the reader through his philosophical journey—a journey taken with the absolute absence of faith. Through reasoning alone, and with an objective assessment of the classical theistic arguments, Deism takes the reader from disbelief to a particular version of deism. Deism discusses such arguments as the Kalam Cosmological, the asymmetry against the evil-god (...) challenge, the anthropic principle, and the moral. Such arguments lead to the undeniable conclusion that there exists a timeless, space-less, wholly good, and infinitely powerful being endowed with freedom of the will, who brought the universe into existence a finite time ago. An objective appraisal of such arguments leads to the conclusions that atheism is an irrational philosophical position, that God does not interact with humans, at least not during our physical existence on earth, and that God is the best explanation of the objectivity of moral value and duty. (shrink)

This is a controversial collection of brand new papers by some outstanding philosophers and scholars. Its aim is to offer comprehensive theistic replies to the traditional arguments against the existence of God.

Is the nonexistence of God conceivable? By St. Anselm.--Five proofs of God's existence, by St. Thomas Aquinas.--Comments on St. Thomas' Five ways, by F. C. Copleston.--Two proofs of God's existence, by A. E. Taylor.--God's existence as a postulate of morality, by I. Kant.--The existence of God, by J. J. C. Smart.--The problem of evil, by D. Hume.--The experience of God, by J. Baille.--Instinct, experience, and theistic belief, by C. S. Pierce.--The ethics of belief, by W. K. Clifford.--The will to (...) believe, by W. James.--Faith as passionate commitment, by S. Kierkegaard.--God as projection, by L. A. Feuerbach.--Bibliographical essay (p. 205-208). (shrink)

Many of us these days sense there is something real beyond the scope of naturalistic science. But what? Must mental and religious lives always remain a mystery and never become part of scientific knowledge? In this well-argued book, physicist Ian Thompson makes a case for a 'scientific theism'. He shows how a following of core postulates of theism leads to novel and useful predictions about the psychology of minds and the physics of materials which should appear in the universe. These (...) predictions constitute a kind of 'theistic science'. It meshes surprisingly well with the structure of reality already revealed by modern quantum field theory and by theories of developmental stages in human minds. The result is a serious look at a promising new rational structure encompassing theology, psychology and physics. (shrink)

Adolf Grünbaum is one of the giants of 20th century philosophy of science. This volume is the first of three collecting his most essential and highly influential work. The essays collected in this first volume focus on three related areas. They discuss scientific rationality-the problem of what it takes for a theory to be called scientific, and ask whether it is plausible to draw a clear distinction between science and non-science as was famously proposed by Karl Popper. They delve (...) into the debate between determinism and indeterminism, in both science and in the humanities. Grünbaum defends the position of the Humane Determinist, which then leads to a thorough criticism of the current theological approaches to ethics and morality-where Grünbaum defends an explicit Secular Humanism-as well as of prominent theistic interpretations of twentieth century physical cosmologies. The second volume is devoted to Grünbaum's writings on the Philosophy of Physics and Space-Time, and the third to his lectures on the Philosophy of Psychology and Psychoanalysis, including his 1985 Gifford Lectures, which are to be published for the first time. (shrink)

This article re-examines Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s theological insights on the interplay between faith and reason, challenging previous fideist interpretations, particularly Imran Aijaz’s view. I introduce the concept of guided theistic rationalism, situating al-Ashʿarī’s approach within a tripartite model: contexts of discovery, justification, and review. In the discovery phase, al-Ashʿarī draws inspiration from Qur’anic verses to formulate rational arguments for God’s existence, akin to Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd. The justification phase rigorously validates these arguments through independent logical reasoning. I (...) further propose a context of review, where individuals critically assess pre-existing arguments, ensuring faith is rationally grounded while accommodating divine submission. Al-Ashʿarī’s balanced approach harmonizes reason with revelation, advocating rational scrutiny of prophetic claims followed by wholehearted acceptance. This nuanced framework, integrating rational inquiry with devout submission to divine revelation, holds broader relevance for contemporary monotheistic traditions. (shrink)

Despite the important role of faith in a religious way of life, there is no consensus on how this notion is to be understood. It is nevertheless widely believed that faith is a multifaceted concept possessing affective, evaluative, practical, and cognitive aspects. My goal in this paper is to provide an account of the nature of propositional faith (in religious contexts) that is flexible enough to encompass different strengths or grades of faith. To do so, I focus on Howard-Snyder’s account (...) of faith as a complex propositional attitude that seems to incorporate a number of plausible features of faith. It is argued, however, that, despite providing individual rational for each such feature, this account fails to provide a deep enough explanation of why those features are entailed by the nature of faith. To rectify this problem, I appeal to the phenomenology of acquiring faith to suggest an account of propositional faith in terms of the intention to form (theistic) beliefs. It is claimed that such a view can not only provide a unitary account of the different strengths of faith but also that it can explain why faith has the characteristics it is said to have. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that the new emerging discipline cognitive science of religion has a bearing on how to think about the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Both defenders and opponents of the rationality of religious belief have used cognitive theories of religion to argue for their point. This paper will look at the defender-side of the debate. I will discuss an often used argument in favor of the trustworthiness of religious beliefs, stating that cognitive science of religion shows (...) that religious beliefs are natural and natural beliefs ought to be trusted in the absence of counterevidence. This argument received its most influential defense from Justin Barrett in a number of papers, some in collaboration with Kelly James Clark. I will discuss their version of the argument and argue that it fails because the natural beliefs discovered by cognitive scientists of religion are not the religious beliefs of the major world religions. A survey of the evidence from cognitive science of religion will show that cognitive science does show that other beliefs come natural and that these can thus be deemed trustworthy in the absence of counterevidence. These beliefs are teleological beliefs, afterlife beliefs and animistic theistic beliefs. (shrink)

There are various permutations of theism: henotheism, pantheism, panentheism, a/theism, and nontheistic divinity. There is debate whether the idea of OmniGod was ever achieved in India. R. C. Zaehner argued that an evolutionary transition from pratenaturalism of the Vedas to Upaniṣad’s monism, culminated in monotheism with Purāṇas and the _Bhagavad Gītā._ I argue differently, beginning with ancient ritualistic polytheism, followed by unifying One Brahman, toward monistic panentheism and later non-dualism of _advaita_ Vedānta. Under the influence of Asaṅga, Buddhism elevated the (...) Buddha as the Great Divine Replacement. As a response or reaction, Brāhmaṇism forged Īśvara as God with the World as his Body. By 13th century, theistic dualism separated Īśvara from his _creatio._ Even Nyāya rational philosophy was persuaded by monotheism as demonstrated in their teleo-cosmological argument for the existence of Īśvara. I attribute all this to sectarian and doctrinal shifts rather than to any evolutionary teleology and/or predestined historicist movement. (shrink)

Richard Dawkins tries to establish an analogy between computer viruses and theistic belief systems, analyzing the latter in terms of his concept of the meme. The underlying thrust of Dawkins' argument is to downplay the role of truth and logic in the survival of theories and to emphasize humankind's helpless liability to incurable infection by doctrines that Dawkins regards as absurd. Dawkins supplies a list of "symptoms” of mind-infection. However, on closer investigation these characteristics are found to be either (...) rather weak protection against criticism or quite virtuous. Dawkins relies on a crude justificationism that could just as well be called a mind-virus. Applying Dawkins’ own selection of the general characteristics of a good meme protector and propagator leads to the conclusion that his particular theistic examples would actually impair copyability. -/- Scientific theories are better examples of memes with high longevity, fecundity, and fidelity. A Darwinian analysis of wishful and fearful thinking as useful to hypotheses-testing and goal-seeking organisms undermines Dawkins' attribution of absolute irrational stubbornness to theists. To counterbalance Dawkins' emphasis on the propagation of the absurd, I rehabilitate the Socratic emphasis on the importance of truth and logic in rhetoric, interpreted broadly as the theory of the successful propagation of a message. I use Popper's notion of situational analysis, and an evolutionary perspective to argue that rational standards of a message enhance its copyability. I further apply Popper’s notions of World 3, 2, and 1 to memes; this helps us see the perpetuation of a doctrine as a logical task. (shrink)

In the past twenty years, interest in the epistemic status of religious belief has greatly increased. Leading this revival are the philosophers Basil Mitchell and Richard Swinburne, who believe that {eligious belief can be justified using inductive "best explanation" arguments. However, while Swinburne's approach is formal, using the calculus of Bayes Theorem, Mitchell's is informal, based on his recognition of judgment as central to such an assessment. This book is the first full length comparison of these two men and their (...) styles of justifying religious belief. The first half addresses the issues of rationality, endorsing Mitchell's methodology; the second half explores the concept of theistic explanation and demonstrates that the ontological argument has a place in the comprehensive explanatory power of theism. (shrink)

This paper is a constructive critical study of William P. Alston’s Perceiving God. It explores his account of perception of God, his doxastic practice epistemology, and his overall integration of faith and reason. In dealing with the first, it distinguishes some possible cases of theistic perception that have not generally been sorted out in the literature. In examining doxastic practices, it explores both the sense in which it is rational to engage in them and the epistemic status of beliefs (...) formed through them. Concerning the integration between faith and reason, it proposes a conception of faith in which, contrary to the prevailing tradition, belief is not central; distinguishes rationality from justification; and argues that the rationality of faith so conceived need not meet the same standard appropriate to the justification, or even the rationality, of the corresponding religious beliefs. (shrink)

In several recent writings and in the 1980 Freemantle Lectures at Oxford, Alvin Plantinga has defended the idea that belief in God is ‘properly basic,’ by which he means that it is perfectly rational to hold such a belief without basing it on any other beliefs. The defense falls naturally into two broad parts: a positive argument for the rationality of such beliefs, and a rebuttal of the charge that if such a positive argument ‘succeeds,’ then a parallel argument (...) will ‘succeed’ equally well in showing that belief in the Great Pumpkin is properly basic. In this essay I shall argue both that Plantinga has partially misconceived the objection, and that he has not succeeded, indeed cannot succeed, in rebutting it, for the objection does in fact constitute a reductio ad absurdum of his position. For the sake of ease of exposition, I shall first provide a bare sketch of the positive argument, though I shall discuss it directly only as it bears on the attempted reductio. (shrink)

This volume argues that theistic philosophy should be seen not as an “armchair” enterprise but rather as a critical endeavor to bring philosophy of religion into close contact with emerging sciences of religion. This text engages with the rationality of religious belief by investigating central problems and arguments in philosophy of religion from the perspective of new naturalistic research. A central question the book analyzes is whether findings in cognitive science of religion falsify or undermine religious ideas and (...) beliefs. With regard to CSR, this volume offers a sustained and critical investigation of the neutrality and positive-relevance view, before offering a re-appraisal of the conflict view. The text argues that when scrutinizing these views, much more attention must be paid to specific normative premises that allow empirical findings to have epistemic relevance. A novel feature is the theoretical application of analytical epistemology in virtue-epistemology to the central question of whether CSR undermines, supports, or is neutral with respect to religious belief. This book appeals to upper-level students and researchers in the field. (shrink)

This essay examines the analogy of a savage observing a sailing ship found in the final chapter of Darwin’s Origin of Species, an image that summed up his critique of British natural theology’s “design” thesis. Its inspiration drawn from works by Mandeville and Hume, and Darwin’s experience on the Beagle voyage, the ship illustration shows how Darwin conceived of natural selection’s relationship to theistic design in terms of a historical consciousness developed by Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. That outlook involved a (...) dual emphasis on the rationality of historical inquiry and the largely irrational character of the actual historical process. Symbolized by the history of ship construction, this perspective aided Darwin in formulating his response to British natural theology. (shrink)

This paper presents a critical analysis of Alvin Plantinga’s recent contention, developed in Warranted Christian Belief (forthcoming), that if theism is true, then it is unlikely that religious unbelief is the product of properly functioning, truth-aimed cognitive faculties. More specifically, Plantinga argues that, given his own model of properly basic theistic belief, religious unbelief would always depend on cognitive malfunction somewhere in a person’s noetic establishment. I argue that this claim is highly questionable and has adverse consequences for Plantinga’s (...) epistemology of religious belief. Plantinga’s proper basicality thesis together with his view of rationality defeaters suggests that there are circumstances in which theistic belief would not be proper function rational even if theism is true. (shrink)

Christ, who is the Creator and source of all knowledge, is the ultimate goal of all those seeking truth in any discipline. It is difficult to know God with the puny tools of science. As we get closer and closer to the truth, our science must merge with our theology otherwise we will be following a false end of our scientific inquiry. I think Max Planck said it best: “God is the beginning of every religion and at the end of (...) the natural sciences.” All scientists who have any depth to their work will find the hand of God in nature or else a mystery that they refuse to identify with God. (shrink)

The four theistic proofs of Monologion are based on the categories of being per se and being per aliud. This article analyses them through a comparative approach. The categories of per se and per aliud are compared with the categories of substance (ti) and function (yong) as touched on the first chapter of the Rectifying Ignorance (正蒙 Zhengmeng) of Zhang Zai (1020–1077), an exponent of neo-Confucianism. In fact, the two pairs of categories explain the relationship between an absolute, the (...) supreme nature (summum) or the Great Void (太虚 taixu) and the sensible world. Through the comparison, this article highlights the fundamental function of being per aliud in the rational knowledge of the supreme nature that exists per se and provides new insights into the process of derivation of being per aliud from the being per se.Contribution: This article, through the comparison with the Chinese philosophical tradition, intends to offer a new perspective on the understanding of the Anselmian categories of being per se and being per aliud. (shrink)

In this essay I analyze two emerging theistic accounts of the laws of logic, one precipitated by theistic conceptual realism and the other from an archetype-ectype paradigm in Reformed Scholasticism. The former posits the laws of logic as uncreated and necessary divine thoughts, whereas the latter thinks of those laws as contingent, accommodated forms of a pre-existing archetypal rationality. After the analysis of the two accounts, I offer an explication of the theological rationale motivating the archetype-ectype model (...) of the laws of logic, and apply that model to recent discussions on theological paradox, abstract objects, and the function of natural-theological argumentation in apologetics. Finally, I respond to three anticipated objections against the archetype-ectype model. (shrink)