Results for 'Tit For Tat (TFT)'

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  1.  37
    The moral and ethical significance of tit for tat.Peter Danielson - 1986 - Dialogue 25 (3):449-.
    TIT FOR TAT (TFT) is the familiar strategy of returning like for like, good for good, bad for bad. Recently Robert Axelrod has shown this rule to be remarkably effective in promoting co-operation among egoists.1Nevertheless, it has been morally denigrated, most notably in the Sermon on the Mount but also by the modern patron of TFT, Anatol Rapoport:Of the contingent strategies, Tit-for-tat elicits consistently the most cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Obviously, it would be fatuous to interpret this result as (...)
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  2. Spatialization and Greater Generosity in the Stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma.Patrick Grim - 1996 - Biosystems 37:3-17.
    The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma has become the standard model for the evolution of cooperative behavior within a community of egoistic agents, frequently cited for implications in both sociology and biology. Due primarily to the work of Axelrod (1980a, 198Ob, 1984, 1985), a strategy of tit for tat (TFT) has established a reputation as being particularly robust. Nowak and Sigmund (1992) have shown, however, that in a world of stochastic error or imperfect communication, it is not TFT that finally triumphs in (...)
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  3.  64
    Evolutionary Equilibria: Characterization Theorems and Their Implications. [REVIEW]Jonathan Bendor & Piotr Swistak - 1998 - Theory and Decision 45 (2):99-159.
    To understand the meaning of evolutionary equilibria, it is necessary to comprehend the ramifications of the evolutionary model. For instance, a full appreciation of Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation requires that we identify assumptions under which conditionally cooperative strategies, like Tit For Tat, are and are not evolutionarily stable. And more generally, when does stability fail? To resolve these questions we re-examine the very foundations of the evolutionary model. The results of this paper can be analytically separated into three parts. (...)
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  4.  48
    Cooperation or Defection Strategies of Conduct in Conflict-Prone Situations.Jan Krawczyk - 2008 - Dialogue and Universalism 18 (4-6):119-125.
    The simple model of conflict-prone situations called Prisoner’s Dilemma is discussed. Whereas the best strategy for the model is to defect, in the case of its iterated version (Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma—IPD) it is possible and more profitable to cooperate with the opponent.The simple strategy called Tit for Tat (TFT) which is easy to recognize, never defects first, punishes every defection but is also forgiving is presented. The TFT strategy is very successful being able to establish the cooperation with its opponents. (...)
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  5.  77
    The Emergence of Reactive Strategies in Simulated Heterogeneous Populations.Ilan Fischer - 2003 - Theory and Decision 55 (4):289-314.
    The computer simulation study explores the impact of the duration of social impact on the generation and stabilization of cooperative strategies. Rather than seeding the simulations with a finite set of strategies, a continuous distribution of strategies is being defined. Members of heterogeneous populations were characterized by a pair of probabilistic reactive strategies: the probability to respond to cooperation by cooperation and the probability to respond to defection by cooperation. This generalized reactive strategy yields the standard TFT mechanism, the All-Cooperate, (...)
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