This article explores the later Schleiermacher’s metaphysics of substance and what it entails concerning the question of transcendental freedom. I show that in espousing a metaphysics of substance, Schleiermacher also abandoned an understanding of nature as a mere mechanism, a view implying what I call a “state-state view of causation” (“SSV” for short). Adoption of the view of the self as substance was motivated by the primacy of practical and religious concerns in Schleiermacher’s later work: in Christian Faith, an analysis (...) of self-consciousness from a first person point of view grounds this understanding of the self. In fact, in Christian Faith, ontology, and thereby theology, is only possible through such a first person analysis. The development of Schleiermacher’s views over time, and the reasons accompanying this development, can be fully understood only the in the context of his engagement with the work of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. In what follows I trace this development through an analysis of the philosophical problems and influences shaping Schleiermacher’s mature view, and shed light on his understanding of self-consciousness and its relation to God. My own account should also serve to correct some recent misunderstandings that have made their way into the secondary literature. (shrink)

Analytical jurisprudence and the legal mainstream perceive legal rights in an interactionist fashion, pursuant to a right-obligation duality. The Paper suggests that this is principally because legal positivism and the analytical Anglo-Saxon legal tradition ground their theories on logical positivism and the Wittgensteinian premise that meaning is produced and asserted in social use, i.e. both consensually and contextually. The paper suggests that there is a surplus of meaning which exists beyond social use and which cannot be conceptualized within the sociolinguistic (...) confines of Wittgenstein’s logic of language. This surplus of meaning corresponds to the essential core of legal rights, which, following Aristotle’s induction and philosophy of the essences, constitutes a necessary property and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of legal rights, namely a state of affairs or a state of being that cannot be altered without their necessary breach or, indeed, the negation of their very meaning. The Paper discusses the shortcomings of the Wittgensteinian approach and revisits the philosophical foundations of legal rights by employing Aristotle’s induction and theory of the essences, which the Paper connects to the phenomenological method and particularly Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and Husserl’s transcedental phenomenology. This is a process of abstraction and insight, which aspires to induce a rational revisiting of the general theory of legal rights and address the surplus of meaning that Wittgensteinian logic leaves semantically uncovered. (shrink)

RESUMENEn este trabajo se glosa la conocida exposición tomista de los trascendentales en De veritate I, 1, y se matizan las posiciones del aquinate en referencia a distintos desarrollos de su pensamiento.PALABRAS CLAVETRASCENDENTALES – SANTO TOMAS DE AQUINOABSTRACTThe paper comments the famous Thomistic exposition of transcedentals in De veritate I, 1, by discussing Aquina’s ideas as regards some of their notes.KEYWORDSTRANSCENDENTALS – AQUINAS.

Psihoanaliza kao teorija, praksa i interpretacija nije se pojavila kao samo još jedan »izam« na početku 20. stoljeća, već i kao jedan bitan pomak od doista tradicionalističkog poimanja onog unutarnjeg u čovjeku spram vanjskog. Sam Lacan, u suvremenosti jedan od najpoznatijih teoretičara i interpreta psihoanalize, kaže da pristup koji bi odogonetnuo mjesto polazišta njenog istraživanja i definiranja »nije baš unutra, a ne zna se da li je izvana«. Ovim se željelo nagovijestiti da ona uporišta koje govore ne samo o psihoanalizi, (...) već i o mogućem nalaženju istih, iznose, pa i računaju s nekim nesigurnostima spram tradicije.U vrijeme nastanka i prvih aktualnosti psihoanalize i Freudovog učenja, u filozofiji se gotovo istovremeno sve češće pojavljuju napori da se ljudska psiha i uopće psihologijsko oslobodi kauzalnosti i mehanicističkih određenja, s jedne strane, i da se istovremeno oslobodi predstave i kauzalnosti nečeg iracionalnog i beskonačnog, s druge strane. Nastojeći izbjeći nejasna određenja i suprotstavljanja duše i/ili psihe, filozofija sustavnije od E. Husserla nastoji sve izrazitije naglasiti čovjekovu unutarnjost kroz reinterpretaciju transcendentalnih iskustva subjektivnosti i intersubjektivnosti. Individualna teorijska tvorba, međusobno teorijsko prožimanje, dodirne i razdvajajuće povijesno- teorijske i filozofijske točke ovih dvaju različitih, ali povremeno i komplementarnih ishodišta predmet su zanimanja i razmišljanja u ovom radu.Psychoanalysis as a theory, practice and interpretation did not occur like another -ism on the begining of the twentieth century, but also as one important step ahead from truly traditional understanding of inside of the man which is confronted with his outside existence. Jacques Lacan himself, today one of the most known theoritician and interpreter of psychoanalysis, says that approach which could figure out where is the starting point of its exploring and defining isn’t really inside, and it’s not sure if it’s outside. Saying this, one wants to foreshow that those foundations which speak not only of psychoanalysis, but also about possible findings of them.That is why there are some uncertainties about tradition in these considerations.At the time when psychoanalysis and Freud’s learnings became actual and new, in philosophy almost simultaneously more and more often are present efforts which human psyche and psychology in general were slowly making free of causalities and mechanistic charachteristics on one side. On the other side, in the same time, there have been efforts which would make the psyche free of such images that would define it as irational and infinte entity. Trying to avoid unclear definitions and confrontations in understanding of psyche and/or soul, philosophy is more sistematical with this problem since philosophy of Edmund Husserl. He’s trying to emphasize more utterly the world inside the man through the reinterpretation of transcedental experience of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Individual philosophical creation, mutual theoretical coming between, connecting and separating historically-theoretical and philosophical standpoints of these two different, but occasionaly also complementary outcomes are the object of interest and reflections in this work. (shrink)

El trabajo se ocupa de la teoría de Vico sobre la providencia. En la primera sección se exhiben las dificultades relacionadas con la interpretación transcendente de la providencia en conexión con las principales tesis contenidas en la "Ciencia Nueva". La segunda parte está dedicada exclusivamente a presentar la interpretación que el profesor Pompa ofrece de la providencia y, finalmente, se señalan algunas objeciones en relación con la noción inmanente de providencia y se sugiere interpretar la noción transcendente de providencia como (...) una explicación de segundo orden.The paper deals with Vico’s theory of providence. In the first section the difficulties involved with the transcendental interpretation is purported in connection with the main thesis containded in New Science. The second part is entirely devoted to present a consistent account of professor Pompa’s view of Vico's theory, and finally some objections to the immanent interpretation are put forward and it is suggested tentatively to understand the notion of transcedental providence as a second order explanation. (shrink)

RESUMENEl llamado “giro pragmático-hermenéutico” de la filosofía actual ha producido inevitablemente un proceso de “des-trascendentalización” de la filosofía. K.-O. Apel propone, desde la pragmática del lenguaje, una “re-trascendentalización” de la filosofía y, en concreto, de la hermenéutica, a fin de superar el historicismo en el que cayeron tanto Heidegger como Gadamer.PALABRAS CLAVEPRAGMATICA – HERMENEUTICA – TRASCENDENTALABSTRACTThe so called “pragmatic-hermeneutic turn” of current philosohpy has generated unavoidably a process of “de-transcendentalisation” of philosphy. K.-O. Apel proposes quite the reverse, fron the pragmatics (...) of language: a “re-transcendalisation” of philosphy and specifially of hermeneutic, in order to overcome Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s historicism.KEYWORDSPRAGMATIC – HERMENEUTICS – TRANSCEDENTAL. (shrink)

O livro de Kant Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático, até nossos dias, ainda tem indefinido seu papel diante da filosofia transcedental. Por não haver, na obra de Kant, uma delimitação clara entre as várias antropologias, a saber, a empírica e a prática, e a devido a algumas afirmações não claras do próprio autor, percebe-se que aquele livro ainda é motivo de interpretações controvertidas por parte daqueles que o analisaram. Este texto representa um esforço no sentido de apreende (...) o papel e a posição que o livro em referência tem na totalidade da produção de Kant. (shrink)

This article is a novel assessment of Hermann Cohen’s theoretical philosophy, starting out from his Kant interpretation. Hermann Cohen was the head and founder of the Marburg School of Neo- Kantianism. In the beginning, hence, I will commence with some initial reflections on the makeup and importance of this school, before I move on to Cohen’s revolutionary Kant interpretation and its ramification for the Marburg School in general.