The aim of this paper is to show in what terms reality can be considered as a stratification of surfaces by developing Mario Perniola's philosophy of transit. The first part will deal with the etymology of the word transit, in order to explain its meanings and uses. As it will be clarified, the development of the notion of transit goes together with the conception of reality as deep in the sense of full, available, rich, as the realm of "difference" and (...) "enigmas". The second part will explain the particular conception of temporality implied in the transit. Together with Perniola's analysis, Nietzschean and Deleuzian reflections about "amor fati" and "eternal return" will be further explored. This concept is crucial to understand not only Perniola's overall philosophy by clarifying his position against postmodern thinkers; it also provides a theoretical framework from which the task and the challenge of the philosopher in the contemporary world emerge. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper identifies two central paradoxes threatening the notion of amor fati [love of fate]: it requires us to love a potentially repellent object (as fate entails significant negativity for us) and this, in the knowledge that our love will not modify our fate. Thus such love may seem impossible or pointless. I analyse the distinction between two different sorts of love (eros and agape) and the type of valuation they involve (in the first case, the object (...) is loved because we value it; in the second, we value the object because we love it). I use this as a lens to interpret Nietzsche's cryptic pronouncements on amor fati and show that while an erotic reading is, up to a point, plausible, an agapic interpretation is preferable both for its own sake and because it allows for a resolution of the paradoxes initially identified. In doing so, I clarify the relation of amor fati to the eternal return on the one hand, and to Nietzsche's autobiographical remarks about suffering on the other. Finally, I examine a set of objections pertaining both to the sustainability and limits of amor fati, and to its status as an ideal. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's fame and influence are based, for the most part, on his first work, Being and Time. That this was to have been the first half of a larger two-volume project, the second half of which was never completed, is well known. That Heidegger's subsequent writings have been continuous developments of that project, in some sense, is generally acknowledged, although there is considerable disagreement concerning the manner in which his later works stand related to Being and Time. Heidegger scholars (...) are deeply divided over that question. Some maintain that there is a sharp thematic cleavage in Heidegger's thought, so that the later works either refute or, at best, abandon the earlier themes. Others maintain that even to speak of a shift or a "reversal" in Heidegger's thinking is mistaken and argue, in conse quence, that his thinking develops entirely consistently. Lastly, there are those who admit a shift in emphasis and themes in his works but introduce a principle of complementarity - the shift is said to repre sent a logical development of his thi.nking. Too often the groups re semble armed camps. (shrink)

On the basis of an interpretation of key passages in The Gay Science, this paper examines Nietzsche's idea of amor fati—love of fate. Nietzsche's idea of amor fati involves the wish to be able to learn how to see things as beautiful. This gives the impression that amor, love, is supposed to play some role in the beautification of fate. But Nietzsche also explains amor fati in relation to his desire to be a (...) devoted “Yes-sayer.” This pulls the interpretation of amor in a different direction; for now it seems as if the love Nietzsche wants to cultivate is supposed to be expressed in a positive, affirmative attitude toward one's fate. How to think this duality under the single idea of amor fati? I develop a novel reading of amor fati as a form of practice, as something that we can do, and explain in its light how the two moments of love are to be brought together. The relation of amor fati to the “Eternal Recurrence of the Same” is also addressed: mastering the practice of amor fati can enable one to pass successfully the test of the Eternal Recurrence of the Same. (shrink)

Rather than assume—based on the contents of the Nachlass—that the Eternal Recurrence, in its initial formulation, coheres with the later theoretico-metaphysical sense (i.e., sharing abstract space with the Will to Power) I propose the inverse (contrary to Heidegger, Deleuze, and Nehamas (whose Proustian exegesis (Nietzsche: Life as Literature) I’m obliged to radically extend)); namely, that the rotary cosmology of recurrence, as a literal proposition, is a consequence of the poetic sense of the earlier parable (GS)–which, I find, ultimately prefigures (...) the design of his own virulent relapse into theoria (WP). (shrink)

In this paper I advance an interpretation of Nietzsche's notions of amor fati and eternal recurrence in which they are taken to delimit the project of becoming well-disposed to life and oneself. I argue that interpreted in this way these notions do not have the problematic implications which stand in the way of our adopting them and, in fact, cast light on how we may theoretically understand and practically live our lives.

In contrast to positivistic assignations of influence in Nietzsche-studies, this article considers the possibility of “conversational” reconstructions of contexts, where the focus is less on “whether” and “when” Nietzsche read a text, and concentrates instead on “how” and “why” he read it. This method is exemplified by the case of Philipp Mainländer, a contemporary about whom Nietzsche says almost nothing of philosophical importance. This article shows that six key leitmotifs of the Zarathustrazeit happen to form direct solutions to dangers entailed (...) by Mainländer’s system: the Death of God, the Übermensch, the Last Man, Will to Power, Eternal Return, and Amor Fati. That each of these tropes serves as a neat solution to Mainländer suggests that Nietzsche was engaged in a sort of competitive intellectual conversation with his philosophy. And as such, Mainländer’s influence on Nietzsche, even if mostly negative, should not continue to be neglected. (shrink)

This book argues that Nietzsche bases his affirmative morality on the model of individual responsiveness to otherness which he takes from the mythology of Dionysus. The subject is not free to choose to avoid such responding to the demands of the other. Nietzsche finds that the basic mode of responding is pleasure. This feeling, as a basis for morality, underlies the morality which is true to the earth and the major concepts of "will to power", "eternal return", and (...) "amor fati". The priority of otherness makes all thought ethical and not only aesthetic. The basis of all meanings combines the fundamental impulse of responding outwards with an immediate complement in the individual interpretation-world. This is specifically ethical because the recognition of our own historical specificity arises as a result of the refusal of others to become mere differences within our notion of the Same, and through their demand that we "become who we are" in the recognition of their separate existence. (shrink)

Guiding questions in this dissertation: Does indeterminacy of interpretation imply no standards and limits of meaning? Is Nietzsche "modern" or "postmodern" in his approach to this and other problems? What is Nietzsche's "affirmative" message? What are the implications for the identity and future of philosophy? ;If Nietzsche has freed the signifier from any transcendental signified, how do we know when the free play of reading has utterly departed from the text? How do we recognize that one reading of a text (...) or one account of the world is better than another? ;Nietzsche said, "What was at stake in all philosophizing hitherto was not at all 'truth' but something else--let us say, health, future, growth, power, life." Truth in the service of life: Truth understood as transitory boundaries or limits without which life is impossible. As esteemers, we always impose limits, constraints. Hence, limits are absolutely necessary, never absent, though never fixed and absolute. Temporary fixity is ensured and so is truth in this sense. Conflict is resolved not by "truth," but by the demands of life, in response to which "truth" has its meaning. It is through Nietzsche's interplay of philological rigor and interpretive play that we can avoid the result in which "the text disappears under the interpretation." ;Nietzsche said, "My style, which is affirmative ... deals with contradiction and criticism only as a means." It is a means for something not easily captured in language, and certainly not in any set of logical inferences: A transformation of the attitude of resentment toward the challenge and struggle of life, and overcoming the desperate desire for salvation from suffering, insecurity, uncertainty, i.e., salvation from oneself and life through "truth." The overcoming of such motives is troped in the myth of the ubermensch and in the transforming ideas of eternal recurrence and amor fati. These are signifiers of a possible type of consciousness, a way of living in which we have a radically different relationship to our beliefs, and are no longer trapped by our "truths" in our unceasing attempt to say the unsayable, to interpret the enigma that is life. (shrink)

Most commentators assume (a) that the affirmation of life can be defined univocally, as an act the success of which can be assessed by means of the test of the eternal return in GS341; and (b), that the affirmation of life is synonymous with what Nietzsche calls amor fati, and thus singlehandedly encapsulates Nietzsche’s ethical ideal. I take issue with both assumptions and develop an alternative view. I argue that for Nietzsche there are two ways to (...) affirm life ethically. The first is unreflective and piecemeal. I propose a substantive modification to Bernard Reginster’s (2014) procedural approach by suggesting that life is affirmed each time an agent seeks to overcome, and succeeds in overcoming, resistance in the pursuit of a first order desire expressive of love for life – the last clause being mine. I further argue that even with this added clause this first form cannot defeat what Reginster calls the ‘normative core of nihilism’, namely the experiencing of suffering as an objection to life. I identify in Nietzsche’s later work a second form of ethical life affirmation: a holistic, ecstatic act, a Dionysian blessing which ‘calls good’ life as a whole and thus redeems it by making it fully desirable on erotic grounds. Yet even in its two ethical forms the affirmation of life does not suffice to define Nietzsche’s ethical ideal. The very perspective of life affirmation is limited because it remains beholden to the very framework Nietzsche sought to escape: the Christian overarching concern for redemption and preoccupation with theodicic narratives. By contrast, I argue that amor fati, as agapic love of life, affords Nietzsche with a distinct resource to go beyond theodicic prospects and examine its relation to the erotic love of life, which is at the core of both forms of ethical life affirmation. I offer a pluralistic reading of GS341, not simply as a test of life affirmation, but as articulating Nietzsche’s two ethical ideals, amor fati on the one hand, and the affirmation of life in both its forms, on the other. (shrink)

Der Problemrahmen des Konflikts zwischen Liebe und Gerechtigkeit beschäftigt Nietzsche von der zweiten Unzeitgemässen Betrachtung bis zu Also Sprach Zarathustra. Die aktuelle philosophische Debatte ist hauptsächlich auf soziale Gerechtigkeit forkussiert. Nietzsche geht aber darüber hinaus und setzt sich mit jenen Aspekten dieser fragestellung auseinander, die auf ihrem Verstädnis als ethisches Problem in der individuellen Einstellung zur Erkenntnis beruben. Die Spannung zwischen Liebe und Gerechtigkeit erscheint als Grundgestal des inneren Konflikts einer Lebensform, die dem Streben nach Erkenntnis Verpflichtet ist. in diesem (...) Sinn ist Nietzsches Reflexion über jene Problematik mit dem philosophischen Rahmen verbunden, dem Gedanken wie die Lehre ver der "völligen Unverantwortlichkeit des Menschen", amor fati und die ewige Widerkehr des Gleichen zugehören.Nietzsche treats the conflict between love and justice in his works from the second of his Untimely Meditations to Thus Spoke Zarathustra. While current philosophical debates discuss this conflict with reference to social justice, Nietzsche focuses mostly on aspects arising from understanding it as an ethical problem regarding the individual's attitude towards knowledge. He thus treats the conflict between love and justice as the fundamental form of conflict internal to a form of life committed to knowledge, and his reflections are strictly connected with the broader philosophical framework from which emerge his doctrines of 'man's complete lack of responsibility', amor fati, and the eternal return. (shrink)

In The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism (1949), Nishitani Keiji provides a thoroughgoing questioning of the theme of nihilism in Japan. Yet, while the text contains a sharp and penetrating interpretation of Heidegger, it focuses on the early Heidegger, whose thinking had not yet ventured into the theme of nihilism. The relationship between Heidegger and Nishitani thus contains a certain “gap” that needs to be investigated. This study takes a cue from the appendix to the The Self-Overcoming of Nihilism, “Nihilism and Existence (...) in Nietzsche,” in order to clarify the differences between Heidegger and Nishitani vis-à-vis Nietzsche’s nihilism. Through this process, we will come to know the difference in their positions on who is the “subject (主体)” of nihilism in terms of their interpretations of a constellation of Nietzsche’s key terms, such as “will to power,” “the eternal return of the same,” the “overman,” “amor fati,” and so forth. From there, we will further identify some of the issues involved in their particular understandings of nihilism, and present a perspective on “contemporary nihilism.” I argue that central to their differences is the status of “morals” in nihilism. (shrink)

Most commentators assume that the affirmation of life can be defined univocally, as an act the success of which can be assessed by means of the test of the eternal return in GS341; and, that the affirmation of life is synonymous with what Nietzsche calls amor fati, and thus singlehandedly encapsulates Nietzsche’s ethical ideal. I take issue with both assumptions and develop an alternative view. I argue that for Nietzsche there are two ways to affirm life (...) ethically. The first is unreflective and piecemeal. I propose a substantive modification to Bernard Reginster’s procedural approach by suggesting that life is affirmed each time an agent seeks to overcome, and succeeds in overcoming, resistance in the pursuit of a first order desire expressive of love for life – the last clause being mine. I further argue that even with this added clause this first form cannot defeat what Reginster calls the ‘normative core of nihilism’, namely the experiencing of suffering as an objection to life. I identify in Nietzsche’s later work a second form of ethical life affirmation: a holistic, ecstatic act, a Dionysian blessing which ‘calls good’ life as a whole and thus redeems it by making it fully desirable on erotic grounds. Yet even in its two ethical forms the affirmation of life does not suffice to define Nietzsche’s ethical ideal. The very perspective of life affirmation is limited because it remains beholden to the very framework Nietzsche sought to escape: the Christian overarching concern for redemption and preoccupation with theodicic narratives. By contrast, I argue that amor fati, as agapic love of life, affords Nietzsche with a distinct resource to go beyond theodicic prospects and examine its relation to the erotic love of life, which is at the core of both forms of ethical life affirmation. I offer a pluralistic reading of GS341, not simply as a test of life affirmation, but as articulating Nietzsche’s two ethical ideals, amor fati on the one hand, and the affirmation of life in both its forms, on the other. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s Ecce homo, Notebooks and Letters: 1888-1889 / Translation by Daniel Fidel Ferrer. ©2023 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. -/- Ecce homo: How One Becomes What One Is (Ecce homo: Wie man wird, was man ist). -/- Who should read Nietzsche? You can disagree with everything Nietzsche wrote and re-read Nietzsche to sharpen your attack. Philosophy. Not for use without adult supervision (required). Philosophy is a designated area for adults only. Read at your own risk. You have the pleasure (...) of reading and of course disagree with all philosophy. Warning philosophical ideas are present. Reading Nietzsche does not mean you will gain anything, in fact, you might lose your previous ideas. -/- Nietzsche does not call this book an autobiography (he has written many short autobiographical sketches before); but rather, uses the expression “I tell myself my life”. -/- Nietzsche was the past philosopher who wrote about our future, “The time is coming when the struggle for the domination of the earth will be waged - it will be waged in the name of basic philosophical doctrines.” KGWB/NF-1881, 11[273]. The world has seen plenty of wars and death, since 1881. The process of the domination of the earth and world is still on-going. -/- What is Nietzsche’s overall project with Ecce homo? -/- Main Leitmotifs in Ecce homo. -/- Christianity as the denial of the will to life, revaluation of all values (Umwerthung aller Werthe), Amor fati, Dionysus as a god and his philosophy (future project for Nietzsche), overthrowing idols, two worlds (“true world" finally became a fable) against Plato eternal world and forms, eternal recurrence or the eternal return of the same (Nietzsche heaviest thought, also his most abysmal thought “abgründlichsten Gedanken”), opposite and counterpart to type of person decadent (décadent), “I count the overcoming of pity among the noble virtues”, against the concept of God (Christian), overman or superman (Übermensch), Will to Power (Wille zur Macht), great politics, immoralist, morality of the Christian church, and Declaration of war (“Kriegserklärung”). -/- Table of Contents -/- Motto [page 3]. Epigraph [pages 4-6]. -/- Preface to the Translation of Ecce homo [pages 7-16] -/- Major Leitmotifs in Nietzsche [pages 17-24]. -/- Translations from Nietzsche’s German to English include. -/- 1). Ecce homo: How One Becomes What One Is (Ecce homo: Wie man wird, was man ist. [pages 25-113]. -/- 2). This poem was included in the first publications of Ecce homo (1908). Glory and Eternity (Ruhm und Ewigkeit). [pages 114-124]. -/- 3). These are all of Nietzsche’s last notebooks (complete) they are numbered 21, 22, 23, and 24. There are a total of 82 notes. Final notes by Nietzsche from the Nachlass (Nachlaß). Sometime in German called the Notizheft. Nietzsche’s notebooks that include some drafts for Ecce homo and other topics he was thinking during his last writings. Dating from October 1888 until early Janurary 1889. [pages 125-191]. -/- 4). Nietzsche’s Letters Regarding Ecce homo. Nietzsche’s letters starting at the end of October 1888 discussing Ecce homo. These are not always the complete letters but include all of the passages of Nietzsche discussing Ecce homo. Complete translation of the last letter Nietzsche wrote. Dated until BVN-1889. #1256. Letter to Jacob Burckhardt in Basel. Turin, about 6 January 1889. [pages 192-223]. -/- Bibliographies [pages 224-254]. -/- Nietzsche’s Philosophy Final Thoughts [pages 255-259]. -/- Enjoy reading Nietzsche's last book. (shrink)

It is important for society to fight against stupidity because the stupid is constitutively destructive. But the one who fights against stupidity, his own and that of others, is, above all, traditionally the philosopher. Let us note the presence of this struggle in Nietzsche, and realise the relevance it would have in his work, which in general is little emphasised. Nietzsche joins the classical line of denouncing stupidity, although he does so to an extreme by modulating it in terms of (...) his perspectivism as an inability to “get out” of the single perspective. Moreover, he is going to discover a kind of stupidity that accompanies wisdom as its necessary shadow and that would be the one that opens for us, in the face of Pauline and Erasmist Christianity, the possibility of a joyful science. On the other hand, cosmic stupidity would have the beautiful name of “necessity”, and the Dionysian aspect of the thought of the eternal return lies above all in the amor fati, which in our case would be translated as affirmation and even love of stupidity. That is why Nietzsche will say that Dionysian wisdom is the principle of the greatest possible stupidity. (shrink)

Published in PoMo Magazine vol. 2, nr. 1 (Spring/Summer 1996) during my years as a grad student at the New School. I examine Nietzsche's presentation of the eternal recurrence, and discuss its interpretations by Heidegger, Bataille, Derrida, Klossowski, Stambaugh, and Vattimo. I will be returning to Nietzsche in the future.

For over two and a half millennia human beings have attempted to invent strategies to “discover” the truth of time, to determine whether time is infinite, whether eternity is the infinite duration of a continuous present, or whether it too rises and falls with the cycles of universal creation and destruction. _Time-Fetishes_ recounts the history of a tradition that runs counter to the dominant tradition in Western metaphysics, which has sought to purify eternity of its temporal character. From the pre-Socratics (...) to Ovid and Plotinus, and from Shakespeare to Hegel, Schelling, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida, _Time-Fetishes_ traces the secret tradition of the idea of eternal recurrence and situates it as the grounding thought of Western philosophy and literature. The thinkers in this counter-history of the eternal return lingered long enough on the question of time to learn how to resist separating eternity from time, and how to reflect on the possible identity of time and eternity as a way of resisting all prior metaphysical determinations. Drawing out the implications of Nietzsche’s reinvention of the doctrine of return, Lukacher ranges across a broad spectrum of ancient and modern thinkers. Shakespeare’s role in this history as the “poet of time” is particularly significant, for not only does Shakespeare reactivate the pre-Christian arguments of eternal return, he regards them, and all arguments and images concerning the essence of time and Being, from an inimitably ironic perspective. As he makes transitions from literature to philosophy and psychoanalysis, Lukacher displays a theoretical imagination and historical vision that bring to the forefront a host of pre- and post-Christian texts in order to decipher in them an encounter with the thought of eternal recurrence that has been too long buried under layers of rigid metaphysical interpretation. (shrink)

Nietzsche's embrace of the idea of eternal recurrence has long puzzled readers, both because the idea is inherently implausible and because it seems inconsistent with other aspects of his philosophy. This paper offers a novel account of Nietzsche's motives for that embrace—namely that Nietzsche found in eternal recurrence the only possible way to reconcile three potent and apparently conflicting convictions: (1) there are no Hinterwelten (“worlds-beyond”), (2) the great love (take joy in) all things just as they are (...) (amor fati), and (3) all joy wills eternity. The case for this account has two parts. I show first that Nietzsche was deeply committed to each of these principles at or before the time the idea of eternal recurrence “came to” him in 1881 and second that these principles, though in apparent conflict, can, as Nietzsche understood them, be reconciled by, and only by, the idea of eternal recurrence. It follows, I argue, that the idea of eternal recurrence was originally independent of Nietzsche's conceptions of the will to power and the Übermensch. (shrink)

Reading the writings of Nietzsche is somewhat like putting together a large and complex jigsaw puzzle. In this paper I aim to show how two pieces of Nietzsche’s puzzle fit together: the first piece being the Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence; and the second piece being On the Genealogy of Morals. In order to see how these two pieces lock in to one another we must understand that Nietzsche’s great love of fate – his ‘Amor Fati’ – is (...) what he calls the “formula for greatness in a human being” (BGE 1:6).2 In this paper I will address the question of how we are to reconcile Nietzsche’s amor fati, understood as a brand of determinism, with Nietzsche’s own understanding of the Doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence as the ultimate test for the highest affirmation of life. Through an investigation of how Nietzsche thinks we should react to the thought of the application of the doctrine of Eternal Recurrence to our own lives – namely, the psychological implications of the doctrine – I aim to show that by proposing the Doctrine as the ultimate test for the highest affirmation of life, Nietzsche also provides part of what he takes to be the solution to the threat of both the impending nihilism and the inhibiting current morality of his age as he discusses them in the Genealogy. (shrink)

I argue that Nietzsche's thought of eternal recurrence is merely a kind of thought experiment that has two forms of engagement. The first form of engagement is destructive and results in the principles of classical logic being reduced to epistemic nihilism. In this first form, Nietzsche is thinking eternal recurrence, as it is presented in previous philosophers, to its end. The second form of engagement does not require the presuppositions of classical logic and is made through the affect (...) of disgust. This second mode of engagement can result in two outcomes; suicidal pessimism or life affirmation. The work on eternal recurrence that scholars typically think of as published has very little positive commitment to the ontological or metaphysical status of eternal recurrence. However, if eternal recurrence does represent the physical nature of the universe, as Nietzsche sometimes speculates about in his notebooks, this would not hurt either his destructive or his affective argument. The affective form of engagement allows us to think about the emergence of this affirmative ideal without strong positive commitment to any particular metaphysics or epistemology. The appearance of such an ideal may be multiply realizable over various physical organizations of the universe. The new life affirming ideal which emerges is not a form of humanism. Rather, Nietzsche thinks that the thought of eternal recurrence will produce "the 'humanity' of the future." The thought of eternal recurrence selects out, via suicidal pessimism, those who cannot affirm life. This fosters the development of a new humanity that can affirm life and create a new kind of happiness unknown to humans previously. This new ideal, amor fati [love of fate], is not simply a reconciliation with suffering and hardship of the past. Rather, one must want and hope that such a thing is the case. This ideal, held by the most powerful people of the future, is an expression of will to power. This ideal understands hardship and challenges on the sea of life as part of what makes us truly great and our lives intrinsically valuable. (shrink)

The paper investigates Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of body and space and Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Francis Bacon’s work, in order to derive a renegotiated interrelation between habitual body, phenomenal space, preferential plane and constructive line. The resulting system is ap- plied as a filter to understand the sartorial fashion of Rei Kawakubo and Hussein Chalayan and their potential as a spatial prosthesis: the operative third skin. If the evolutionary nature of culture demands a constant change, how does the surface of (...) a third skin, which embodies the generative of stable/ unstable, respond to changes of context? The fleeting, shifting conditions of contemporary culture/ lifestyle rely upon, result in, and reflect one constant, change: change of working conditions, family structures, modes of inhabitation, relation networks, of userprofile and identity, of social and territorial boundaries. We occupy the shift- ing spatial parameters of a transitional supermodern environment. Culture, as enacted or embodied through each of these fields, is regulated by a number of abstract and factual variables that interplay constantly: time, space, movement, surface, individual, and data. Elizabeth Grosz argues that culture is an evolutionary effect: it regenerates itself in order to ensure the survival of the species. Each “prosthetic” expression of culture – language, fashion, architecture, etc. – changes repeatedly. Here change is not an end in itself, but a means. And the most successful prosthesis may not be the one that is able to answer the largest number of challenges, but one which itself undergoes a process of learning, self-modification, and differentiation – in short, a process of evolution. Any prosthesis is by nature an extension of the body. In the case of architecture and fashion the prosthesis addressing change is most often external to the body – a “cultural fur” or a surface phenomenon, that is, a highly profiled supplementary skin. As with all prostheses, their respective life-span depends on their ability to reflect a change in context and value systems. They are adapted or updated, if not, they vanish. Any situation of change is processed as a differentiation between the actual and the virtual of a given context. Grosz identifies distinctions between the actual and virtual, the real and the possible: the possible is a preformed real that has not yet received its final materiality, and thus delineates a range of options of becoming. The real is the blueprint of the possible, negotiated by factual limitations, and it is conjoint with the actual through a process of differentiation and divergence. The virtual comprises alternate variations of the actual, it defines a realm of deviation from the blueprint. In order to be responsive to change, the balance between the actual and virtual thus must be rendered unstable: “The virtual requires the actual to diverge, to differentiate itself, to proceed by way of division and disruption, forging modes of actualisation that will transform this virtual into others unforeseen or uncontained within it.” 4 The integration of the virtual allows a re-ordering of the blueprint, a return to the crossroad of possibilities, unlimiting and processing an alternative real, and establishing a state of continual change. A repeated change – not as a choice between a number of options but as a gradual process – marks the moment of evolution, and requires a dynamic system. Such a dynamic can be rendered as an adaptable, flexible, modular, mobile, or morphing system of change. The key lies with the fluency and ability of adaptation for the proposed differentiation between actual and virtual – thus it is an elastic change that is required. The nature of this elasticity is encoded in a repeated repositioning of the variables: a constant fine-tuning of a maximum number of parameters that engineer, alter and define the blueprint. When looking for a dynamic system that incorporates a transformation of skin or space, we are in search of dynamics through an operative surface, controlled by means of the constructive line. Both operative surface and constructive line are generative methods for the formation and form finding of the second and third skin of sartorial fashion and architecture respectively, as they both produce inhabitable or wearable envelopes with a specific responsiveness. Both professions share communication, coding and signage, form information programs, pattern charts, volume outlines, texture fields, surface operations, and implement electronic or digital extensions. In both, the constructive line shapes the surface twice: before production and in operation. The surface demarcates space, spatial envelope, enclosing garment, field of action. In which way can an operative system of the surface with stable/ unstable conditioning generate a phenomenological or evolutionary change in the reconstruction of body and context? How do time, space, movement, surface, individual and data interact in this framework? What is the impact of surface strategies and constructive line on that system? (shrink)

In this article I deal with the question of how time and eternity can be linked or even how they can come together, for they are in themselves incompatible. The problem is expounded with the help of Meister Eckhart’s mysticism. For Meister Eckhart knows of a unity between God and man that is no moment of exstasis but durable in time. In the first part of the article I give several metaphores Eckhart uses to describe God and man getting one, (...) and the feelings that go along with it: or, for that matter, the feelings resulting from God and man remaining apart. In the second and third part of the article the problem of the unity of God and man is approached from two sides: l. man becoming God; 2. God becoming man. 1. Man becomes God by means of what I – anachronistically – call ‘amor fati’: the love for everything that inevitably happens, or, even stronger, wanting these events to happen. This brings about a comparison between Eckhart and Nietzsche, the one who coined the word ‘amor fati’. With all the differences, both Eckhart and Nietzsche know the joy of man’s godliness by means of the amor fati. 2. God becomes man because of his love for man. And then, Eckhart is thoroughly ingrained with the idea that man is nothing compared to God. So God’s love becomes tragic: God gets involved with life in time, with all the shortcomings and misery that implies. Secondly, man who did become God, becomes, like God, man again too, out of, of course, love for his fellow men. So time and eternity get linked in an exchange of the qualities of God and man. Nevertheless, man does not end up with being God, or God with being man, for two reasons: 1. God had already involved himself with time with the creation ; and man, being capax dei, had already been meant to be eternal, then. So God and man become what they, basically, have always been. 2. The exchange between God and man dialectically dissolves – “hebt auf” – in neighbourly love. So, although God and man remain together, their unity does not become ‘stable’ in the sense that God and man in their unity are not changing anymore. In this way, the problematic nature of the relationship of time and eternity does not get acute. (shrink)

-/- This paper offers a preliminary interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of Eternal Recurrence, according to which the doctrine constitutes a parable that, speaking of what is permanent in life, praises and justifies all that is impermanent. What is permanent, what always recurs, is the will to power or to self-overcoming that is the fundamental engine of all life. The operating mechanism of such a will consists in prompting the living to undergo transformations or transitory deaths, after which this fundamental (...) engine resurrects again and is once more activated. The individual human being, in his capacity as creator, is only a conscious and finite surrogate of this fundamental will. In confronting his abysmal thought of Eternal Recurrence, Zarathustra comes to the realization that the individual human being will never cease to be a mere transit that, while remaining in existence, will have to always return to the moment of his own self-overcoming. This means that the small man in each of us, the man that can be overcome, will always recur, and that even the greatest man we could become will still be too small and human all too human. Although this thought generates disgust with existence, it can also become a source of life-affirmation, when we learn to love our tragic destiny: that of never being able to realize the ideal of superhumanity that is recommended by the book, and, yet, that of eternally striving to realize it. (shrink)

본 논문에서는 스토아사상에 관한 니체의 해석을 중점적으로 다룬다. 그런데 해당되는 선행연구는 국내에 없다. 우리는 그 이유를 두 가지로 추측할 수 있다. 첫째는 스토아사상이 가지는 실천적 성격 때문이다. 자연학과 논리학에 집중되었던 초기 스토아사상과 달리, 중기 이후 스토아사상은 윤리학에 집중되어 있다. 그러한 특성은 스토아사상에 대한 평가절하로 이어졌을 가능성이 농후하다. 둘째는 스토아사상에 대한 니체의 모순적 해석에 그 이유가 있다. 예를 들면, 니체는 에픽테토스(Epictetus)를 가장 이상적인 인물로 묘사하기도 하고, 견인주의를 견지하며 인간의 고통이 가지는 값어치를 낮게 다루는 원흉으로 비판하기도 한다. 우선 니체는 그의 중기저작을 통해 (...) 스토아사상의 색채를 곳곳에서 드러내고 그것에 찬성한다. 먼저 그는 스토아사상의 자기치료 개념에 천착한다. 즉 스토아사상과 마찬가지로, ‘자기’에게 집중한 최초의 인물로 소크라테스(Socrates)를 지목하면서 철학과 의학의 연관성을 밝힌다. 다음으로 니체는 스토아사상과 마찬가지로 연민을 신랄하게 비판하고, 그것을 대체하는 것으로 자족성을 내세운다. 이러한 자족성의 개념은 마지막으로 니체의 운명애(Amor Fati)논의로 이어지며, 니체는 운명애의 이론적 기저가 되는 영원회귀에 관한 것을 스토아사상으로부터 영향 받는다. 니체는 동시에 스토아사상에 대한 신랄한 비판도 서슴지 않는데, 니체의 비판을 대략 두 가지로 대별해 볼 수 있다. 첫째는 스토아사상의 견인주의가 인간의 고통이 가지는 가치를 평가 절하했다는 것이고, 둘째는 스토아사상이 가지는 목적론에 관한 비판이 그것이다. 본 논문에서는 스토아사상에 대한 니체의 모순적 해석을 있는 그대로 드러내는 것에 그 임무를 두고자 한다. (shrink)

GS 341 is one of the most familiar of Nietzsche’s writings. This article proposes a new reading that stands in contrast with most English-language Nietzsche scholarship. The text presents a communication and its reception. A ‘demon’ makes an announcement, and a hearer responds in one way or another. But there is also another narrative altogether, whose conceptual vocabulary comes from a dynamic world-view. In this an interaction of forces leads to a new situation. If the hearer is not crushed by (...) the ‘greatest weight’, there must be an inner force that counteracts its impact. I argue that what Nietzsche calls amor fati is a state that allows our drives to achieve full expression, and so makes possible a collective strength able to withstand the greatest impact. The final sentence refers to a “confirmation and sealing”. What happens is that the demon’s message makes an impression on the receptive hearer. For Nietzsche this is a working metaphor, not a turn of phrase. In a draft from this period he writes: “Let us stamp the image of eternity on our life!” That sudden and forceful act, embodying an evaluative judgement, is the event that GS 341 is all about. (shrink)

Propounded in relation to a peculiar mode in the view of an oscillating or cyclic universe, the concept of Return of Power, or of ontic recurrence as further increase in ontic Power signifies the determination of the existing entity according to its own selective recurrence as dialectically exceeding a previous status. Based thus upon the assumption that the actual ontological existence of the entity lies in its own potentiated recurrence (for it is maintained that only what is able to (...) return to itself as potentiated signifies actual ontological existence) and that an ontic eternal return can only occur in terms of further Power, this notion embodies the culminating phase within change as an ultimate overcoming of a previous ontic status or situation respecting the category Power as a primary criterion within a constantly increasing Real (as Power, precisely). An ontic selective ultimate event respecting becoming as a general increment of the Real, this concept exceeds both the ontic dispersion in nothingness of the linear time and the identical ontic repeatability of the Eternal Return of the Same, the latter insofar as asserting the perennial return of man's own status of powerlessness, and as rendering accordingly impossible any actual (dialectical) transition to a well-defined superior ontic phase. (shrink)

This chapter looks at Nietzsche's notion of the affirmation of life. It begins with the origins of the concept in Schopenhauer and in the Schopenhauerian philosophy known to Nietzsche. It then examines affirmation in three phases of Nietzsche's writing: early, middle and late. It relates affirmation to other key Nietzschean concepts like the Apollonian and the Dionysian, eternal recurrence, amor fati and will to power.

In Nietzsche and the Shadow of God, his study of Nietzsche’s integral philosophical corpus, Franck revisits the fundamental concepts of Nietzsche’s thought, from the death of God and the will to power, to the body as the seat of thinking and valuing, and finally to his conception of a post-Christian justice. The work engages Heidegger’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s destruction of the Platonic-Christian worldview, showing how Heidegger’s hermeneutic overlooked Nietzsche’s powerful confrontation with revelation and justice by working through the Christian body, (...) as set forth in the Epistles of Saint Paul and reread both by Martin Luther and by German Idealism. Franck shows systematically how Nietzsche “transvalued” the metaphysical tenets of the Christian body of believers. In so doing, he provides an unparalleled demonstration of the coherence of Nietzsche’s project and the ways in which the revaluation of values, amor fati, and the trials of eternal recurrence reshape the living self toward a creative existence beyond original sin—indeed, beyond an ethics of “good” versus “evil.” Bergo and Farah’s clear translation introduces this work to an English-speaking audience for the first time. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s Eternal Return (ER) is interpreted in many ways, including by him. I present it as a hermeneutic device, a way of reading texts, especially those whose influence threatens one’s authorial autonomy and/or are later difficult to take ownership of due to philosophical growth. It returns past texts with new interpretations, similar to the way ER leads one to embrace one’s past without changing anything, which radically changes everything from a resented painful burden into a celebrated enhancement of (...) freedom and power. I show how he could have derived the idea from Schopenhauer, his own embarrassing past, by performing the technique on Schopenhauer. The same attitude toward past texts of recreating them according to one’s present interests and concerns simultaneously releases one’s present texts for future readers to impose their readings onto them, just as Zarathustra tells his followers not to follow him. Heidegger takes the idea up in a far more nuanced account than he is usually given credit for and applies it, among other places, to the history of philosophy. All philosophers say the same as it keeps returning. Derrida then recreates this as iterability, the deconstruction of the no/change dichotomy that Nietzsche began. (shrink)

Resumo No Ecce Homo, Nietzsche afirma que a concepção básica de Assim falava Zaratustra consiste no "pensamento do eterno retorno, essa fórmula suprema de afirmação a que se pode chegar". Tomando como ponto de partida a análise das diferentes partes desse livro, contamos antes de mais nada definir o lugar que o pensamento do eterno retorno nele ocupa. Estabelecendo a relação desse pensamento com a noção de além-do-homem, o conceito de vontade de potência, o projeto de transvaloração de todos os (...) valores e a ideia de amor fati, pretendemos examinar a maneira pela qual Nietzsche o concebe em Assim falava Zaratustra. Queremos, por fim, avaliar em que medida o pensamento do eterno retorno do mesmo consiste na mais alta aceitação do mundo tal como ele é.: In Ecce homo, Nietzsche states that the basic conception of Thus spoke Zarathustra consists on "the idea of eternal recurrence, the highest formula of affirmation that can possibly be attained". Taking as point of departure the analysis of the different parts of this book, first of all we intend to define the place of the thought of eternal recurrence. Establishing the relation of this thought with the notion of overman, the concept of will to power, the project of transvaluation of the values, and the idea of amor fati, we plan to examine the way Nietzsche conceives it in Thus spoke Zarathustra. Then we aim at evaluating to which extent the thought of eternal recurrence consists on the highest acceptation of the world as it is. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to argue in favour of a philosophical posthumanist and Nietzschean reading of Ira Levin’s This Perfect Day while demonstrating how transhumanism isunbefitting of being called a Nietzschean theory. I will do this by establishing Chip, the protagonist, as a posthuman and being on the path of the ‘Overhuman’ whereas Wei, the antagonist, will be illustrated as Chip’s intended counterpart the Last Human. Through explaining ‘Transhumansim’ and connecting the field to Wei, I will showcase a (...) new way of reading transhumanist ideology, namely ‘Weiism’. The polar opposite in characters of ‘Overhuman’ and ‘Last Human’ will argue in favour of the Nietzschean paradoxical, as part of philosophical posthumanism. Amor fati and the eternal recurrence become posthumanist narrative tools through their weaving into the posthuman narrative of Chip. My argument is that by making philosophical posthumanism more existentialist in nature, it becomes simpler to argue against nihilistic and totalitarian tendencies of worshipping technology. Finally, it is the spiralling motion forward as a mix between the Nietzschean, eternally cyclical re-inventing of oneself and the posthumanist consideration for the future which makes for a literary combination of the two fields of study. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.3 (2002) 208-222 [Access article in PDF] Writing, Illness and Affirmation Jeremiah Dyehouse My formula for greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely to bear what is necessary, still less conceal it—all idealism is mendaciousness in the face of what is necessary—but love it. —Friedrich Nietzsche (...) In her widely circulated book On Death and Dying, Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, M.D., addresses herself to a changed historical context for work in medicine. In societies with increasingly effective medical care, she argues, doctors and nurses find themselves working with patients whose health problems range from imperceptible yet terminal sicknesses to psychosomatic ailments. Today, especially, it is easy to see the reality of her description of this situation: forms of terminal cancer can be detected earlier and earlier in a patient's life, rendering the disconcerting reality of a terminal illness with few or no symptoms. Equally strange for doctors and patients today are forms of environmental illness like chronic fatigue syndrome, a condition suffered by many but still disputed by doctors and researchers. To this situation of medical risk, personal suffering, and therapeutic care, Kübler-Ross prescribes a communicative engagement with the dying. This engagement, she argues, not only teaches doctors about death and dying, but it also provides respite for those who must experience these events.The problem of communicating with the dying, the main focus of Kübler-Ross's book, is nevertheless eclipsed by the other, more notable aspect of On Death and Dying. For out of this book emerged the now very popular understanding of the stages of death, the normal sequence of an individual's emotional reconciliation to dying: the processes of denial and isolation, anger, bargaining, depression—the whole series of intrapsychic processes leading up to a final acceptance of death and dying. Now we live amongst a whole panoply of staged progresses towards the acceptance of trauma: trauma associated not only with death and dying but also with substance abuse, catastrophe, and forms of violence. It is perhaps worth recalling, however, that the most famous of these stage models, the five stages [End Page 208] of death, emerged out of Kübler-Ross's attempt to learn what the dying can teach the living about communication.In what follows, I assume that writing about illness is another, more popular form of Kübler-Ross's descriptive and communicative project. To write pathography, as Anne Hunsaker Hawkins calls narratives of illness and dying in her survey of these texts, Reconstructing Illness: Studies in Pathography, is to engage with what sickness and dying teach about life and writing. As might be guessed, most pathographies orbit familiar centers of gravity: agency for the dying, reconciliation for the living, the whole leaden project of acceptance. Even so, pathography is not always and everywhere engaged in such projects. Pathography, as Hawkins demonstrates, is a highly variable project. Literary pathography is quite different from popular pathography, and texts within these categories differ with respect to the purpose of their writing. Pathography is conceived as a communicative engagement with sickness and dying, with the sick and the dying, but is hardly unified in its aims or its functions. It is a form of writing that not just potentially but actually admits a diversity of purposes and produces a variety of effects.It is my purpose here to propose a typology for pathographies. Although pathography as a genre of writing takes a bewildering variety of forms, these writings can be grouped according to their effects. I divide pathography into three types, according to the kind of response they offer to sickness and dying, to the sick and the dying. First, I treat pathography as a process of passive acceptance, the bearing of a burden proposed by the necessities of illness and death. Next, I characterize pathographies that approach the writing of illness or dying as a process of active acceptance. This type of pathography uses writing about illness and dying as a process for the... (shrink)

Written on the threshold of Thus Spoke Zarathustra during a highpoint of social, intellectual and psychic vibrancy, The Joyful Science is one of Nietzsche's thematically tighter books. Here he debuts and practices the art of amor fati, love of fate, to explore what is "species preserving" in relation to happiness (Book One); inspiration and the role of art as they keep us mentally fit for inhabiting a world dominated by science (Book Two); the challenges of living authentically and (...) overcoming after the death of God (Book Three); and the crescendo of life affirmation in which Nietzsche revealed the doctrine of eternal recurrence and previewed the figure of Zarathustra (Book Four). Invigorated and motivated by Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche in 1887 added a new preface, an appendix of poems, and Book Five, where he deepened the critique of science and displayed a more genealogical approach. This volume provides the first English translation of the Idylls from Messina and, more importantly, it includes the first English translation of the notebooks of 1881-1882, in which Nietzsche first formulated the eternal recurrence. Structurally and stylistically, The Joyful Science remains Nietzsche's most effective book of aphorisms, immediately after which he took on the voice and alter ego of Zarathustra in order to push beyond the boundaries of even the most liberating prose. (shrink)

This paper will articulate an underappreciated side of the psychoanalytical Deleuze: his relation to Melanie Klein, particularly as it appears in The Logic of Sense. Deleuze's engagement with Klein largely follows his familiar strategy of re-reading a thinker off of a twist in one or two of that thinker's key concepts. With Klein, this twist involves re-reading her story of psychic development on the basis of disjunction rather than negation, so that the psychic surface that emerges generates a persistent non-correspondence (...) between self and other and between concept and thing. Deleuze thereby makes Klein a central figure in his ontology of sense and his analysis of how the physical surface of bodies generates a metaphysical surface of thought. However, Deleuze's ultimate turn is a Nietzschean one towards overcoming, the thought of eternal return, and the demolition of the Oedipal Law. As this final turn makes clear, even in his early writings that engaged more directly and affirmatively with psychoanalytical thought, Deleuze was already on an anti-Oedipal path. (shrink)

Nietzsche wrote that he owed his philosophy to his long sickness, which he called “the teacher of great suspicion”. The present paper considers the related ideas of the will to power and the eternal return in the light of Nietzsche’s concepts of sickness and health. This reading of Nietzsche’s works is guided by the interpretations of Gilles Deleuze and Pierre Klossowski, whose commentaries have been most influential in shaping French neo-Nietzscheanism since 1965; however, those passages literally or metaphorically (...) employing the language of physical and mental illness and health are emphasized. After introducing the key concepts of will, force, affirmation, and self, the paper develops the idea of active and reactive forces, presents the eternal return as a selective doctrine, and considers the meaning of arnor fati. It closes with remarks, based upon Nietzsche’s views, on the interpretation of philosophical texts and on the relationship between the philosopher’s life and works. (shrink)

A deeply personal reckoning with family, mental illness, and suicide, Dana Trusso captures the meaning of Nietzsche's armor fati--to love one's fate--through her surreal imagery and longing to heal intergenerational wounds. Lines are drawn from Lars von Trier's Melancholia, Sonic Youth's Experimental Jet Set, Trash and No Star, and lines she read from her aunt's journals as a child. -/- The photo is a sculpture of an earth goddess by Jean-Philippe Richard located in the botanical gardens of Èze, France. (...) Nearby is Le Chemin de Nietzsche, a steep hike from the seaside to mountainous ruins that is said to have inspired Thus Spoke Zarathustra. (shrink)

Franz Overbeck associates the eternal return with Nietzsche's passion for the ideal of the extreme (Ideals des ‘Extremen’), a drive for the ultimate that is related to the notion of the Nietzschean overhuman. The aim of this paper is to bring to light and analyze the Nietzschean understanding of the ultimate, starting from Overbeck and bringing to light the conception of Christian eschatology presupposed in Nietzsche’s analysis of ressentiment and the ascetic ideal. Explaining the eschatology from which Nietzsche (...) starts will help to have a better understanding of the doctrine of the eternal return, exploring how the Christian heritage from which Nietzsche drank weighs on it. (shrink)

This paper is about the effects on people''s lives of their attitudes towards time and their own embodiment. People commonly see time as biform; there is the time of bodily life and the eternal time which transcends mortal life. This division is deeply implicated in the dualistic values that pervade western thought. So, when Nietzsche substitutes a monist notion of time, he profoundly unsettles our cherished values (which, of course, are gendered). Nietzsche''s major thrust, I argue, is to elucidate (...) and advocate the more appropriate values that emerge when human existence is understood as entirely earthborn.I use two contrasting literary characters to show concretely how people''s lives and relationships are affected negatively or positively according to the temporal perspectives they adopt (and thus the significance they give to their corporeality). I explain how acceptance of human finitude enables a fruitful and rewarding life, while its refusal is life-diminishing. This also makes conceivable a realm beyond gender. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s ZarathustraKathleen Marie HigginsThe Mask of Enlightenment: Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, by Stanley Rosen; 286 pp. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995, $18.95 paper.In Ecce Homo Nietzsche remarks that he wants to be read the way good old philologists read Horace. Stanley Rosen has fullled this Nietzschean wish. His Mask of the Enlightenment interprets Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra with astute attention, and it delivers on Rosen’s (...) stated aim of avoiding both the obscurantism of postmoderns and the selective attention of analytic philosophers. It is philological in the best sense, balancing its consideration of detail with a sense of the book’s larger context, as well as the context of textual predecessors to whom Nietzsche refers and responds.Rosen reads Nietzsche as a fundamentally political thinker, who seeks to transform humanity’s collective circumstances. The ultimate goal of this effort [End Page 193] is “to breed a new race of mankind” that would supersede the decadent existing race (p. 56). This positive aim, however, requires the destruction of the existing race to make room for the new one.Zarathustra, according to Rosen, is an artistic statement of these aspirations and a tactic for achieving them. From the beginning, Zarathustra calls for the appearance of the superman and the destruction of contemporary European culture. Aware of how far his contemporaries are from the superman, Zarathustra utilizes a double rhetoric, concealing his real intent from all but the select few.Zarathustra addresses noble lies to the crowd, which make his doctrines appear to be afrmative and salvational, but try to seduce the majority to their own self-destruction. Preaching the coming of the superman and the doctrine of eternal recurrence (the view that time recurs cyclically), Zarathustra’s real purpose is to accelerate nihilism and hasten the destruction of current European culture. This aim, however, is concealed by the seemingly afrmative character of these doctrines.Zarathustra’s esoteric message rests on Nietzsche’s materialistic reductionism, according to Rosen. Nietzsche understands reality, fundamentally, to be nothing but chaotic uctuations among accumulating points of force. Even the expression “will to power” suggests a more coherent ontological structure than reality exhibits. The doctrine of “will to power” is an exoteric idea that conceals Nietzsche’s belief that the world is a chaos of uctuating points of force. Will, subjectivity, and physics are all illusions that disguise a cruel and uncaring world.The doctrine of eternal recurrence, in its esoteric sense, reects this vision. Claiming that the sequence of temporal events recurs endlessly, the doctrine is an image for the universe’s spontaneous being, which has no inherent value. This vision is nihilistic, for it implies the illusory status of our subjective selves, any sense of progress, and even our scientic theories. If reality is ultimately chaos, our lives are meaningless.So understood, the doctrine of eternal recurrence is not obviously compatible with Zarathustra’s call for the superman. The superman project is doomed to fail, since eternal recurrence implies that the condition of decadence will recur, even if a superman is generated at some point. Eternal recurrence is also incompatible with amor fati, the love of fate that Zarathustra preaches. Eternal recurrence is an image of chance, of the random happening of force-points, while amor fati is a deterministic vision. Chance and necessity are the same in their human signicance. Both deny human freedom. Chance means that our behavior arises from the un-ordered movements of force points.One of the achievements of Rosen’s book is its mapping of such tensions within Zarathustra, tensions that motivate the drama of the book. These tensions are numerous. Zarathustra preaches the superman to those he seeks as followers, but followers are inherently incapable of the superman’s creative [End Page 194] spontaneity. Zarathustra’s bombast, used to attract attention, is in tension with the subtlety of his actual message. The activism implied by Zarathustra’s preaching is at odds with the fatalism of amor fati. The rank-ordering of human types, a feature of Zarathustra’s elitism, is incompatible with his inner doctrine that the world is chaos.Rosen concludes that some of these tensions... (shrink)

A short story about love, suspense and criminal inclinations. Un relato literario sobre amor y proyecciones criminales.

In this essay I examine the tension between Nietzsche's doctrine of amor fati and his political project of Zuchtung. As philosophical naturalist, Nietzsche espouses a love of fate and a respect for necessity and reality. However, as philosophical legislator, he apparently denies the fatality of the human being in his attempts to cultivate or perfect it. I argue that Nietzsche's Zuchtung differs importantly from "idealistic" varieties of legislation in that it both requires and aims at the affirmation of (...) fate. On my reading, Nietzsche's nomothetic project neither contradicts nor undermines his naturalistic project: rather it represents its apotheosis and culmination. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that Nietzsche should be understood as a “thorough-going nihilist”. Rather than broaching two general projects of destroying current values and constructing new ones, I argue that Nietzsche should be understood only as a destroyer of values. I do this by looking at Nietzsche’s views on nihilism and the role played by Nietzsche’s cyclical view of time, or his doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same. I provide a typology of nihilisms, as they are (...) found in Nietzsche—negative, reactive and radical—through a close reading of an unpublished fragment in his later notebooks, remnants of which are scattered throughout his published work. I show how the progression between the different stages of nihilism are a “necessary consequence of the ideals entertained hitherto” , with the eternal recurrence of the same playing a vital role in this progression. The last stage of nihilism—radical nihilism—is ambiguous between a life-denying, or passive, nihilism and a life-affirming, or active, one; but, I argue, both kinds of nihilism preclude a construction of new values. But there is an inherent tension within Nietzsche’s account of nihilism insofar as it relies on the eternal recurrence of the same. This tension is brought out nicely by Löwith and partially resolved by Klossowski. There are at least two meanings of the eternal recurrence of the same. In one sense, the cosmological reading, it is intended to make sense of the idea that time is infinite and matter is finite by claiming that every possible combination of matter will recur infinite times. In the other sense, the anthropological reading, it is a kind of thought experiment, analogous to Kant’s categorical imperative: “live in every moment so that you could will that moment back again over and over” . There is a tension between these readings insofar as one must will to live in such a way that they will do it again, over and over , but also that what they do will make no difference, for what one decides to do has been done innumerable times. I argue that this tension can only be resolved by considering Nietzsche as aiming at “goal-lessness as such” and placing him as an active nihilist. (shrink)

At the opening of the first volume of his Deconstruction of Christianity, Nancy argues that “The much discussed ‘return of the religious,’ which denotes a real phenomenon, deserves no more attention than any other ‘return’” (1). This statement may seem paradoxical in light of Nancy’s extensive study of the logic of the return – including, of the divine – in texts such as “Of Divine Places,” Noli me tangere, Dis-Enclosure and Adoration. Nancy does pay considerable attention to (...) something that, according to him, deserves none. In this paper, I examine Nancy’s critique of the “return of religion” in detail and argue that it would be a mistake to assume that Nancy’s understanding of the logic of the “return” is limited to the – largely uninteresting and even dangerous, indeed – return of the Same, just as it is a mistake to assume that the phenomenon known as the “return of religion” merely consists of the dialectical resurgence of a past religious fervour, a step backwards in history. According to Nancy, religion today returns in a way that radically breaks with the logic of the return of the Same and testifies to an eternal return of difference which, paraphrasing Nancy, opens religion to the limitlessness that constitutes its truth. It does, therefore, deserve our attention, yet only insofar as, paraphrasing Nancy, it opens religion to the limitlessness that constitutes its truth (Dis-Enclosure 1), thereby providing us with new resources to think religion in the singular-plural today. (shrink)

Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return of the same exhibits the preoccupations and limitations of his middle and late periods. It situates Nietzsche in the grand narrative of the history of the misunderstanding of being that Heidegger was striving to map. Yet it thereby neglects the question of the primordiality and insuperability of mood that was a focus of Being and Time and The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. It does not acknowledge the alternative ontological path (...) pursued by Nietzsche’s engagement with a world and time grounded in joy. This article attempts to defend Nietzsche by means of an appeal to the early Heidegger. (shrink)

O presente artigo tem como objetivo principal investigar as nuances da relação estabelecida entre a noção de amor fati e o pensamento do eterno retorno tal como aparecem no livro IV de “A gaia ciência”, obra de Friedrich Nietzsche. O tom afirmativo da obra, que se expressa de forma poética e artística, nos permite partir de uma perspectiva estética de análise das questões a serem exploradas. Pretende-se, portanto, abordar as diferentes acepções do conceito de arte no percurso da (...) filosofia nietzschiana para melhor compreender o conceito de vida como obra de arte e, a partir disso, pensar as possíveis maneiras de articulação entre a noção de vida como obra de arte e a comunicação do amor fati e do eterno retorno como partes constituintes do projeto de transvaloração dos valores. Diante disso, torna-se viável uma melhor compreensão da possível relação que o filósofo estabelece entre a noção de amor fati – a qual tem lugar no primeiro aforismo do livro IV – e o pensamento do eterno retorno – o qual, por sua vez, é anunciado no penúltimo aforismo do mesmo livro. Trata-se, em última instância, de investigar em que medida e de quais maneiras ocorre o atravessamento mútuo de ambos os conceitos e a relevância disso no quadro geral da proposta da filosofia nietzschiana. (shrink)