This article is an attempt to clarify the role of pregivenness by drawing on the accounts afforded by Eugen Fink both in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and in the complementary writings to this study. Pregivenness is first situated, along with givenness and non-givenness, within the framework of the system of transcendental phenomenology. As a second step, an examination is undertaken of the dimensions of pregivenness in the natural attitude. Next, nonpregivenness in the transcendental sphere is examined with a focus upon (...) the way in which indeterminateness does not undermine the possibility of a transcendental foreknowledge in the natural attitude, and on the other hand implies the productive character of phenomenological knowledge. After showing how, with the reduction, the pregivennes of the world turns into the pregivenness of world-constitution, the paper addresses the problems raised by the nonpregivenness both of the depth-levels and the reach of transcendental life. By unfolding these lines of inquiry, transcendental phenomenology surmounts the provisional analysis of constitution at the surface level as well as the limitation of transcendental life to the egological sphere. Finally, it is contended that Fink’s account of pregivenness overstates apperceptive or secondary pregivenenness because is does not deal with the pregivenness that precedes acts and is the condition of possibility for primary passivity. Reasons for the omission of impressional or primary pregivenness are suggested. (shrink)

In this issue of Studies in Transcendental Philosophy five scholars enquire about the theoretical aspects of Kant’s transcendental philosophy related to the notions of subject, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge. Andrew Brook examines Kant’s views on transcendental apperception at the end of the Critical Period, focusing on Opus Postumum which contains some of Kant’s most important reflections on the subjective dimension. As is known, the self-conscious act designated by the proposition ‘I think’ is an act of spontaneity, and this spontaneity is (...) the reason that the subject calls itself an intelligence. In his article Addison Ellis examines the theoretical and practical dimension of spontaneity, calling into question the distinction between a merely ‘relative’ spontaneity and one that is ‘absolute’. Luca Forgione points to two forms of self-consciousness introduced by Kant: inner sense, based on a sensory form of self-awareness, and transcendental apperception. Through the notion of inner sense, Kant also allows for an introspective account of self-awareness; nonetheless, Kant holds an utterly sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness provided for by the notion of transcendental apperception. Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira’s article presents a systematic and a historical approach, linking the contemporary debate on transcendental argument to Kant’s philosophy. It addresses both Stroud’s objection and Strawson’s perspective on transcendental argument and introduces a new reconstruction of Kant’s Refutation as successful truth-directed transcendental argument. In contrast to the contemporary movement of transhumanism and its claims that creatures like us can exist independently of our bodies, Robert Hanna develops a generalist perspective on the subjective dimension, according to which all rational human creature are synthetic a priori necessarily, essentially embodied Kantian selves. I would like to thank the authors for participating in this issue and for helping to make it really special. (shrink)

Resumen En este artículo de investigación trataré de repensar, dentro de la intuición marcada por Heidegger en su interpretación de Kant, el papel que juega la noción de imaginación, en su vinculación inexorable, por un lado, con la apercepción trascendental, y con el tiempo, por otro, a fin de alcanzar, al menos, un esbozo temático de tal imaginación en términos de auto-afección radical del sí-mismo. Y todo ello para mostrar la posibilidad de una lectura interpretativa que haga valer la (...) importancia, justamente, de un sí mismo y/o mismidad.In this paper, I will try to rethink Heidegger’s interpretation of the role of transcendental imagination within his understanding of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. My paper focuses on the connection between transcendental apperception on the one hand and the time on the other. In this sense, I will try to develop a thematic outline of such imagination in terms of radical self-affection of Selfhood. And this in order to show the possibility of an interpretative reading that asserts the importance, precisely, of a self and/or selfhood. (shrink)

In this article I compare the phenomenology of Husserl with Polo’s philosophy of the mental limit. This comparison is orientated to highlight the importance of habits in anthropology.

blurb from publisher: "In Apperception and Self-Consciousness in Kant and German Idealism, Dennis Schulting examines the themes of reflexivity, self-consciousness, representation and apperception in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and German Idealism more widely. Central to Schulting’s argument is the claim that all of human experience is inherently self-referential and that this is part of a self-reflexivity of thought, or what is called transcendental apperception, a Kantian insight that was first apparent in the work of Christian Wolff (...) and came to inform all of German Idealism. In a rigorous text suitable for students of German philosophy and upper-level students of metaphysics, epistemology, moral and political philosophy, and aesthetics courses, the author establishes the historical roots of Kant’s thought and traces it through to his immediate successors Karl Leonhard Reinhold, Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. He specifically examines the cognitive role of self-consciousness and its relation to idealism and places it in a clear and coherent history of rationalist philosophy." . (shrink)

In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/7), Kant laid out a deep-running and largely original picture of the apperceptive mind, including a claim that in consciousness of self, one does not appear to oneself as an object and that consciousness of self is presupposed by consciousness of other things. As a result, consciousness of oneself does not provide knowledge of oneself and the referential apparatus of consciousness of self is radically different from other kinds of referential apparatus. The main purpose (...) of this paper is to summarize this picture and then explore how much of it is still to be found in his late, unfinished Opus Postumum (1800/04). (shrink)

A core thesis of Kitcher's is that thinking about objects requires awareness of necessary connections between one's object-directed representations ‘as such’ and that this is what Kant means by the transcendental unity of apperception. I argue that Kant's main point is the spontaneity or ‘self-made-ness’ of combination rather than the requirement of reflexive awareness of combination, that Kitcher provides no plausible account of how recognition of representations ‘as such’ should be constituted and that in fact Kant himself appears to (...) lack the theoretical resources to clearly distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness or apperception properly so-called. (shrink)

This article traces the development of Edmund Husserl’s approach to the concept of the ego through the different stages of the evolution of his phenomenological project. The aim is to delineate Husserl’s shifting viewpoints from a Humean to a Kantian perspective, particularly focusing on the transition toward a Kantian transcendental approach. Through an analysis of Husserl’s engagement with Kant’s texts, especially on transcendental apperception, the study reveals how Husserl’s encounters with Kantian philosophy informed his conceptualization of the ego. It (...) further examines the “empty character” of the ego, contrasting Husserl’s and Kant’s strategies to address Humean skepticism and their differing solutions for integrating the egological dimension into subjective experience: The transcendence-in-immanence of the ego for Husserl, the I as analytical form of thoughts for Kant. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar la distinción leibniziana entre apercepción sensible y consáentia a la luz de su ontología monadológica, con la intención de esclarecer las diferencias constitutivas entre los tres tipos de mónadas que Leibniz postula, esto es, entre las mónadas simples, las meras almas y los espíritus. Con esto, además de argumentar en contra de la concepción estándar de la apercepción, la cual termina por confinarla al caso específico de los espíritus, sitúo la propuesta (...) del hannoveriano entre dos lecturas contemporáneas: por un lado, aquella que comprende la apercepción como un acto de orden superior reflexivo, esto es, una percepción de la percepción; y, por otro lado, aquella que, al distinguir entre apercepción sensible y consáentia, privilegia una teoría de primer orden para hablar de la primera, reservando los actos reflexivos para la segunda. Aunque la evidencia textual es más afín con la segunda, hay elementos de la primera que permiten matizarla.The main aim of this article is to analyze Leibniz’s distinction between sensitive apperception and ‘conscientia’ through his monadological ontology, with the intention of lighten the constitutive differences between the three types of monads that Leibniz state, that is, between bare monads, souls and spirits. By proving this, my approach not only argues against the standard conceptions of Leibniz's notion of apperception, which ends attributing apperception only to the specify case of spirits, but it abo places the Hanoverian proposal between two contemporary lectures: on one side, an approach that understand apperception as a high order reflexive act, that is, a perception of a perception; on the other side, an approach that distinguishes sensible apperception from ‘conscientia’ in order to privilege a first order theory for the first one, reserving the reflective acts only for the second. Even when the textual evidence is closer to the last one, there are some elements of the first approach that allow us to improve it. (shrink)

This paper defends the thesis of the analyticity of the principle of apperception, as developed in the first part of the B-Deduction, against recent criticisms by Paul Guyer and Patricia Kitchen The first part presents these criticisms, the most important of which being that the analyticity thesis is incompatible with both the avowed goal of which being that the Deduction of establishing the validity of the categories and Üie account of apperception in the A-Deduction. The second part argues (...) that Kant's procedure in the B-Deduction of beginning with an abstract analysis of a discursive understanding, independentiy of its relation to the specifically human forms of sensibility, requires him to regard the principle as analytic and that this explains the difference from the A-Deduction. By appealing to the model of a deduction in Kant's moral theory and the two step in one proof structure of the B-Deduction, the third part argues that the analyticity thesis is in fact compatible with the goal of the Deduction. (shrink)

“Source monitoring” theory is applied to the turn-of-the-century argument that, whenever binocularly fused patterns are self-consciously apperceived, both eyes' monocular sensations are consciously perceived. According to monitoring theory's refinement of the argument, binocularly apperceived patterns are accompanied by selfconsciousness that one is perceiving patterns , whereas monocular sensations are accompanied by no self-consciousness of their source. In the current test of this refined argument, 32 subjects were monocularly presented with 6 letters of the alphabet, while binocularly fusing 6 different letters, (...) and were subsequently required to discriminate these 12 letters from 6 other letters that they had visually imaged. Consistent with monitoring theory, the results of experimental testing suggest that binocularly fused letters are neurally monitored as “peripheral,” self-consciously experienced as “perceived,” and subsequently remembered as not “imaged.” The results further suggest that, during such binocular apperception, monocular data are not totally unconscious-like computer data-but are consciously experienced as “sourceless” sensations that are memorially confused with visually imaged sensations. (shrink)

This work represents an investigation of the most important properties of the human mind consciousness, apperception and reflection - and of their significance for Leibnizian philosophy. The development of Leibniz's thinking in the course of his treatment of these themes receives especially detailed treatment, and is thoroughly documented on the basis of the original texts. The concepts of consciousness and reflection were the object of intensive discussion in the l7th century. Starting out from the problem of the distinction between (...) humans and brutes - Descartes' view of animals as mere machines was always decisively rejected by Leibniz-Kulstad shows the significance of these concepts in the early writings of Leibniz. He shows how Leibniz was then stimulated by Locke to add the word "apperception" into his philosophy. The author sets out the influence of Locke on Leibniz and demonstrates how Leibniz adopted a firmer and more constant position as to the relation between consciousness and reflection than one finds in Locke's own writings. From the beginning to the end of his life Leibniz defends the thesis that both consciousness and reflection consist in the memory of one mental act via another. The author shows how Leibniz hereby aligns himself with an European philosophihical tradition which can be traced back to Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. Of course, a clarification of the meanings of words such as "consciousness", "reflection" and "apperception" is important not only for an understanding of Leibniz's philosophy but also for contemporary metaphysics and theory of knowledge. Leibniz certainly recognized and thought through the problems associated with these words, but he never developed a final, coherent theory, a fact which certainly reflects in part the complexity of the underlying problems. By exploiting not only all the relevant Leibnizian writings but also the results of more receent philosophy in this field, Kulstad is able to draw a reliable picture both of Leibniz's treatment of these problems and of the influence of his views on his contemporaries and successors. (shrink)

This essay chiefly concerns the unity of self-consciousness expounded under the heading "the original synthetic unity of apperception" in Kant's transcendental deduction. It focuses mainly on Kant's identification of this unity with the understanding, the faculty of knowledge, with the aim of throwing light on the understanding and on knowledge as well as on synthetic unity.

Husserl frecuentemente critica la construcción kantiana de la subjetividad trascendental a través del método regresivo. Sin embargo reconoce que la Deducción de los conceptos puros del entendimiento (A) es tal vez el texto más fenomenológico de la Crítica de la razón pura, en la medida en que allí Kant intenta acceder directamente a las condiciones de posibilidad de la experiencia. Contra la opinión de Husserl, es nuestra intención mostrar en este artículo que la descripción de las operaciones sintéticas que (...) Kant lleva a cabo en la Deducción trascendental (A) no es el resultado de algo semejante a aquello que Husserl llama experiencia trascendental. Para sustentar esta postura proponemos una particular interpretación de la noción kantiana de autoafección, y de su relación con la de síntesis de la aprehensión. (shrink)

Whilst agreeing with Robert Pippin that Hegel undertakes his philosophical enterprise in light of Kant's insights into the failings of pre-critical metaphysics, this paper outlines the shortcomings of Pippin's Hegel interpretation by contrasting what I call 'apperceptive idealism' on the one hand with 'transcendental ontology' on the other. By privileging subject over substance, Pippin commits Hegel to an ontologically modest form of Kantianism that, in missing how reality as a whole is the main topic of Hegel’s philosophy, leaves no room (...) for a crucial Hegelian task, namely accounting for the presence of self-conscious thinking in nature. Appreciating the nature of Hegel's true ambitions whilst remaining aware of how his Logic maps a 'realm of shadows', opens up the possibility of understanding his philosophy as forging a middle path: Hegel is neither the subjective idealist of Pippin's interpretation nor the advocate of a revival of first-order metaphysical theorising depicted by so many of Pippin's critics. (shrink)

La antropología trascendental es la fundamentación materialista del idealismo revolucionario de Marx. Expondré esta tesis en tres momentos principales, en el primero describo el marco crítico o conceptual común a la teoría de la revolución y el trascendentalismo, concretamente sobre las ideas de ciencia, naturaleza y vida en Marx y en Husserl. La crítica de la deshumanización de la praxis científica desemboca —en Husserl— en la restitución del valor científico del sujeto de los procesos vitales, la conciencia de un (...) cuerpo explotado, dimensión que exploro en el segundo apartado como reconducción del decurso histórico-evolutivo del capital, al sujeto de la revolución como sujeto encarnado, hambriento, explotado. En la tercera, y última parte, sitúo ese concepto de subjetividad trascendental concreta, encarnada o histórica, en la base del concepto de género humano del que se sirve Marx para trazar la meta revolucionaria de la humanidad, su universalización. Palabras clave: materialismo, trascendentalismo, subjetividad, revolución. (shrink)

The interest contemporary philosophy takes in Kant's notion of apperception is restricted to his criticism of the Cartesian Ego and to his refutation of scepticism, but there is a profound lack of concern for the notion itself and for the act of spontaneity in particular which is connected with the use of the word T. Starting from a comparison of Wittgenstein's account of this use with Kant's considerations it is argued that the latter aims at a theory of formal (...) conditions of knowledge which includes the availability of the notion of the I. It is clarified what the determination of apperception as an 'act of spontaniety' amounts to (B: 132). Kant's scattered remarks on the ability of having the representation of the I, of using the word 'I', are considered in order to show that what he called 'the logical I' has something to do with the capacity of performing an act of judgment. It is argued that such an account is not to be found in contemporary discussions of 'essential indexicals', 'first-person view' and mental self-ascriptions. (shrink)

La presente investigación se propone mostrar la génesis y desarrollo de la tentativa matriz de la filosofía de Gilles Deleuze, el empirismo trascendental. Para ello, se realizará una revisión de las problemáticas por las que atraviesa dicha tentativa a lo largo de la obra de este pensador. Cuidadosa atención recibirán a propósito de la génesis del empirismo trascendental el problema del hábito y el de la constitución de la subjetividad, que Deleuze reconoce en Hume (Empirisme et subjectivité, 1953). (...) A partir de ellos, se establecerán los caracteres principales del que se identifica como problema de los principios, en cuyo seno se define una relación particular entre principio y génesis. Gracias al establecimiento riguroso de dicha relación, Deleuze integra los aportes del empirismo y los de la filosofía trascendental bajo una misma propuesta filosófica. Esta propuesta tendrá a la vista el desarrollo de una crítica sistemática hacia lo dado, con lo cual tanto el objeto como el sujeto del pensar precisarán ser sometidos a una indagación acerca de su génesis. Definido el empirismo trascendental como la tentativa filosófica que apunta a pensar la génesis trascendental o actualización de lo dado, esta investigación espera dar cuenta del ámbito de dicha génesis así como de los principios de determinación que la rigen. Para ello se estudiarán las nociones de campo trascendental, plan de inmanencia y continuo ideal (Différence et répétition, 1968; Logique du sens, 1969). Al abordar esta última noción, se pondrá especial interés en dilucidar la reformulación que efectúa Deleuze de los princip ios de razón suficiente, de indiscernibilidad y de continuidad de Leibniz (Le Pli, 1988). (shrink)

This paper describes an attempt to repurpose Kant’s a priori psychology as the architectural blueprint for a machine learning system. First, it describes the conditions that must be satisfied for the agent to achieve unity of experience: the intuitions must be connected, via binary relations, so as to satisfy various unity conditions. Second, it shows how the categories are derived within this model: the categories are pure unary predicates that are derived from the pure binary relations. Third, I describe how (...) Kant’s cognitive architecture has been implemented in a computer system (the Apperception Engine) and show in detail what it is like for the system to construct a unified experience from a sequence of raw sensory input. (shrink)

The question of this work is the relationship between cognition and self-knowledge. That question is approached both by way of Kant on apperception and from the perspective of contemporary theories of mind which locate the origin of our cognitive life in interpersonal, interpretive practices, e.g., Sellars, Davidson, Dennett and Brandom. Kant does not integrate the social dimension into his account of cognition. In fact, many of his arguments for the apperception principle are beholden to a picture of mind (...) which precludes his recognizing the social dimension of cognition. Nonetheless, one can reconstruct a Kantian argument for the apperception principle within the framework of a theory which recognizes the constitutive role of interpretation in cognition. ;Chapter One explores the various ways that the priority of interpersonal interpretation has been claimed. These range from analyses of our talk of the mind as descriptive-predictive strategies to functionalist theories of mind to theories which emphasize the connection between interpreting language and attributing propositional attitudes and the normative dimension of interpretation . Chapter Two outlines seven interpretive questions that any reading of Kant on apperception must address, questions about what Kant means by 'apperception' and the character of the apperception principle. Chapter Three is an analysis of those Kantian arguments for the apperception principle which picture the mind as a private arena, arguments which are untenable from the perspective established in Chapter One. Chapter Four explores Sydney Shoemaker's argument for a functionalist version of Kant's apperception principle and argues that his approach is unsatisfactory. Chapter Five introduces Robert Brandom's theory of propositional attitudes with a discussion of Sellars' theory of sentence meaning and Davidson on the relationship between belief and meaning. Chapter Six then looks at what difference the ability to attribute oneself a propositional attitude might make on Brandom's theory. I argue against Brandom that having a belief or an intention presupposes the ability to explicitly say that one has that belief or intention. Chapter Seven returns to Kant and argues that the analysis and conclusion of Chapter Six are broadly Kantian. (shrink)

Kant points to two forms of self-consciousness: the inner sense (empirical apperception) grounded in a sensory form of self-awareness and transcendental apperception. The aim of this paper is to show that a sophisticated notion of basic self-consciousness, which contains a pre-reflective self-consciousness as its first level, is provided by the notion of transcendental apperception. The necessity for a pre-reflective self-consciousness has been pointed out in phenomenological literature. According to this account, every self-ascription of any property implies a (...) more fundamental form of self-consciousness, i.e., a kind of immediate familiarity with oneself. This pre-reflective self-consciousness is a non-relational and non-identificational form of self-consciousness and concerns an immediate acquaintance of the subject with itself. In the specific terms of transcendentalism every thought contains an implicit reference to a first-personal “givenness” or a sense of “mineness” that articulates a non-relational and non-identificational form of a pre-reflective model of self-consciousness. (shrink)

In focusing on the systematic deduction of the categories from a principle, Schulting takes up anew the controversial project of the eminent German Kant scholar Klaus Reich, whose monograph “The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments” made the case that the logical functions of judgement can all be derived from the objective unity of apperception and can be shown to link up with one another systematically. -/- Common opinion among Kantians today has it that Kant did not mean to (...) derive the functions of judgement, and accordingly the categories, from the principle of apperception. Schulting challenges this standard view and aims to resuscitate the main motivation behind Reich’s project. He argues, in agreement with Reich’s main thesis about the derivability of the functions of judgement, that Kant indeed does mean to derive, in full a priori fashion, the categories from the principle of apperception. -/- Schulting also shows that, given the general assumptions of the Critical philosophy, Kant's derivation is successful and that absent an account of the derivation of the categories from apperception, the B-Deduction cannot really be understood. -/- New edition. First published 2012 as „Kant’s Deduction and Apperception. Explaining the Categories" (Palgrave Macmillan). (shrink)

El presente artículo se propone analizar una serie de llamativas coincidencias entre el pensamiento tardío de Husserl y el pensamiento temprano de Heidegger –en particular en torno a tópicos como la muerte, la finitud, la negatividad y la posibilidad– a partir de la puesta en primer plano de un problema metodológico crucial para la fenomenología: el de la legitimación de las propias descripciones del ámbito de la subjetividad originaria. Ello conduce a Husserl, pretendo mostrar, al abandono de una noción estrecha (...) de donación y legitimación asociada a la intuitividad y al desarrollo de una fenomenología constructiva centrada en la pregunta por lo inconstituible y por el modo en que la esfera propiamente constituyente puede darse, si bien siempre indirectamente, en la experiencia, en el sentido de lo que Montavont ha llamado un “trascendental a posteriori”. Es allí donde las coincidencias con Heidegger saldrán a la luz. (shrink)

En el presente texto, se pregunta por el pasaje del idealismo trascendental de Immanuel Kant al empirismo trascendental de Gilles Deleuze. Sostendremos dos hipótesis: en primer lugar, que el principal elemento distintivo del segundo con respecto al primero es la ausencia de una condición de concordancia entre los flujos de las diferentes facultades; en segundo lugar, que la escena que Deleuze construye para dar cuenta de una síntesis disyuntiva entre elementos heterogéneos está a su vez inspirada en Kant, (...) más específicamente en la Analítica de lo sublime. Deleuze reelabora esta escena, en su primer sistema filosófico propio, para construir un encuentro que violenta la sensibilidad y fuerza a las diferentes facultades a un ejercicio autónomo que rompe con el sentido común y, sin embargo, encuentra una armonía en el fondo de la discordancia. (shrink)

In several places of his work, Kant distinguishes between two senses of self-consciousness: a pure one and an empirical one. The aim of this work is to analyze these two senses of consciousness and show that, for Kant, self-consciousness does not occur unrestrictedly: a relation with something other than consciousness is needed for it to become conscious of itself. I carry out these objectives throughout six sections. In the first one I lay out the Kantian principle of pure apperception. (...) In the second one, I present the limits of pure apperception through Kant’s critique of rational psychology. Then, in the third section, I set the basis to understand the relationship that Kant establishes between the I think and the I exist. In the fourth one I show that pure apperception, despite being pure, is not possible without the opportunity of perception. Next, in the fifth one, I introduce the notion of empirical apperception, establish its relationship with pure apperception, and elucidate its meaning. Finally, in the last section, I explain the way in which empirical self-consciousness is determined, in relation to the knowledge of objects of the external sense. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es mostrar qué significa “conocimiento trascendental” en la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant, especialmente a partir de una explicación de las razones por las que este modificó en la segunda edición la definición ofrecida en A 11s. En primer lugar, me centro en la concepción de la ontología de Wolff y Baumgarten, y explico por qué la definición de conocimiento trascendental que Kant ofreció en la primera edición había de resultarle insatisfactoria. (...) En segundo lugar, profundizo en las razones de la corrección introducida por Kant en 1787 (B 25). Sostengo que solo esta última formulación revela la originalidad del conocimiento trascendental con respecto a la ontología de Wolff y Baumgarten, debido a que tal formulación clarifica que el conocimiento trascendental se centra en nuestro tipo específico de conocimiento (unsere Erkenntnißart), frente a la indeterminación de la que, según Kant, adolece la ontología de sus predecesores. Finalmente, planteo una breve discusión crítica sobre la base de estos resultados. (shrink)

This essay looks askance at how robot-assisted childcare is constructed in the public domain of the Internet. Complex interactions of rhetorical manoeuvres, narratives and postnarrativity, and semiotic slippages may channel the apperception of this application of robotics. The prospect of robots in childcare roles is exceptionally contentious, for it connotes interference with the child-caregiver attachment bond. The industry’s response to psychology-informed concerns is to ‘rebrand’ the product as a robot companion for a child or as a home robot for (...) the family. A technocentric bias in information disseminated online creates an illusion of expertise and may endorse technology-driven morality. (shrink)

I critically examine one central line of reasoning in Mario Caimi's book »Kant's B Deduction« (Cambridge Publishing, 2014).

En este artículo introductorio, exploro el sentido de la influencia de Kant en la filosofía de Heidegger, y en particular examino el significado de su afirmación tardía según la cual "la ontología fundamental no es otra cosa que filosofía trascendental". Sostengo que, para dar sentido a esta afirmación, no tendremos que limitarnos a la lectura atenta de Heidegger sobre Kant a finales de la década de 1920, sino que nos centraremos en sus primeros trabajos sobre lógica y en su (...) redescubrimiento de Aristóteles. Creo que, al hacerlo, Heidegger, fuertemente influenciado por el neokantismo y, en particular, por Emil Lask, llega a la idea de que la pregunta kantiana acerca del campo trascendental como un campo de validez solo puede responderse si planteamos preguntas a priori sobre el modo de ser de ese campo y la forma en que las determinaciones ontológicas emergen como condiciones de posibilidad para nuestra experiencia de los objetos. (shrink)

En el marco del centenario del nacimiento de José Rubén Sanabria, nos ha parecido conveniente estudiar algún aspecto de su amplia obra filosófica. En su libro Filosofía del Absoluto, el filósofo michoacano hace gala de un manejo envidiable de la fecunda tradición tomista desarrollada a lo largo del siglo XX denominada “tomismo” o “realismo trascendental”. Uno de los aspectos más interesantes y que mayor discusión ha desatado es el de la fundamentación ontológica del ente. En este trabajo se retoma (...) esta parte de la disputa, recuperando no sólo los pasajes centrales sobre el tema que elabora el propio Sanabria en la obra mencionada, sino también algunas de las posiciones de Johannes B. Lotz y Emerich Coreth, a los que sigue abundantemente en esta obra. (shrink)

Se exponen algunas de las reflexiones de Alberto Moretti acerca del carácter trascendental de la lógica, poniendo especial atención en cierta evolución que parece haber en sus ideas sobre este asunto entre la publicación en el año 2006 de “Lógica y semántica” y “la Lógica y la trama de las cosas”, del año 2016. Se presentan los rasgos más generales de una versión del naturalismo lógico que podría sobrevivir a los cuestionamientos trascendentalistas de Moretti.

Dennis Schulting offers a thoroughgoing, analytic account of the first half of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the B-edition of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that is different from existing interpretations in at least one important aspect: its central claim is that each of the 12 categories is wholly derivable from the principle of apperception, which goes against the current view that the Deduction is not a proof in a strict philosophical sense and the standard reading that (...) in the Deduction Kant only gives an account of the global applicability of the categories to experience. This novel approach enables a reappraisal of Kant's controversial claim that transcendental self-consciousness is not only a necessary condition of objective experience but also sufficient for it. The book provides an extensive analysis of Kant's theory of transcendental apperception and also explains why the argument of the Transcendental Deduction is both a regressive and a progressive argument. (shrink)

talk Oslo-Kant congress. In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.

En el presente trabajo se aborda el problema fundamental que concierne a la pragmática trascendental del lenguaje referido al alcance normativo de las reglas del discurso. Luego de presentar las características fundamentales que estas reglas manifiestan en la pragmática trascendental (I), se desarrolla la discusión en torno a su alcance normativo (II). Reconstruyendo y criticando la solución de Karl-Otto Apel a esta problemática (III) se presenta esquemáticamente una propuesta de solución (IV) y finalmente se extraen algunas conclusiones que (...) pueden ser tenidas en cuenta para futuros desarrollos de esta propuesta (V). (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that there are multiple principles of apperception which jointly constitute the foundation of Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction.