The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics and to explain what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analysed in it: (ii) to give a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default reasoning.

We obtain modal completeness of the interpretability logics IL $\!\!\textsf {P}_{\textsf {0}}$ and ILR w.r.t. generalised Veltman semantics. Our proofs are based on the notion of full labels [2]. We also give shorter proofs of completeness w.r.t. the generalised semantics for many classical interpretability logics. We obtain decidability and finite model property w.r.t. the generalised semantics for IL $\textsf {P}_{\textsf {0}}$ and ILR. Finally, we develop a construction that might be useful for proofs of completeness of (...) extensions of ILW w.r.t. the generalised semantics in the future, and demonstrate its usage with $\textbf {IL}\textsf {W}^\ast = \textbf {IL}\textsf {WM}_{\textsf {0}}$. (shrink)

Of course, although this view on meaning was the prevailing one for almost a century, many of the people who initiated the enterprise of logical semantics, including people like Frege and Wittgenstein, had an open eye for all that it did not catch. However, the logical means which Frege, Wittgenstein, Russell, and the generation that succeeded them, had at their disposal were those of classical mathematical logic and set-theory, and these indeed are not very suited for an analysis of (...) other aspects of meaning than those which the slogan covers. A real change in view then had to await the emergence of other concepts, which in due course became available mainly under the influence of developments in computer science and cognate disciplines such as artificial intelligence. And this is one of the reasons why it took almost a century before any serious and successful challenge of the view that meaning equals truthconditions from within logical semantics could emerge. (shrink)

This paper provides an update semantics for counterfactual conditionals. It does so by giving a dynamic twist to the ‘Premise Semantics’ for counterfactuals developed in Veltman (1976) and Kratzer (1981). It also offers an alternative solution to the problems with naive Premise Semantics discussed by Angelika Kratzer in ‘Lumps of Thought’ (Kratzer, 1989). Such an alternative is called for given the triviality results presented in Kanazawa et al. (2005, this issue).

Some Generalizations of Categorical Grammars Emmon Bach 0. INTRODUCTION The last decade of work in syntax has seen a marked demotion in the importance of ...

a la base de cet article a ´ et´ e pr´ esent´ ee ` a la cinqui` eme ‘Conference on Semantics and Linguistic Theory’ qui s’est tenue ` a Austin, Texas, en F´ evrier 1995, et va paraˆıtre dans les actes de celle-ci. Nous aimerions remercier les participants `.

Update semantics1 embodies a radical view on the relation between context and interpretation. The meaning of a sentence is identified with its context change potential, where contexts are identified with information states. The recursive definition of semantic interpretation is stated in terms of a process of updating an information state with a sentence. Meanings of sentences, then, are update functions. In general, these are partial functions, since the possibility to update with a sentence may depend on the fulfillment of certain (...) constraints (presuppositions, the presence of antecedents for anaphora, etc.). It is important to note that context and interpretation are interdependent: the interpretation process depends on the context, `. (shrink)

Discussions often end before the issues that started them have been resolved. For example, in the late sixties and early seventies, a hot topic in philosophical logic was the development of an adequate semantics for the language of modal predicate logic. However, the result of this discussion was not one single system that met with general agreement, but a collection of alternative systems, each defended most ably by its proponents.

The aim of this paper is to argue that update semantics is a natural framework for contextually restricted quantification, and to illustrate its use in the analysis of anaphoric definite descriptions and certain other anaphoric terms.

The aim of this paper is to argue that update semantics is a natural framework for contextually restricted quantification, and to illustrate its use in the analysis of anaphoric definite descriptions and certain other anaphoric terms.

Our main concern in this paper is the semantics of predicates of personal taste. However, in order to see these predicates in the right perspective, we had to broaden the scope to the wider class of relative gradable adjectives. We present an analysis of the meaning of these adjectives in the framework of update semantics. In this framework the meaning of a sentence is not identified with its truth conditions, but with its impact on people’s intentional states. In (...) this respect, an important characteristic of relative gradable adjectives is the interplay between their evaluative features and people’s expectations. The dynamic set-up also makes it possible to model the interpretation of a relative gradable adjective without supposing that the context always supplies a ‘cut-off’ point determining its application, and to deal in a pragmatic way with situations in which the Sorites paradox arises. (shrink)

This first chapter contains an introduction to modal logic. In section 1.1 the syntactic side of the matter is discussed, and in section 1.2 the subject is approached from a semantic point of view.

This paper is on the update semantics for might of Veltman. Threeconsequence relations are introduced and studied in an abstract setting.Next we present sequent-style systems for each of the consequence relations.We show the logics to be complete and decidable. The paper ends with asyntactic cut elimination result.

The filtration method is often used to prove the finite model property of modal logics. We adapt this technique to the generalized Veltman semantics for interpretability logics. In order to preserve the defining properties of generalized Veltman models, we use bisimulations to define adequate filtrations. We give an alternative proof of the finite model property of interpretability logic with respect to Veltman models, and we prove the finite model property of the systems and with respect to (...) generalized Veltman models. (shrink)

Interpretability logic is an extension of provability logic. Veltman models and generalized Veltman models are two semantics for interpretability logic. We consider a connection between Veltman semantics and generalized Veltman semantics. We prove that for a complete image-finite generalized Veltman modelW there is a Veltman model W ′ that is bisimular to W.

This paper is an informal introduction to some aspects of dynamic semantics. It is a compilation of earlier reports on joint work with Frank Veltman. The opening section can also be found in Groenendijk et al. 1996a. Section 3 is drawn from Groenendijk et al. 1995a. Some of the discussion in section 4 derives from Groenendijk et al. 1996c.

In his original semantics for counterfactuals, David Lewis presupposed that the ordering of worlds relevant to the evaluation of a counterfactual admitted no incomparability between worlds. He later came to abandon this assumption. But the approach to incomparability he endorsed makes counterintuitive predictions about a class of examples circumscribed in this paper. The same underlying problem is present in the theories of modals and conditionals developed by Bas van Fraassen, Frank Veltman, and Angelika Kratzer. I show how to (...) reformulate all these theories in terms of lower bounds on partial preorders, conceived of as maximal antichains, and I show that treating lower bounds as cutsets does strictly better at capturing our intuitions about the semantics of modals, counterfactuals, and deontic conditionals. (shrink)

[Note 2015: Much of the content of these remarks has now been published in my paper "Presuppositions as Anaphoric Duality Enablers", Topoi.] This is the text of my comments on the project of dynamic semantics for the session on that topic at the Central Division APA meeting on April 21, 2007. The other speakers were Jeroen Groenendijk, Frank Veltman and Thony Gillies. I question the philosophical basis for dynamic semantics. My doubts have to do with the nature (...) of information states and the norms of semantics. I also question the data that inspire the project. In particular, I question the data concerning presupposition and the data concerning modal operators and conditionals. (shrink)

A generalized Veltman semantics developed by de Jongh is used to investigate correspondences between several extensions of intepretability logic . In this paper we present some new results on independences.

The article argues for a parallelism between the interpretation of deontic modals and the interpretation of counterfactuals. The main claim is that dependencies between facts play a role in the resolution of both types of modality: in both cases, facts ‘stand and fall’ together. The article provides two types of evidence supporting this claim: (i) evidence that comes from the interaction between primary and secondary duties (as presented in contrary-to-duty imperatives) and (ii) evidence that comes from the possibility of reproducing (...) well-known counterfactual puzzles in the domain of deontic statements. The article argues that the semantics of deontic modals needs to be stated in a way that pays attention to dependencies between facts and illustrates this with a proposal building on work on counterfactuals by Kratzer and Veltman. (shrink)

The interpretability logic of a mathematical theory describes the structural behavior of interpretations over that theory. Different theories have different logics. This paper revolves around the question what logic describes the behavior that is present in all theories with a minimum amount of arithmetic; the intersection over all such theories so to say. We denote this target logic by IL.In this paper we present a new principle R in IL. We show that R does not follow from the logic ILP0W* (...) that contains all previously known principles. This is done by providing a modal incompleteness proof of ILP0W*: showing that R follows semantically but not syntactically from ILP0W*. Apart from giving the incompleteness proof by elementary methods, we also sketch how to work with so-called Generalized Veltman Semantics as to establish incompleteness. To this extent, a new version of this Generalized Veltman Semantics is defined and studied. Moreover, for the important principles the frame correspondences are calculated.After the modal results it is shown that the new principle R is indeed valid in any arithmetically theory. The proof employs some elementary results on definable cuts in arithmetical theories. (shrink)

In this paper we shall define semantically some families of propositional modal logics related to the interpretability logic \(\mathbf{IL}\). We will introduce the logics \(\mathbf{BIL}\) and \(\mathbf{BIL}^{+}\) in the propositional language with a modal operator \(\square\) and a binary operator \(\Rightarrow\) such that \(\mathbf{BIL}\subseteq\mathbf{BIL}^{+}\subseteq\mathbf{IL}\). The logic \(\mathbf{BIL}\) is generated by the relational structures \(\left \), called basic frames, where \(\left \) is a Kripke frame and \(\left \) is a neighborhood frame. We will prove that the logic \(\mathbf{BIL}^{+}\) is generated (...) by the basic frames where the binary relation \(R\) is definable by the neighborhood relation \(N\) and, therefore, the neighborhood semantics is suitable to study the logic \(\mathbf{BIL}^{+}\) and its extensions. We shall also study some axiomatic extensions of \(\mathsf{\mathbf{BIL}}\) and we will prove that these extensions are sound and complete with respect to a certain classes of basic frames. Finally, we prove that the logic BIL+ and some of its extensions are complete respect with the class of neighborhood frames. (shrink)

Interpretability logic is a modal formalization of relative interpretability between first‐order arithmetical theories. Verbrugge semantics is a generalization of Veltman semantics, the basic semantics for interpretability logic. Bisimulation is the basic equivalence between models for modal logic. We study various notions of bisimulation between Verbrugge models and develop a new one, which we call w‐bisimulation. We show that the new notion, while keeping the basic property that bisimilarity implies modal equivalence, is weak enough to allow the (...) converse to hold in the finitary case. To do this, we develop and use an appropriate notion of bisimulation games between Verbrugge models. (shrink)

The notion of a critical successor [5] in relational semantics has been central to most classic modal completeness proofs in interpretability logics. In this paper we shall work with a more general notion, that of an assuring successor. This will enable more concisely formulated completeness proofs, both with respect to ordinary and generalised Veltman semantics. Due to their interesting theoretical properties, we will devote some space to the study of a particular kind of assuring labels, the so‐called (...) full labels and maximal labels. After a general treatment of assuringness, we shall apply it to obtain a completeness result for the modal logic w.r.t. generalised semantics for a restricted class of frames. (shrink)

Veltman’s test semantics and developments thereof reject the canon about semantic contents and attitude ascriptions in favor of dynamic alternatives. According to these theories the semantic content of a sentence is not a proposition, but a context change potential (CCP). Similarly, beliefs are not taken to be relations between agents and propositions, but agents and CCPs. These deviations from the canon come at the cost of an elegant explanation about the correctness of belief. Standardly, it is taken that (...) the content of a belief is correct just in case the content of that belief is true. The proponent of the test semantics cannot appeal to this explanation since they hold that certain contents, namely epistemically modalized contents, do not express propositions, and are neither true nor false. After motivating the need for an account of the correctness of belief within the dynamic framework, I argue that the few extant accounts in the literature are unsatisfactory. A novel account is proposed that avoids the problems of competing views. (shrink)

This paper deals with the truth conditions of conditional sentences. It focuses on a particular class of problematic examples for semantic theories for these sentences. I will argue that the examples show the need to refer to dynamic, in particular causal laws in an approach to their truth conditions. More particularly, I will claim that we need a causal notion of consequence. The proposal subsequently made uses a representation of causal dependencies as proposed in Pearl to formalize a causal notion (...) of consequence. This notion inserted in premise semantics for counterfactuals in the style of Veltman and Kratzer will provide a new interpretation rule for conditionals. I will illustrate how this approach overcomes problems of previous proposals and end with some remarks on remaining questions. (shrink)

We present a generalization of Segerberg's onion semantics for belief revision, in which the linearity of the spheres need not occur. The resulting logic is called broccoli logic. We provide a minimal relational logic, with a bi-modal neighborhood semantics. We then show that broccoli logic is a well-known conditional logic, the Burgess-Veltman minimal conditional logic.

A Kripke-style semantics developed by de Jongh and Veltman is used to investigate relations between several extensions of interpretability logic, IL.

It is a recurring mantra that epistemic must creates a statement that is weaker than the corresponding flat-footed assertion: It must be raining vs. It’s raining. Contrary to classic discussions of the phenomenon such as by Karttunen, Kratzer, and Veltman, we argue that instead of having a weak semantics, must presupposes the presence of an indirect inference or deduction rather than of a direct observation. This is independent of the strength of the claim being made. Epistemic must is (...) therefore quite similar to evidential markers of indirect evidence known from languages with rich evidential systems. We work towards a formalization of the evidential component, relying on a structured model of information states (analogous to some models used in the belief dynamics literature). We explain why in many contexts, one can perceive a lack of confidence on the part of the speaker who uses must. (shrink)

The idea of interpretability logics arose in Visser [Vis90]. He introduced the logics as extensions of the provability logic GLwith a binary modality. The arithmetic realization of A B in a theory T will be that T plus the realization of B is interpretable in T plus the realization of A. More precisely, there exists a function f on the formulas of the language of T such that T + B C implies T + A f.The interpretability logics were considered (...) in several papers. An arithmetic completeness of the interpretability logic ILM, obtained by adding Montagna ''s axiom to the smallest interpretability logic IL, was proved in Berarducci [Ber90] and Shavrukov [Sha88]. [Vis90] proved that the interpretability logic ILP, an extension of IL, is also complete for another arithmetic interpretation. The completeness with respect to Kripke semantics due to Veltman was, for IL, ILMand ILP, proved in de Jongh and Veltman [JV90]. The fixed point theorem of GLcan be extended to ILand hence ILMand ILP. The unary pendant "T interprets T + A" is much less expressive and was studied in de Rijke [Rij92]. For an overview of interpretability logic, see Visser [Vis97], and Japaridze and de Jongh [JJ98]. (shrink)

In this paper we introduce a theoretical framework and a logical application for analysing the semantics and pragmatics of contrastive conjunctions in natural language. It is shown how expressions like although, nevertheless, yet, and but are semantically definable as connectives using an operator for implication in natural language and how similar pragmatic principles affect the behaviour of both contrastive conjunctions and indicative conditionals. Following previous proposals, conditions on contrast in a conjunction are analysed as presuppositions of die conjunction. Further (...) linguistic evidence leads to a distinction between restrictive and non-restrictive connectives of contrast, and consequently between direct and indirect contrast, which are given a precise definition. A general interface for a theory of contrast using possible world semantics for implication is then presented. As a test case, we show how this interface is applicable to the semantics for conditionals that was introduced by Veltman in his article 'Data semantics and the pragmatics of indicative conditionals' (1986). This application yields an extension of Veltman's Data Logic, called Contrastive Data Logic Once appropriate modifications are added to Veltman's pragmatic considerations, we show that contrastive data logic provides an adequate tool for the analysis of substantial linguistic data concerning contrast and implication in natural language. (shrink)

Psychological experirnents have repeatedly shown that in judging the likelihood of uncertain events people do not follow the principles of probability theory. A notorious example is given by the so called conjunction fallacy. In this paper I argue that this fallacy is not really a fallacy when it is analysed in the light of a dynamic theory of default reasoning. The question that immediately rises is whether the fact that this theory conforms better to the way people actually think provides (...) a reason to prefer it to probability theory. (shrink)

In light of the impact of work on human flourishing, an intractable problem for political theorists concerns the distribution of meaningful work in a community of moral equals. This article reviews a number of partial solutions that a well-ordered society could draw upon to provide equality of opportunity for eudemonistically meaningful work and to minimize the impact of bad work upon those who perform it. Even in view of these solutions, however, it is not likely that opportunities for meaningful work (...) can be guaranteed for all people, which carries an implication that, even in well-ordered societies, it is likely that not all people will flourish. The author argues that the limitedness of meaningful work is not a reason to reject the normative claim that meaningful work is integral in flourishing, nor is it a reason against working to transform social and political institutions to increase opportunities for meaningful work. (shrink)

This book develops the view that meaningful work is central in human flourishing. The author defends a pluralistic account of what makes work meaningful, arguing that work can be meaningful in virtue of developing capabilities, supporting virtues, providing a purpose, or integrating elements of a worker's life.

In this paper the system IL for relative interpretability is studied.

The core language can be extended by defining additional logical constants. E.g., we can add ‘→’ (implication), ‘∨’ (disjunction), and ‘∀x’ (universal quantifiers). The choice of logical primitives is not as optional in DPL as it is in standard predicate logic.

Comparing the typologies of human activities developed by Beauvoir and Arendt, I argue that these philosophers share the same concept of labor as well as a similar insight that labor cannot provide a justification or evaluative measure for human life. But Beauvoir and Arendt think differently about work (as contrasted with labor), and Arendt alone illuminates the inability of constructive work to provide non-utilitarian value for human existence. Beauvoir, on the other hand, exceeds Arendt in examining the ethical implications of (...) our existential need for a plurality of free peers in a public realm. (shrink)

Voorzover het maken van kopieën uit deze uitgave is toegestaan op grond van artikel 16B Auteurswet 1912 j0 het Besluit van 20 juni 1974, St.b. 351, zoals gewijzigd bij het Besluit van 23 augustus 1985, St.b. 471 en artikel 17 Auteurswet 1912, dient men de daarvoor wettelijk verschuldigde vergoedingen te voldoen aan de Stichting Reprorecht (Postbus 882, 1180 AW Amstelveen). Voor het overnemen van gedeelte(n) uit deze uitgave in bloemlezingen, readers en andere compilatiewerken (artikel 16 Auteurswet 1912) dient men zich (...) tot de uitgever te wenden. (shrink)

Evil, Political Violence and Forgiveness: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card is a collection of new philosophical essays written in tribute to Claudia Card, exploring her leading theory of evil and other theories of evil. The collection brings together an international cohort of distinguished moral and political philosophers who mediate with Card upon an array of twentieth-century atrocities and on the nature of evil actions, persons and institutions.

This collection of new essays examines philosophical issues at the intersection of feminism and autonomy studies. Are autonomy and independence useful goals for women and subordinate persons? Is autonomy possible in contexts of social subordination? Is the pursuit of desires that issue from patriarchal norms consistent with autonomous agency? How do emotions and caring relate to autonomous deliberation? Contributors to this collection answer these questions and others, advancing central debates in autonomy theory by examining basic components, normative commitments, and applications (...) of conceptions of autonomy. Several chapters look at the conditions necessary for autonomous agency and at the role that values and norms -- such as independence, equality, inclusivity, self-respect, care and femininity -- play in feminist theories of autonomy. Whereas some contributing authors focus on dimensions of autonomy that are internal to the mind -- such as deliberative reflection, desires, cares, emotions, self-identities and feelings of self-worth -- several authors address social conditions and practices that support or stifle autonomous agency, often answering questions of practical import. These include such questions as: What type of gender socialization best supports autonomous agency and feminist goals? When does adapting to severely oppressive circumstances, such as those in human trafficking, turn into a loss of autonomy? How are ideals of autonomy affected by capitalism? and How do conceptions of autonomy inform issues in bioethics, such as end-of-life decisions, or rights to bodily self-determination? (shrink)

On the surface, it is not clear whether the ordinary citizen in Plato’s Republic possesses the virtue of justice defended in the dialogue. In order to resolve a tension in Plato’s treatment of the ordinary citizen, this paper presents a distinction between the civic justice of the ordinary citizen and the platonic justice of the philosopher. Whereas the justice possessed by the philosopher requires knowledge of the good as well as a reason-governed soul, civic justice requires only true beliefs about (...) justice and a habit or practice of just action. (shrink)

Both Aristotle and Kant note that the highest form of friendship enables individuals of good virtue to reveal themselves to one another. I argue that Aristotle and Kant emphasize complementary aspects of self-disclosure in friendship: whereas Kant acknowledges the inherent value of self-disclosure in friendship, Aristotle suggests that joint perception in friendship is instrumentally valuable in the acquisition of self-knowledge. I also argue that although Aristotle has a more developed account of friendship, Kant advances a superior account of self-disclosure in (...) friendship in his later remarks on friendship in the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue. (shrink)